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The State of the Parties in a Polarized Nation
Daniel J. Coffey and John C. Green

The 2004 campaign was among the most holly contested in American
history. Following the bitter 2000 election, both of the major political parties
expected another close battle. In some respects, each party returned to older
forms of campaigning, focusing on grassroots mobilization, but with new
methods. The Democrats, stung by the events that took place in Florida in
2000, conducted nationwide get-out-the-vote drives with special help from
interest group allies. Meanwhile the Republicans organized a voter canvass
that reached down to the precincts using modem targeting and communication techniques. On election night, 60 percent of Americans turned out to
vote, the highest percentage since 1968. This surge in participation produced
a closely divided result, with a very narrow majority for the Republicans.
The critical role of political parties in generating these results suggests
that the era of party decline has long since passed. Party scholars argue that
it is no coincidence that a more active and vibrant party system has led to
greater levels of citizen participation. Of course, the resurgence of parties
leads to a new set of questions. Has there been a fundamental change in the
party system? Have changes in campaign finance law changed the role of
parties and their interest groups allies in campaigns? Will the parties put as
much effort into grassroots mobilization in future elections? Has the public
become too polarized? Can government institutions function well under
these circumstances?
This collection of essays is the fifth in the series that assesses the state
of the parties after a presidential election (the earlier editions were Shea and
Green 1994; Green and Shea 1996, 1999; and Green and Farmer 2003). In
this volume, a group of prominent and emerging scholars examines the state
of the parties from a variety of perspectives. Overall, research on political
parties often is subsumed by other issues, such as legislative studies, public
opinion research, and studies of campaign finance and elections. As the following chapters show, however, political parties are vibrant institutions, central to all these aspects of politics in a functioning democracy. As such, political parties are worthy of study in their own right.
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Here we break down the study of parties into six sections: the party system, party resources, party activities, minor parties, partisanship in the public, and the party in government. Before we do, so, however, it is useful to
review the 2004 election.

The Election of 2004
Once again, the 2004 presidential election came down to a few battleground states, with twelve states decided by less than 5 percent of the vote.
To the surprise of many, Florida, the center of the controversy in the 2000,
election, backed George W. Bush with 52 percent of the vote. Instead, Ohio
was the deciding state. The vote count was not as close as Florida in 2000
and the balloting controversies were settled fairly quickly. With victories in
Ohio, Iowa, and New Mexico, Bush won with 286 electoral votes and was
reelected to a second term.
In the end, 2004 was a banner year for the GOP, reinforcing its victory
in the 2002 midterm elections. Bush became the first president since his
father in 1988 to win more than 50 percent of the popular vote. In all, the
GOP picked up four Senate seats, to bring their margin to 55- 45, and three
House seats, increasing their margin of control to 232- 202. The Republicans then had more seats in Congress than at any time since 1948. Bush
entered his second term in office with his party controlling the Congress,
something that had eluded Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan when they
were reelected.
A Durable Republican Majority?

These results lead to the larger historical questions: Has the Republican
Party become the majority party in the United States? Has a partisan realignment occurred? Many observers answer with a qualified yes. Since 1994,
Republicans have consistently won elections at all levels of government.
They have constructed strong and effective party organizations. The minor
party agitation of the 1990s has declined, largely to their benefit. Despite
some scholars' predictions of an "emerging Democratic majority" (Judis
and Teixeira 2002), the Republicans also have gained parity with the Democrats in the allegiance of the voters, doing surprisingly well among many
Democratic groups in the electorate, including Hispanics, women, and
Roman Catholics. And they have governed in a consistently conservative
fashion, despite great controversy and fierce opposition.
However, other observers are still skeptical of a Republican realignment.
Despite the party's successes, the Unites States is still a "fifty-fifty nation,"
with Bush winning just over 50 percent of the popular vote. The Republican
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party organizations have no monopoly on new resources and techniques, and
some of the most innovative features of the 2004 campaign came from the
Democrats and their allies. A polarized public shows no inclination to
strongly embrace the Republicans, and it contains huge pockets of discontent. Although polls have shown time and again that the public believes the
Republicans can do a better job dealing with terrorism, the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent War on Terror have not appeared
to have caused a mass realignment as the Great Depression did. This is in
part due to the Bush administration's aggressive antiterrorism policies. As
evidence of this, nearly 40 percent of citizens in a January 2006 Gallup poll
felt that the Bush administration had gone too far in restricting individual
liberties to fight terrorism. President Bush has, not surprisingly, remained a
highly polarizing figure.
Moreover, the Republican margins in government are also razor thin. For
example, the GOP's historic majority of 232 seats in the House of Representatives would have been the smallest Democratic majority in their long period of control from 1954 to 1994. And after the 2004 election, each of the
major parties held exactly 3,657 state legislative seats (National Conference
of Stale Legislatures 2005). And as the Republicans discovered in 2005 and
2006, unified party control is a double-edged sword. When one party holds
the reins of government, it is more likely to be held accountable for the problems that occur under its watch.
Along these lines, a number of scandals in 2005 appear to place the
Democrats in an advantageous position going into 2006. Fundraising scandals, ties to corrupt lobbyists, the administration's slow response to the catastrophic Hurricane Katrina (contrasting so sharply with the administration's
quick response to 9/11 ), and revelations of domestic spying by the National
Security Agency all threaten the GOP's majority party status.
Democrats will nevertheless face an uphill battle to regain control of
Congress in 2006. This is especially true given Republican control of the
redistricting process in several states. As Jacobson (2005a, 165) points out,
after the 2000 census, the GOP managed to gain fifteen congressional seats
in states where Republicans directed the redistricting process through partisan gerrymandering. Democrats are still plagued by fighting between centrists and progressives over the direction of the party, especially in how it
responds to President Bush's policies. Moreover, although scholars continue
to debate the significance of the Republicans' success in the 1994 midterm
elections, a Democratic sweep in 2006 or 2008 may not necessarily presage
the end of Republican dominance. In fact, mid-realignment breaks, when the
out-party gets a few years in power, appear to occur with some regularity . 1
Clearly, however, the 2006 midterm elections and the 2008 presidential
contests will be important tests of a durable Republican majority. Signifi-
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cantly, as the first presidential election since 1928 without a sitting president
or vice president on the ballot, the 2008 nomination could lead to one of the
most divisive primary seasons in years for both parties.

New Finance Rules
The 2004 elections were the first campaign to operate under the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) and its new finance
rules. BCRA banned "soft money," otherwise illegal contributions raised by
the political parties, and it set limits on "issue advocacy" broadcast spending
paid for by corporate or union treasury funds within sixty days of a general
election. While the hope of most reformers was to reduce the amount of
money in politics, BCRA appeared to have little influence on the overall
amount raised and spent, as the major parties took advantage of higher contribution limits and Internet fundraising to raise additional "hard money"
donations. In fact, the Democratic and Republican National Committees
raised more hard money in 2004 than hard and soft money combined in
2000.
BCRA did, however, have a major impact on how money was raised and
spent. Even without soft money, parties were able to spend unlimited funds
on uncoordinated expenditures. Meanwhile, interest groups turned to "527
committees"-advocacy organizations falling under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code-to raise and spend unregulated funds. Here, the new
restrictions on issue advocacy meant that such spending occurred prior to the
sixty-day blackout before the election or went into nonbroadcast expenditures such as direct mail and grassroots activities. All told, the 527 committees raised and spent nearly $600 million in the 2004 election (Curriander
2005, 123).
Democrats appeared to benefit the most from the 527 committees, reflecting their historic disadvantage in raising hard money. The highly polarized context of the election led to the formation of new groups supporting
and opposing President Bush. On the Democratic side, America Coming Together, the Media Fund, and MoveOn.org were three of the most prominent
(Curriander 2005, 123). These and other progressive groups were part of a
broader coalition, America Votes, designed to coordinate such campaigning.
On the Republican side, prominent 527 committees included Progress for
America and Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. The latter made charges against
John Kerry's Vietnam service that had an impact on the outcome.
These innovations were part of the extraordinary voter mobilization on
both sides. But 2004 was a major disappointment for the Democrats. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the dramatic increase in turnout did little to
help the party. Moreover, Kerry's campaign, which raised more money than
any other Democratic campaign in history, lost its edge to the Bush cam-
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paign where the Democrats have traditionally been strongest: at the grass
roots.
These organizational innovations are in a state of flux and thus are important factors to watch in the upcoming campaigns.
A Polarized Electorate

In 2004, the electorate was polarized, a fact captured somewhat crudely
in the distinction between "red" (Republican) and "blue" (Democratic)
states. However, the switch of Iowa and New Mexico to the Republican column and New Hampshire to the Democratic means that the Electoral College
map is now almost as neatly segmented as it was in the election of 1896.
Thus, region has reappeared as a feature of national politics. Democratic
strongholds are now relegated to the Northeast, Upper Midwest, and Pacific
Coast, while the Republican bastions include the South, Plains and Mountain
states, and Lower Midwest. The South is critical to this new regionalism,
having completed its long movement from a Democratic- to a Republicandominated region. As Nelson (2005, 5) points out, President Bush became
the first president since Franklin Roosevelt to win more than 1,000 Southern
counties in consecutive elections.
These regional differences mirror a sharp division in voter preferences.
After the 2004 election, a popular political cartoon joked that the blue states
should secede from the nation and join the "United States of Canada," while
the red states were dubbed "Jesus Land." This joke reflects important differences in the values of many Americans. To the surprise of many observers,
the 2004 exit polls found "moral values" to be the central concern of a plurality of voters (22 percent). This concern should not be overstated, however,
because "moral values" was only marginally more important than the war
in Iraq (15 percent), terrorism (19 percent), and the economy and jobs (20
percent).: But it does suggest that cultural disputes have become an important part of the political agenda. A good example is the role of same-sex
marriage in the 2004 campaign, during which anti-same-sex marriage
amendments passed in eleven states, including the battleground states of
Ohio, Michigan, and Oregon (Donovan et al. 2005).
The "moral values" voters reflected a growing difference between secular and religious Americans. According to exit polls, 78 percent of white
born-again Protestants- making up 23 percent of the electorate-voted for
Bush in 2004. Just as important, the religious versus secular divide appeared
to grow in 2004. Church attendance was significantly related to Bush support; 61 percent of those attending church weekly voted for Bush, compared
to only 36 percent of those who never attend and 47 percent who report they
attend services only occasionally. One of the biggest differences was a
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"marriage gap." Married people voted at a rate of 57 percent for Bush (up
from compared 53 percent in 2000), while only 40 percent of singles did so.
These regional, issue, and demographic differences produced an extraordinary partisan division in 2004: 93 percent of self-identified Republicans
voted for Bush and 89 percent of self-identified Democrats backed Kerry.
The independents broke almost evenly (48 percent for Bush to 49 percent
for Kerry).3

The Party System
Part I of this book considers the state of the broader party system in this
highly polarized electorate. In chapter 2, James Reichley argues that American party alignments operate on sixty- to seventy-year cycles, as opposed to
the more typical thirty-year realigning cycles. From this perspective, the
1990s were a realigning period in which the Republicans tentatively replaced
the Democrats as the nation's majority party. Reichley sorts through the
complexities of the 2004 campaign and concludes that the Republicans may
well become the normal majority party. Thus, 2004 reveals the operations of
a new party system.
According to Howard Reiter in chapter 3, the sharp partisan divisions
of the present era have dampened intraparty factionalism. Reiter points out,
however, that this does not mean the end of party factions. Like "old war
wounds," these divisions remain latent within the major party coalitions. So,
for example, Howard Dean's candidacy revived the division between centrist
and liberal Democrats, and the war in Iraq may presage a cleavage between
conservative and moderate Republicans. Regional differences are a critical
factor in such factions, which may play a crucial role in the 2008 presidential
nomination contests.
Chapter 4 turns to the " state of party elites," where John Jackson, Nate
Bigelow, and John Green analyze the attitudes of national party convention
delegates between 1992 and 2004. They find strong and systematic differences between Democratic and Republican delegates over the period. These
cleavages were especially deep on the social welfare questions, reinforced
by cultural and foreign policy disagreements. At the same time, however,
there was a consolidation of factions with the parties, so that in 2004 a centrist faction played a dominant role in each party- the "New Democrats"
and the "Moderate Republicans," respectively. These factions have a clear
regional character as well.
This polarization of party activists also extends to state political parties.
In chapter 5, Daniel J. Coffey analyzes the ideological content of state party
platforms and finds sharp differences between the Democrats and Republicans. Importantly, this study finds almost no link between the ideology of
state party platforms and median public opinion. Instead, the issue polariza-
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tion is strongly related to the views of party activists and political competition. While this ideological coherence strengthens state party coalitions in
important respects, Coffey's analysis shows that parties may be in danger of
losing popular support if ideologically motivated activists take the parties
too far from the political center.

Party Resources
Part 2 turns to party resources, where there were major innovations in
2004. In chapter 6, Diana Dwyre, Eric Heberlig, Robin Kolodny, and Bruce
Larson demonstrate that the new campaign finance laws did not reduce national party committee finances because the parties found new ways to raise
and spend money. They were able raise record amounts of "hard dollar"
contributions and incumbent members of Congress became a significant
source of party funds. They also found new ways to spend a record amount
of money in campaigns, including the expansion of independent expenditures on behalf of candidates. However, these trends did not increase competition in congressional elections and they raise troubling questions about the
role of money in politics.
In chapter 7, Ray La Raja, Susan Orr, and Daniel Smith find that the
new campaign finance laws had a similar effect on state party finances. State
parties actually raised more "hard money" in 2004 than in 2000, and in battleground states, the parties increased candidate support for mobilizing voters. However, in nonbattleground states, the state parties were less able to
carry out voter mobilization efforts. Indeed, the national laws appear to have
had less of an impact on state parties than the electoral and legal context of
the state. The import of local circumstances makes the long-term impact of
the federal campaign finance laws far from clear.
The 2004 campaign also saw innovations in the campaign spending of
interest groups. David Magleby, Quin Monson, and Kelly Patterson explore
these developments in chapter 8 with their analysis of America Votes (AV),
a coalition of thirty-two progressive interest groups that sought to coordinate
their campaign efforts. Some of the AV members were 527 committees
newly minted to take advantage of the latest campaign finance laws; the best
known of these committees was America Coming Together. This analysis
finds that AV behaved much like coalitions of lobbying groups, allowing its
members to specialize in particular activities. Whether this innovation will
persist in 2008 is unclear.
One of the most interesting aspects of the 2004 election was Howard
Dean's presidential nomination campaign. Dubbed the first "Internet campaign," it has implications beyond the 2004 election-especially because
Dean became the chairman of the Democratic National Committee in 2005.
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In chapter 9, Scott Keeter, Cary Funk, and Courtney Kennedy report on an
innovative survey of Dean's campaign volunteers. The "Deaniacs" were to
the left of the general population and rank-and-file Democrats on many issues but were quite similar to other liberals. The impact of technology in
mobilizing new resources from distinctive party factions could dramatically
alter party politics in the future.

Party Activities
Part 3 reports on the operation of political parties circa the 2004 election. In chapter I 0, Peter Ubertaccio explores Republican efforts to
strengthen their grassroots party organization. Ubertaccio shows that the Republicans successfully applied the techniques of "multilevel marketing"
(MLM) companies, such as Amway, to improve their ability to register and
tum out voters. The best example was the "72-Hour Task Force" that allowed Republicans to match the traditional Democratic get-out-the-vote advantage in 2002 and 2004. Ubertaccio argues that MLM techniques represent a new model of local parties that relies on neither patronage-based nor
consultant-driven organizations. The Bush campaign employed this approach successfully in 2004 and the Democrats may pursue it in the future.
The Democrats and their allies opted for another approach in the 2004,
mixing new and old grassroots techniques. In chapter 11, Melanie Blumberg,
William Binning, and John Green offer a case study of this campaign in Mahoning County, Ohio, a crucial Democratic stronghold. Here they detail the
impressive grassroots efforts of America Coming Together, organized labor,
the Kerry campaign, and Democratic Party organizations. The study concludes that the inability of the Democratic campaign to coordinate the diverse elements of the campaign proved costly on Election Day, and furthermore, the new campaign finance laws contributed to the "uncoordinated"
campaign.
In chapter 12, David Dulio and R. Sam Garrett report on the continued
professionalization of party organizations by reviewing the relationship between campaign consultants and state party operatives. Using a new measure
of state party organizational strength, they find that consultants are allies of
state parties rather than adversaries. The latter view is advanced by not only
some scholars but also some party activists, as demonstrated by Howard
Dean's critique of professionalized politics as chair of the Democratic National Committee. Dulio and Garrett demonstrate that, in fact, consultants
and parties perform complementary roles in the campaign process, and both
weak and strong parties benefit from their specialized services.
Dan Shea and John Green turn to a study of local party activities and the
mobilization of young voters in chapter 12. Although local party organiza-
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tions have experienced gains in organizational strength in recent times, it is
far from clear that they are effectively connecting with young voters- who
are, after all, critical to the parties' future success. This failure is due primarily to the perception that youth mobilization is too difficult and to a lack of
innovative outreach. The authors argue that local parties can contribute to
rejuvenating political participation in the United States by successfully
reaching out to the youth vote.
Minor Parties
As discussed in part 4, minor party candidates had a negligible direct
effect on the presidential election in 2004, unlike 1992 and 1996, when Ross '
Perot was on the ballot, or 2000, when Ralph Nader made a difference. However, in chapter 14, Ronald Rapoport and Walter Stone demonstrate that the
Perot phenomenon continued to matter to the major party coalitions. Reporting on an innovative twelve-year panel study of Perot activists, they find that
the Republican success between 1994 and 2004 was due in part lo the support of these individuals. This pattern aptly illustrates the "dynamic of third
parties," whereby the major parties bid for the support of a successful minor
party's constituency in subsequent elections. Interestingly, they find that
these Perotistas have become disenchanted with the Republicans under President Bush and may be available to the Democrats in 2008.
In chapter 15, Christian Collet and Jerrold Hansen report on the desultory Nader campaign of 2004. Nader's shunning of the Green Party in 2004
damaged its prospects of becoming a viable minor party, while Nader's increasing shrill populism harmed his own reputation. Due to the memories of
the bitterly contested 2000 election, Nader's core supporters in 2000liberals in the Mountain West and New England-deserted him in favor of
Kerry. The Nader 2004 supporters amounted to a disparate set of alienated
voters of various sorts rather than the progressive constituency of 1992 and
1996. The authors are pessimistic about the prospects for an effective thirdparty candidate in the present period of party polarization.
Partisanship and the Public
Part 5 reviews the "party-in-the-electorate" or "party-in-elections"
(Aldrich 1995). In chapter 16, David Kimball and Cassie Gross examine the
much-debated polarization of the mass electorate. They note an important
psychological aspect of polarization, an "us versus them" mentality, missed
by other analyses of the electorate. President Bush was a highly polarizing
political figure, aided and abetted by the mobilizing activities of party elites
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and their interest group allies. Party polarization was concentrated among
the most partisan and attentive citizens. It will be interesting to see if this
level of polarization persists in the 2008 election.
In chapter 17, John R. Petrocik helps explain this polarized electorate by
looking at the components of the major party coalitions. He argues that the
core values of a party are largely determined by the social characteristics of
the groups that make up each party's coalition, and he shows how the Democratic and Republican coalitions have changed since the New Deal era. A
key difference is the increased importance of religious commitment in 2004.
As a consequence, cultural issues were important enough in the minds of
many voters to trump economic and foreign policy issues. Thus, contemporary parties represent a significantly different alignment of social groups
than those of a generation ago.
Kyle Saunders and Alan Abramowitz offer another insight into voter polarization in chapter 18: the electorate has become more ideological. They
argue that voters' self-identified ideology is a far more powerful force in
determining partisan identification and that it has become more so over time.
In their view, this ideological cleavage in the vote is a product of citizens'
rational assessment of each party's policies, which have grown increasingly
distinctive. This high level of consistency between citizens' policy assessments and partisan leanings suggests that the current era of polarized politics
will continue in the future.
In chapter 19, Jeffrey Stonecash explores the conventional wisdom that
the public has become more conservative in this era of partisan polarization.
He shows that there is only modest evidence that the citizenry has adopted
more conservative views. Instead, he finds that conservatives have become
more concentrated in the Republican Party, reducing its internal divisions
and producing a more unified conservative posture. While Stonecash analyzes only the GOP, the same may be true of the Democrats, where liberals
have become highly concentrated as well.

Party in Government
Part 6 considers party in government. In chapter 20, Richard Skinner
argues that scholars need to reevaluate the role of partisanship in the White
House. He argues for a "partisan presidency" that stands in sharp contrast
to the "modern presidency" of the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, since the
New Deal, the presidency has largely been independent of the parties, as
each president seeks to enact a personal agenda. For Skinner, the partisan
presidents include Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, but especially George W.
Bush. Bush's aggressive campaigns for congressional Republicans, strongly
partisan legislative agenda, and overtly partisan administrative practices
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have produced something like unified party government in Washington, D.C.
Whether this kind of party unity will persist in the future remains to be seen.
There is no greater exemplar of party polarization than the House of
Representatives. In chapter 21, Lawrence Butler argues that scholars need a
better understanding of the role of the leadership within the House in enforcing party unity. Scholars, he argues, need to distinguish between party unity
and party effectiveness in passing legislation. After the Republican "revolution" of 1994, a more centralized leadership was implemented. This new
order may well have allowed the GOP to pass legislation despite the very
narrow Republican margin of control of the body. This leadership will be
tested during President Bush's second term.
In chapter 22, Shannon Jenkins, Doug Roscoe, John Frendreis, and Alan
Gitelson offer an evaluation of the key 1994 election-which put the GOP
in charge of the U.S. Congress and many state governments-from the perspective of a decade later. Contrary to some early assessments, these authors
show that the election was indeed significant, with sudden Republican gains
that largely persisted ten years afterward. However, this dramatic change had
two parts. In the South, the I 994 election was the result of steady Republican
gains, but in the North it was a sudden surge. The authors conclude that the
Republican gains created a new partisan equilibrium in national politics.
In chapter 23, David Ryden analyzes the role of the U.S. Supreme Court
in determining the state of the parties. The Court has shown an increasing
willingness to rule on nearly every aspect of the electoral process, including
redistricting and campaign finance reform, two areas Ryden reviews in detail. In this regard, the Courts for political parties operate in and outside of
government. Ryden argues, however, that the Court has yet to develop a
clear doctrine of regarding political parties to guide its deliberations. Thus,
its decisions are frequently problematic for the functioning of a democratic
politics. In this final chapter, the book comes full circle: the laws the Courts
develop are a key feature of the broader party system.

Unanswered Questions
These essays leave a number of questions on the table about the state of
the parties in the near future. Among the most important are:
• Will the GOP cement its role as the majority party? Or will the Democrats stage a comeback? Will the party system return to an even match
in partisan terms?
·
• Will the parties maintain strong and vital organizations? How will
state parties perform in the long run without soft money? Will interest
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•

•

•

•

group coalitions such as America Votes and 527 committees such as
America Coming Together continue to matter?
Will the parties continue to make concerted efforts to mobilize citizens at the grass roots? If party competition dies down, will voter
turnout decline as well? Will local parties seek to find new supporters,
especially among the young?
Have we seen the end of important third-party movements, or will
third-party support reemerge if public disapproval for the parties
rises?
With 2008 approaching, will the departure of President Bush from the
White House reduce the polarization of the voters? Will regional divisions persist and will cultural differences remain a part of the political
agenda?
How well will government institutions perform in a polarized politics?
Will the partisan presidency endure or pass away? How will the
Courts regulate the political process?
Notes

I. In previous realignment cycles, the minority party has managed to win brief but unified control of the fcder.1I government: the Whigs in 1841- 1843, the Democrats in 1893- 1894
and again in 1913- 1917, and the Republicans in 1953- 1954. On two other occasions, the
minority party has managed to win control of both houses of Congress: the Democrats in
1879- 1880 and the Republicans in 1948- 1949.
2. Exit poll data from CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/rcsults/
statcs/US/P/00/cpolls.0.html.
3. Ibid.
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The Future of the American Two-Party System
in the Twenty-First Century
A. James Reicl,/ey

American political parties are back. After several decades in which they
were variously pronounced "weakened by years of neglect" (Broder 1971 ),
"mere jousting grounds for embattled politicians" (Bums 1973). afflicted
by "a massive loss of public confidence" (Burnham 1982), "in disarraymore so than at any time in the last century" (Keefe 1988), replaced by
"the news and publicity media as primary organizers of citizen action and
legitimizers of public decisions" (Polsby and Wildavsky 1988), and "in a
late stage of a century-long decline" (Shafer 2003), parties are once more
at the very heart of American politics, thriving, unified, well financed, and
shaping voter decisions.
During the 1990s there were growing signs of party revival. Party unity
on roll-call voting in Congress rose steadily throughout the decade (Pomper
2003). National party organizations raised and spent unprecedented campaign war chests (Corrado, Barclay, and Gouvea 2003). Party loyalty in elections increased, and ticket splitting sharply declined (Ceaser and Busch 2001;
Hetherington 200 I). By the end of the decade L. Sandy Maisel (1999) found
parties once more "the vital linking institution" in American government.
As the new century began, some thoughtful political analysts, while welcoming the resurgence of party activity, continued to question the staying
power of parties as effective forces in national politics. "The role of parties
in elections," Maisel warned, "remains in doubt." John Kenneth White and
Daniel Shea observed that parties still had failed "to reestablish their connection with the voters" (2000).
During the first term of President George W. Bush, however, both major
national parties achieved increased organizational strength and appeared to
tighten their grips on voter loyalties. In Congress, both parties- particularly
the dominant Republicans- were "cohesive and elaborately organized"
(Sinclair 2002). In the House of Representatives, committee leaders were
"more accountable to their party colleagues," and the Republican majority
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leadership exerted tighter procedural control than at any time since Speaker
Joseph Cannon was stripped of some of his powers in 1910. In the Senate,
power remained more diffuse, and the filibuster weapon restricted the majority's freedom to act, but party unity on roll-call votes continued to be high.
In the 2004 presidential election, 93 percent of Republicans and 89 percent of Democrats voted for the candidates of their respective parties-both
figures unprecedented highs since modem polling began measuring the electorate. In voting for the House of Representatives, 91 percent of Republicans
and 88 percent of Democrats cast ballots for their party's candidate-both
also record highs in modern polling (White 2004). Only 14 percent of congressional districts elected House members from a different party than had
carried them for president. About 25 percent of voters told pollsters on Election Day they regarded themselves as independents, but many of these in
recent elections have consistently supported one party or the other. The 2004
National Election Study found that only 5 percent of those who actually
voted were "pure independents," down from 7 percent in 2000. National
turnout rose to 61 percent-the highest level since 1968.
Contrary to predictions by many analysts (including me), enactment of
the 2002 McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform act did little to undermine the fundraising capacities of national parties. While prohibited from
receiving unlimited corporate, union, or individual contributions-so-called
soft money-both national parties in 2004 broke previous records in fundraising. The Democratic National Committee for the first time in recent history actually raised slightly more than the Republican National Committee,
although overall the campaign of Bush and his Republican supporters
slightly outspent Senator John Kerry and the Democrats-$1.14 billion to
$1.08 billion (Federal Election Commission 2005b; Malbin 2006).
Modem national parties are, of course, far different from the parties of
fifty years ago-more centralized, less based on patronage and more on ideology, more linked to high-priced political consultants and professional fundraisers. Halfway through the first decade of the new century, the cry of most
reformers, media critics, and much of the public is not that parties are too
weak but that they have become too strong, splitting the nation into bitterly
polarized ideological camps, blocking compromise and cooperation in Congress, and favoring ideological extremes at the expense of the neglected
middle.
Nevertheless, contemporary American political parties appear to come
close, at least structurally, to the model proposed by the famous 1950 American Political Science Association report urging a "more responsible twoparty system" (see Green and Hermson 2002). As called for by the report,
parties in the early years of the new century offer voters a genuine choice,
more focused on policy alternatives than on ancient prejudices, and the majority party through congressional enactment or executive order is able to
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implement a large part of its program. If the political outcome so far is not
exactly what many of the reformers had in mind, the party system may simply be giving expression to underlying currents in American democracy.

An Enduring Two-Party System
Strengthened parties have continued to function within the traditional
two-party system that goes back at least to the years immediately after the
Civil War and is rooted in party differences that emerged during George
Washington's first term. The uprising of third parties in the 1990s that
brought Ross Perot 19 percent of the popular vote in the 1992 presidential
election (though no electoral votes) has for now largely subsided. Thirdparty candidates for president, including Ralph Nader, received less than I
percent of the popular vote in 2004. The Congress elected in 2004 included
only one member in the House not of a major party (Socialist Bernard Sanders of Vermont) and one in the Senate (Independent James Jeffords, also of
Vermont), both of whom received committee assignments from their body's
Democratic caucus.
Why has the two-party system, which in its rigor is almost unique in
modem developed democracies, persisted so long in the United States? Maurice Duverger pointed out many years ago (in his formulation known as Du verger's Law) that polities maintaining single-member, first-past-the-post systems of election- principally the United States and Great Britain and some
of its dominions- tend to promote the development of two major parties
whose candidates have a real chance of winning elections (Duverger 1954).
Even polities such as Britain, Canada, and Australia, however, which
like the United States use the first-past-the-post system, have generally had
at least one significant minor party represented in parliament alongside the
two major ones. Why have enduring minor parties with substantial impacts
been so rare in the United States?
The first-past-the-post election system pushes us toward a two-party political system. But the constitutional factor that really has kept the system
locked in place has been the institution of the Electoral College for choosing
presidents.
Quite contrary to the intentions of the founders, almost all of whom
hated parties, the Electoral College, as long as most states retain the at-large
system for choosing electors, heavily favors the presidential nominees of the
two major parties that can pile up large blocs of electoral votes in heavily
populated states. The system even makes it improbable that a minor party
could hold the balance of power between the two major parties, as has sometimes occurred in Britain and Canada.
Constitutional change to eliminate the Electoral College would entail a
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political effort that is not likely to be forthcoming. The less populated states
benefit from being constitutionally overrepresented in the College (each state
receives the combined total of its members in the Senate and the House),
while the more populous states gain political clout from the at-large system
of choosing electors. Together these interests maintain a formidable barrier
against change.
The high visibility of the presidential election shapes the structure of our
entire political system. As long as the Elector.ii College confines the real
presidential competition to the candidates of the two major parties, the
United States will probably continue to have a two-party system in most congressional and state elections.
Reinforcing the effects of the Electoral College and first-past-the-post
elections, representatives of the two major parties have taken pains to enact
state election laws that strongly advantage major-party candidates. In Pennsylvania, for example, major-party candidates for the state senate need only
2,000 signatures on petitions to get their names on the ballot, whereas independent or minor party candidates require 29,000 (reduced from 56,000 by
court order).
A major national calamity or conflict might lead to the creation of a new
major party, as the struggle over slavery gave birth to the Republicans in the
1850s. Barring such a catastrophe, though, it is probable not only that we
will continue to have a two-party system but also that the Republicans and
the Democrats will be the main contestants. After all, even the Great Depression of the 1930s failed to make enduring cracks in the two traditional major
parties' shared monopoly of political power.
Why have the Democrats and the Republicans endured for so long as
main beneficiaries of constitutional and statutory factors favoring a twoparty system? There may be something to W. S. Gilbert's observation in
Iolanthe:

That every boy and every gal
That's born into this world alive,
Is either a little liberal,
Or else a little conserva-tive.
Democrats and Republicans, if this formulation is correct, may represent an
inherent division of humankind between natural liberals and natural conservatives.
More specifically to American experience, I have elsewhere argued that
Republicans and Democrats embody traditions of values and interests that
have competed for national political power since the very beginning of
American history (Reichley 2000). One- which I call the republican tradition, coming down along a line from the Federalists and the Whigs to the
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modern Republicans- has emphasized social order, economic growth
through market capitalism, and religion-based morality. The other-the liberal tradition, proceeding from the Jeffersonian Republicans to the modern
Democrats- has emphasized social equality, economic sharing, and strict
separation between church and stale. Both traditions-distinguishing them
from feudal and socialist traditions in Europe-have championed personal
freedom: the republican tradition accentuating economic freedom and the
liberal tradition stressing freedom of expression. In foreign policy, both traditions have had nationalist and internationalist wings.

Throwing the Rascals Out
In earlier editions of this volume, I have theorized that alternations in
national control by parties representing the rival ideological traditions have
roughly followed two patterns of political cycles. I will here briefly summarize how these cycles have operated before discussing what clues they may
give on possible developments in national politics as the twenty-first century
unfolds.
The first pattern is a series of short cycles that is relatively simple and
rises pretty clearly from the empirical data. These are what may be called
"throw the rascals out" cycles. After a party has held the presidency at the
national level or the governorship at the state level (increasingly even in what
used to be thought of as one-party states) for two or three terms (eight to
twelve years), voters tend to grow dissatisfied or bored with the party in
power and are receptive to pleas by the opposition that it is "time for a
change." All other things being equal, this tendency produces pressures that
lead to the incumbent party being voted out of office, often by a large majority, and the former opposition being installed.
Since the early 1950s the Republicans and the Democrats have fairly
regularly alternated in control of the White House, with four two-term periods (not counting the current Republican run of at least two terms), one of
three terms (the Reagan-Bush I years), and one that was confined to a single
term (Carter). Going further back in history, since the Republicans and the
Democrats became the major parties competing for national power in the
1860s, the average duration of party control of the White House has been
eleven years. The only markedly longer periods of party dominance were the
twenty-four-year tenure of the Republicans during and after the Civil War
and the twenty-year period of Democratic supremacy during and after the
Depression. Both of these exceptions may reflect the effects of the system of
long-term cycles that I will discuss below.
Similar short-term cycles have operated for governorships in states with
competitive two-party systems. In the seven most populous states with his-
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torically competitive systems, the average period of party control of the governorship from 1950 to 2004 was a little more than eight years. In Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the two parties exchanged control of the governor's
office every eight years with almost rhythmic regularity. In New York, Ohio,
and Michigan, parties tended to hold gubernatorial dominance for slightly
longer periods, but alternation nevertheless occurred. In Illinois there was
regular alternation until 1976 when the Republicans began a twenty-six-year
tenure, finally giving way under clouds of scandal to Democratic governor
Rod Blagojevich in 2002. In California the two parties exchanged control of
the governorship every eight years until the Republicans won four straight
terms in the 1980s and 1990s, followed by two Democratic victories, the last
cut short by Governor Gray Davis's replacement through recall by Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2003. Cyclical party turnover now
seems to be developing in some of the Southern states where Democrats
used to enjoy one-party dominance, such as Texas, Virginia, and Florida.
From 1954 to 1994, regular shifts in party control did not occur in Congress. Between the Civil War and the Eisenhower administration, changes in
control of Congress usually accompanied, or slightly proceeded, the presidential cycle (Norpoth and Rusk 2005). In only four two-year periods did the
president's party not control at least one house of Congress (under Hayes,
1879-1880; Cleveland, 1895-1896: Wilson, 1919-1920; and Truman,
1947-1948 ). From 1954 to 1994, however, the Democrats controlled the
House of Representatives without interruption and the Senate for all but six
years. As a result, Republican presidents during this forty-year span regularly confronted Congresses dominated by their political opposition. After
the 1994 election, the shoe was on the other foot, with a Democratic president for six years facing a Republican Congress. Whether the 1994 turnover
will lead to more normal short-cycle alternations in party control of Congress or will tum out to have been the harbinger of a new long cycle giving
the Republicans extended dominance in Congress, as the Democrats enjoyed
after 1932, remains to be seen.

The Long Cycle
Probably the best known of the theories that a long-term cycle has operated in American national politics is that of historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr.
(1986), carrying on work begun by his father. Schlesinger's theory is more
closely related to political ideology than to parties, but it also has party manifestations. According to Schlesinger, there have been throughout U.S. history regular alternations between spans of political liberalism and conservatism, each lasting about sixteen years, or four presidential terms. The most
recent spans were the liberal one launched by John Kennedy in 1960 and
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its conservative successor, which began in the late 1970s. Right on time,
Schlesinger claimed after the 1992 election, Bill Clinton had initiated a new
liberal era.
Like most cyclical theories, Schlesinger's theory seems to work better
in retrospect than as a predictive tool- though even in retrospect it requires
some rather odd combinations, such as bunching Richard Nixon and Gerald
Ford into a common liberal phase that began in 1960. The Republican landslide in the 1994 midterm elections, followed by George W. Bush's arrival
in the White House in 2001, seemed to bring a premature end to the new
liberal era introduced by Clinton.
Among political scientists, who generally have been more open to cyclical theories than historians, most theories of long cycles are linked to the
concept of "critical" or "realigning" elections introduced by V. 0. Key
( 1955). Critical elections, Key claimed, have periodically purged American
politics and government of accumulated debris and opened the way for new
departures. Key's work has been carried on by, among others, Walter Dean
Burnham ( 1970), Gerald Pomper ( 1970), and James Sundquist ( I983). In
most versions of this theory, realigning elections, ending the dominance of
one political party and establishing normal political control by its major
rival, have occurred every twenty-eight to thirty-six years.
There is some dispute over which were the actual realigning elections,
but general agreement places realignments at or just before the elections of
Thomas Jefferson in 1800, Andrew Jackson in 1828, Abraham Lincoln in
1860, William McKinley in 1896, and Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. (Some
scholars drop the elections of Jefferson and Jackson on the ground that the
two-party system did not achieve full development until the 1830s.)
A puzzle for believers in the traditional theory of realigning elections is
the apparent failure of one to occur on schedule in the 1960s. Burnham argues that a realignment did occur with the election of Nixon as president in
1968 and the creation of a new Republican majority in presidential politics.
Certainly the shift of the South away from the Democrats at the presidential
level after 1968 was a major change in national politics. But if this was a
realignment, why did it not produce a change in control of Congress or most
of the major states, as had occurred with previous realignments?
The theory of realignments that I have proposed deals with this problem- and some of those that rise from Schlesinger's rival formulation-by
proposing that long cycles in their fullness have actually covered not sixteen
years (Schlesinger) nor twenty-eight to thirty-six years (Key and his successors) but sixty to seventy years (Reichley 2000). Truly realigning elections
in my view have occurred-at least prior to the major realignment that may
now be under way-only three times in American history: 1800 (Jefferson).
1860 (Lincoln), and 1930 (FDR). The elections of Jackson in 1828 and McKinley in 1896 were important political events, but they were in fact restora-
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tions and climaxes of eras that had begun about thirty years before, rather
than true realignments or, in the broader sense, enduring changes in national
political direction.
Jackson won in 1828 after a period of about ten years in which national
politics had been in flux and the old hegemony of Jefferson's party appeared
shaken. But Jackson was clearly in the line of Jefferson, as was generally
recognized at the time- including, before his death in 1826, by Jefferson
himself (Meyers 1957). Martin Van Buren, one of Jackson's principal lieutenants and his successor as president, wrote, "The two great parties of this
country, with occasional changes in name only, have, for the principal part
of a century, occupied antagonistic positions upon all the important political
questions. They have maintained an unbroken succession" (Van Buren
1967). Jackson carried every state Jefferson carried in 1800 and lost every
state Jefferson lost. Jefferson· s narrow victory over John Adams in 1800 was
converted into Jackson's landslide triumph over John Quincy Adams in 1828
by the addition of seven new Western states in which the Democrats were
strong. So the 1828 election and Jackson's subsequent triumph over forces
in Congress led by Henry Clay restored the dominance of the (renamed)
Democrats instead of bringing in a new majority party.
Similarly, McKinley's victory in 1896 followed a period of about
twenty years during which there had been no clear majority party. The 1896
election represented a rallying of the forces, temporarily in eclipse, that had
made the Republicans the majority party from 1860 to 1876. McKinley won
through renewal of the coalition of Northeastern and Midwestern states on
which the Republican Party had been founded. William Jennings Bryan, his
Democratic opponent, swept the South, the Democrats' principal stronghold
since the end of Reconstruction. Bryan also tapped the farmers' revolt and
the silver issue in the West to win some of the Western states, normally
Republican, that had been admitted to the Union since the Civil War. But
within a few years most of these were back in the Republican column,
where they normally remained until the Great Depression of the 1930s. The
1896 election, therefore, did not displace the former majority party but renewed and strengthened the party that had become dominant after the last
major realignment.
The mystery of why no true overall realignment occurred in the 1960s
is thus explained: it was not due. What actually happened in the 1960s was
the renewal and climax of the cycle dominated by liberalism and the Democratic Party that began in the 1930s. In 1964 Lyndon Johnson decisively defeated Barry Goldwater, representing a radical version of the laissez-faire
economic ideology that had prevailed during the preceding cycle. The movement of the South away from the Democrats at the end of the l 960s was an
early sign of the breakup of the New Deal cycle- similar to the move of the
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Northeast away from the Democrats in the 1840s and the swing of major
Northern cities away from the Republicans after 1912.
Briefly stated, each of the sixty- to seventy-year cycles moved through
roughly similar phases: (I) a breakthrough election in which the innovating
party gained power under an inspiring leader (Jefferson, Lincoln, FDR), followed by an extended period during which the new majority changed the
direction of national life and enacted much of its program; (2) a period of
pause during which the dominant party lost some of its dynamism and forces
reflecting the ethos of the preceding cycle staged a minor comeback (John
Quincy Adams, Cleveland, Eisenhower); (3) a climactic victory by the majority party over a more radical expression of the ideology of the preceding
cycle (Jackson over Clay, McKinley over Bryan, Johnson over Goldwater),
followed by enactment of remaining items in the majority party's program;
and finally (4) the gradual decline and ultimate collapse of the old order,
opening the way for a new realignment and a new majority.
The phases of the sixty- to seventy-year cycles correspond roughly to
some of Schlesinger's sixteen-year spans. The long-cycle theory, however,
explains why the Jeffersonians after 1800, the Republicans after 1860, and
the Democrats after 1932 held onto power for longer than Schlesinger's theory would predict. These were all periods covered by the initial phase of the
long cycle, during which the majority is fresh and holds the support of the
public through an extended period of elections. The separate cycles posited
in the twenty-eight- to thirty-six-year theory correspond neatly to the rise
and decline segments of the long cycle.
Political cycles are probably rooted, at least partly, in generational
change. Schlesinger argues that his sixteen-year spans reflect the succession
of political generations. Members of the political generation of John Kennedy, for example, were putting into effect values and attitudes acquired during their youths in the liberal environment of the 1930s. The Reaganites of
the 1980s were applying values they had developed during the relatively conservative 1950s (though many Reaganites regarded themselves as revolting
against Eisenhower's moderate Republicanism). Members of the generation
of the 1990s, in this theory, should have been eager to reintroduce the liberal
values with which Kennedy inspired them during their college years in the
1960s.
Schlesinger's analysis, like his larger cyclical theory, captures part of
the truth. Genuinely major changes in political direction, however, seem to
occur only after persons holding political values and party loyalties formed
by the last major realignment have largely passed from the political scene.
So long as generations whose party allegiances were shaped by the Civil
War and its aftermath remained politically active, the normal Republican majority in national elections was hard to shake. Similarly, party loyalties
formed by the Depression and the New Deal have been remarkably durable.
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But the generations most deeply marked by the New Deal era, roughly those
born from 1905 to 1930, now make up a sharply declining share of the potential voter population- less than 8 percent, according to the 2000 census.
The last two major realignments, in the 1860s and the 1930s, came at
times of massive traumas within the larger social system- the Civil War and
the Great Depression. The first realignment, in the 1800s, coincided with
huge territorial growth and population migration. Probably a major realignment requires both an electorate in which loyalties fonned by the last great
political divide have grown weak and powerful sources of new division.
The first condition now clearly exists for much of the voting public. Do
social and political forces currently at work in national life provide the
second?

Republican Realignment
After both of Ronald Reagan's presidential election landslide victories
in the 1980s, many Republican political activists, some conservative journalists, and a few political scientists argued that realignment favoring the Republicans was in fact under way (Chubb and Peterson 1985). When Reagan
left the political scene in 1989, however, the Republicans remained the minority party in public opinion polls, Democratic majorities in the House of
Representatives appeared secure, and talk of Republican realignment had
subsided (Shafer 2003).
In 1992 Bill Clinton restored the Democrats to control of the White
House, though with less than a majority of the total vote. The amazing 19
percent of the popular vote won by Ross Perot's independent candidacy gave
clear evidence that ties to the existing major parties, fonned by the last great
realignment, had grown weak.
The huge Republican victory in the midterm congressional elections of
1994, producing Republican majorities in both houses of Congress for the
first time in forty years, coupled with big Republican wins in gubernatorial
elections in most of the major states, once more aroused hope or dread, depending on subjective preference, that Republican realignment at last was in
motion. Two years later, voters maintained Republicans in control of Congress by reduced majorities but kept Clinton in the White House with a plurality of the popular vote.
In 2000 the presidential election seemed to show an almost exactly
evenly divided electorate. George W. Bush eked out the narrowest of Electoral College victories, awarded by a one-vote majority on the Supreme
Court five weeks after the election, but in the popular vote ran more than
300,000 behind Vice President Al Gore.
Some early interpretations of the 2004 election suggested that not much
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had changed since 2000. While Bush this time indisputably won in both the
electoral and popular vote, commentators were quick to point out that his
electoral vote margin was the smallest for an incumbent president winning
reelection since Woodrow Wilson in 1916. Exit polls conducted for a consortium of major news media reported that Bush had been supported by only
45 percent of young voters ( 18 to 29 years of age) and 45 percent of selfidentified moderates- hardly evidence, it was said, of ongoing realignment
(White 2004).
Examination of swings among other crucial voter groups, however, presents a somewhat different picture. Bush's popular vote majority, while relatively small, was solid- the first actual popular vote majority won by a presidential victor since his father in 1988. He made significant gains among
groups vital to recent Democratic coalitions: up twelve percentage points
among Hispanics (some analysts challenged the size of Bush's gain among
Hispanics but conceded he probably won about 40 percent-the Republicans' preelection target; Leal et al. 2005); up five points among women,
shrinking the Democrats' lead among women to only three percentage points
compared to eleven in 2000; up seven points among voters over age 60; up
five points among Catholics to a majority of 52 percent; and up six points
among Jews.
The 2004 National Election Study found that among actual voters, those
identifying themselves as Republicans actually outnumbered Democrats by
36 percent to 32 percent, compared to an eight-point Democratic lead in
2000. If leaners- those identifying themselves as independents but expressing a preference for one party or the other-are thrown into the mix, Democrats held a minuscule lead of 47.6 percent to 47.1 percent (Weisberg and
Christenson 2005).
Republican realignment among working-class and lower-middle-class
whites, once predominantly Democratic constituencies, grew stronger in
2004. White voters from families with incomes between $30,000 and
$50,000 supported Bush over Kerry by 58 to 41 percent. Even white voters
with incomes between $15,000 and $30,000 went for Bush by 51 to 48 percent (Pew Research Center 2005a). Republican strength among white lowermiddle-class and working-class voters produced large gains for Bush in old
steel•producing and coal-mining counties in southwestern Pennsylvania
around Pittsburgh and blue-collar suburban areas in southeastern Michigan
around Detroit (offset in both states by swings to Kerry in upscale suburban
counties, which I will discuss below). When the Democratic candidate for
president loses coal-mining West Virginia by 13 percentage points, it can
fairly be said that the Democratic Party is in trouble.
A postelection analysis by a centrist Democratic study group called
Third Way found that the "economic tipping point- the income level above
which white voters were more likely to vote Republican than Democrat-
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was $23,700." The survey found that middle-class blacks continued to vote
heavily for the Democrats, but Hispanics rising into the middle class trended
toward the Republicans. Among the white middle class, the study concluded,
"Democrats were not competitive at all." 1
Besides holding the presidency, Republicans also made gains in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Among voters for Bush, 91 percent
cast ballots for Republican candidates for the House of Representatives, up
from 86 percent in 2000. Shifts to Bush and the Republicans among critical
voter groups appear to have been largely due to two main factors: the influence of the war against terrorism and consolidation of major traditional religious groups in support of the Republican Party (Stanley and Niemi 2005;
Weisberg and Christenson 2005; Shanks et al. 2005; Verba and Schlozman
2005).
Preference for Bush as a wartime leader, coupled with the Republicans'
long-standing advantage on defense-related issues, had significant impact in
the voting booth. Exit polls reported that 58 percent of voters said they
trusted Bush "to handle terrorism," while only 40 percent trusted Kerry.
Among the 54 percent who answered that the United States was safer from
terrorism than it had been in 2000, 79 percent voted for Bush (Abramowitz
2004). Based on the findings of the 2004 National Election Study, Herbert
Weisberg and Dino Christenson (2005) concluded, "September 11, 200 I,
gave George Bush the opportunity that November 7, 2000, had not given
him, and his campaign did not let that opportunity slip through their hands."
The other crucial factor building the Republican majority was mobilization of highly observant members of major religious groups. Exit polls found
that among the 41 percent of voters who reported attending church at least
once a week, 61 percent voted for Bush and only 39 percent for Kerry-a
disparity more than three times the size of the gender gap. A more detailed
postelection survey by the Survey Research Center at the University of
Akron found that 88 percent of "traditionalist" evangelical Protestants (regular church attenders, holders of traditional Christian beliefs), 68 percent of
traditionalist mainline Protestants, and 72 percent of traditionalist nonLatino Catholics voted for Bush (Green et al. 2005). (On the other hand, the
Akron survey reported that only half of at least nominal mainline Protestants
overall voted Republican for president, which I will discuss below.)
For the first time in U.S. history, the more highly observant members of
all numerically major religious groups except African-American Protestants
have come together in support of the same political party. How durable this
faith-based political coalition will be remains to be seen, but its effects on
current politics have been substantial. A recent Pew Research Center survey
(2005b) found that church attendance now ranks behind only race as a predictor of party affiliation-ahead of gender, income level, union membership, and level of education.
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Referenda on the same day as the 2004 election in eleven states on constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage, all of which passed
overwhelmingly, had particularly strong effects in mobilizing voters motivated by moral values derived from religion. "Two-fifths of survey respondents," according to one study, "said that same-sex marriage was an important issue in the presidential race." Ohio's referendum on the issue may well
have helped bring out and unite religiously conservative voters who gave
Bush the state and the election (Lewis 2005).
Many political analysts identify issues like public prayer and same-sex
marriage as "wedge" issues, suggesting that only economic issues and those
embraced by liberal ideology should be "real" issues. But for millions of
Americans, concerns such as the future of the traditional two-parent family,
the place of religion in public life, and protection of the unborn hold preemptive political importance.
The 2004 election occurred under relatively unfavorable conditions for
an incumbent president or party. The Iraq war had turned out to be unexpectedly long and bloody, with no end in sight. Many voters felt the administration had been deceptive in justifying the war and were disturbed by revelations of abuses of captured prisoners. The economy was recovering only
gradually from the 2001 recession, with slow job growth, and the stock market slumped during most of the campaign. The large federal government surplus that greeted Bush when he took office had been transformed into a skyrocketing deficit. After a strong performance at the Republican convention,
Bush lost badly in the first debate with Kerry and only partly recovered in
two later encounters. Yet the slim majority supporting Bush and the Republicans seemed hardly to waver, giving evidence of a commitment that had become firm and might be enduring.
During the first year of Bush's second term, troubles continued. The Iraq
war showed no sign of a resolution and both American and Iraqi casualties
mounted. Opposition to the war increased and became more vocal. Economic growth picked up, but many people reported finding no improvement
in their own pocketbooks. Gas prices exploded, causing outrage among motorists and threatening the general economy. Bush's efforts to build support
among Democrats in Congress and in the public for reforms of Social Security had negative effects. The president's approval ratings sank, and polls
showed dissatisfaction with Republicans in Congress (Gallup 2005a).
Yet discontent with the Republicans did not seem to translate into support for the Democrats. A Pew survey in the summer of 2005 found Republicans leading Democrats in party identification by four percentage points
among whites in the second lowest economic quintile, including families
with incomes between approximately $19,000 and $30,000, and by increasingly larger margins in all higher quintiles (Pew Research Center 2005a).
Polls showed almost identical majorities disapproving of both Democrats

28

A. James Reichley

and Republicans in Congress. A Gallup poll in August 2005 found Rudy
Giuliani and John McCain, who ranked first and second in trial heats among
Republicans for their party's 2008 presidential nomination, running five
points ahead of Hillary Clinton, who topped the Democratic poll, and 13
points ahead of John Kerry (Gallup 2005b). Focus groups conducted by
Democratic researchers in swing and rural states in the summer of 2005
found Democrats favored on economic and most domestic policy issues but
that "powerful as concern over these issues is, the introduction of cultural
themes- specifically gay marriage, abortion, the importance of the traditional family unit, and the role of religion in public life-quickly renders
them almost irrelevant in terms of electoral politics at the national level"
(Democracy Corps 2005).
All of these findings came before the devastation wrought on the Gulf
Coast by Hurricane Katrina in the first days of September 2005. In the early
fall of 2005, some Democrats clearly expected, and some Republicans
feared, that effects of this disaster would send a transforming shock through
the entire national political system. Long-term political consequences will
depend on the results of inquiries into causes for the bungled responses by
government at all levels to the chaos in New Orleans, the perceived effectiveness of Bush's leadership in relief and recovery, and the impact of storm
losses on the larger economy.
The national security and moral values issues that played major roles in
producing the Republican majority in 2004 seem likely to be important factors in American politics for many years to come. The war against Islamic
terrorists, even after most U.S. fighting units are finally withdrawn from Iraq,
will probably stretch long into the future-perhaps at least as long as the
forty-year Cold War with the Soviet Union. This struggle will have its ups
and downs, helping or damaging the parties of particular administrations in
office. But the long-standing preference of a majority of the public for the
Republicans on security issues may well, on balance, advantage the Republicans, as it did during most of the Cold War. It should be remembered that
the Cold War deeply divided the Democratic Party but helped keep the Republicans united and in control of the White House from 1968 to 1992, except for Jimmy Carter's narrow victory in 1976 after Watergate. The public's
trust in the current struggle will no doubt ultimately depend on whose leadership is deemed most effective.
The likely political effects of moral values concerns may be more mixed.
As I will discuss in the next section, identification of the Republicans with
traditional morality and a religious presence in public life has already produced gains for the Democrats among some constituencies. In a nation that
remains predominantly religious, however, the issue provides a powerful
base of support for the Republicans. A Pew survey in August 2005 found
only 29 percent viewing the Democratic Party as "generally friendly" to
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religion, down from 42 percent in 2003, while 55 percent regarded the Republican Party as friendly to religion (Pew Research Center 2005b).
African Americans so far have overwhelmingly resisted being drawn
into a Republican realignment. In 2004 Bush won only 11 percent of the
African-American vote, up only three percentage points from 2000. Part of
the reason for the loyalty of most blacks at all social and economic levels to
the Democrats may be that realignment among African Americans- who
from the 1860s to the 1930s were massively Republican- was not completed, particularly in the South, until 1964. As late as 1960, Richard Nixon
won 32 percent of the black vote against John Kennedy. But in 1964 Barry
Goldwater, the Republican candidate for president, opposed passage of the
Civil Rights Act, and African Americans that year gave more than 90 percent
of their vote to the Democrats. Black support for the Democrats has largely
remained at that level ever since.
The social and moral conservatism of many African Americans, who
have been more politically organized through their churches than any other
group, has from time to time attracted the attention of Republican strategists.
During Bush's first term, the administration's "faith-based initiative," which
would direct federal funds into religiously sponsored welfare programs, was
warmly supported by many black churches. More recently, the same-sex marriage issue has caused some socially conservative black clergy to question the
viability of continued alliance with Democratic liberalism. If AfricanAmerican support for Republicans rose to as little as 20 percent, the Republican Party would gain a critical edge in crucial swing states such as Pennsyl•
vania, Michigan, Ohio, and Florida.
In light of the 2004 election, the Republicans seem to have more room
to grow than the Democrats. States carried by Bush were predominantly in
the South and the mountain West, where population continues to rise. A survey by the Los Angeles Times found that Bush carried ninety-seven of the
nation's one hundred fastest-growing counties. Some of these counties are
relatively small, but many are located in exurban regions where population
increase is now greatest. Kerry won with less than 55 percent of the vote in
fourteen states that total 189 electoral votes, while Bush won by less than 55
percent in only ten states, with 113 electoral votes.
A significant factor in growing Republican strength in recent elections
may be that Republican operatives have simply been better at running political campaigns. While the Republicans have actually lost some of their longstanding dominance in fundraising, by common consent among political professionals, journalists, and political scientists they have been more effective
at conducting campaign "ground wars"-canvassing door-to-door, registering voters, putting out yard signs, writing letters to the editor, operating
phone banks, and getting out the vote on Election Day. In 2004 Democrats
relied largely on auxiliary organizations, the so-called 527 groups, to man-
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age grassroots efforts by often imported workers, while the Republican campaign built up a vast army of local volunteers. Republican volunteers were
specifically assigned to contact persons within their communities who
shared their religious, social, or recreational interests. A study by Sidney
Milkis and Jesse Rhodes (2005) found that for the first time in history the
Republicans created "a national party machine, composed of more than a
million campaign volunteers across the country," with potential effects on
future elections.
In the years immediately ahead, the short-term "throw the rascals out"
cycle and a long-term Republican major realignment cycle that may be
emerging will be pulling in opposite directions. In 2006 the Republican congressional majority produced by the 1994 election will be twelve years old.
In 2008 the Republicans will have held the White House for two consecutive
terms. Democratic congressional gains in the 2006 midtenn elections, particularly in the House, appear likely. The Republican candidate for president
in 2008 will have to deal with eight years of accumulated voter frustration
and discontent of a kind that, with only one exception since 1952, has helped
limit the incumbent party to no more than two terms in control of the White
House. If Republican losses in Congress are relatively small and if a Republican once more wins the presidency in 2008, we will have pretty clear evidence that the nation has entered a major new cycle in political history.

Democratic CounterwRealignment
Realignments do not work all in one direction. While some groups come
together in a new majority party, others may coalesce to give enduring support to a vigorous alternative majority. The Civil War and its aftermath,
which helped establish the Republicans as the normal national majority party
for most of the next seventy years, also firmly anchored the South to the
Democrats for almost a century. As James Sundquist (1983) has pointed out,
major realignments usually come when the two major parties are clearly distinguishable on highly contentious issues.
In 2002 John Judis and Ruy Teixeira published a best-selling book called
The Emerging Democratic Majority in which they argued that existing
trends pointed to development of an enduring Democratic majority in national politics. Among the factors they cited were continued strong support
for the Democrats among women, blacks, Hispanics, and Jews; growing
Democratic strength in once heavily Republican middle-class suburbs; and
weakening of traditional religion. The Republicans proceeded to win the
next two elections, but some of the trends that Judis and Teixeira identified
have continued to operate.
Among the bright spots for John Kerry and the Democrats on Election
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Night 2004 were victories in former Republican suburban strongholds outside New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Chicago, which were crucial
to Democratic majorities in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Illinois. Some of these suburbs remain normally Republican in local and state elections, but the gradual swing to the Democrats even
at these levels is evident, something like the earlier move in the South from
the Democrats to the Republicans.
Growing Democratic strength in upscale suburbs reflects a Democratic
trend among parts of the upper middle class. In 2004, voters with postgraduate education supported Kerry 55 to 44 percent, in contrast to a narrow Republican lead in 1988 among holders of postgraduate degrees. Among college graduates, Bush led by only 52 to 46 percent, down sharply from a
Republican advantage of 62 to 37 percent in 1988. Disaffection from the
Republicans among professionals and some corporate managers and their
spouses springs in part from cultural discomfort with the religious Right.
But causes probably go deeper and may be long-lasting.
One source of the swing may be the long-term effects of advanced education. A study of attitudes among college faculties released in the spring of
2005 found 72 percent of faculty members identifying themselves as liberals
and only 15 percent as conservatives. Democrats outnumbered Republicans
50 percent to 11 percent. The more elite the school, the greater the preponderance of liberals and Democrats. Liberal dominance was greatest in the
English literature, philosophy, political science, and religious studies departments, where at least 80 percent identified themselves as liberals and no
more than 5 percent were conservatives.2
For many years, U.S. college faculties have been predominantly liberal,
with little apparent lasting effect on partisan preferences among most college
graduates. But political and cultural attitudes acquired in colleges and graduate schools may now increasingly be finding their way into voting booths. In
addition, overwhelming support on university faculties provides the Democrats with valuable resources of economic, administrative, and foreign and
domestic policy expertise.
A downside for the Democrats from their close identification with dominant intellectual elites, and with allied opinion molders in the media and the
entertainment industries, is that the Democratic Party risks becoming the target for populist resentment of a kind that historically has been focused on
big business and inherited wealth. In 2004 John Kerry proved particularly
vulnerable as a symbol of this identification.
Changes in attitudes toward religion among a fairly large part of the public, particularly in the middle class, have also worked in the Democrats'
favor within some constituencies. The University of Akron survey of religious alignments cited earlier found that among "modernist" mainline Protestants (those low in church participation and holding nontraditional reli-
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gious beliefs), Kerry won by a majority of 78 to 22 percent. Among
modernist white Catholics, Kerry won by 69 to 31 percent. Even among
"centrists" (the large group placed between traditionalists and modernists
by John Green and his colleagues analyzing the Akron data), Kerry was supported by 42 percent of mainline Protestants and 45 percent of white Catholics. Kerry's overwhelming lead among modernist mainline Protestants enabled him to break almost exactly even among mainline Protestants overall,
a reliable Republican constituency since the Civil War. Among white Catholics overall, an equally reliable Democratic constituency during most of
American history, Bush won narrowly by 53 percent (Green et al. 2005).
The "modernist" category employed by Green and his colleagues mixes
together two tendencies in contemporary American religion that, while related, are distinct: religious liberalization and secularization. Religious liberalism, in the sense of major reinterpretation of many traditional Christian
beliefs and doctrines in response to the findings of modern science and
scholarship, coupled with advocacy of liberal political and social action, has
been a significant force among mainline Protestants, and to a lesser extent
Roman Catholics, for more than fifty years. Many modernists in this sense
are highly active in their churches and motivated by religious convictions in
their political action.
During the pontificate of Pope John Paul 11, the U.S. Catholic hierarchy
became increasingly conservative on personal moral and cultural issues,
though not on economic or peace issues. The Vatican and many American
bishops have sought actively to restrain social liberalism among priests and
laity. Since the 1960s, however, religious liberals have been dominant in the
national leaderships of most mainline Protestant denominations. Until very
recently, the liberalism of mainline leaders seemed to have little effect on
the behavior of their laities, who remained predominantly conservative-tomoderate in their social attitudes and Republican in their politics. The Democratic trend among some mainline Protestants in 2004 may indicate that the
liberal attitudes of denominational leaders, whose views now are shared by
many local clergy, are influencing a growing share of laity.
Accompanying religious liberalization, and sometimes rising from it, has
been the even stronger force of secularization-disassociation from any kind
of organized religion. By 2004 the percentage of Americans telling pollsters
they identified with no religious faith had risen to just over 15 percent-up
from 5 percent in 1984. In 2004, 72 percent of declared seculars voted for
Kerry. To these may be added the sizable number whom sociologists categorize as "behavioral seculars"-those who identify themselves to pollsters as
Methodists or Catholics or Jews or some other denomination but who almost
never attend religious services and do not regard traditional religion as an
important factor in their lives. It seems reasonable to conclude that most of
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the 35 percent of modernist mainline Protestants and 30 percent of modernist
Catholics who responded to the Akron survey that they "rarely" attend religious services (defined as "seldom or never") are in fact behavioral seculars,
with no meaningful attachment to any religious faith.
If avowed seculars, behavioral seculars, and liberal white Protestants and
Catholics are added (with some overlap) to the still heavily Democratic bodies of African Americans, Hispanics, Jews, union members, people living in
poverty, and single women, the Democrats still have close to a majority
within the national electorate-as reflected by the 2000 and 2004 elections.
If the trend toward secularism continues-if the United States is destined to
become increasingly like Western Europe, where organized religion now
plays little part in the lives of most people-the Democrats can fairly expect,
given normal public reaction against incumbent Republicans, to regain control of national government soon. If that happens, it may then be the Democrats who emerge, as Judis and Teixeira predicted, as the nonnal majority
party in a new realignment, giving shape and direction to public life well
into the twenty-first century.
A problem for the Democrats is that many of the liberal interest groups
at the core of their current coalition seem unwilling to allow them to deviate
from a strict ideological line on contentious social and moral issues such as
abortion, same-sex marriage, affirmative action, and federal judicial appointments. This development has already lost them majority support among
white Catholics and may foster further erosion among social conservatives
in some of their traditional constituencies such as African Americans, Hispanics, Asians, and working-class whites.

An End to Long-term Realignment?
Some political scientists and historians have always doubted the existence of long-term political cycles (Shafer 1991; Ladd 1991 ). A recent influential book by David Mayhew (2002) challenges the thirty-year cycle theory proposed by Burnham and others. Mayhew particularly, but not
exclusively, argues that the 1896 election, which is essential for the thirtyyear theory, does not meet criteria for a realigning event- a conclusion that
I share. My own view, as stated earlier, is that major realignments, introducing a new cycle in national political life, have in the past come not at approximately thirty-year intervals but every sixty to seventy years, when generational change has weakened traditional party loyalties and in response to
profound national traumas or transformations.
It may be, however, that conditions early in the twenty-first century simply do not permit development of the kind of bonding political commitments
that came out of earlier realignments. The clamor of competing media, the
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distractions of the consumer society, the nihilistic pressures of modern culture may atomize contemporary life to a degree that enduring political cohesion is unlikely to take root. Or it may be that current national and international problems-the collision between promised government benefits and
acceptable levels of taxation or borrowing, the economic and cultural perils
of globalization, the threat of nuclear proliferation, and the continuing struggle against terrorism, among others-are so complex and intractable that solutions offered by any one party or group of political leaders will not be
supported for long by the voting public. Recent political experience in Europe suggests this may be the case.
Yet the generations that went through the Civil War and the Great De•
pression faced enormous and what seemed at the time almost insurmountable challenges. In both of those earlier periods, a new majority party
emerged, implementing proposed solutions-never wholly successful or
universally popular, but able to move the nation forward and commanding
widespread political support for an extended period. My bet is that it will
happen again, with the Republicans still advantaged to play the role of normal majority party.

Notes
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Party Factions in 2004
Howard L. Reiter

About ten weeks into George W. Bush's second term, a reporter for the
New York Times compiled an inventory of the blocs within Bush's Republican Party. He listed four "broad coalitions": the Cultural Coalition, the
Leave-Us-Alone Coalition, the Security Coalition, and the Old Guard Coalition. Within these groupings, there were no fewer than ten blocs, including
Biblical, America First, Tax-Cutting, and so forth. 1 On the same page of the
newspaper, another reporter wrote of tensions within the Democratic Party
between liberals and centrists.2
Factionalism within major American parties is a subject that never goes
away. It is difficult to describe the Republicans and Democrats without getting into a discussion of moderate, business, and religious-Right Republicans, or Southern, liberal, and feminist Democrats. However, while journalists, politicians, and political junkies use such terms all the time, political
scientists have done little to clarify the fault lines that run within each party,
the only major exception being those who study legislative roll-call voting.
Indeed, some of the classic definitions of a political party. such as Edmund
Burke's "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the
national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all
agreed" (1971, 1:151) and Anthony Downs's "a team of men seeking to
control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election" (1957. 25), treat parties as monolithic. But even the most casual observer knows that each American major party is a grab bag of disparate
groups with different agendas.
Several features of major U.S. political parties guarantee that they will
have internal divisions. First, the United States is a large and heterogeneous
country, with many groups divided along class, ethnic, gender, racial, religious, geographic, ideological, and other lines. Second, there are only two
major parties in the United States; combined with the first feature, this
means that each party is necessarily made up of numerous disparate groups.
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Third, the federal structure of American government enables each party to
take a somewhat different profile in different states; parties in Utah and Mississippi are likely to be more conservative than their counterparts in Massachusetts and California. Finally, American political parties have traditionally
been less united around a political program than many parties in other nations; therefore there has been more toleration of a wide variety of perspectives within each party. As we shall see, however, this factor has changed in
recent years.
What is a faction, and why are factions important to study? Two scholars
once defined a faction as "any relatively organized group that exists within
the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes
with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a
part" (Beller and Belloni 1978, 4 I9). As a definition, this seems reasonable,
as it is neither overly vague nor too precise in its requirements for what a
faction is. These authors went on to note that "factions structure the processes of intraparty politics and decision-making; ... define the struggle for
control of the party, its policies, its leadership and offices, its doctrines, its
treasury, etc.; ... are devices for the distribution of party patronage-and,
for governing parties, of government patronage; and they are instruments for
generating and supporting rival candidacies for public office" (437).
Most important of all, divisions within parties affect their ability to perform the functions that parties are supposed to carry out as a vital part of the
democratic process. Among these are structuring the vote for the electorate,
recruiting candidates for public office, organizing government, and in general providing linkages between the electorate and public officials. All of
these functions, and how well they are perfonned, are conditioned by the
nature of the divisions within parties and the intensity of those cleavages. For
example, parties help simplify the voting process for voters by symbolizing
particular ideologies or issue positions. However, if a party is deeply divided, the voter may not know which faction is represented on the ballot,
and so the party label means less. Another example is that parties normally
organize legislatures, and a factionalized majority party may be unable to
form majority voting blocs and get legislation passed.
Is factionalism beneficial or harmful to political parties? There is no
question that factions have a bad reputation. "Simply stated," Terence Ball
has written, "a party is a faction of which one approves, and a faction a party
of which one disapproves" (1989, 156). A party riven by factionalism may
have difficulty functioning effectively, but factionalism may also give partisans opportunities to work within the party rather than face the unpalatable
choice of knuckling under to the party majority or defecting. Factions can
also be a way for party members to communicate with party elites (Bowler,
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Farrell, and Katz 1999, 14- 16). Factionalism may, in other words, provide a
relatively harmless way of letting off steam-or it can divide the party into
warring contenders who have lost sight of collective goals. Different kinds
of factions might have different effects on the parties of which they are part
(Beller and Belloni 1978, 439- 42). To a great extent, a party is defined by
its factional composition. If the party is divided, it matters greatly whether
those blocs are based on ideology, patronage, personal ties, ethnicity, geography, or something else. Some cleavages, such as those based on ideology,
pose more of an enduring threat to party unity than others, such as those
based on personalities that come and go.
These considerations should make us cautious about predictions of party
splits. Every major American party contains disparate and even contradictory elements, and yet the parties usually manage to hold these groups together. Those who predict that social and economic conservatives cannot
long coexist in the Republican Party (e.g., Lowi 1995) must confront the fact
that they have done so for at least a quarter of a century now and have been
fairly successful at submerging their differences in order to win office and
govern. Older examples pervade U.S. history, such as the inclusion of Northerners and Southerners in the Democratic New Deal Coalition and the Republican combination of progressives and conservatives in the early twentieth century.
As noted earlier, political scientists who study legislative roll-call voting
have paid attention to factions within parties (Kolodny 1999; Hammond
1997; Rohde 1991 ), but legislatures are only one arena in which partisans
act. Moreover, they may not be the best place in which to observe the factions of a party. Unlike national conventions, national committees, and other
party institutions, legislatures were not created by the parties; the legislative
agenda is not one that is drawn up primarily to accommodate different party
factions. Voting behavior in a legislature is influenced by the presence of the
other party, which may produce an artificial unity within a party by encouraging its members to band together in the face of a common threat. Moreover, unlike national conventions, legislatures do not necessarily include numerous members of each party from each state. Until the Republican Party
began to grow in the South in recent decades, for example, it would have
been difficult to study Southern Republicans by observing Congress. Instead
of looking only at Congress, we should also look at party institutionsnational conventions and voters in primaries and caucuses- whenever there
is a contest, because analysis of such institutions gets us closer to the real
battle within a party and provides us with evidence from most if not all the
states.
If factionalism is important to understand, then we are justified in asking
what the factional makeup of the Democratic and Republican parties looks
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like, particularly in the context of the 2004 presidential campaign. After all,
any faction worth its salt should regard the presidential nomination as the
highest prize a party can offer. But before we can understand factionalism
in 2004, we need a brief overview of how party factionalism evolved over
the years.

Party Factions through History
Modern American political parties arose in the 1830s, during the age of
Andrew Jackson. In that period, parties developed many of the features we
now know: national conventions, platforms, congressional coordination, and
national committees. During the period from the 1830s through the 1850s,
Democrats and Whigs divided along sectional lines at their national conventions. Northern and Southern Whigs squared off, and Democrats experienced both North-versus-South and East-versus-West divisions around such
issues as the extension of slavery to the territories, trade, and the proposed
transcontinental railroad. In Congress, too, sectional differences emerged
within each party. When sectional strife began to reach the boiling point in
the 1850s, the Whigs disintegrated, and the Democrats suffered a split in
1860 that produced two sectional presidential candidates (Reiter 1996). Later
that year, the young Republican Party won its first presidential election, but
the South then seceded and the Civil War broke out.
After the Civil War, both parties endured many decades of unstable factionalism. The blocs of states that banded together at one national convention
often had no similarity to the blocs that emerged four years later. Neither
socioeconomic ties nor candidates' personalities nor the coalitions around
the Populist or Progressive movements produced lasting alliances among
states (Reiter 1998). Instead of blocs based on sectional differences, like
those before the Civil War, states would form alliances of convenience,
based on specific favors such as promises of control over government patronage jobs or cabinet positions. State and local party leaders used their convention delegates as bargaining chips in complex negotiations. Consequently,
the states one voted with at the last convention might bear little resemblance
to one's current allies.
All that changed during Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s.
By vastly expanding the role of the federal government in American society
through new regulatory powers and social welfare programs, the New Deal
helped produce a more national political system. Just as state and local government came to enjoy less autonomy than before, the state and local parties
began to lose their peculiarities as voters looked more and more to national
political issues as they decided how to vote. One consequence was that many
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voters in what had been strongly Republican or Democratic regions began to
build the minority party and create more political competition. Over the
years, Southern conservatives began to move away from the Democratic
Party, which became a party that championed civil rights, and Northern liberals began to move away from the Republican Party, which increasingly
stood against the progressive programs that many Republicans had favored.
The Solid South began electing Republicans, and states like Vermont and
New Hampshire began electing Democrats.
Early in this process, each party began to develop stable factions. For
the Democrats, the South began to rebel against its Northern counterparts as
early as the late 1930s over such issues as Roosevelt's attempt to enlarge the
size of the Supreme Court and his administration's attempt to ensure that
federal contractors did not discriminate on the basis of race (Patterson 1967;
Garson 1974). Over the next couple of decades, there was a clear NorthSouth division at national conventions, in the Democratic National Committee, and in Congress, with the South clearly the more conservative region
(Reiter 200 I a). At national conventions, there was also a division between,
on the one hand, states whose politics were dominated by old-fashioned political machines and the patronage culture that went with them and, on the
other, states where progressive political reform was more influential. A series of candidates presented themselves as critics of politics-as-usual and became targets of machine politicians. They tended to run best in the Upper
Midwest and the Far West, where the Progressive movement of the early
twentieth century was most influential, and in New York and New England
as well.
On the Republican side, the first issues that led to lasting factions involved foreign policy. In the late I 930s, the question facing Americans was
whether to aid Great Britain, France, and other European nations that faced
Nazi aggression. Republicans in the Northeast, who had business ties across
the Atlantic, were most eager to help those nations after Germany invaded
Poland in 1939, while Midwestern Republicans preferred to stay out. Northeastern Republicans were also more prone to advocate domestic policies that
were more moderate versions of the New Deal, while Republicans elsewhere
preferred to fight Roosevelt's programs head-on. Over the years, Northeastern Republicans increasingly became a relatively liberal minority within
their own party.
These factional patterns persisted long past the 1930s and 1940s, and in
fact these fissures- the Democrats' between North and South and between
reformers and machine politicians, the Republicans' between the Northeast
and the rest of the country- have continued in some form to the present day.
However, they have been somewhat attenuated by an extremely important
trend in American politics: the growing ideological homogeneity within
each party (Hetherington 2001). Arizona senator Barry Goldwater's Repub-
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lican nomination in l 964 jump-started the process by which numerous conservative Democrats, especially in the South, began their migration into the
Republican Party, while many liberal Republicans, especially in the Northeast, moved toward the Democrats. Today, each party is more united and less
factionalized than it has been since at least the early twentieth century. As
we shall see, this fact has many implications for the state of party factionalism in the early twenty-first century.

Democratic Party Factionalism Today
When Bill Clinton ran for president in 1992, his base of support reflected
the older factional lines. Running against Paul Tsongas and Jerry Brown,
who were critics of Democratic orthodoxy, Clinton ran well not only in the
South but in traditional machine states as well. In 1996 and 2000, there were
no divided votes at the Democratic National Conventions. The first year saw
Clinton's unopposed renomination, and in the latter year, former New Jersey
senator Bill Bradley's challenge to Vice President Al Gore died when Bradley lost all of the early primaries and caucuses. With the Democratic Party
fairly united, there is little evidence that the Gore-Bradley contest reflected
any of the patterns I have been discussing. Exit polls indicate that Gore won
key constituencies, such as labor, African Americans, and gays, that might
have been expected to be open to an insurgent candidate due to dissatisfaction with some of the Clinton-Gore policies; however, Bradley was too close
to Gore ideologically to make a compelling case for change, and most Democratic constituencies had long been rallying behind Clinton in response to
Republican attacks (Mayer 200 l, 33).
In 2004, were there echoes of the liberal-conservative disputes that had
wracked the Democratic Party in earlier years? We can answer this question
with regard to both elites and the Democratic masses.
Party Elites

In Congress, what sorts of Democrats voted with the rest of their party
most often? Every year, the respected journal Congressional Quarterly examines all the votes in Congress on which a majority of Democrats voted
against a majority of Republicans, giving each member a score representing
the percentage of votes on which that member voted with his or her party.
Figure 3.1 shows the results for the Democrats in 2004, by region (CQ
Weekly 2004a). The data indicate above all the very high level of support
that the average Democrat gave to the party.
What were the factors associated with high or low party loyalty? The
most obvious is ideology, which I measure with a combination of the scores
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awarded in 2002 by two ideological organizations, the liberal Americans for
Democratic Action and the American Conservative Union (Barone 2003).
Using data from 2002 instead of 2004 avoids the problem of using some of
the same votes to measure ideology and party loyalty; the ideology of a
major politician does not change very much in two years. The more liberal
a Democrat was, the more he or she voted with other Democrats; the correlation between ideology and partisanship was + .771 in the Senate and + .817
in the House of Representatives. There were sectional differences, too, with
Southerners the least supportive and Northeasterners slightly more loyal
than others outside the South. This is largely because Southern Democrats
continue to be somewhat more conservative than Democrats elsewhere; the
least loyal Democrat in each house, Senator Zell Miller of Georgia (who
backed his party only 2 percent of the time) and Representative Charles
Stenholm of Texas (59 percent), was a Southerner. Northeastern Democrats
were more liberal than Democrats elsewhere, especially in the Senate.

Party Mas,,;es
While Massachusetts senator John Kerry swept nearly every primary and
caucus, there was little variation in his vote from state to state (Burden 2005,
22- 34; Ceaser and Busch 2005, 69- 105, 109- 11, 114- 18; Day, Hadley, and
Stanley 2005, 74- 86; White 2005, 3- 20; Institute of Politics 2006). Exit
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polls reveal that Kerry appealed to different kinds of Democrats in different
primaries and caucuses. In seven states, he ran at least 10 percent better
among conservatives than among the very liberal; in two states, the reverse
was true; and in thirteen states, less than IO percent separated the two
groups. Similarly, it did not make a lot of difference whether a Democrat
thought that the war, the economy, health care, education, or taxes was the
main issue; all of these groups supported Kerry in roughly the same proportion. Instead, what defined the Kerry voter was a desire to win; on average,
voters who said they chose a candidate on the basis of his potential to beat
President Bush were 24 percent more likely to vote for Kerry than were voters who chose a candidate based on the issues. The Massachusetts senator
was the candidate of voters who made a cool calculation that he could win
in November rather than going with their ideological heart.
There was a further pattern to Kerry's support, however; his appeal to
relatively conservative Democrats was strong in the earliest events-the
Iowa caucuses, the New Hampshire primary, and especially the Vermont primary. These events all had in common the fact that former Vermont governor
Howard Dean ran a relatively strong race. That Dean-with his slashing attacks on the war, his criticism of the Democratic establishment, and his
claim to represent the "Democratic wing of the Democratic Party"appealed to liberals is not surprising (on the Dean campaign and his appeal
to liberals, see chapter 9 in this volume). In the five states where Dean received more than 10 percent of the vote, Kerry's appeal to conservative
Democrats was highest; in the other states, Kerry's supporters were all over
the ideological map. The conclusion to be drawn is that only the Dean candidacy revived old internal battles among Democrats. Where he was strong, he
appealed mainly to the most liberal Democrats, leaving Kerry to win moderates and conservatives. Dean also had an antiestablishment appeal, but no
candidate since Jimmy Carter has won a presidential nomination from either
party without the support of the party establishment (Cohen et al. 200 I).
Unfortunately for Dean, his bubble burst on the night of the Iowa caucuses,
and in most of the primaries, Kerry was free to win Democrats of all stripes.
As the November election approached, a cross-section of Americans was
surveyed about the campaign by the National Election Study. Who among
the Democrats had reservations about Kerry?
In answering this question, I included all people who considered themselves Democrats, registered or not. It has been shown that people who call
themselves independents but say that they lean toward a party behave in similar fashion to those who identify themselves with that party, albeit less
strongly (Keith et al. 1992). Therefore, in order to maximize the size of the
sample, I combined self-identified Democrats with those independents who
feh closer to Democrats than to Republicans.
At first glance, this group was highly supportive of Senator Kerry; about
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nine out of ten voters in the sample voted for him. But how many had reser•
vations about Kerry? All respondents were asked, "Is there anything in par•
ticular about John Kerry that might make you want to vote AGAINST him?"
Fully 28 percent of Democrats and Democrat•leaning independents replied
in the affirmative. The most frequent comments were that Kerry was indeci•
sive, was dishonest, and had a bad war record; this suggests that Republican
accusations that Kerry "flip-flopped" and had lied about his war record had
had some effect, even among Democrats. As figures 3.2 and 3.3 show, there
was not a consistent relationship between ideology and people's inclination
to say negative things about Kerry; this fits his record in the primaries. There
were sectional differences, however, with Southerners least negative about
him and Westerners most negative. About half the Southern Democrats in
the sample were African Americans, who are among the most loyal of Dem•
ocrats.

Republican Party Factionalism Today
While there have been no divided roll•call votes at Republican National
Conventions since 1976, surveys of delegates have shown that the earlier
Northeastern exceptionalism has persisted. In 1988, while Vice President

Figure 3.2 Percentnge of Democrats Who Suld There Wus Something uhout Kerry
They Disliked, by Ideology, 2004
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Figure 3.3 Percentage of Democruts Who Said There Was Something ubout Kerry
They Disliked, by Region, 2004
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George H. W. Bush's delegates were ideologically similar to those of his
chief rival, Kansas senator Bob Dole, Bush's Northeastern delegates were
markedly less conservative than his delegates from the rest of the country. In
1996, when abortion was the main issue among delegates, nominee Dole' s
Northeastern delegates took substantially more pro-choice positions than his
delegates outside the Northeast did. In 2000, exit polls of Republican voters
through Super Tuesday showed that the insurgent Senator John McCain received at least 33 percent of the vote in every state in the Northeast but did
not reach this percentage in any state outside the Northeast except his home
state of Arizona. McCain ran 25 percentage points better among selfdescribed Republican moderates than among conservatives (Reiter 200 I b).
In 2004, Republican factionalism was nonexistent. Like other recent
presidents- Ronald Reagan in 1984 and Bill Clinton in 1996-George W.
Bush faced not a whisper of opposition from any other prominent member
of his own party in his bid for renomination (Burden 2005, 34-35; Ceaser
and Busch 2005, 111- 15, 120- 22; Institute of Politics 2006). In order to
assess the state of Republican factionalism in 2004, therefore, we need to go
outside the primaries and caucuses that we examined for the Democrats.
What kinds of Republicans gave President Bush their strongest support, and
who were his chief critics? I will answer those questions by examining both
party elites and party masses. Those answers can help us speculate as to
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what a challenge to the president's renomination might have looked likeand what may happen in the future.

Party Elites
In 2004, according to Co11gressio11al Quarterly, the average Republican
senator or representative voted President Bush's way about 83 percent of the
time (CQ Weekly 2004b). Figure 3.4 shows some of the patterns, broken
down by region. In the Senate, only seven members out of fifty-one voted
Bush's way less than 90 percent of the time, and four of those were Northeastern moderates: Lincoln Chafee (Rhode Island), Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe (Maine), and Arlen Specter (Pennsylvania).
In general, what were the factors associated with high or low support of
Bush? The most obvious is ideology; the relationship between ideology and
support for Bush among Republican senators in 2004 was quite strong, with
a correlation coefficient of + .733. The fact that Northeastern Republican
senators were among the least supportive of Bush was mainly due to the
fact that so many of them were moderates. In the House of Representatives,
Northeastemers were also especially likely to be among President Bush's
weakest supporters within his own party. Although Northeasterners comprised only one-sixth of House Republicans, they made up half of the thirty
representatives who supported Bush no more than 75 percent of the time.
Figure 3.4 Support for Bush by Republican Members of Congress, by Region, 2004
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Unlike in the Senate, Midwestern Republican representatives were a bit less
likely to back Bush than were those from the Southeast and Far West. In the
House, the correlation between conservatism and support for Bush was
+ .628. The fact that so many moderates were from the Northeast explains
why Bush's support was lowest there. In short, whether a Republican member of Congress supported Bush was primarily a function of how conservative that person was. In light of Bush's mostly conservative policies, this is
not surprising.
P(lrty Masses

What about the mass of ordinary people who consider themselves Republican? In the National Election Study survey from the fall of 2004, Republicans were highly supportive of President Bush; more than nine out of
ten voters in the sample voted for him. What kinds of Republicans had reservations about Bush? As with the Democrats, all Republican respondents
were asked whether there was anything in particular about their party's candidate that might make them want to vote against him. Fully 37 percent of
Republicans replied in the affirmative. As figure 3.5 shows, liberal and centrist Republicans were more likely than conservatives to express reservations
about Bush; this is in keeping with the findings about congressional support
for Bush.

Figure 3.S Pcrcenlugc or Republicans Who Suid There Wus Something uboul Bush
They Disliked, by Ideology, 2004
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The geographic patterns shown in figure 3.6, however, are somewhat
surprising. While Northeastern Republicans were, as usual, Bush's greatest
critics, those from the Far West were nearly equally so. This may be the
result of the survey sample, which overrepresented the blue states of California, Oregon, and Washington; the only other Western states in the sample
were Colorado and Utah. The survey thus may have contained an oversample
of moderate Western Republicans. The three blue states, whose citizens represented 61 percent of Bush's Far Western voters, were 79 percent of the
National Election Study's Far Western Republican sample.
What specifically did Republicans cite as reasons not to want to vote for
Bush? The most frequent reason was dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq,
which was cited by more than one-third of the Republicans who cited any
reason at all. Among those expressing reasons not to vote for Bush, those
describing themselves as extremely conservative were far less likely to mention the war than other ideological groups, but that was the only predictable
link between ideology and views on the war. Furthermore, Midwesterners
were more likely than Republicans in other parts of the country to mention
the war. Other relatively common responses referred to Bush's family, his
level of intelligence, bad economic times, the national debt, and dishonesty.
The many references to the Iraq war tantalizingly suggest that an antiwar
Republican insurgency might have secured a sizable minority of votes in

Figure 3.6 Percentage of Republicans Who Said There Was Something about Bush
They Disliked, by Region, 2004
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some of the primaries and caucuses in 2004. There is other evidence that
many Republicans lacked confidence in Bush's conduct of the war. In a Gallup/CNN/USA Today survey conducted in late January and early February,
just as the primaries were starting, one-third of Republicans gave an antiwar
or anti-Bush response to at least one of the following questions: whether
they approved of Bush's conduct of the war, whether the war was worth getting involved in, whether the Bush administration had deliberately misled
the public about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and whether the
war could be justified only if WMD were found or would not be justified
even then. Since on all of these questions independents were far more critical
than Republicans of Bush, an antiwar candidate might have made an especially strong showing in open-primary states.

Conclusion
Many decades after the New Deal produced lasting factional divides
within each of the major parties, those cleavages continue to be relevant. In
2004, members of both parties in Congress voted in predictable ways, with
liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans being most loyal to the party
or to Bush, respectively. Ordinary Republicans, too, reacted to Bush as we
might expect, with conservatives happiest with him. Where Howard Dean
ran well in the primaries and caucuses, he attracted more liberal Democrats
than John Kerry did; Dean represented both ideological and antiestablishment appeals and so was able to activate old cleavages among Democrats.
However, 2004 also saw novel forms of intraparty disputes. Where Dean
did not run well, Kerry's support was across the board and not ideologically
distinctive. This pattern is a reflection of the great cohesiveness of the party,
where differences between candidates revolve around degrees of liberalism
and where an emphasis on Kerry's electability cut across many groups. On
the Republican side, dissatisfaction with Bush•s leadership of the war in Iraq
similarly cut across ideological lines and provides us with a good example
of how a particular issue can transcend older intraparty lines. Both the Kerry
candidacy and the war, however, were temporary phenomena, and there is
no reason to think that either of them will cause a lasting shake-up in party
factions. These patterns do, however, suggest that the alignments that developed a half-century ago are like old war wounds. Under the right circumstances, such as the Dean candidacy, the old fault lines can be reactivated.
At other times, the divisions within the parties are more obscure or are based
on circumstances of the moment such as the war in Iraq.
Perhaps we can best understand this mixed portrait as a result of the
increased ideological homogeneity of both major parties over the past half-

Party Factions in 2004

49

century, which was caused by a gradual realignment of voters into the party
that best represents their ideology. The net effect has been to unify both parties and render them more ideologically monolithic (Jacobson 2000, 17).
This process has been well documented by congressional scholars. Fleisher
and Bond (2000, 3- 4) have graphically shown the rise in party voting and
party unity scores in Congress since the late 1960s, and Sinclair (1996, 93)
has documented the shrinking gap between the voting records of Northern
and Southern Democrats in both houses. Hetherington (200 I) has provided
an especially useful analysis of these trends. (On the ideological differences
between Democratic and Republican national convention delegates, see the
next chapter in this volume.)
As the parties become more unified programmatically, and as the pressures for hanging together intensify due to the closeness of recent presidential and congressional races, we should expect that factions within the party
will become less polarized over policies and shaped more by evanescent factors such as the personalities of presidential candidates and short-term policy
controversies. In addition, presidential candidates of the same party are
likely to differ less on ideology than on the emphasis placed on different
parts of the agenda. Dean stressed the war in Iraq, while North Carolina senator John Edwards emphasized economic conditions. To some extent, these
controversies may reflect different strategies for winning elections (Reiter
1981 ).
The consequences for the parties are in many ways quite positive. When
factions were lasting and based on ideological differences, as they were for
years after the New Deal, it was often difficult for the parties to unite in
campaigns or to govern. Today, by contrast, each party enjoys more unity
than it has experienced for decades, perhaps more than ever. That unity enables it to carry out many of its functions better than it could if it were still
as divided as it was during the post-New Deal period, when many voters
seemed to lose interest in partisanship (Wattenberg 1984). Today, election
campaigns present a more unified image, with fewer prominent defectors,
and the majority party in Congress is able to govern more effectively than
before. There may still be echoes of earlier struggles when a party chooses
a presidential candidate or when the right issue arises, but bitter intraparty
rivalries that make governance difficult do not characterize the present era.
What about party factions in the immediate future? There is good reason
to believe that these patterns will persist in 2008. With President Bush unable to run again and Vice President Dick Cheney unwilling to run for president, both parties will have an opportunity for wide-open nominating races
in 2008. Once again, the Democrats will choose from an array of candidates
who range from the very liberal to the moderately liberal. Potential candidates with a liberal reputation, such as New York senator Hillary Rodham
Clinton, have already been moving toward the center, with an eye toward the
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general electorate, while lesser-known figures like Virginia governor Mark
Warner will surely be displaying their liberal good faith in order to woo
Democrats in the primaries and caucuses. On the more ideologically homogeneous Republican side, the hero of the moderates, Arizona senator John
McCain, has been mending fences with the Bush administration and other
conservatives, while more centrist figures like New York governor George
Pataki and Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney have begun to move rightward. At this early stage, there is every reason to believe that the ideological
range of candidates within each party will be limited and that each party
will be able to unite behind its nominee as soon as he or she clinches the
nomination.
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The State of the Party Elites
National Convention Delegates, 1992- 2004
John S. Jackson Ill, Nathan S. Bigelow, and John C. Green

The state of the party elites after the 2004 election can be succinctly
summarized in one word: polarized. The major party activists were sharply
different from each other on self-identified ideology and the major issues of
the day, advocating two quite different views of American government in a
systematic way. Although there is some variation by issue and within each
party, there can be no mistaking the sharp divisions between the leadership
echelons of the two major parties. Of course, this polarization is not entirely
new. Past studies, including our own, indicate that such divisions have existed for more than a decade, standing in stark contrast to the predominantly
pragmatic, nonideological parties of previous eras (see Jackson, Bigelow,
and Green 2003).
This essay is built on an empirical base of eight surveys of national convention delegates in the four presidential elections from 1992 to 2004. This
twelve-year period took the nation from President George H. W. Bush's
failed reelection bid to the reelection of his son, George W. Bush. On the
Democratic side, the period spans the 1992 election of Bill Clinton, a relatively unknown governor of Arkansas, through the unsuccessful 2004 quest
for the presidency by Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts. Much has
changed in this twelve-year period, especially on the defense and foreign
policy fronts. But much has also remained relatively stable, particularly with
regard to domestic issues. However, neither party is fully united on issues,
despite an increase in the prominence of moderate factions since 1992.

The Importance of Party Elites
The value of using national convention delegates to study the party elites
has been amply discussed and debated in the literature (Miller and Jennings
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1986; Kirkpatrick 1976; Maggiotto and Wekkin 2000; Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport 1986). While there are admittedly some drawbacks
and limitations to such an approach, there are also some significant advantages. Although the national conventions no longer determine presidential
nominations, the delegates constitute what Jeane Kirkpatrick called "the
presidential elite" within the two national parties (Kirkpatrick 1976). Once
every four years they are the embodiment of the national party organizations. For one week, meeting at the designated time and place, they are the
party's highest plenary body, exercising the power and authority of the entire national party. In addition to formally nominating the candidates for
president and vice president of the United States, they perform significant
additional functions, such as adopting the party's platform and the rules
under which the next presidential nominations will be conducted and holding a giant "pep rally" for the party's candidates (David, Goldman, and Bain
1960). The success or failure of the national conventions goes far in signaling the extent to which the party is united and ready for the general election
in the fall.
Convention delegates are often representatives of state and local party
organizations, displaying distinctive regional political cultures. They are also
often envoys from the party's interest group allies. And once the convention
is over, they become emissaries back to local party and interest group organizations, where they can play a critical role in rallying them for the presidential campaign. Thus delegates are a slice of life at the party's grass roots
and the broader activist pool, at least in the year of the presidential election.
In short, convention delegates can teach us much about the state of the presidential echelon of party activists in their election year.
One thing delegates can reveal is the distribution of issue positions between and within the major parties. In this regard, each party's delegates
embody the key policy differences with their rival party and also important
factional differences within each party's coalition- and they tend to hold
these views in a more consistent and sophisticated way than the mass public
(Jackson, Brown, and Bositis 1982). Scholars have found that these differences have become increasingly large and significant over the last several
decades (Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2003; Green, Jackson, and Clayton
I 999; Jackson and Clayton 1996). Indeed, one of the central pieces of evidence for party polarization in recent times has been the increasingly sharp
issue differences of these party elites (Pamper 2003). Social welfare issues
have long been fundamental to this polarization, but foreign policy and cultural issues have been added to the mix in recent times (Herrera I 995).
Indeed, the high level of party polarization could be a manifestation of a
new "values divide" and the advent of "culture wars" in American politics,
especially divisions over sexual and family issues. The values divide was
hotly debated after the 2004 election, but culture wars were widely discussed
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during the l 990s-especially after Pat Buchanan publicly proclaimed a culture war at the 1992 Republican National Convention. Although foreign policy questions were not a focus of this debate in the 1990s, they have often
been related to values disputes-and may be once again due to the Iraq war
and other contemporary controversies (Guth et al. 2005).
As with many concepts, there are two schools of thought. One argues
that the culture wars are real, rooted in deep value divisions in American
society. The public is polarized, with little middle ground or room for compromise. As a consequence, politics has degenerated into warring camps,
where political leaders reflect the disputes in the public (White 2003; Greenberg 2004). The contrarian school claims that the culture wars are much exaggerated. A degree of conflict over values has always existed in society, and
it is no worse than in the past. Moreover, the public is not especially polarized on such matters, and most Americans hold moderate issue positions that
make compromise possible. What passes for culture wars is the product of
small but intense minorities-and the decisions by political leaders to pursue
such divisions (Williams 1997; Fiorina 2005).
One of the few things these two schools agree upon is that political leaders, including party elites, are most likely to exhibit the values divide and
participate in the culture wars, whatever their character or source. Our data
can help determine the extent to which these new divisions contribute to
party polarization alone or in combination with other older divisions. After
briefly describing the source of our data, we will first review differences between the parties over the last four elections and then tum to divisions within
the parties.

The Surveys
The data in this study are part of the ongoing Party Elite Study and are
drawn from national surveys of the delegates to the Republican and Democratic national conventions for the years 1992- 2004. In each year, the methodology remained essentially the same. We obtained the official roster of
the delegates, listed by state, from the Democratic and Republican national
committees. A systematic random sample was then drawn from each list
using a skip interval designed to produce approximately one thousand original names and addresses from each party list. The questionnaires were
mailed initially the week after the national conventions were held. Each
questionnaire contained a cover letter from the study directors explaining the
study's purpose. Approximately one month after the first wave of questionnaires was mailed, a follow-up questionnaire was sent to nonrespondents.
The returned questionnaires were gathered up through the day of the national
elections.
Overall, we obtained a very respectable response rate in the range of
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40- 50 percent. In almost all cases, those who responded were not systematically different from nonrespondents. In the small number of instances where
systematic differences were discovered, we weighed the data to overcome
some demographic deficits among the respondents. Thus, we are confident
that the respondents are representative of all delegates to the national conventions in the year studied. The surveys contained a series of questions that
have been repeated, with their wording largely unchanged, across the entire
twelve years. In most cases, the questions were adopted from the National
Elections Study questions used on voters generally. Thus, the resulls should
be comparable across time and across both parties.

Party Divisions by Issues, 1992-2004
We begin with the self-identified ideology of the national convention
delegates. The question employed offered responses ranging from "very liberal" to "very conservative," with a "moderate" option offered between the
two ideological alternatives. Figure 4.1 provides the overall results for all the
national convention delegates from 1992 through 2004.
The ideological gap between the two parties is notable. The dominance
of self-identified conservatives among the Republicans is especially marked,
attracting between 71 and 81 percent of the Republican delegates during
these four elections. Most of the remainder, from one-fifth to one-fourth of
the total, called themselves moderates; there were almost no liberals. It is
also interesting to note that I 996, Bob Dole's convention, marked the apex
of the conservative dominance, a pattern that declined slightly in George W.
Bush's conventions of 2000 and 2004.

Figure 4.1
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On the Democratic Party's side, the picture is more mixed. Figure 4.1
shows that a majority called themselves liberals, but it is a narrow majority.
Of course, the term liberal was stigmatized in the 1990s, so that Democratic
activists may have preferred a "moderate" (or "progressive") label even if
they held liberal issue positions. In any event, there were almost as many
self-identified moderates as liberals among the Democratic delegates in the
last four presidential campaigns. In addition, the gap between the two categories was the narrowest during John Kerry's 2004 convention. Indeed, this
nearly even division probably reflects some of the larger battles between the
liberal wing of the party rallied by liberal groups and the more moderate
wing represented by the Democratic Leadership Council. This division goes
back at least to the Carter-Kennedy nomination battle of 1980 and perhaps
back even further to the McGovern insurgency in 1972 and the social movements of the 1960s. Clearly, "conservative" is not a popular label among
Democrats, and very few delegates chose the term over this period. Thus the
facile stereotype that Democrats are pure liberals is not borne out by these
data. In fact, the Republican elites are more ideologically consistent.
Social Welfare Issues

We tum next to specific issues that divide the two parties, beginning with
economic issues. The first of these is about the scope of governmental services, a defining difference between the two parties for many decades. Since
the New Deal, the Democrats have been known as the party that favors having the government provide a higher level of public services, particularly
to the poor and needy, while the Republicans have been opponents of "big
government," at least with regard to economic matters. Figure 4.2 provides
the results of a question about this issue.
Clearly, the question of providing more or fewer governmental services
does divide the two parties markedly. For the past three national elections,
80 percent or more of the Democratic delegates favored the "continue" or
"provide more" government services position, with only a smaller and
smaller percentage choosing the "provide fewer services" option.
On the Republican side, well over half favored the "fewer services" position, and this was the choice of more than 80 percent of the 1992 and 1996
delegates. It is interesting to note, however, that the 2000 and the 2004 convention delegations were somewhat more moderate on government services,
with only 61 and 62 percent, respectively, preferring a cut in government
services. Perhaps President Bush's "compassionate conservatism" appeal
had some resonance with these delegations. In addition, it may make a difference which government services are considered. The potential for cutting
farm subsidies and government support for American businesses have both
engendered deep divisions within the Republican majority in Congress dur-
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Figure 4.2 Government Services
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ing the Bush administration. It may also be that cutting services is more easily advocated by the "out party" than by the party in power. which is faced
with the burden of actually governing, making policy, and formulating budgets. Or perhaps the Republicans have become more diverse as they have
experienced electoral success and grown in numbers. Whatever the dynamics, it is notable that the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, both of which
the Republicans won, have produced somewhat more internal party division
on this issue.
Another deeply contentious issue between the two major parties has
been the question of providing health insurance. Harry Truman first proposed health care insurance for the elderly, but it was not until Lyndon Johnson led a large majority of Democrats in the Congress twenty years later that
Medicare and Medicaid were adopted. Bill and Hillary Clinton attempted to
extend this idea to all of the uninsured in 1993 and 1994, but their plan for
a complicated form of national health care failed in the face of determined
opposition from the insurance industry, many in the medical community,
and a united Republican Party. Since then, there has been a constant chorus
of complaints against the current system, particularly the problems of fortyfive million Americans who have no health insurance. Figure 4.3 provides
the views of the delegates on this topic.
It is very evident that the elites of the two parties are very polarized on
this issue. In 2004, 84 percent of the Republicans preferred private health
insurance plans, compared to 81 percent of the Democratic elites who preferred some form of government insurance. Only 9 percent of the Republican
delegates and 6 percent of the Democratic delegates took the other party's
characteristic position on this item. In addition, the Democrats' majority
support for the government insurance position has increased steadily since
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its low point of 1996. That was immediately after the collapse of the Clinton
health plan in 1994 and their significant midterm congressional election
losses of 1994. Even in face of that massive repudiation, fully 69 percent of
the Democratic delegates supported a governmental insurance plan, while
90 percent of the GOP delegates opposed it. On this matter, the two parties'
elites could hardly be more polarized. It is uncertain whether there could be
any middle ground found in such circumstances.
A new issue on the agenda in 2004 was the major tax cuts advocated by
President Bush and enacted by the Republican-controlled Congress. Although not strictly a social welfare issue, the major parties saw powerful
links to social welfare programs. The Democrats felt that the tax cuts benefited the rich and would reduce the capacity of the federal government to
help the poor, while the Republicans felt such cuts would restrain the size of
government and generate economic growth and reduce poverty. These party
elites were deeply polarized on Bush's tax cuts: 98 percent of Democrats
opposed them and 95 percent of Republicans supported them (data not
shown).
Another closely related domestic issue is whether government should
provide aid or special assistance to minority groups. Race has long been a
divisive issue in American politics, and conflict over race has been difficult
for the political system to process. The Civil War and the civil rights revolution of the 1950s and 1960s were among the most disruptive and conflictridden periods in American history, and we are still facing their legacy. More
recently, conflict over affirmative action programs divided the Republicans,
who are generally opposed to them, from the Democrats, who are generally
in favor. African Americans have become one of the bedrock components of
the Democratic Party, providing one of the most dependable bloc votes for
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lhe Democrats. Meanwhile, white Southerners have become almost equally
dedicated lo lhe Republican Party. Thus, any question overtly dealing with
race is likely to show very distinct differences. Figure 4.4 provides these
results.
Figure 4.4 indicates very distinct partisan differences on this difficult
issue. However, the two parties are somewhat less polarized on this issue
than they were on health insurance. This more modest level of polarization
is due largely to the decline of the Republicans' opposition to affirmative
action from 75 percent in 1996 lo 60 and 62 percent in 2000 and 2004, respectively. By comparison, the Democrats were more consistently in favor
of the liberal option, with a steady support in the range of almost threefourths of the delegates in each year. Again, it is the two George W. Bush
nominating conventions that provided some modicum of diversity on this
matter. The Bush administration has made a point of reaching out to minorities, especially Hispanics and to a lesser degree African Americans. If the
GOP begins to make inroads in these communities, ils internal heterogeneity
is likely to increase.

Defense Spending
Defense spending has been a particularly contentious issue that divides
the parties internally as well as polarizing them. But it is also an issue that
seems to be particularly susceptible to changes over time, depending on who
is in the White House and what is happening abroad. Figure 4.5 reflects these
long-term patterns.
In 1992, at the end of the George H. W. Bush administration, Democrats
were heavily in favor of decreasing defense expenditures, by a margin of 83

Figure 4.4 Minority Group Help
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Figure 4.5 Derense Spending
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percent to 7 percent. At the same time, the Republicans were deeply divided
over the Bush administration's policy of decreasing the defense budget in
response to the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union: 30
percent of the Republican delegates wanted to decrease expenditures while
24 percent wanted to increase expenditures; 46 percent were in the neutral
category. This ambivalence may have resulted partially from a desire to support their own party's president. Four years later, at the end of the first Clinton administration, this pattern had changed dramatically, with fully twothirds of the Republicans wanting defense expenditures increased and only
11 percent wanting them decreased. Meanwhile, Democratic delegate demands for decreased defense spending fell a bit to 72 percent.
By 2000, the Republican delegates' support for increased spending had
increased to fully 91 percent, a pattern that undoubtedly reflected a nearconsensus among the GOP that Clinton had weakened the U.S. military-a
charge George W. Bush raised repeatedly against Al Gore in the 2000 campaign. Thus, defense expenditures would probably have increased under the
second Bush administration even in the absence of 9/11 and the war in Iraq.
As it was, those two influences combined to dramatically expand the defense
budget by 2004. By that year, it was the Democrats who were divided, with
47 percent of the delegates advocating a decrease, 35 percent taking a neutral
position, and 18 percent advocating further increases. John Kerry's tentative
and contradictory handling of the issue vis-a-vis his contradictory armaments funding votes in the U.S. Senate in the 2004 campaign only reflected
the divisions among his own partisans.
In 2004, there were new foreign policy issues on the agenda, such as the
war in Iraq, and they divided the parties sharply. For example, 70 percent of
Democratic delegates believed the Iraq war was "completely unjustified,"
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while 76 percent of Republican delegates thought it was "completely justified" (data not shown).
Cultural Issues

In the parlance of the "values divide" and "cultural wars" language, few
issues have been as divisive as the battle over abortion. In fact, one could
make the case that the Supreme Court's landmark case of Roe 1•. Wade
( 1973) helped ignite the culture war and was the major stimulus for millions
of evangelical Christians to enter the political process qua religious advocates for the first time. Given the respective party platform statements on this
issue, one might expect extensive polarization of the party elites. After all,
the Republican platform was unequivocal in its pro- life position and the
Democratic platform just as unequivocal in its pro-choice advocacy during
the period under study. Certainly the popular stereotypes of the two parties
place them at loggerheads on this highly salient issue. Figure 4 .6 provides
the results.
The problem with the popular stereotype is that it contains some distortion. The Democrats generally live up to their pro-choice image. Over the
first three national conventions in this era, the pro-choice position support
ranged from 82 to 90 percent. Interestingly enough, only in 2004 was there
some decline, down to 76 percent pro-choice and 23 percent taking the more
ambivalent position among the Democrats. Among Republican delegates,
ambivalence and moderation were the popular positions: in all four conventions, well over half of the Republicans wanted to approve abortions in some
cases and less than 20 percent took the pure pro-life position of the party's
national platform. This issue is an example of how an intense minority can

Figure 4.6 Abortion
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dominate a party's public policy position. The pro-life components of the
Republican Party's base are very vocal and very mobilized, and they are
able to dominate the political discourse in speaking for the Republican Party.
However, the data in figure 4.6 indicate that they do not speak for the majority of GOP party elites.
At least on the Republican side of the equation, this is one "value" issue
where the moderates predominate. The problem is that the Democrats do not
offer much moderate cover here. In addition, the Democrats are also not the
governing party at this time; they only have the challenge of maintaining the
status quo, which is much easier to do than advocating fundamental
change- and can be done with a minority of votes in the U.S. Senate. The
parties are certainly divided on abortion but not fully polarized: a strongly
pro-choice Democratic majority faces a moderate to pro-life range on the
Republican side. In fact, it may be the Republicans who better reflect the
ambivalence about abortion evident in most public opinion polls. This fight
was focused in the second term when President Bush nominated two new
Supreme Court members and will undoubtedly continue.
A new but closely related issue appeared on the political agenda in 2004:
the legalization of same-sex marriage. After the state supreme court legalized the practice in Massachusetts, the issue became a critical feature in the
campaign, with President Bush endorsing an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to prevent same-sex marriage and Christian Right groups putting
eleven initiatives on state ballots with the same goal (data not shown). On
this issue, the delegate opinion was in some ways a mirror image of opinion
on the abortion issue. Among Democrats, 48 percent favored same-sex marriage, with the remainder opposing it (but with 40 percent in favor of civil
unions). For the Republicans, just 4 percent supported same-sex marriage
and 72 percent favored traditional marriage only (and another 24 percent
open to civil unions).
Over the recent decade, the question of school choice has come to be
deeply divisive in the United States. It is an issue carrying the weighty concerns over education for schoolchildren overlaid with issues of race and religion. Should public tax money, in the form of vouchers, be provided to parents to transfer their children out of often troubled public schools, especially
in the central cities, and into more successful schools-public or private, and
potentially religious based-often in the suburbs? Democrats, who have a
heavy contingent of teachers and their unions in their base, say no. Republicans, with a heavy contingent of evangelical Christians in their camp, say
yes to school choice and to vouchers. Figure 4.7 provides the results for four
elections.
The data paint a picture of dramatically polarized party elites. Well over
80 percent of the Democrats were opposed to school choice in the past three
elections, while almost as many Republicans favored it. Only the Democrats
in 1992 showed much variation in this monolithic party polarization. This
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Figure 4.7 School Choice
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issue will remain on the agenda because the Republican majority in Congress is in favor of some form of school choice and President Bush has persistently advocated it. The Democrats are reduced to a position of attempting
to block change here, and it is unclear how long their veto of some form of
vouchers or school choice plans can be maintained. A number of school systems have already adopted some variation on this theme. and many others
are considering this change with the active support of the U.S. Department
of Education behind them.
The next item shows how a party's position can wax and wane depending on the circumstances. In the early to mid- l 990s, term limits were very
popular, especially among some conservatives and Republicans. Newt
Gingrich• s 1994 "Contract with America" promised term limits for Congress. Meanwhile, some twenty states adopted term limits for their legislative and executive branches, and most of those would probably have extended those same limits to the U.S. Congress if the Supreme Court had not
declared such limits enacted by the states to be unconstitutional. Then the
Republicans took over the majority in the Congress in 1994, maintaining that
majority ever since except for a brief interlude in the Senate from January
200 I to December 2002. Some states have even contemplated abandoning
their term limits now that they have more experience, although the "rollback" position does not enjoy widespread popularity. Figure 4.8 reflects
those changes.
Almost three-fourths of the GOP delegates in 1992 favored term limits,
but by 2000 this position had declined to well below a majority. Clearly the
Republicans are now deeply divided internally on this issue. A Democratic
majority was always opposed to term limits, and they have not changed much
on this position. Democratic support for term limits started at 25 percent in
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1992 and has stood at 16 or 17 percent ever since. This issue seems to be an
instance where the more the political elites learned about a policy and its
application in the real world of practical politics, the less they liked it.

Issues Dimensions, 1992-2004
How did these attitudes fit together among Republican and Democratic
delegates between 1992 and 2004, and how did the structure of opinion vary
over time? To answer these questions, we performed a factor analysis on selfidentified ideology and the seven issue questions found in all four surveys,
for each year and then for all four years combined.'
Table 4.1 presents the results of this analysis for both sets of party elites.
The first column shows the results from 1992 to 2004, and the next four
columns replicate the analysis for each year individually. The results confirm
our previous finding that the rival party elites are quite polarized. The gulf
between the parties is greatest on self-identified ideology, followed by social
welfare issues such as government services, national health insurance, and
help for minorities. The social issues were modestly less polarizing overall,
but abortion and school choice became more so after 1992. Defense spending and term limits were less important overall ( 1992-2004) largely because
of the dramatic changes in the pattern of opinion already noted: defense
spending had become more divisive by 2004 and term limits less so. But
regardless of specific issue patterns, it is clear that major party elites were
sharply divided along liberal-conservative lines.
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Tobie 4. 1 Structure or Opinion, Nutionol Convention Delegutcs, 1991-1004

Factor loadings
Liberal Ideo logy
Maintain government services
Support national health insurance
Support minority assistance
Oppose school choice
Support abortion rights
Decrease defense spending
Oppose term limits
Eigenvalue
% variance explained
Weighted N
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/ 992- 2004

The Internal Strucfllre of Democratic Opinion
Within this overall pattern of interparty division, there is considerable
variation within each party. Two dimensions of opinion emerge from this
analysis when the Democrats were analyzed alone (Jackson, Bigelow, and
Green 2003). The first dimension might be called "welfare liberalism"; it
is composed of self-identified ideology and altitudes on defense spending,
national health insurance, and help for minorities. Delegates on one end of
this dimension of opinion strongly identified as liberals and supported the
central priorities of the welfare state (with reduced defense spending to free
up resources for domestic priorities). Delegates on the other end of this dimension were more likely to identify as moderates, less eager to cut defense
spending and skeptical of new welfare initiatives.
The second dimension can be cautiously labeled as " antigovernment
populism"; at its core were attitudes on school choice, tenn limits, and the
scope of government services. We use the term allfigovernmellt to distinguish the targets of this populism-public officials, as opposed to business
and corporate officials, which represented another form of populism advocated by the Left. 2 This measure reveals that hostility to government elites
was a significant part of the structure of opinion among some Democratic
delegates. Delegates on one end of this dimension favored school vouchers,
term limits, and modest reductions in the level of government services; delegates on the other end, who were much more numerous, had an unfavorable
view of such limitations, implying a more positive view of government officials. It is worth noting that abortion loads on both factors, revealing the
nearly uniform pro-choice positions of these delegates. Of course, abortion
rights can be thought of both as an element of welfare liberalism and as op-
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position to the power of government officials. These two dimensions of
Democratic opinion were quite stable in the four years under study, with a
slight weakening of the populist dimension by 2004.
The /111emal Structure of Republican Opinion

The Republican delegates have a more complex structure of opinion.
Readers accustomed to thinking of the Democrats as more diverse than the
Republicans may find this result surprising, but other studies of Democratic
and Republican elites in the 1980s found similar patterns (see Green and
Guth 1991 ). Three dimensions emerge from this analysis (Jackson, Bi •
gelow, and Green 2003). The first dimension, which we label "anti-welfare
state conservatism," contains attitudes on minority assistance, government
services, and national health insurance. In many respects, this dimension is
the opposite of the "welfare liberalism" dimension among the Democratic
delegates. Republicans on one end of this dimension strongly opposed these
public programs, while those on the other end expressed considerable support. Presumably, this conservatism is associated with support for free market ideology.
The second dimension might be called "cultural conservatism" and includes views on abortion, self-identified ideology, and to a lesser extent
school choice. On one end of this continuum are the cultural conservatives
who became prominent in the GOP during the 1990s; on the other end are
the cultural moderates once dominant in the party.
Finally, the third Republican dimension is a counterpart to the "antigovernment populism" found among the Democrats. For Republicans, this dimension is defined by support for term limits, and to a lesser extent, school
choice and increased defense spending. So, these Republican populists supported some limits on public officials but were also strongly nationalistic;
nonpopulists were deeply skeptical of such limits on public officials and less
supportive of a larger defense budget.
Unlike the Democratic dimensions, these Republican dimensions were
much less stable over time, varying considerably from year to year. The
three basic dimensions appeared in 1992, 1996, and 2004, but with slightly
different loading in each year. The most consistent dimension was antigovemment populism, and the major exception was in 2000, when the welfare
and cultural issues merged into a single dimension (thus paralleling the twodimension structure of the Democrats). This bridging of economic and social
conservatism may well have arisen from the strong desire to win back the
White House in 2000. However, in 2004 the GOP delegates were again divided along economic and social lines, much as in 1992 and 1996.
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Factions among Party Elites, 1992-2004
To better visualize this structure of opinion among the delegates, we created a crude measure of factions among the party elites.1 Here we dichotomized the issue dimensions at the mean and then cross•tabulated them to
group the delegates with various combinations of "high" and "low" scores.
For the Democrats, the two issue dimensions produced four such "factions."
For the Republicans, this strategy produced eight groups, but upon inspection we combined three very similar categories for a total of six factions. 4

Democratic Factions
The four Democrntic factions represent various combinations of welfare
liberalism and antigovernment populism. The most recognizable of these
groups we labeled the "Traditional Liberals" because they scored high
(above the mean for all Democrats) on welfare liberalism and low on populism. Another group was essentially the opposite, scoring low (below the
mean for all Democrats) on welfare liberalism and high on antigovemment
populism~ we called this group the "Traditional Centrists."
The other two factions represent additions largely peculiar to the 1990s.
We call one the "Populist Liberals" because they score high on welfare liberalism but also high on antigovemment populism. With some apprehension,
we label the remaining faction the "New Democrats"; they scored low on
welfare liberalism (consistent with the fiscal restraint of the Democratic
Leadership Council) as well as low on the populist dimension (fitting with
the Council's pro-government vision). These groupings- and their labelsshould be viewed with caution, since they reflect differences within parties
that are often much smaller than interparty differences on the issues. However, they allow us to observe the changes in the makeup of the Democratic
convention delegates from 1992 to 2004 (see figure 4.9). Some of these
changes reflect shifts in opinion over time among party elites, but others
arise from the presence of new elites with different opinions. It is beyond
the scope of this essay to delineate the relative impact of these two sources
of change. What we can observe is the "state of party elites" on the eve of
each presidential campaign.
The 1992 Democratic National Convention was a low point for the Traditional Liberals in the 1990s: they made up only about one-fifth of delegates
that year. This situation may reflect some discouragement with liberal activism leftover from three straight presidential defeats at the hands of Ronald
Reagan and George H. W. Bush. However, the Traditional Liberals rebounded in 1996, rising to more than one-third of all delegates, and then
declined to a bit under one-third in 2000 and remained at about that level in
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Figure 4.9 Democratic Faction Groups
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2004. This change reflects the polarization of the Democratic elites on social
welfare issues we observed above.
The trajectory of the Traditional Liberals was influenced by the rise and
fall of the Populist Liberals. In 1992, they were the single largest faction,
making up more than two-fifths of the total. No doubt these delegates were
influenced by the populism sweeping across the nation at the time and the
critique it offered of welfare liberalism. This faction declined sharply after
1992, making up between one-sixth and one-tenth of the delegates in subsequent years. The decline was propelled by a shift away from support for
school choice, and to a lesser extent, term limits among the delegates who
served in these conventions.
The Traditional Centrists made up about a quarter of the delegates in
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1992, outnumbering the Traditional Liberals. They remained essentially unchanged in size in 1996, declined slightly in 2000, and rebounded somewhat
in 2004-ending the period with a little more than one-fifth of the delegates,
almost half the size of the Traditional Liberals in 2000 and 2004. The decline
of support for school choice hurt this faction, but it was buoyed by the shift
in defense priorities among Democratic delegates.
The Traditional Centrists had to compete with a new "centrist" faction
during this period, the New Democrats. This faction was quite small in the
1992 convention, accounting for about an eighth of the delegates. This suggests that Bill Clinton and Al Gore were first nominated by a variety of other
Democratic factions but then increased their following by one means or another: the New Democratic delegates more than doubled by 1996, making
up more than one-quarter of the total, and then expanded to more than twofifths in 2000, becoming the single largest faction among the Democrats. In
2004, the New Democrats experienced a slight decline (to 31 percent) but
remained the second largest faction within the party. Thus, the fortunes of
the New Democrats are inversely related to the popularity of antigovernment
populism.
Overall, it appears that Clinton fundamentally changed the Democratic
Party elites. In 1992, Populist and Traditional Liberals, along with Traditional Centrists, dominated the party elites. Since then, the New Democrats
have supplanted the antigovernment populists and challenged the more liberal wing of the party. But this latter argument is far from settled and is
likely to be on display again in the 2008 election. Some, like former presidential candidate and Democratic National Committee chair Howard Dean,
argue that only by stressing core liberalism will the Democrats regain majorities in Congress and retake the White House. Others, perhaps including Hillary Clinton, argue that the New Democrat approach is the best way to regain
power in a country that may have shifted rightward on at least some matters.

Rep11blica11 Factions
The six Republican factions are displayed in figure 4.10. The GOP was
rife with factions in the early 1990s, representing both the successes and
failures of the Reagan-Bush era. By 2000 and 2004, the Republicans had
solidified around two dominant factions, even though the others did not disappear altogether.
"Traditional Conservatives" are those delegates who score low on both
social welfare and cultural conservatism but less so on antigovemment populism issues. In partial contrast, the "Populist Conservatives" score high on
all three dimensions, adding strong support for school choice and especially
term limits to conservative positions on economic and social issues. The core
of the Christian Right can be found among the Populist Conservatives, in
addition to other elements of the "hard Right," such as gun owners and anti-
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Figure 4.10 Republican Faction Groups
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tax advocates. However, some of these constituencies are found among the
Traditional Conservatives as well.
A similar division occurs among the historic rivals of the hard Right in
Republican circles. These factions include the "Moderates" and the "Populist Moderates." Both score relatively low on welfare and cultural conservatism, but the former are also low on antigovemment populism, while the
latter have high scores on populism. These two factions contain much of the
traditional business and professional constituency of the Republican Party.
(Of course, these "Moderates" were still far more conservative than the
Democratic delegates.)
"Libertarians" score high on economic conservatism and low on social
conservatism, as well as high on the issues related to populism, largely on
the grounds of personal liberty. Finally, the "Progressives" are the remnant
of the once-potent "Liberal Republicans," who score the most liberal on
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welfare and cultural issues and low on populism. The Progressives have
shrunk to less than 10 percent of the total since 1992.
Much as it did among the Democrats, the populism of the 1990s rearranged the factions within the GOP. The Traditional Conservatives made
up only under one-twentieth of the delegates in 1992, largely because of the
Populist Conservatives, who made up almost one-fifth of the total. However,
the Traditional Conservatives made a rebound in 1996, growing to about
one-fifth of the delegates in 2000 and 2004. Fueled in part by the decline in
support for term limits, this expansion was especially evident after the GOP
victories in the 1994 elections. However, the Populist Conservatives maintained nearly one-fifth of the delegates in 1996 before declining to one-tenth
in 2000 and less than one-tenth in 2004.
The Moderates experienced a similar trajectory. In 1992, they made up
about one-sixth of the delegates, eclipsed by the Populist Moderates at almost one-fifth. However, the Moderates made a big comeback in 1996, doubling in size to almost one-third. Much of this gain appears to have been at
the expense of the Populist Moderates, whose numbers declined, falling to
about one-tenth of the GOP delegate pool. This trend continued in 2000,
where the Moderate faction expanded to an outright majority of the GOP
delegates, and the Populist Moderates declined to less than one-tenth. In
2004, the Moderates slipped just below their outright majority but remained
the dominant faction.
So, the long-standing debate over how conservative the GOP should be
was submerged briefly by a surge of populism in 1992 but then resurfaced
once the surge subsided. Both the Libertarians and Progressives suffered
dramatic declines over the period. Each made up over a fifth of the delegates
in 1992 but fell steadily to less than a twentieth by 2000 and remained just
above that level in 2004. The merging of the economic and social conservatism in 2000 sharply reduced the distinctiveness of these small factions, but
they did not entirely disappear.

The Character of the 2004 Party Factions
What types of delegates made up these different factions in each party
in 2004? Although a full description is beyond the scope of this essay, a few
salient features are worth discussing. Convention delegates are chosen at the
state level, so it should come as no surprise that the factions had a distinctive
regional distribution. The centrist Democratic factions were overrepresented
by Midwestern and Southern delegates, while delegates from the liberal factions were mostly from the North and West. In part, this regional distribution
represents the effects of political competition: Democratic delegates from
safe Republican states were the most likely to come from the centrist fac-
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tions of the party, while the more liberal factions dominated safe Democratic
states. Interestingly. delegates from battleground states represented an almost even distribution of the Democratic factions.
In part, the regional distribution reflects different political cultures. Although there were no significant gender or racial differences among these
factions, there were important religious divisions. The more libernl factions
contained the largest number of secular delegates and delegates from nonChristian faiths. Black Protestants were common in all the factions but especially among the Populist Liberals and New Democrats. Catholics were most
common among the centrist factions, and so were both mainline and evangelical Protestants.
These religious differences are reflected in the issue of same-sex marriage. The two centrist factions opposed same-sex marriage, but with a majority in favor of civil unions. In contrast, some two-thirds or more of the
liberal factions backed same-sex marriage and less than one-tenth supported
traditional marriage only. But the Democratic delegates were nearly unanimous in their opposition to the Iraq war, with only very modest variation
across factions.
By the time they convened in Boston at the end of July 2004, most Democratic delegates expressed strong support for John Kerry-their presumed
nominee. However, when asked which candidate they originally supported,
the four Democratic factions expressed some notable differences. The two
moderate factions (Traditional Centrists and New Democrats) were most
likely to favor John Kerry or John Edwards. The Traditional and Populist
Liberals were the most likely to support Howard Dean or Dennis Kucinich.
There were also strong regional patterns for the Republican factions in
2004. Southerners made up two-fifths of the two most conservative factions
but made up roughly one-third of the other factions as well. Westerners were
also most common among the two most conservative factions at more than
one-quarter and then declined elsewhere. Northerners were most common
among the more moderate factions, especially the Progressives and Populist
Moderates. It is worth noting that the dominant Moderate faction had the
most even regional distribution. Like their Democratic counterparts, Republican delegates from safe Republican states were most likely to represent a
conservative faction within their party. The moderate factions were also
likely to come from safe Republican states, while the small group of Libertarians was overrepresented in battleground states and the tiny Progressive
faction in Democratic states.
In terms of religion, evangelical Protestants dominated all the Conservative and Populist factions. Indeed for the two most conservative factions,
evangelicals outnumbered the next largest group, mainline Protestants, by
more than two to one. Evangelicals were less common among the more moderate factions, and their place was taken by mainline Protestants, the single
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largest group, but also by Catholics, who were a close second. The few Republican delegates who identified themselves as secular were most likely
members of the Libertarian faction. Other religious minorities were rare in
all the factions.
These patterns of religious affiliation help explain the factions ' views on
marriage. A majority of all but one of the factions favored traditional marriage only, usually by very large margins. The exception was the Progressives, where a large majority favored civil unions. Indeed, support for civil
unions increased steadily from the most conservative to most liberal factions. There was little support for same-sex marriage, with the exception o f
the Libertarians, among whom about one-sixth backed the option. In 2004,
the more conservative factions of the Republican Party united behind President Bush, including support for the Iraq war. Note, however, that there was
some modest skepticism about the war on the part of the more liberal
factions.
Conclusion
In 2004, the major party elites were strongly polarized on a wide variety
of issues. This pattern of polarization was common in the l 990s, and in some
modest respects, the patterns in 2000 and 2004 reflect a bit more moderation
compared to 1992 and 1996 (see Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2003). But
such modest changes were overwhelmed by the strong and persistent divisions between the major parties on key social welfare issues, such as the
scope of government services and health insurance. And new issues that
arose in 2004, such as the Iraq war, the Bush tax cut, and same-sex marriage,
tended to strongly reinforce the existing party differences.
Clearly, cleavages over social welfare were the most important divisions
between the major party elites. Foreign policy was often a strong source of
division, but it was more variable over time, reflecting the international situation as well as the party that held the White House. Similarly, the values
divide and culture wars disputes reinforced the ideological differences between the parties, though in a less consistent way. It is interesting that the
hot-button cultural issues created asymmetrical patterns within the parties.
For example, the Democratic delegates were strongly pro-choice on abortion, but the Republicans were not comparably pro-life, with a plurality holding moderate positions. A comparable asymmetry occurred on marriage: the
GOP delegates were very strong supporters of traditional marriage only,
while the Democratic delegates had more diverse opinion, with the largest
numbers favoring civil unions rather than same-sex marriage.
However, within this pattern of interparty polarization, neither party is
fully united. Over the period of study, the Democrats were characterized by
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four factions, rnnging from consistently liberal to centrist, while the Republican had six factions, reaching from consistently conservative to moderate.
These patterns suggest that the Democrats are more divided by demography
and the Republicans by ideology. It is worth noting that these findings on
intraparty differences are greater than has been observed in studies of elected
officials, such as members of Congress (see chapter 3 and also Pomper
2003). This may result from the fact that the nation's regions are more fully
represented among delegates than other kinds of political elites. After all,
conventional delegates always include Southern Democrats and New England Republicans, whereas these groups are markedly Jess likely to be
elected to Congress.
The relative size of these factions was not especially stable over the period in question. In fact, there was considerable change in the relative size
of the factions, with two factions, the New Democrats and Moderate Republicans, becoming dominant over the period. In part, these changes reflect
shifts in elite opinion, such as a decline in support for term limits, but also
the appearance of new delegates, many of them elected in support of Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush. The increased influence of these moderate factions reflects to some extent an increase in party unity. So by 2004, the major
parties had become more distinctive and united on many issues.
This state of party elites has important implications for the party system.
For one thing, it means that party organizations are Jess likely to be riven by
bitter ideological disputes and that the disputes that do occur are more likely
to have positive consequences for the party as a whole. It also means that
factionalism is Jess likely to stand in the way of competing for votes against
the rival party that is characterized by quite different issue positions. Finally,
it means that voters are more likely to hear consistent political messages that
reflect the underlying values of the party. All this can contribute to clearer
choices at the polls and more consistent government after the election. Of
course, this situation also means that national politics is likely to be characterized by fierce partisanship between disciplined armies with opposite visions for government and an inability to compromise on policy. If the state
of party elites is any guide, there is no reason to believe that such a high
level of partisanship will decline anytime soon.

Notes
I. For purposes of 1his analysis, we used 1hc full range of lhc survey ilcms. To assure
the number of cases in each of lhc studies did not bias the results, we weighted each set of
party dclcgalcs and each year equally. We performed a principal components analysis with a
varimax rotalion; sec Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2003 for a full discussion.
2. Items for the individual surveys suggest that opposition lo corporate clilcs is likely
to be slrongly associated wilh welfare liberalism.
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3. Herc, we define fac1ions by issue positions rather than membership in or affect toward
factional organizations. Of course, issue positions and affiliation with such organizations arc
highly correlated (Green, Jackson, and Clayton 1999).
4. For these purposes, we used factor scores generated by pooling all four surveys. For
the Democrats, the results arc straightforward because the same two-factor solution emerged
in the pooled data. The Republicans were more complicated: the pooled data generated a
three-factor solution, with economic conservatism (government services, national health insurance, and help for minorities), social issue conservatism (ideology, abortion, school
choice), and populism (term limits, school choice, and defense spending) factors. We used
factor scores from this analysis to define the GOP factions.

5

State Party Activists and State Party Polarization
Daniel J. Coffey

In recent years American political parties have become increasingly polarized. Numerous studies of party activists and elected officials have shown
that the degree of ideological homogeneity within each party across issues
has increased significantly since the mid- l 970s (Aldrich 1995; Carsey and
Layman 2002). Some have gone so far as to argue that American parties
have become as ideologically coherent and programmatic as their European
counterparts (Pomper 2003). Moreover, the rise in the ideological differences between the parties coincides with substantial increases in the organizational strength of the parties. American party organizations have more
money, staff, and technology and have been making efforts to coordinate
their activities down the to county and precinct level (Aldrich 2000; Morehouse and Jewell 2003b; Clark and Prysby 2004).
Changes in mass public opinion, however, do not appear to be the guiding force behind the polarization of the parties. Fiorina (2005), for example,
finds that on most issues, differences between the views of Democrats and
Republicans in the electorate are modest at best and do not appear to be
increasing over time. However, there is some disagreement on this point. For
example, Abramowitz and Saunders ( 1998), Bartels (2000), and Hetherington (200 I) all have found evidence that increases in elite polarization have
increased the public's awareness of partisan differences, which has in turn
increased the salience of party identification for the mass public, leading to
less split-ticket voting and increases in party attachment. At the same time,
however, the high degree of polarization among elites cannot be fully explained by what have been modest increases in partisanship in the general
public. For example, several studies have shown that party unity scores and
the ideological differences between party members in Congress are at their
highest levels in nearly a century (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Pomper 2003).
In contrast, in 2004, while 76 percent of citizens believe that there are important differences between the parties- the highest proportion in nearly fifty
years of National Election Studies- the percentage of citizens who strongly

76

Daniel J. Coffey

identify with either party is modestly higher (31 percent) than it was in 1988,
when only 60 percent saw important differences between the parties, and is
considerably lower than the 38 percent of citizens who were strong partisans
in 1964, when just 55 percent of respondents perceived that there were important differences between the two parties (American National Election
Studies).
One reason for the lack of polarization is the structure of modern political parties. Shea (2003) argues that the resurgence of party organizations in
recent years has actually led to lower levels of turnout, citizen trust in government, and participation in civic organizations. This is partly because parties tend to focus on providing numerous technical services for candidates,
such as raising money, providing seminars in effective campaign tactics, and
distributing poll results. As a result, the public remains largely disengaged
from the parties. Moreover, the revival of political parties in recent years has
been the result of the mobilization of ideological activists. As Bibby ( 1999)
points out, modern parties are in many ways networks of allied interest
groups and issue advocates. The dependence on such groups for financial
and electoral support has produced more ideologically polarized candidates
and parties, who have little incentive to reach out to citizens not affiliated
with these groups, as mobilizing voters is costly and uncertain (Shea 2003).
As a result, as White and Shea (2004, 65-67) note, in some polls only about
one-quarter of respondents feel that the two-party system is appropriate for
solving the nation's problems.
One consequence of these developments is a substantial disconnect between the views of political party activists and the larger citizenry. As the
primary representative institutions in American politics, the ability of parties
to represent the broader public is of fundamental importance (Schattschneider 1942; Key 1949; Epstein 1986). It is true that party activists have always been more ideological than the electorate and than the rank and file in
their own party (Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport 1986). What is less
appreciated is that to a large extent, parties may not be capable of representing the larger citizenry because the views of party activists are considerably
different from the larger public's views (Fiorina 2005).
This problem is especially true at the state level, where open party structures allow ideological activists to control state party organizations (Usher
2000). Several studies, for example, have shown that activists associated
with the Christian Right are very strong within numerous state Republican
parties (Green, Rozell, and Wilcox 2000; Layman 2001). For instance, as
Hacker and Pierson's (2005) study of the 2001 tax cuts indicates, the cultivation of activist support by elected officials can result in public policies that
diverge significantly from the preferences of the median voter. They argue
that modern politics produces powerful incentives for elected officials to
craft legislation and make campaign appeals to avoid punishment by well-
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organized interest groups and an ideologically extreme base of supporters
who control important financial resources. While their study focuses on the
skewed policies that have resulted from the Republican Party's mobilization
of conservative activists, the same can be said of the Democratic Party and
iL'i dependence on liberal interest groups (Berry 1999). As a result, both parties have significant financial and electoral incentives to pursue agendas or
take policy positions that are significantly to the right or left of the state
political center. In such an environment, party agendas should be more likely
to be driven to satisfy a reliable core of supporters instead of the general
public, and this should help to account for the lack of voter attachment to
increasingly well-organized, well-funded, and competitive state parties.
How does party ideology vary across state parties? There is substantial
research that parties and elected officials are highly responsive to public
opinion (Downs 1957; Page and Shapiro 1992). Research on state politics
has found that public opinion has a substantial effect on state public policy.
Specifically, Erikson, Wright, and Mclver's (1993) comprehensive analysis
of state public opinion provides strong evidence that differences in the ideology of elected officials and public policy from state to state are caused by
differences in median public opinion. Their research is supported by several
studies showing a strong link between public opinion, elite ideology, and
state public policy (Hill and Leighley 1993; Berry et al. 1998).
The analysis that follows will compare the relative influence of median
pubic opinion and party activist opinion on state party agendas. Using data
from state party platforms, I find that activist opinion is more strongly corre•
lated with the ideology of state party platforms and especially the polarization
between platforms within the same state. In addition, state political culture
significantly influences party platform ideology, with moralist states having
more ideological platforms than individualist states. Finally, counterintuitively, more competitive state party systems are more ideologically polarized
than states in which there is relatively little competition between the parties.
In every specification of models of party platform ideology below, I find that
median statewide public opinion has no influence on platform ideology.

Why Party Platforms?
This chapter analyzes party representation using an unconventional
method. Instead of looking at state legislative roll-call voting (as was done
in Aldrich and Battista 2002) or public opinion surveys (like Erikson,
Wright, and Mciver 1993 and Berry et al. 1998), I use state party platforms
to measure party ideology. Previous studies that analyzed state party platforms have found that they are reliable indicators of state party positions
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(Elling 1979; Paddock 1998). Paddock ( 1992), for example, measured party
ideology using state party platforms and found party ideological differences
became increasingly polarized between 1956 and 1980, while Elling found
that once in office, legislative parties make serious efforts to fulfill the commitments of the state party platform.
The analysis of state platforms has several advantages. Across states,
there is variance in political culture, levels of turnout, party organizational
strength, and intraparty competition (Morehouse and Jewell 2003b). As a
result, a variety of hypotheses about the relative influence of public opinion
and activist opinion on party positions can be tested.
As such, an examination of state party agendas is ideal for analyzing
how state parties represent citizens, as they provide an excellent comparative
measure of party ideology. At first glance, state party platforms may seem
of little importance. None of the provisions are binding on politicians within
the party, and most interest groups place their efforts on direct lobbying or
mobilizing grassroots support in elections to influence party positions on issues. Yet there are several reasons why an analysis of party platforms is an
appropriate tool for analyzing intra- and interparty differences across state
parties. State party platforms provide a standard unit of analysis for measuring party ideology across the states. Given the difficulties of measuring party
elite and activist ideology at the state level, platforms are indicators of party
positions that can be obtained by researchers with little effort.
In essence, this approach allows parties, through activists and elites, to
put into their own words what matters most in politics. As Gerring argues,
"Any study of party ideologies is ... a study of what politics is all about.
Since political parties are one of the chief disseminators of political culture,
partisan rhetoric provides a window into the values and attitudes that have
guided American politics" ( 1998, 21 ). Parties provide citizens with their positions on specific policies over a range of issues. h should be noted that
most state platforms were obtained directly from party websites, often under
links titled "Who We Are," "What We Stand For," or "About Our Party."
In other words, when the Internet is a major source of information for most
citizens, the state parties are doing their best to advertise the platforms as
the definitive statement of the organization's core beliefs.

Co111e111 Analysis Description and Procedures
The primary concern for this chapter is how state party platforms vary in
terms of ideology. Why are some platforms modernte and others very liberal
or very conservative? A first step, therefore, is to measure party ideology.
Party ideology was characterized for this purpose by calculating by the
proportion of liberal and conservative sentences in each State of the State
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speech. Specifically, the calculation used was the number of liberal sentences minus the number of conservative sentences, divided by the total
number of sentences in the platform.
To measure ideology in this manner, an ideological judgment was made
about each sentence: liberal, conservative, or neither. The denominator is
the total number of sentences in the platform, thereby factoring moderate
sentences into the ideological calculation and moving the score closer to a
neutral score of 0. For example, the Wisconsin Democratic platform is 164
sentences long, of which 147 are liberal, while only 3 are conservative. The
corresponding score, then, is .88. In contrast, the moderate Hawaii Republican platform is 206 sentences long, of which 57 are liberal and 125 are conservative, yielding a score of - .33. I have previously used this scheme to
code gubernatorial State of the State speeches, and the method produces reliable and valid indicators of ideology (Coffey 2005). In many ways, this
scheme is similar to that used by other researchers who have coded party
ideology (Laver and Garry 2000).
What makes a sentence liberal or conservative? Ideology is difficult to
define, and many scholars argue that American parties (and politics in general) are distinct for being nonideological-their fragmented organizational
structures cause them to be more focused on winning elections and maintaining social cohesion than pushing dogmatic agendas (Epstein 1986). Recent
studies have challenged this conventional wisdom. Klingemann, Hofferbert,
and Budge (1994) find that American national party platforms are nearly us
distinct from each other as many manifestos in European party systems. Gerring's (1998) extensive study of campaign speeches and national party platforms from 1828 to 1996 finds that American parties have distinct philosophies that are clearly articulated in national party platforms across decades.
My coding of sentences as liberal and conservative is generally similar
to Gerring's scheme. Gerring defines party ideology as messages or positions that are "internally coherent, externally differentiated (from one another) and stable through time" (I 998, 3 ). Using this framework, I coded
sentences as liberal if they call for one of the following:
• intervention in the free market to protect working-class and lowerincome citizens
• greater spending on social welfare programs
• support for the protection and expansion of the rights of marginalized
groups
Conservative sentences generally have one or more of the following
characteri sties:
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• oppose government regulation of the economy
• call for the protection of individual opportunity (especially lower
taxes and private property right) in the marketplace
• advocate a strict regulation of individual behavior
• promote a greater role for religion (often Christianity) in the public
sector
The sentences were usually fairly easy to interpret. I erred on the side of
caution, however, as the primary claim of this study was that state political
parties are ideologically polarized. Ideological sentences had to encompass
some specific policy proposal (or criticism) that embodies a vision of what
is "good" (or "bad") for a state's government and society. If a sentence was
ambiguous in its ideological position, I coded it as moderate. I used two
basic guidelines:
I. Would such a sentence appear in the opposition party's platform?
2. How would a reasonable person interpret such a sentence?
These guidelines often caused me to reject a sentence as not having ideological content. 1
Party Platform Ideology

I coded sixty-seven state party platforms written between 2000 and
2002; in a few cases (Arkansas and Virginia Democrats; Louisiana and Illinois Republicans), I decided to use the 2004 platform. Where more than one
platform was written between 2000 and 2002 for a state party, I used only
the most recent platform.
The platforms clearly distinguish the parties across the states. The Democratic average score is a fairly liberal .66, while the average GOP platform
is - .64 (see table 5.1 for each state party's score). There is no overlap between the parties; the most liberal GOP platform, from Indiana, has a score
of - .25. In comparison, the most conservative Democratic platform, Alabama's, has a score of .42.~ Despite the substantial ideological differences
between the party platforms, there is a fair amount of variance within each
party. The absolute range of the platform ideology is .45 for the Democratic
Party and .61 for the Republicans.3
The polarization of parties at the state level is consistent with partisan
polarization at other levels of government. Numerous studies have documented the increasing polarization of the parties in Congress, as party unity
scores have reached their highest levels in decades (Poole and Rosenthal
1997; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Sinclair 2002; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003). Pamper (2003) has found that national party platforms have
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Tublc 5.1 Stille Purty Jdcologicul Scores
Slllte

Republic,ms

Democmts

AK
AL
AZ
AR

- .79

.65

CA

.42

-.80

co
CT
DE
HI
ID
IL
IN

IA
KS
LA
ME
MA
Ml
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NH
NM

NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
RI
SC
SD
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WV
WI
WY
Average Platfonn Score

- .32
- .60
- .70
-.25
-.63

.78
.63
.80
.73
.71
.43
.63
.62
.66
.52
.80
.43

- .75

- .n
- .51

-.86
- .70
- .68
- .50

- .59
- .47
- .52
- .69

- .44
- .78
- .71
-

.73
.47
.81
.59

-

.62
.83
.67
.83
.68
.64 (.15)

.75
.74
.80
.76
.70
.70
.49
.66
.51
.70
.80
.84
.55
.71
.62
.51
.68
.69
.85
.48
.87
.59
.66 (.12)

N111c: Cell entries arc party platfonn scores a.~ a ratio of liberal to conservative sentences: for the
average platfonn score. the standanl devi:nion is in parentheses.
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grown increasingly programmatic over the last three decades. As noted in
the previous chapter, activists attending the national party conventions are
especially polarized along ideological lines. Moreover, as studies of public
opinion have demonstrated, ideological polarization has extended to the
mass public, although it appears to be concentrated among the most partisan
and attentive citizens (see chapter 16).

Causes or State Party Platform Ideology
Have party activists distorted party positions? What factors explain the
variance in state party ideology? Public opinion, as Erikson, Wright, and
Mciver (1993) have shown, has a substantial impact on state elected officials. The assumption is fairly simple: liberal states should have liberal party
platforms, and relatively conservative states should have conservative platforms. If activists are responsible for the ideological polarization of the parties, however, the relationship between party ideology and median public
opinion may be distorted.
As Erikson and his colleagues also found in their study, political activists have a significant influence on the positions of parties. Party activists
prevent elected officials from converging on the mean of state public opinion; conservative activists pull elected Republican officials to the right, while
liberal activists pull elected Democrats to the left of the ideological spectrum. From state to state, however, the correlation between activist opinions
is highly correlated with median public opinion. This pattern results from
the fact that activists are drawn from the larger state population and in general share the same beliefs and attitudes about public policies and the proper
role of government in society. Based on their surveys of party activists in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, Erikson, Wright, and Mciver found that activists are more polarized but that relative differences from state to state correlate with the variance in median public opinion from state to state.
This may no longer be the case, however. Activists associated with each
party are pushing their candidates to take more polarized positions. As Berry
and Schildkraut have noted about the national party platforms since 1980,
"Regardless of motive, citizen groups work to accentuate the differences between the parties, to drive a wedge in further so that the parties do not gravitate toward a more moderate position" (1998, 148). Activists are most involved in the writing of the party platform (Jewell 1984). Party activist
opinion, therefore, should have a stronger influence on platform ideology
than general state opinion.
Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between median public opinion and
Democratic platform ideology. To measure public opinion, I have used the
updated Erikson, Wright, and Mciver data set, which includes surveys of
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Democratic Party Platform Ideology nnd Stutc Public Opinion
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Median State Public Opinion

S011rce: Author's analysis: Erikson, Wright and Mciver ( 1993).

Nme: Dcmocr.itic platform ideology (y-axis) ranges from O (modcmlc) 10 I (very libcr.11); public opinion (x-axis) ranges from conservative ( - .35) 10 libcml (.10).

state public opinion from 1995 to 1999.4 One benefit of using these data is
that they precede the writing of the party platforms. The initial evidence suggests that there is little in the way of a relationship between state public opinion and party platform ideology.
Figure 5.1 shows that while there appears to be a slight positive relationship (r
I 6) between median public opinion and Democratic Party liberalism, the relationship is weak at best. In some states, public opinion is related
to platform ideology; Massachusetts, for example, has liberal citizens and a
liberal platform. In contrast, however, Oklahoma and South Dakota have
fairly conservative populations and Wisconsin is a relatively moderate state,
but those states' platforms are extremely liberal. There is a similar pattern
for Republican platforms (r = .10); Minnesota, California, and Washington
all have much more conservative platforms than would be expected based on
median public opinion in those states (data not shown).
What then are the systematic factors driving party ideology? I have estimated two models for each party to compare the relative influence of citizen

=.
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and activist ideology on state party platforms. Since party ideology is measured on a ratio scale ranging from I to - I, it is appropriate to use OLS
regression to analyze what variables systematically affect party ideology. In
this analysis, there are two dependent variables: Democratic Party ideology
and Republican Party ideology. For each party, the ideological model must
be estimated separately, since the independent variables for each party are
the same for each state.$
One concern with the analysis is the low number of observations. The
regression results, therefore, must be interpreted with some caution. As a
result, I have estimated the models with few variables to avoid overspecification. Since the primary claim is that activists are driving state party
agendas, each model includes the measure for median public opinion used
above. In addition, the Erikson, Wright, and Mciver data provide information
about the percentage of conservatives, liberals, and moderates in each state,
which is also used in some of the models below. For activist opinion, I have
used the Party Elite Studies of each party's national convention delegates
from 1992 to 2004.6 Activist opinion is measured by the pooled average ideology of each state's party delegation for the four national party conventions
from 1992 to 2004.
The model includes three control variables: state political culture, stale
party competition, and electoral turnout. In theory, party ideology should
moderate with increases in party competition, because parties tend to moderate in order to avoid losing votes (Downs 1957). Party competition is measured by the Ranney competition index (Bibby and Holbrook 2004). This
measure ranges from .50 (no competition) to I (the parties are perfectly
competitive). The measure takes into account the percentage of seats won
by the parties in the state legislature, each party's percentage of the vote in
gubernatorial elections, the frequency of divided government, and the length
of time the parties have controlled the governorship and the legislative
houses (Bibby and Holbrook 2004, 87). Each model also includes a variable
for turnout in state elections, measured by the average turnout in senatorial,
gubernatorial, and presidential elections between 1997 and 2002, which is
prior to the writing of most of the state party platforms analyzed (Bibby and
Holbrook 2004).
Finally, I have included dummy variables for state political culture based
on Elazar' s (l 972) typology. Elazar classifies state political culture in three
subcultures: moralist, traditionalist, and individualist states. He points out
that history, the demographic makeup of the state, and a range of other factors significantly affect citizens' understanding of the proper role of government in society. In moralist states, there are high levels of citizen participation in politics and a general view that government can be used to improve
society. These states are more likely to have platforms, regardless of party.
Since politics is more ideological and policy oriented, I expect to find more
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ideological platforms in these states, as the parties strive to point out the
differences between their agendas and those of the opposition party. In traditionalist states, there is generally low voter turnout, and elites have historically dominated politics and party organizations. While this may lead to less
ideological platforms, most traditionalist states are in the South, where the
GOP has built a strong following by appealing to racial and religious conservatives (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Layman 2001 ). Moreover, as the
Southern Grassroots Party Activists Project has shown, Southern Democratic activists are now as nearly liberal as many of their Northern counterparts (McGlennon 2004). Individualist states, by contrast, should have more
moderate platforms. In these states, politics is mainly about winning elections and distributing the spoils of office. As Mayhew ( 1986) noted, these are
historically strong organizations, and it is difficult for ideological activists to
enter and control the state party organization. These states are also the least
likely to have platforms, indicating to some extent the lack of importance
that issues and philosophical differences play in party politics in individualist states.7

The Results
Table 5.2 shows the regression results for the Republican and Democratic state parties. Importantly, for both parties, median state public opinion
is not related to the party's ideology-and is actually in the wrong direction
(i.e., more liberal citizens cause more conservative platforms; see models I
and 3). In contrast, activist opinion is significantly related to state party ideology for Democratic platforms and is at least in the correct direction for
each Republican model. The negative coefficients in each model mean that
the more liberal activists become, the more liberal the state party platform
becomes, while more conservative activists lead to more conservative platforms for both parties.
Since the claim that public opinion does not influence party ideology is
a strong one, I performed another test using a different measure for mass
public opinion. In the second set of models (2 and 4 ), I used the percentage
of self-identified liberals (for Democrats) and conservatives (for Republicans) in a state. It may be that the use of median public opinion would not
take into account states in which opinion is ideologically bipolar. As the second models show for each party, however, this is not the case. Importantly,
state public opinion, measured two different ways (by mean public opinion
and the percentage of citizens in a state that are self-identified liberals or
conservatives), does not appear to have any systematic effect on platform
ideology. 8
The political culture dummy variables are modestly related to each par-
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OLS Regression or State Party Platform Ideology

Rep11hlicc111 Platforms
Model I
Median Public Opinion

Model 2

-.35

Model 3

.62
(.79)

Percent Liberal
Activist Opinion
Party Competition
Moralist
Traditionalist
Turnout
Constant
Adjusted R

N
F

Model./

- .06
(.24)

(.48)

Percent Conservative

De11111cra1ic Platfonm

- .17
(.14)
-.56•
(.33)
- .11 •
(.06)
- .12

- .16
(.13)
- .56"'
(.33)
- .11 *
(.06)

- .12

- .16*
(.09)
.61••·
(.25)
.08
(.05)
- .04

-.30
(.57)
-.18"'
(.09)
,640*
(.25)
.07
(.05)
-.05
(.06)
-.01 *

(.09)

(.09)

(.06)

.01

.01

- .01**

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

.45
(.58)
.13
30
1.75

.27
(.50)
.14
30
1.77

.76
(.32)
.25
37
3.01

.85
(.37)
.26
37
3.07

Nate: Cell entries arc unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
• signifkanl at p < , 10
•• significant at p < .05
... significant at p < .01

ty's platfonn ideology. In moralist states, Democratic platforms are more
liberal and Republican platforms are more conservative. The coefficient of
- .11 in models I and 2 for Republican platforms can be interpreted such
that, for a typical state Republican platform that is one hundred sentences
long, there will be about eleven more conservative sentences in moralist
states compared to nonmoralist state cultures. In each model, turnout reduces
platform ideology. The negative coefficient in the Democratic models and
the positive coefficient in the Republican models means that when turnout
increases, state party platforms become more moderate. The result can be
interpreted to mean that a I percent increase in turnout leads to a .0 l decrease in platfonn polarization. Since turnout ranges from 29 percent to 61
percent, this seemingly small effect can be significant. Moreover, this correlation is expected; in states where there is greater turnout, parties should be
more attentive to public opinion (Hill and Leighley 1993; Brown, Jackson,
and Wright 1999).
Importantly, party competition-in all of the specifications of the
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model- is significantly and positively related to party ideology. The greater
the level of party competition between the state parties, the more conservative the Republican platform becomes and the more liberal the Democratic
platform becomes. Figure 5.2 compares the ideological polarization of the
platforms, or the difference between the ideological score of Republican and
Democratic platforms where both state parties have written a platform, to
the degree of party competition in each state. The graph shows a clear relationship between party polarization and competition; the more competitive
the parties in a state are, the more ideologically distinct each party's platform is. Wisconsin, Washington, Oregon, and Minnesota are all competitive
and their parties are sharply polarized, while Idaho, Utah, and Hawaii are all
moderate states with low levels of polarization. In fact, only Indiana's parties
appear to be acting as Downs's theory would predict.
Why would this cause parties to become more polarized? Key (1956)
argued that in such states, parties tend to be competitive, registration laws
are more open, and parties must therefore present distinct sets of proposals

Figure 5.2 State Party Competition und Plutform Polurlzution
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to voters in order to win elections. Several studies of legislative politics have
found evidence for this counterintuitive hypothesis; increasing competition,
at both the district level and for control of the legislature, increases partyline voting in the legislature (Rosenthal 1990). Miller and Stokes ( 1963) and
Gulati (2004) argue that legislators rely heavily on their constituencies,
which does not mean the average voter in a district but rather a core group
of supporters who reinforce or bias a legislator's perception of what his or
her constituents think. Rosenthal ( 1990) and Aldrich and Battista (2002)
point out that the more balanced the parties are in the state legislature, the
more salient the party labels become, causing legislators to vote along party
lines.
It may be that the presence of an ideological alternative heightens the
incentive for activists to become involved in party politics. As Layman
(2001) and Carmines and Stimson (1989) show, a change in a party's position on a set of issues sends strong signals to the electorate and to other
activists about each party's position on the issues. Layman (2001), for example, analyzed national party platforms between 1972 and 1992 for the relative content each party devoted to social, religious, and cultural issues and
found that each party's platform devoted progressively more attention to
these issues. By 1992, the party platforms expressed very polarized views
on moral issues. As religious conservatives became more influential within
the Republican Party, cues were sent to more secular activists, and in a twoparty system, this meant becoming more active within the Democratic Party
(Layman 200 I, 110-27). In fact, increasing conservatism among state Republican platforms is associated with increased liberalism among state Democratic platforms (r = - .45). Where Democratic state platforms are very
liberal, Republican platforms are very conservative, as in Wisconsin, Washington, and Oregon, while in states where the Democratic Party is relatively
conservative, the Republican Party is relatively liberal, as in Indiana, Hawaii,
and New Hampshire. Only a few states- Utah, West Virginia, and North
Carolina-come near fitting the pattern of a conservative Republican Party
with a relatively conservative Democratic Party.

Conclusion
The results indicate that platform content is not random. In fact, the relationship between party competition, activist polarization on religious issues,
and state political culture indicates that the platforms are related to important
systematic, institutional factors. Importantly, in each specification, the polarization of activists is significantly and positively related to party polarization. This provides strong evidence of the importance of party activists in
driving party agendas and the ideological positions of the parties. The con-
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sistency of the relationship across different models indicates that there is in
fact a strong relationship between the two variables.
The results presented in this chapter should be interpreted cautiously. For
each dependent variable, the sample sizes are very small, and so the results
can easily be influenced by a few outliers or changes in the specification of
the models. Moreover, the lack of organizational variables (such as caucus vs.
primary states) means that the model may be underspecified in identifying
how party organization influences the ideology of the platfonns (Usher 2000).
Finally, I have chosen to measure the ideology of the party-as-organization
and, perhaps not surprisingly, found that activists do in fact have more ideological views than the general public or even than the party rank and file
(Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport 1986). It may be that with a full
set of platforms over an extended period of time I would find more influence
for the general public on party ideology, as an analysis taking into account
temporal changes in both public opinion and party ideology may reveal a
stronger link than the cross-sectional analysis used here (Gray 1976).
Yet, as shown in multiple specifications, variance in state party platform
ideology is explained by systematic factors. Party competition, turnout, activist opinion, and state political culture all exert strong influences on party
ideology. The influence of party activists, it would appear, distorts the relationship between median state public opinion and platform ideology. The
consistency indicates that there is an important divide between the views of
those writing the platforms and citizens statewide.
The revitalization of modern parties may be at a cost of broader citizen
representation. Party organizations are designed to represent the views of
party activists. The results indicate that parties are constructing agendas that
do not reflect the views of state citizens. Parties are able to do so because
the consequences of diverging from the median opinion in the state are not
as severe if both parties are engaged in the polarization. One of the key
claims of the Downsian ( 1957) theory is that voters punish parties or candidates for moving away from the political center by rewarding their competitors. If both parties, however, move to the ideological poles without a corresponding shift in median public opinion, then neither party is at risk of such
punishment.
The fact that public opinion is not related to party ideology provides
insight into the nature of modern party organizations. As Beck (2003) has
recently argued, American politics is characterized by two majorities, one
passive and the other highly ideological. Public opinion surveys appear to
confirm this point. Rather than seeing a uniform increase in attachment to
the parties, surveys reveal an increasingly bipolar pattern of partisanship.
While the number of citizens who strongly identify with either major party
increased from 24 to 33 percent between 1976 and 2004, the proportion of
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weak party identifiers decreased from 39 to 28 percent at the same time that
the percentage of independents who lean toward one major party or the other
increased from 22 to 29 percent (American National Election Studies). This
suggests that while the partisanship of some in the electorate has been activated by the polarization of the parties, other voters have become less
attached.
Politics in many ways today is a self-selected activity. There can in fact
be wide disparities between what the general public believes and what those
participating in politics believe. Ideological polarization between the parties
is consistent with Schattschneider's and the 1950 APSA Committee on Parties' view that American parties with distinct ideological and policy positions would improve representation within the United States (Shea 2003). As
Shea and Beck point out, however, significant disparities between the views
of the genernl public and party activists can lead to lower feelings of political
efficacy, lower levels of turnout, and decreased trust in the political system.
Indeed, as the model of party polarization showed, there was a significant
relationship between platform polarization and state electoral turnout such
that there is higher turnout in states where the parties are less polarized.
What this chapter has shown is that party agendas, as represented by party
platforms, are unrepresentative of the views of most citizens across the
states.

Notes
I. I coded sentences using a computer content analysis program, which identifies sentences as liberal or conservative based on the appeanmce of certain key words from an ideological dictionary I created (sec Coffey 2005 for details on the exact coding scheme). The
essential idea is that words have significant political and policy meanings, and their appearance in speeches and platforms indicates a greater likelihood that a sentence advocates a particular ideological point of view. The dictionary was created using Laver and Garry's (2000)
dictionary from British and Irish party manifestos. as well us words appearing disproportion•
utely in either the Republican or Democratic 1996 and 2000 party platform or in five ~elected
gubernatorial State of the State speeches in 2000 (Alabama, New Mexico, New York, Vermont, and Washington), which were chosen for party, regional, and demographic variation.
The dictionary was occasionally modified to include new word~ when analyzing the plat•
forms. The use of a computer program increases the reliability of the analysis by consisten1ly
coding large quantities of text. However, sentences can be miscoded because words have multiple meanings depending on the context in which they arc used. As a rcsull, I manually re•
viewed every sentence in each platform. While this ~ubstantially increased the work for con•
tent analysis, the gain in validity far outweighed the lo~s in the reliability. Importantly, the
manual review means that ultimately the coding of the sentences was not dependent upon the
accuracy of the dic1ionary. Rather, the dictionary was a tool to make the coding more efficient, while the manual review ensured that the coding scheme was valid. Finally, two independent coders manually reviewed a JO percent sample of the platforms, and the percentage
agreement for the coding of all sentences was 77 percent.
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2. Rachctcr, Kcllstcdt, and Green (2003) coded the 2002 Iowa platfonn as containing
seventy-three conservative planks and no liberal planks, which compares favorably to my
score of - .63, which is also very conservative.
3. An independent sample's t-tcst shows that the difference in means between the party
platform scores is significantly different from zero at p < .0 I.
4. The updated Erikson, Wright, and Mciver data set is available at http://socsci
.colorado.cdu/- mcivcrj/wip.html.
5. I have created a measure of party polarization taking the absolute value of the difference between the Democratic Party platfonn score and the Republican score for all stales
with two platfonns. Since the number of cases is small (26) and the regression results arc
generally similar to those shown in table 5.2, the polarization score has not been modeled.
6. The data for the Party Elite Studies ( 1992- 2004) were made available by John Jackson and John Green.
7. Of the thirty-four state parties where the dominant political culture is moralist, thirty
have platforms (88 percent). By comparison, only 59 percent of individualist state parties (20
out of 34), and 56 percent of traditionalist state parties ( 18 of 32) have platfonns. The average
ideological score for Democratic platfonns is .72 in moralist states, .62 in traditionalist slates,
and .62 in individualist states. The average Republican platform score is - .66 in moralist
states, - .72 in traditionalist states, and - .55 in individualist states.
8. One problem with the analysis is the potential correlation between activist opinion
and slate public opinion. The concern is that the lack of a significant coefficient for median
public opinion is a statistical artifact and docs not represent a meaningful lack or influence
for mass public opinion in terms of state party ideology. The correlation of the mean of state
public opinion and Republican Party activist ideology is - .71; for Democratic activists and
state public opinion, it is - .23. The high correlation combined with the relatively small data
set suggests that multicollinearity may be present at least in the Republican model. In order
to test for this, I ran separate models using state public opinion and activist opinion. There
arc, however, no substantive differences in the results when the variables arc used separately.
Moreover, a matrix of the bivariate correlations shows that none of the corrclaiions for the
other variables exceeds .80, which is commonly used as cutoff value for testing for the presence of multicollinearity (Berry and Feldman 1985, 44).

Part II

Party Resources

6

Committees and Candidates
National Party Finance after BCRA
Diana Dwyre, Eric Heberlig, Robin Kolodny, and Bruce uirson
The 2004 elections were the first run under the new federal election campaign law, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). The new
law was meant to end the flow of unregulated soft money to political parties
and to increase disclosure about campaign activities by political parties and
interest groups. While BCRA was not meant to be a wholesale change in
campaign finance regulation, reformers hoped that it would mean that less
money would be spent in elections through political parties, that elected officials would be less reliant on big donors, that competition might increase,
and that campaigning would be "fairer" to candidates without party and interest group issue advocacy advertising.
Here, we examine several important issues in contemporary campaign
finance through the rubric of BCRA. First, we ask about the contemporary
state of campaign money via political parties. What do we know about party
fundraising after BCRA? Did BCRA succeed in getting "big money" out of
politics? Second, we analyze the increased support for party organizations
from candidates, particularly sitting members of Congress. If this trend was
an unintended consequence of BCRA, what are its implications for the political process? Third, we assess the current situation of competitive elections
in the United States and ask whether campaign money has helped or hindered this basic tenet of representative democracies. Fourth, we look at the
current pattern of party expenditures to ask whether they are effective in
helping the parties reach their goal of controlling governmental institutions.

What Money Is in Party Politics?
Conventional wisdom holds that Republicans have a significant fundraising advantage over Democrats. When we correct the data for inflationary
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effects (by converting all the amounts to $2,000), we find that in 2004, Democrats significantly closed the gap with Republican fundraising overall (see
figure 6.1 ). Given the traditional Republican money advantage, this finding
is extremely significant, as the innovations in fundraising Democrats
achieved in 2004 could reshape the nature of electoral competition. This
election cycle showed that the Republicans' capital-intensive edge was not
so daunting and that the Democrats' labor-intensive edge was indeed replicable by the Republicans.
We disaggregate the six national committees' receipts in constant dollars
and find that the Democratic National Committee (DNC) surpassed the Republican National Committee (RNC) in receipts in 2003- 2004. This was the
big story of the 2004 elections (Corrado 2006). The congressional committees (the National Republican Senatorial Committee [NRSC], Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee [DSCC], National Republican Congressional Committee [NRCC], and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee [DCCC]) were another matter entirely, with three of the four not
achieving parity with their overall fundmising in 2000 (hard and soft money
combined; see figure 6.2). Only the NRCC was able to exceed previous 2000
fundraising levels, and it did that by a significant amount- $25 million in
hard money. In fact, in the post- soft money environment, the DNC, RNC,
and NRCC were able to surpass their previous combination of hard and soft
money receipts with hard money only. However, the NRSC, DSCC, and
DCCC were not even able to achieve parity with their past combined totals.
Figure 6.1

Overall Party Fundraising Trends
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New Rules for Party Fundraising

The sudden loss of soft money after BCRA meant that the parties had to
raise much more hard money in order to merely maintain their previous level
of fundraising. This new campaign finance environment created incentives
for entrepreneurial thinking. Necessity was indeed the mother of invention:
all the party committees implemented stepped-up and new fundraising efforts, and they all perfonned beyond expectations-even the three that failed
to replace the banned soft money.
In addition to the soft money ban, BCRA made other changes that were
favorable to party fundraising: it raised the hard-money individual contribution limits and, for the first time, indexed those limits to inflation. Congressional refonners recognized that the ban on soft money might have a detrimental effect on party fundraising and that the contribution limits had not
been increased since the 1970s, so that the value of the maximum donation
had diminished significantly over time. Before passage of BCRA, an individual contributor could give $20,000 in hard money per year to a national party
committee. This amount counted against an individual's annual aggregate
contribution limit of $25,000 per year for all hard money contributions, including those to candidates and political action committees (PACs). Under
the new law, an individual may contribute $25,000 per year to each party
committee, and there is a separate sublimit within the new aggregate individ-
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ual contribution limit of $95,000 per two•year election cycle of up to
$57,500 for all contributions to party committees and PACs, with the remain•
der ($37,500) being an individual's total allowed contributions to candidates
(see table 6.1 ).
The new law actually encourages individual contributors to give to the
parties by stipulating that $20,000 of the total $95,000 aggregate limit for
individuals can be given only to political parties (Magleby, Monson, and
Patterson 2005, I 3). This incentive seems to have worked. Contributions at
the maximum amount constituted a larger proportion of party hard money
receipts than in past election cycles for all of the national party committees.
For instance, 12.4 percent of the DNC's individual contributions were at the ·
maximum amount in 2004, up from 9.8 percent in 2000; similarly, 17.4 per•
cent of the RNC's individual contributions were maximum contributions, up
from 6.5 percent in 2000 (Federal Election Commission 2005a). Of course,
some of these individuals may have contributed large sums of soft money
before and thus may have given even more before BCRA. Nevertheless, the
party-friendly structure of the rules channeled some of that lost soft money
to parties in a more open and controlled manner.
Parties raised more in small contributions as well. All of the national
party committees raised more from individuals in 2004 than in past elec•
tions, and the Democratic committees in particular saw a surge in small con•
tributions of less than $200 (labeled "unitemized" contributions in the Fed•
era! Election Commission records). In 2003- 2004, the DNC raised $166
million in unitemized contributions, well above the $38 million they raised

Tuble 6.1

New Contribution Limits under BCRA-Beginnlng January 1, 2003

Individuals

• Contributions to candidates: $2,000* per election (was $1,000)
• Contributions to multicandidate committees (PACs): $5,000 (unchanged)
• Contributions to state, district, and local party committees: $10,000
(combined) per year (was $5,000)
• Contributions 10 national party commiuces: $25.000"' per year (was
$20.000)
• Overall limit on contributions from one person: $95,000"' every two years
(was $25,000 per year); within this limit, however, only $37,500 may be
contributed to candidates, and no more than $37,500 to other commiuees
that arc not national parties

Party
Commillees

• National party commillces: up to a total of $35,000* to Senate candidates
per six-year campaign (was $17,500)
• All other contribution limits remain the same ($5,000 per election for
House candidates)

Source: Fcdcml Election Commission n.d.
Note: • ln<lcxc<l for inflation; increase., will be implemented <luring odd-numbered years starting in
:?005 an<l will be in effect for a two-ycur period. Sec Jack.,on, Bigelow. um! Green 2003 for a full discussion.
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for 2002 and the $60 million raised for 2000. Likewise, the RNC increased
the amount it raised in small chunks, collecting $157 million for 2004, up
from $103 million for 2002 and $91 million for 2000 (Federal Election Commission 2005b).
New Approaches to Party F1111draisi11g

The national party committees used a variety of approaches to raise
more hard money under the new f undraising rules. They asked current contributors for larger contributions; tapped partisan grassroots supporters for
contributions; found new contributors, especially via the Internet; and hit up
their own officeholders and candidates to contribute to their party. Both parties invested heavily in new computer technology for direct mail, Internet
fundraising, and voter mobilization. The DNC spent about $15 million on
such efforts. Its huge database of potential party contributors and voters was
dubbed "Demzilla" by party operatives, and the RNC established a similar
data program called Voter Vault. 1
The Internet proved to be an effective fundraising tool for the party committees, and one that involved very little cost, thus retaining nearly the full
value of each contribution. While there is no reliable information on how
much the parties raised from the Internet, it is safe to assume that at least
some of the increase in small contributions came from increased online donating. The parties' websites were set up to accept contributions, and they
developed large e-mail lists of party supporters to solicit them for contributions directly and at a much lower cost than traditional direct mail or telemarketing fundraising. Of course, the parties still raised money the oldfashioned way- with mail solicitations, phone calls, and events- and these
efforts benefited greatly from the larger and more sophisticated lists of contacts developed by the parties with the aid of advanced computer management systems.
The parties also stepped up their large contributor programs. The DNC
established the "Presidential Trust" and enlisted some big-money fundraisers, the "Patriots," to raise at least $100,000 for the Democratic nominee. 2
The RNC invited the Bush team's "Rangers" (who raised $100,000 for
Bush) and "Pioneers" (who raised $200,000) to become "Super Rangers"
by raising at least $300,000 for the party.3 Since BCRA permits individual
contributions to a party committee of up to $25,000, raising these large sums
for the party was quite a bit easier than raising large amounts for a candidate
directly, which could be collected in maximum increments of only $2,000.
The Capitol Hill committees continued their programs that rewarded big
contributors with access to party leaders. The NRSC's "Majority Makers"
gave $25,000 (the maximum) to the party committee and received an invitation to a private reception featuring President George W. Bush at Senate Ma-
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jority Leader Bill Frist's Washington-area home.~ The DSCC invited "allied
lobbyists and consultants" (not the PACs they represent) to be on its "Majority Council" by making a $25,000 contribution from their personal funds in
exchange for monthly meetings with Senate Democratic leaders. 5
A largely unanticipated source of increased funding for the parties was
their own officeholders and candidates. While the parties have long asked
their officeholders to contribute to the common goal of attaining or maintaining majority status (Kolodny 1998), the House and Senate party committees
enhanced these efforts for the 2004 election. The law allows candidates and
former candidates and officeholders to transfer an unlimited amount from
their own campaign accounts to a party committee. Party leaders recognized
this huge fundraising potential of their own colleagues. The 2003-2004
DCCC chairman, Rep. Robert Matsui (D-Calif.), remarked that "money
from members is particularly important, because there [are] no costs of fundraising.... When a member gives a dollar, that entire dollar is spent on
candidates, whereas with direct mail, there's the cost of stamps and printing" (Camey 2004, 2170). This last fundraising avenue has significant implications for democratic accountability in American elections. Therefore, we
will investigate it in some detail.

Individual Candidates as Donors and Parties' Collective Electoral Goals
In 2004, parties expected their congressional members-incumbent officeholders-to pay what are sometimes called "dues" to the relevant party
campaign committee. The prescribed amount depended on the officeholder's
seniority, committee posts, fundraising history, and leadership positions. For
example, the DCCC announced in early 2004 that it expected its 186 safe
incumbents to transfer part of the $87 million in their campaign accounts to
the campaign committee;6 it collected $18.3 million dollars from Democratic
House members, up from $11.3 million in the previous election cycle. The
NRCC received $20 million from its members, up from $13.8 in 2002. The
Senate campaign committees did not levy formal dues, but their members
nonetheless gave more generously in 2004 than in 2002. Representatives and
senators gave more to their party committees in the 2004 election cycle in
part because of BCRA' s increase in individual contribution limits (from
$1,000 to $2,000 per election), which made it possible for them to collect
more from individual contributors to their own campaigns.
The increase in contributions to party committees by incumbent members of Congress in the 2004 election cycle is part of a broader trend in the
redistribution of campaign funds that began prior to the passage of BCRA.
Members of the House increased their total contributions to candidates and
party organizations from $27 .3 million in 1996 to $73.6 million in 2004, an
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increase of 170 percent. Senators redistributed fewer dollars but increased
their giving even more rapidly than House members, by nearly 250 percent,
from $8.1 million in 1996 to $28 million in 2004. Contributions from presidential candidates do not follow the same pattern-or seemingly any pattern.
While giving $67 million in 1996, they decreased their donations to $30 million in 2000 and $38.8 million in 2004.
Total contributions by members of Congress grew dramatically between
the 1996 and 2004 election cycles as party margins remained narrow and
party leaders pressured members to contribute to the party's collective electoral efforts (Kolodny and Dwyre 1998; Heberlig and Larson 2005). Party
leaders increasingly sought to exploit Federal Election Commission regulations allowing federal candidates' personal campaign committees (PCCs) to
transfer unlimited sums of unobligated hard money to national party committees (11 CFR 1113.2). In contrast, contributions from PCCs to other candidates are limited to $1,000 per election, and contributions from leadership
political action committees (LPACs) are limited to $5,000 per election.
To assess the effect of BCRA, we tum to a detailed analysis of contributions by chamber. Figure 6.3, which presents contributions by House members, shows steady growth of all types of contributions, except contributions
from LPACs to the party congressional campaign committees (CCCs), which
remain modest compared to other types of contributions. Of greatest interest
are the contributions from PCCs to CCCs, which- absent any regulatory

Redistribution of Campaign Funds by House Members, 1996-2004

Figure 6.3
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limits- have increased more rapidly than contributions to candidates from
PCCs or LPACs. Furthermore, contributions from PCCs to CCCs level off
in 2002, then spike upward again in 2004 after the implementation of BCRA,
which deprived parties of soft money and prompted them to seek new
sources of hard money in large sums.
One would think that such a large increase in hard money contributions
to the CCCs would impose substantial fundraising burdens on members of
the House. Although it may, members of the House merely shifted the allocation of their party contributions (data not shown). In 2002, House incumbents gave $45.4 million to local, state, and federal party organizations, with
$24.5 million (54 percent) going to the CCCs. Their contributions to local,
state, and federal party organizations actually declined slightly in 2004, to
$41.6 million. At the same time, however, their giving to the CCCs increased
to $37.4 million. The CCCs now consume 90 percent of House members'
contributions to party organizations. House members helped the CCCs replace lost soft money with hard money at the expense of the state and local
party organizations that had received this money in the past.
The redistribution of campaign funds by senators, like their House colleagues, has also increased steadily over the past decade. Senators traditionally have contributed the plurality of their funds to other candidates through
LPACs. Though senators' LPAC contributions increased apace in 2004, sena-

Figure 6.4 Redistribution of Campaign Funds by Senators, 1996-2004
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tors dramatically increased their contributions to the Senate CCCs through
their PCCs. This spike in contributions to the CCCs mirrors the same increase in House contributions to CCCs. Though senators, unlike House
members, increased their giving to local and state party organizations from
2002 to 2004 ($2.7 million to $4.7 million, the proportion of their overall
party contributions going to the CCCs increased from 58 percent to 71 percent- similar to the trend among House members. Senators, however, appeared to shift PCC contributions away from candidates ($3.8 million in
2002 to $1.4 million in 2004) in order to increase their giving to CCCs (see
figure 6.4). Like House members, senators are increasingly taking advantage
of their ability to give unlimited contributions from their PCCs to national
party committees, and in 2004, senators gave generously to help their party's
CCCs replace soft money banned by BCRA.
Furthermore, the percentage of representatives and senators who redistributed any campaign money continued to increase from 2002 to 2004, continuing the trend across the previous decade (from 80 percent in 1996 to 95
percent in 2004 in the House; from 25 percent in 1996 to 86 percent in 2004
in the Senate). The percentage of members contributing to the CCCs increased more dramatically (58 percent to 95 percent in the House; 18 percent
to 90 percent in the Senate) than the percentage contributing to candidates,
confirming the shift in the party orientation of giving. Senators illustrate
these changes most dramatically. Senators' participation rates had been level
for several election cycles after 1998, with senators preferring to contribute
to other candidates rather than the CCCs by more than 20 points in most
election cycles. However, the proportion of senators contributing to the
CCCs jumped dramatically from 61 percent in 2002 to 90 percent in 2004,
surpassing the proportion who contributed to other candidates. The increased proportion of members contributing shows that the larger dollar
amounts contributed are not merely the result of party and committee leaders
contributing more, but of greater participation by the entire party caucuses.
An additional observation regarding participation rates is that a lower
proportion of senators than House members have traditionally contributed,
though senators nearly closed this gap in 2004. The typically higher levels
of giving in the House suggest the greater strength of House party leaders
relative to Senate leaders and the greater value of majority party control to
House members than to senators.
Following BCRA, the story of redistribution activity is largely one of
continuity. Contributions and the percentages of members contributing continued to climb, as they had across the previous election cycles. The critical
change that BCRA has likely induced is greater giving to the CCCs as the
parties sought to replace soft money with large hard money contributions.
Members of the House complied by shifting contributions from state and
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local party organizations to the CCCs. And since there is some evidence that
individual contributors are more likely to give to a candidate than to a party
in order to reap the benefit of a personal connection to an officeholder
(Francia et al. 2003), legislators can raise money more easily than parties,
which can offer only the collective benefits of party loyalty and majority
status.
The parties' presidential nominees also transferred large amounts to
party committees in 2004, most of it from excess primary funds. John Kerry's campaign gave $23.6 million to the DNC, $3 million to the DCCC, and
$3 million to the DSCC (Federal Election Commission 2005a). 7 Al Gore
gave $1 million to the DCCC, $1 million to the DSCC, and $4 million to the
DNC, most of it leftover from his 2000 presidential campaign. The Bush
reelection campaign transferred $26.5 million to the RNC, $ I million to the
NRCC, and $1 million to the NRSC (Federal Election Commission 2005b).
But with no other party leaders, such as a Speaker or floor leader, to
coordinate their activities for the collective good of the party and to provide
incentives for pro-party behavior, presidential candidates are idiosyncratic
in their use of funds to assist other candidates and party organizations (ranging from the Clinton campaign's contribution of $5 million to Steve Forbes's
contribution of $38 million, both in 1996). Though the contributions of individual presidential candidates vary considerably, the amounts can be substantial. In the presidential elections, the contributions of a few presidential
candidates were more substantial than the contributions of all 100 U.S. Senate incumbents. As the leaders of the party ticket, presidential candidates
overwhelmingly contributed their funds to party organizations, 99.5 percent,
rather than to party candidates. In contrast, House members gave 77 percent
of their contributions and senators 64 percent of theirs to party organizations
across the five election cycles between 1996 and 2004.
Furthermore, presidential candidates may provide their most valuable
assistance not by redistributing campaign funds directly but rather by appearing at candidate and party fundraisers and campaign rallies (Holbrook
and McClurg 2005; Jacobson, Kernell, and Lazarus 2004). In 2004, moreover, Kerry and especially Bush engaged in substantial joint fundraising activities that helped their parties. The Bush campaign, for example, used joint
fundraising committees in 2004 to help channel substantial sums of campaign money into the campaign accounts of nearly thirty Republican House
and Senate candidates. 8

Where Did the Money Go?
In 2004, the six national party committees spent a total of $1.2 billion,
more than twice the $545.7 million spent in 2000 (Federal Election Commis-
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sion 2005a). The Republicans spent $646 million (almost twice their 2000
spending) and the Democrats $570.5 million (approaching three times the
figure in 2000). The DNC had the largest increase, a more than threefold
increase to $389.8 million, while the RNC just doubled its expenditures to
$382.6 million. The Capitol Hill committees showed similar increases: the
DSCC more than doubled to $88.3 million and the DCCC nearly doubled to
$92.4 million; the NRCC also nearly doubled to $ 184.7 million, while the
NRSC increased by just half to $78.7 million. Clearly, BCRA did not restrict
spending nor slow its rate of increase.
Spending to support candidates is the most directly relevant portion of
party expenditures, and in 2004 such spending totaled $378.6 million. Here,
the Democrats outspent the Republicans $218.6 million lo $160 million. The
Democratic advantage came from $120.5 million in independent expenditures by the DNC. In contrast, the RNC spent $18.3 million in independent
expenditures, also chiefly in the presidential campaign. However, the RNC
spent more than twice as much as the DNC in generic party ads, $45.8 million to $18.6 million. These expenditures were in addition to the coordinated
expenditure $16.1 million for the presidential race (the maximum allowed
by law). Expenditures by the Hill committees were more even. The DSCC
spent $23.8 million compared to $28.6 million for the NRSC. Meanwhile,
the DCCC spent $39.7 million and the NRCC $51 million. Here, too, independent expenditures ($122.3 million) were the largest source of candidate
support, dwarfing coordinated expenditures and direct contributions combined ($20.8 million). Indeed, direct contributions to candidates were a tiny
fraction of total candidate support Uust $2.7 million in total).
On the expenditure side, one of the most significant effects of the BCRA
was to change the avenue of party assistance from candidate-oriented issue
advocncy to independent expenditures. Parties can still help their candidates
by making direct contributions and coordinnted expenditures in their races,
but these types of spending have severe limits. Before BCRA, parties made
issue advocacy advertisements, which were paid for with a mix of hard and
soft money. Although these ads restricted the type of campaign language
parties could use (that is, no "magic words" such as "vote for," "vote
against," "support," or "defeat" could be spoken or written), they could be
paid for in a way that allowed parties to use generous amounts of unlimited
soft money donations mixed with hnrd money. BCRA eliminated soft money
as a fundraising stream for the parties, making issue advocacy a less attractive choice for the political parties. Without the ability to use easy-to-raise
soft money, parties could use only hard money for unlimited independent
expenditures. However, this category of spending does allow parties to use
the magic words and explains why issue ndvocacy was entirely abandoned.
Money for independent expenditures is raised by the parties in limited,
fully disclosed hard money donations, but independent expenditures allow
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parties to spend in unlimited amounts. The only restriction is that parties
may not coordinate their efforts with the candidate they intend to help. For
this reason, parties stayed away from independent expenditures in previous
elections, even though they have been allowed to make them since 1996. The
law's original authors did not mean for parties to have the use of unlimited
independent expenditures (making instead a unique category of limited "coordinated" expenditures for parties), but parties won this role in the first of
two important Supreme Court rulings discussed below.
Colorado l
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. 1•. Federal Election
Commission (518 U.S. 604 [ 1996]), known as Colorado /, the Colorado
Republican Party spent money to help a yet-to-be-named Republican U.S.
Senate candidate defeat Democratic candidate Tim Wirth. Because the ad
was really anti-Wirth and because the Republican primary had not yet been
held and hence no nominee selected, the party claimed this expenditure
could not be coordinated with the candidate's campaign and therefore was
independent. Further, the party challenged the notion that there should even
be coordinated expenditure limits, arguing that the very basis of a political
party is different from any other political donor, as they are trying to promote a slate of candidates and not trying to lobby for particular votes or
policy outcomes. In Colorado I, the Supreme Court agreed that parties could
engage in independent expenditures. However, it remanded the argument
about parties and unlimited coordinated contributions to the lower courts.
The restrictions against coordination proved burdensome to the national
party committees, and they declined to make use of independent expenditures, with the exception of a brief experiment by the NRSC in 1996. Issue
advocacy advertising under the soft money regime was preferable, as it
did allow some information sharing with the campaigns and central party
organizations.
Colorado II
In Federal Election Commission ,,. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (533 U.S. 431 [200 I]), known as Colorado II, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of coordinated expenditure limits on parties, arguing that to take the limits off would invite wealthy donors to contribute to
parties with instructions that their contributions go to particular candidates-a corruption of the party conduit (thus also called the "corrupt conduit" idea).'1 The argument for the 5-4 majority opinion was that evidence
of a past tally system by one of the six national party committees, the DSCC,
in which the party organization kept track of donors' wishes regarding how
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their donations should be redistributed, was extrapolated to mean that taking
the limits off coordinated spending would be the same as taking real contribution limits off wealthy donors (as if making a check out to a party committee would have implicit or explicit assumptions about the specific candidate
or target of such a donation).
The majority opinion also addressed two other corollary arguments of
importance. First, it acknowledged, as the Court had previously argued in
Buckley v. Valeo ( 1976), that independent expenditures were not as helpful
to candidates as coordinated expenditures and could even be harmful to
them. The majority opinion quoted from Buckley:
Independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's
campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence or prearrangement and coordination or an expenditure wilh the candidate or his agent
not only undermines the value or lhe expenditure to the candidate, bul also
alleviales the danger lhat expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitment from the candidale. 10

Does the Court prefer that party spending end up being counterproductive to the candidate? The Court's focus on the corrupting influence of donors is so intense as to preclude the harm that may come to the quality of
democratic discourse by preventing parties from coordinating with their candidates. There are numerous examples of independent party campaigning
(through both issue advocacy and independent expenditures) that have introduced themes unimportant to the candidates or made factual errors about
candidates or their opponents. 11 We would argue that these rushed, though
well-intended, efforts harm not only the parties as viable electoral organizations but also perceptions of candidate competence and integrity (as voters
normally do not distinguish among campaign appeals by source) and ultimately citizen interest in the political process.
The second problem in this reasoning, briefly considered by the Court,
is the matter of large contributions or transfers from incumbent members of
Congress or from prosperous nominees back to the party organizations. The
parties argued that their coordinated expenditures amounted to very little
compared to donations from incumbent members. The idea was that parties
are at least as dependent on their officeholders for funds as on outside donors. But the majority opinion in Colorado II argued,
The Party again discounts the threat or outflanking contribution limits on individual and nonparty groups by stressing thal incumbent candidales give more
excess campaign funds to parlics than parties spend on coordinaled expenditures .... But the foct that parties may do well for themselves off incumbents
docs not defuse concern over circumvention; if contributions to a party were
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nol used as a funnel from donors to candidates, there would be no reason for
using the tallying system the way the witnesses have described it. (sec. 5)

The Court does not answer the issue it addresses in Colorado II concerning
the implications of party reliance on incumbent candidates for democratic
governance. Instead, it moves back to its broader concern about parties as
conduits for wealthy contributors.

Independent Expenditures in 2004
While party observers often lament how weak the parties seem to be (a
debatable contention, to be sure), the prohibition on significant coordination
with candidates during the campaign season is an extreme impediment to
strong parties. Party organizations that have maximized the use of funds for
independent expenditure investment, as the NRCC has, have also witnessed
a growth in internal party cohesion in the legislature. While we do not contend that one behavior causes the other, the two are clearly correlated.
In a previous work (Dwyre and Kolodny 2006), we looked carefully at
the spending in congressional races in 2004. Because independent expenditures, unlike issue advocacy, are fully disclosed, we can appreciate the magnitude of party investment in competitive races and compare it to the very
modest effect of coordinated expenditures (see table 6.2). In House contests,
sixty-one candidates received total party spending of $500,000 or more. This
figure includes both coordinated and independent expenditures. Since the
limit for coordinated spending was $73,000, most of the spending was done
independently of the candidates-without their knowledge or consent. Interestingly, we found that seventeen of these candidates were outspent in their
own races by national party organizations.
An analysis of Senate races yielded similarly surprising findings. In
eight out of nine races considered competitive in 2004, the party committees

Tuble6,2 Party Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 2000-2004
(in millions or dollars)

/999- 1000

100/- 2002

1003- 100.J

Party
C"ordi11a1ed l11depe11de111 Coordinated l11depmde111 C""rdi11a1ed /11depe11de111
Co111111i11ee £tpe11ditures £tpe11di111re.1 £rpe11diture.1· £rpe11dit11res £rpe11dirures £rpe11di111res
DNC
13.5
0
0.35
0
16.1
120.3
DSCC
0.13
0.13
0.18
0
4.4
18.7

DCCC
RNC
NRSC
NRCC

2.6
23.7
0.000172

3.7

1.9
0
0.27

055

1.8
14.1
0.55
0.45

1.2
0.5

0
1.3

2.4
16.1
8.4
3.2

36.9
18.3

19.4
47.3

109

Committees and Candidates

spent between $1 million and $4 million in independent spending on behalf
of their candidate. Thal parties did not exceed candidate spending in any of
these races suggests only that Senate races are extremely expensive. In several instances, parties spent close to half what their candidates did.
The other big story was how the RNC and DNC spent independent expenditures on behalf of their presidential candidates. These committees were
not previously allowed to spend independent expenditures, but were given
explicit permission to do so in Federal Election Commis:,;ion rules related to
BCRA. The DNC made extensive use of this spending opportunity, using
more than $120 million to help John Kerry's campaign. The RNC did not
use independent expenditures that much, only $18 million, but instead used
a type of "generic" or "hybrid" spending in conjunction with President
Bush's reelection committee to allocate an additional $48 million to its candidate's campaign (Dwyre and Kolodny 2006).

The State of Electoral Competition
Despite the record amounts of money the parties have poured into federal elections, the level of competition has not increased in congressional
races. Indeed, the number of House and Senate races considered competitive
has declined significantly since 1992, as table 6.3 shows (J. Campbell 2003).
And the real action took place in only twelve states that were considered to
be battlegrounds in the last presidential election. One might expect that the
parties, more than other types of contributors, would be inclined to spread
the wealth among candidates and thus make more races competitive, giving
themselves a better chance of attaining majority status or enhancing their
control of a chamber. Yet the parties have not behaved that way. 12
Prior to the 1980s, the congressional campaign committees generally op-

Tublc 6.3

Competitive Congressional Races, 1992-2004

Election Year

Competitfre Home Seats

Competitii•e Senate Semi

1992
1994
1996
1998

103
152
174
58
43

17
14
20
15
13
13

2000
2002

2004

48
35

9

Sources: CQ Weekly Rt•1mrl (Oclobcr 24. 1992): 3340, 3342. 3358-59; (Oclobcr 22, 1994): 2998- 99,
3006: (Oclobcr 19, 1996): 2955-56, 2964: (Oclobcr 24, 1998): 21170-71, 2873; (Scpccmbcr 23. 2Cl00):
2182: (October 26, 2002): 2790, 2794; (Oclobcr 23, 2004): 2502. 2506.
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erated as incumbent protection organizations, giving the majority of their
funds to incumbents, most of them in safe seats (Kolodny 1998; Dwyre
1994 ). As the Republicans began to make some real gains in the House
and the Senate (due in part lo the realignment in Southern congressional
elections), the stakes grew higher and both parties began to distribute their
resources more strategically. That is, they directed funds to those candidates in the most competitive contests rather than to safe incumbents who
really did not need the money (Dwyre 1994). As the number of competitive
races dwindled (see table 6.3), party money went to fewer House and Senate contests.
It is rational for the parties to invest in those races where they have a
real chance of making a difference, if their resources are limited. Yet party
resources have grown (even under the new BCRA restrictions), and the parties are still not investing in the second-tier races. Instead, they are pouring
even more into the handful of races and states deemed truly competitive.
Since the parties are not spreading their resources around more widely, they
have done little to enhance the level of competition in federal elections. Indeed, since many PACs and big individual contributors follow the parties'
lead, they too are directing their resources to those same few close races,
leaving hundreds of candidates who might otherwise have a chance starving
for cash.

Conclusion
In this chapter, we have established that parties' fundraising abilities and
expenditures were not hurt by BCRA as much as some feared (and some,
like the RNC and DNC, even prospered) and that competition in national
elections continues to decline despite the high levels of money present in the
system. The political parties are clearly becoming more aggressive players
in the electoral arena. Members of Congress are increasingly cooperating to
elect fellow partisans by providing financial assistance to candidates and
party committees. Moreover, rather than allocating money on their own,
members are increasingly turning over campaign money to the party CCCs,
which allocate funds to competitive campaigns (Damore and Hansford 1999;
Herrnson 2004). Thus, member contribution activity is increasingly targeted
at gaining or preserving majority control and the enhanced power that such
control creates for all members of the party. Stronger congressional parties
have led to more centralized efforts to coordinate and control party fundraising efforts among incumbents. BCRA has intensified these trends. It did
not reduce the flow of money into congressional campaigns. Rather, the parties raised more money than ever, and members of Congress redistributed
more than ever to the parties. Parties had come to rely on unlimited soft
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money in the 1990s. With such funds banned by BCRA, the parties successfully exploited the ability of incumbents to help replace soft money with
hard money. Members of Congress had increasingly redistributed campaign
money as they responded to the pitched battle for majority control in the
1990s. But BCRA gave them an additional reason to share their campaign
wealth. The evidence we have presented shows a clear shift toward contributions to the CCCs by members of both the House and the Senate in 2004.
Other important consequences of BCRA, we argue, are that forcing parties to act independently of their candidates instead of in a coordinated manner does not promote good democratic discourse and that the arguments for
prohibiting parties from talking to their candidates are problematic. As there
continue to be calls for further reform of the federal campaign finance system (e.g., to regulate the activities of the 527 independent groups), we expect
that some in Congress, especially the party leaders, might call for taking the
cap off of party coordinated expenditures on behalf of candidates as a more
rational way to channel money in federal elections than independent expenditures. Some on the Supreme Court seem open to such a change. Moreover,
if it can be shown that coordinated spending would allow parties and their
candidates to efficiently pursue majority status and perhaps therefore to increase the number of competitive congressional races (even if this is merely
a by-product), then perhaps even reform-oriented interest groups such as
Common Cause and the League of Women Voters might get behind such a
change in policy. We expect that both of the major parties would prefer unlimited coordinated over unlimited independent expenditures.
Further research covering more election cycles is needed to analyze
more fully the relationship between party spending and competition. Of
course, the parties will continue to target the most competitive races. But
with the ability to coordinate with their candidates, and thus to have more
reliable information and fewer wasted and ineffective efforts, the parties may
become motivated to spread their resources more widely.
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Surviving BCRA
State Party Finance in 2004
Raymond J. La Raja, S11.mn E. Orr, and Daniel A. Smith
On December I 0, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the bulk of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). In McC01111ell v. Federal
Election Commis,iion, the Court let stand nearly all of BCRA's Title I, which
banned parties from using "soft money" for "federal election activity." This
activity, for which only regulated hard money could be used, includes voter
registration within 120 days of a federal election, voter identification, getouHhe-vote (GOTV) efforts, and electioneering communications mentioning federal candidates. In banning party soft money, BCRA not only altered
the strategies and activities of national parties but also, by extension, those
of state parties. With state parties no longer permitted to solicit or transfer
soft money for federal activity, some observers questioned whether they
would be able to survive under BCRA.
In this chapter, we assess how state parties have responded to the new
campaign finance regulatory environment indirectly impos~d upon them by
federal law. After providing a glimpse at the expectations of observers leading up to the implementation of BCRA, we briefly detail the total contributions and expenditures of the one hundred Democratic and Republican state
parties in the 2003- 2004 election cycle. We then break down the aggregate
spending patterns of state parties, examining their federal account activity in
the most recent cycle. Finally. we scrutinize the financial and organizational
durability of Democratic and Republican state parties in two states under the
new campaign finance regime, comparing over time their federal and nonfederal (also known as "state") accounts. In doing so, we are able to shed
light on how BCRA's sanctions have affected state party finances and activities, changed the relationship between state and national parties, and altered
the overall strength of state parties.'
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State Parties under BCRA
Prior to the passage of BCRA, many state parties were the beneficiaries
of- and in the eyes of some, dependent upon-soft money (Bibby and Holbrook 1996). Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), not
only did state parties raise sizable amounts of soft money for federal campaigns on their own but they also received soft money transfers from the
national parties for electoral activities. In order to take advantage of financial
incentives under FECA that permitted hard-soft dollar splits on coordinated
spending between the national and state parties (Dwyre and Kolodny 2002),
the national parties often exchanged soft dollars for more valuable hard dollars raised by state parties.
Though some observers thought state parties would be able to offset the
loss of soft dollar transfers, others questioned whether they would be able to
respond in the post-BCRA era. Defenders of the new law argued that state
parties were becoming mere money-laundering conduits, "used by national
party officials as vehicles for implementing their newly developed strategy
of federal electioneering under the guise of issue advocacy [television ads]"
(Mann 2003, 27). Others argued that state parties prior to BCRA had been
able to maintain their autonomy, and as such they would not suffer because
they were never heavily dependent on the national parties for their financing
(Morehouse and Jewell 2003a). Still others anticipated dire consequences for
state parties under BCRA, claiming that the ban on party soft money might
diminish the strength of state parties and party competition, especially where
state parties were weak fundraisers. These weaker state parties benefited
from national party soft money, which helped incorporate them into national
campaigns (La Raja 2002, 183 ). Some even predicted that state parties
would "become underfinanced, ineffective bystanders as other groups drive
both issues and candidates" (Bowler 2003). With the national parties no
longer permitted to transfer soft money to influence the activities of state
parties, state parties might have financial disincentives to participate in federal campaigns (Stoltz 2003; La Raja 2003a, 2003b, 2003c).

Contribution and Expenditure Patterns of State Parties
In the 2004 election cycle, state parties raised a total of $723 million
(combined federal and state accounts). The total was marginally less than
the $823 million raised in 2002 and the $802 million in 2000. In the aggregate, when transfers from the national parties are subtracted from the preBCRA contribution totals of the state parties, state parties actually raised
more federal dollars from individuals and political action committees (PACs)
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in the 2004 cycle ($445 million) than previously (Armendariz and Pilhofer
2005; La Raja 2006).
Table 7.1 details the 2003- 2004 contribution and expenditures totals for
the major state parties in all fifty states. Three Democratic state parties (New
Jersey, California, and Florida) each raised in excess of $20 million federal
and state dollars, with the New Jersey Democrats raising in excess of $28
million. Republican parties in five states (New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
California, and Florida) raised more than $20 million during the period, with
the Republican Party in Florida topping $50 million in contributions. Over
half (58) of the state parties dipped into the red during the cycle, with Democrats in California overspending by more than $12 million and the Ohio GOP
spending nearly $10 million more than it raised.

Federal Expenditures

or State Parties

In terms of federal account expenditures, the one hundred major state
parties spent as much on nonmedia activities under BCRA as they did four
years earlier. Remarkably, they did this using about 85 percent hard money,
in contrast to 2000 when half their contributions were in the form of soft
dollars. There are important differences, however, between Republicans and
Democrats and between battleground and nonbattleground states. In the first
year after the implementation of BCRA, Republican state parties appear to
have been in better shape financially than Democratic parties. Moreover,
Democratic parties in nonbattleground states experienced significant declines in spending, suggesting that the national parties concentrated resources more than ever in battleground contests during the 2004 election.
Media Spending
The most dramatic change from the previous presidential election was
that state parties no longer sponsored broadcast advertising in federal elections. In 2004, they spent nominal sums on television and radio advertising,
compared to the 2000 election when the Democrats and Republicans spent
$139 million and $97 million, respectively (see table 7.2). Almost all the
advertising by state parties in 2000 came in the form of "issue ads"- paid
for, in part, with soft money- which were tailored to help candidates without invoking electioneering slogans. BCRA effectively put an end to this
practice by banning soft money that national parties raised and then transferred to state parties to pay for these ads. Instead, national committees paid
for advertising directly in 2004, mostly through "independent" expenditures
that were not coordinated with their presidential candidates.
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Tuble 7.1 Contributions und Expenditures lo Stute PurUes, 2003-2004 Election Cycle,
Combined State and Federul Accounts

Co111rih111im1.1·

£rpe11di11m1s

Sit/II!

Democrat.1·

Rep11blkc111s

De111ocrC11s

R11p11hlic1111.1·

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachuseus
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode lsland
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

$2,228,607
$4,266,936
$7,868,469
$2,943,251
$24,871,666
$5,740,980
$1,688,552
$2,001,607
$21,372,089
$6,228,851
$1,038,010
$513,331
$12,267,926
$13,483,330
$11,653,703
$2,559,692
$3,290,669
$7,342.891
$3,294.134
$1,346,095
$2,466,860
$16,038,229
$10,857,185
$450,550
$19,218.962
$2,502,121
$1,079,490
$4,882,164
$28,347,364
$3,878,665
$16,184,698
$14,567,938
$2,812,329
$15,964,691
$4,940,918
$7,434,057
$18,2 I 9,464
$257,139
$3,022,456
$2,524,836
$6,645,989
$3,863,263
$721,803
$1,174,131
$6,500,605
$17,350,707
$1,823,046
$9,080,806
$251,800

$'i,t50,753
$1,244,623
$5,847,710
$1,637,127
$29,493,501
$4,317,091
$2.342,066
$1,651.491
$50,920.376
$7,696,974
$2,252,666
$747,980
$13,012.475
$12,968,497
$8,440,876
$618,137
$5,955.769
$4,158,138
$2,829,943
$2,558,404
$5,044,456
$18,886,710
$8,014,688
$4,000,027
$17,969.958
$984,479
$1,369.485
$2,696,147
$10,564,637
$2,095,993
$22,870, 163
$3,109,030
$668,196
$25,302,904
$2,433.460
$6,301,120
$26,163,070
$373,166
$2,905,922
$4,220,940
$3,250,576
$6,701,574
$1,296,841
$446,210
$4,412,126
$9,962,844
$2,329,813
$8,458,743
Sl.486,756

$1,828.730
$4,747.438
$8,569,642
$3,395,048
$37,230,327
$5,127.778
$1,939,843
$1,905,091
$28,826,259
$6,147,029
$1,120, 111
$369,266
$12,627,788
$14,818,593
$7,821,188
$2,753,500
$4,298,292
$6,883,952
$3,157,699
$1.758,031
$2,309,896
$11.451.416
$12,050,827
$593,053
$21,195,442
$3,407,429
$612,295
$5,645,423
$22,890,214
$3,415,008
$ I 0,982,433
$14,695,828
$2,063,507
$19.429,790
$5,312,208
$7,691,021
$17,693,603
$435,943
$2,962,866
$2,282,389
$8,362,960
$4,002,354
$925,775
$985,615
$5,440,565
$18,203,345
$1,931.433
S 11,655,924
$236,278

$2,062,699
$2,202,951
$3,855,934
$1,444,130
$28,517,361
$5,570,696
$2,832,104
$1,582,113
$39,999,847
$10,162,738
$2,393,955
$638,171
$13,633,786
$13,625,773
$7,542,518
$756,729
$6,663,057
$4.313,624
$3,071,361
$2,752,634
$5,358,005
$12,513,758
$12,951.060
$3,810,117
$18,0 I 9,525
$1,167,296
$1 , 147,048
$1,550,671
$11,018,319
$2,385,103
$17,394,286
$5,256,104
$1,907,874
$35,178,063
$3,212,378
$4,540,139
$22,958,551
$362,673
$3,341,184
$6.451.900
$4,797,546
$10,863,930
$1,636,490
$563.407
$5,902,805
$9,459,027
$2,050,387
$6,881,854
$1,164,552

Source: Center for Public Integrity, hnp://www.publicin1cgrity,org/par1ylincs/derau1t.asp,t
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Tobie 7.2 State Porty Spending In Prcsidcntiol Elections, 1992-2004
(in millions or dollors)

/992

/996

2000

Rcpuhllcons
Media
Mobilization & Grassroots
Administrative
Unidentified
Total

0
7
32
2
4/

26
16
53
4

97
39
103
6
245

Democrats
Media
Mobilization & Grassroots
Administrative
Unidentified
Total

3
12
36
3
54

73
17

139

3

51

54

107
32

62
108

99

7
/50

329

200./

I
71

122
4
/98

6

179

Source: Federal Election Commission (coded by authors).

Grassroots Campaigning and Mobilization Efforts
BCRA also sought to encourage state parties to focus on grassroots campaigning. The new campaign finance law carved out an exception to the soft
money ban for state and local parties that allowed them to spend a limited
amount of nonfederal money on party-building activities. The so-called
Levin Amendment pennitted state and local parties (where state laws permitted) to collect contributions in amounts up to $10,000 that could be used
for grassroots activity if combined with hard money. In the end, local and
state parties did not take advantage of the Levin Amendment-spending less
than $3 million in Levin funds for the cycle- as it proved too complicated
to implement.
Among state party committees, Republicans gained significant ground
on Democrats in terms of spending on mobilization of voters (see table 7.2).
While Democrats outspent them in 2000, Republicans surged ahead in 2004,
devoting $71 million to mobilization and grassroots efforts compared to $62
million for Democrats. The differences can be explained by the divergent
strategies of the two parties. The Democratic Party pursued a dual strategy
of using state parties and 527 organizations to mobilize voters in battleground states. State parties spent hard money, while the 527s relied chiefly
on soft money to pursue their GOTV goals. This division of labor reflected
concerns by Democratic strategists at the national level that the party could
not compete effectively against Republicans in the states with only hard
money. Thus, 527s sought to complement Democratic efforts in battleground states.
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According to the Center for Responsive Politics (2004), the largest 527
organization, America Coming Together (ACT), spent at least $80 million
on voter mobilization to help Democrat John Kerry. Partisan donors wishing
to support their favored candidate came to understand a simple heuristic:
hard money goes to state parties and soft money to 527s (Weissman and
Hassan 2006). Progressive 527 organizations appeared to concentrate on voters in the suburbs, while state parties focused on traditional Democratic bastions in urban areas. It is unclear how this division of labor developed, particularly since coordination between state parties-which operate under
federal hard money rules-and 527s-which operate primarily with soft
money- is illegal under BCRA. The lack of direct coordination between
Democratic parties and 527s may have hampered partisan efforts to mobilize
voters. Another problem was that duplicative GOTV operations probably increased administrative costs for the party and its supporters.
Republican partisans worked mostly through the state party structure to
mobilize voters in 2004. Building on the strategy developed in the 2002 election, they exploited a massive voter database, which linked party staff with
volunteer networks in neighborhoods. Led by the RNC, the party mined consumer data, hunting license registrations, and magazine subscriptions to
identify likely Republican donors and voters. Their system, known as "Voter
Vault," built a database of 175 million names and integrated a Web-based
grassroots organizing tool that allowed campaign volunteers to establish
their own "precincts." Much of this work was coordinated with state and
local parties.
Armed with these voter profiles, the national and state parties inundated
likely Republican voters with direct mail and phone calls. The increase in
these two activities was particularly striking. Republican state parties spent
almost $50 million on direct mail in 2004, while they spent less than half
that amount ($22 million) in 2000. Similarly, they more than doubled their
spending on phone banks from $3.6 million in 2000 to $8.6 million in 2004,
building on a trend they started at least a decade earlier. Not to be outdone by
traditionally strong Democratic field operations, Republicans also doubled
expenditures on field canvassing to $ I 8 million in 2004. Paradoxically,
while expenditures on voter contacts increased, party staff costs declined. In
2004, Republican state parties spent $33 million on staff in 2004, which was
$IO million less than in 2000. Staff costs may have decreased due to outsourcing voter contact activity or because parties achieved productivity gains by
relying more heavily on volunteer networks.
Democrats experienced greater declines in staff costs than Republicans,
spending $30 million in 2004 on salaries, benefits, and related costs compared to $69 million in 2000. This is one indication that the size of Democratic campaign organizations may have shrunk, in part due to their dual
strategy of using 527s. In key battleground states, 527s recruited talented
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campaigners early in the process before state parties had their wheels turning
for the presidential campaign. Nonetheless, Democratic state parties managed to hold their spending steady in a number of areas. Relying on campaign tactics developed in previous presidential elections, they organized
"coordinated campaigns" that emphasized canvassing with paid staff and
volunteers in heavily Democratic areas. Spending on field operations was
$15 million, about the same as in 2000. Similarly, they spent the same
amount on phone banks ($6 million) as the previous presidential election.
Democrats, however, increased spending on direct mail, from $36 million to
$43 million.
The Democrats also significantly augmented office-related expenditures,
from $33 million to $68 million (including utilities, travel, equipment, rent,
and computers). Most likely a significant portion of Democratic spending
was related to amassing and managing a large database. Like the RNC, the
DNC wanted to exploit information technology to reach targeted voters. The
DNC system combined a voter file called DataMart with another database
called Demzilla, which compiled information about donors, activists, volunteers, and local party leaders. Assembling these databases required massive
amounts of data collection. State parties may have played an important role
in putting together the databases, which might account for the surge in officerelated expenses (Reich 2005).

State Party Spending in Battleground States
One important effect of BCRA on state parties was that it concentrated
spending more in battleground states. In most presidential elections, the parties pursue an Electoral College strategy that focuses on the large swing
states. In 2004, the concentration of funds in battleground states was even
greater than in 2000. Table 7.3 compares spending on voter mobilization in
the same ten battleground states between 1992 and 2004. These states were
chosen because the outcome of the presidential contest in 2000 and 2004
was five percentage points or less between the rival candidates. In 2000,
Democrats spent nearly half their funds on voter mobilization in these ten
states and the other half in the remaining forty states. In 2004, however, they
spent 59 percent of their voter contact funds in these same battleground
states. Republicans also concentrated efforts more in battleground states. In
2000, they spent 35 percent of funds in these ten states, while in 2004 this
portion increased to 43 percent.
It is difficult to determine whether the new campaign finance law encouraged parties to concentrate voter mobilization activity in selected states.
Going back to at least 1992, parties were moving toward a strategy of greater
concentration of campaign efforts in swing states. In the past decade, with
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Tuble 7.3 Stute Purty Expenditures on Voter Mobilizution (in millions), BuUleground
vs. NonbuUleground Stutes, 1992-2004
Nm1bm1/egm1111J

Bt111legro11111/

% Ba11/egro11111I

5
11
25
40

2
5
14
31

27%
32%
35%
43%

9
12
26
25

3
5
25
37

23%
29%
48%
59%

Republicuns
1992
1996

2000
2004

Democrats
1992
1996
2000
2004

Source: Feder.ti Election Commission (coded by authors).
Nore: .. Baulcground.. is defined here as the same ten stale~ in which the major party candidate~ fin•
ishctl five or rcwcr percentage points apart in both 2000 and 2(Xl4. These Mate~ arc Florida, Iowa. Michi•
gan. Minnesota. New Hampshire. Nevada. Ohio, Oregon. Pennsylvania, and Wi~cunsill-

the help of technology, parties have enhanced their capacity to identify likely
partisan voters in key contests throughout the nation.
Under BCRA, it may be true that parties are less inclined to " waste"
hard money on states that are not critical to an election, since hard money is
more difficult to raise than soft money. An analysis of national party hard
money transfers to state parties in 2004 shows that the RNC and DNC gave
more of their money to expected battleground states than in the past. Party
leaders in Washington may have instructed donors to focus on these same
battleground states when giving hard money. Any of these behaviors may
have contributed to a greater imbalance in voter mobilization activity in
competitive and noncompetitive states, but it cannot be attributed definitively
to BCRA.

State Party Spending in Nonbattleground States
A more detailed analysis of the forty nonbattleground states reveals another post-BCRA pattern. States with campaign finance laws that permit unlimited contributions to the parties fared worse under the new federal system
than states that had regimes with contribution caps (in some form) that were
similar to BCRA. In other words, soft money states did not appear to make
the transition to BCRA as well as hard money states. For Democratic state
parties in nonbattleground, soft money states, total nonmedia spending in
federal elections declined significantly between 2000 and 2004. These sixteen Democratic state parties spent $87 million in 2000, but only $38 million
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in 2004. In contrast, states with laws limiting party fundraising experienced
an increase in party spending. These twenty•four states spent $25 million in
2000 and roughly $52 million in 2004. These differences suggest that BCRA
may have a differential impact on slate parties depending on how much state
laws vary from BCRA hard money limits. In states where the party was accustomed to raising soft money for state elections, the Democratic organizations appear to have had greater difficulty campaigning in federal elections
under BCRA.
For Republicans, the transition to BCRA did not appear as difficult for
soft money states. In states with no limits, the parties spent slightly more in
2004 than in 2000. However, in states where the campaign finance laws ap•
peared more similar to BCRA, Republican parties increased their spending
even more, from $31.9 million to $53.4 million. It appears, then, that BCRA
might have contingent effects on state parties, hurting Democratic organizations more than GOP state parties. Among Democratic parties, the difficulties appear greater in states with few limits on party fundraising.

State Party Activities in Colorado and Florida
As the aggregate findings reveal, a state's electoral and campaign fi.
nance regulatory environments are key considerations when assessing
BCRA's fiscal and organizational impact on state parties. To understand the
potential contingent effects of BCRA, we examine the impact of BCRA on
state parties in two states, Colorado and Florida. The parties in the two states
make good comparative cases, as both states had competitive federal elections between 2000 and 2004, with Republicans having a slight edge, but
where party financing in one (Florida) is unconstrained and in the other (Colorado) it is heavily regulated.
State Electoral £11\lironment and Campaign Finance Regulations
With respect to Florida's electoral environment, the first three electoral
cycles of the twenty-first century are ripe for comparison, providing consistency over time as well as useful variations. In 2000 and 2004, Florida was
not only a battleground state for the presidency; it also had competitive U.S.
Senate races both years. The 2002 midterm election featured an uncompetitive gubernatorial race. In all three cycles, nearly all of the seats in the House
of Representatives were won by margins of 55 percent or greater.
Colorado's electoral milieu during the period of study was more varied
than Florida's. While the presidential contests in 2000 and 2004 were not
competitive, with President Bush taking the state both years, the state had
highly competitive U.S. Senate races in 2002 and 2004. Like Florida, Colo-
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rado had a less-than-competitive gubernatorial race in 2002, but the state did
have a few competitive House races over the three election cycles.
Florida's campaign finance regulations concerning political parties remained unchanged over the three election cycles. Florida has virtually no
source or size limits on contributions that can be made lo state political parties. Parties registered in the state may receive unlimited contributions from
corporations, unions, PACs, and individuals, as well as from national and
local political parties. The state's lax contribution requirements to parties,
combined with the state's sizable population and importance in the Electoral
College tally, have enabled its Democrats and Republicans lo become among
the top state party fundraisers in the country (Morehouse and Jewell 2003a,
163).
In Colorado, campaign finance regulations were abruptly altered by
Amendment 27, a constitutional amendment ballot initiative passed in 2002
that capped contributions lo state parties at $2,500 for individuals and PACs,
but permitted larger, "bundled" contributions (up to $12,500 annually) to
state parties from restricted "Small Donor Committees." The amendment
strictly prohibits contributions to state (and local) parties that are earmarked
for a candidate committee, but allows unlimited inlraparty transfers among
the state and national parties. Immediately after its passage, some political
observers anticipated that Amendment 27 would severely constrict the fundraising abilities of the state parties, with donors bypassing stale parties and
contributing instead to 527s with the tacit blessings of party officials.~

BCRA 's Effects 011 State Party Co11tribmio11s
We anticipate that federal parties may reduce their transfers to state parties because they are no longer allowed to take advantage of favorable hardsoft dollar funding ratios. Given the electoral milieu outlined above, it would
seem that Florida parties with their high-profile Electoral College status are
in a better position than Colorado's to attract transfers from the federal parties post BCRA, as such dollars, being more difficult to raise than the soft
dollars used for transfers prior to BCRA, will no doubt be allocated very
strategically. Simultaneously the state parties would be expected to see increases in contributions to their state accounts as donors take advantage of
the higher contributions limits under BCRA. However, as Florida parties received large influxes into their state accounts prior to BCRA by way of soft
dollar transfers, they may struggle to maintain their pre-BCRA state account
contribution levels. Parties in Colorado received less soft dollar transfers and
thus should see little impact on their state account contributions because of
BCRA; Amendment 27, though, should reduce state account contributions.
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Co11trib111io11S lo Florida Sw1e Parties

It appears that BCRA did not substantially hurt the ability of state parties
in Florida to raise money, although it did affect how much they received in
transfers from national parties, especially for Democrats. In the post-BCRA
2004 cycle, the Florida Republican Party maintained its federal and state
account contributions when compared to the 2000 cycle. As figure 7.1
shows, the state GOP raised a total of $50.9 million in the 2004 cycle, down
slightly from the $54.1 million it raised for the 2000 elections. In the 2004
cycle, 72 percent of total party funds were raised by the state party. The
balance of $14.2 million was transferred from the national parties to the state
party's federal account (hard money only), which demonstrates that the national Republican parties continued to invest heavily in key swing states
under BCRA. In the 2004 cycle, the state party raised nearly $27 million in
nonfederal (state account) contributions, which was marginally more than in
2000 (not counting the $13.3 million in soft dollars transferred from the national parties). Clearly, the expectation that a large-stale party such as the
Florida GOP-which seemed hooked on soft money transfusions in 2000
(Barber 2004)-would suffer under BCRA is not the case. In the 2002 gubernatorial cycle, the vast majority of the funds raised by the state GOP went
into the party's state account, including some $11.7 million it received in
soft money transfers from the national parties (Dunbar 2002). Only $4.2 million (7 percent) of the $60.1 million in total contributions in 2002 went into
the state party's federal account. Overall, then, while BCRA appears to curtail soft money transfers, the party has maintained funding for its state account and increased contributions to its federal account.
The Florida Democratic Party, as figure 7.1 shows, consistently trailed
(by roughly half) the aggregate campaign contributions made to its Republican counterpart. The total amount of money raised by the Democrats in the
2004 cycle ($21.4 million) was half the total raised during the 2000 cycle
($42.6 million). The party did not receive any federal party transfers in 2004,
perhaps due to the national party's complicity in directing donors to contribute to "extra-party" 527 organizations operating in Florida. It is clear that
the Florida Democratic Party under FECA was much more dependent on
infusions of soft money from the national parties than the GOP was, although its hard money in 2004 was tenfold that of 2000. During the 2002
midterm election, the state party raised more money for its state account
(nearly $28 million) than during either presidential cycle.
Co11tributio11S to Colorado Stale Parties

Keeping in mind the electoral backdrop in Colorado and changes in state
campaign finance, the impact of BCRA, though apparent, is less clear. The
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compounding effect of the two financial regulations changes appears lo have
caused almost all contributions to be directed to the state parties' federal
accounts. In the 2004 cycle, the Colorado GOP raised considerably more
hard dollars than it did four years earlier. As figure 7.2 shows, the party
raised $3.8 million for its federal account in 2004, roughly 91 percent of the
party's total contributions. During the 2000 cycle, by contrast, contributions
to the party's state account made up 63 percent of the $3.1 million in total
contributions. There were indications in 2000, though, that the state GOP
was well positioned to raise federal hard dollars under BCRA, as the party
on its own raised 98 percent of the $1.1 million for its federal account that
cycle. During the 2002 midterm cycle with a gubernatorial contest, a tight
Senate race, and several House races in play, the Colorado GOP raised considerably more money ($14.1 million) than in either of the presidential elections. It received hefty transfers in hard and soft money from the national
party in this final cycle before the soft money ban.
The pattern of campaign contributions to the Colorado Democrats over
the three election cycles is somewhat different. During the 2004 cycle, the
state party raised 1.4 million, roughly $600,000 less than the amount raised
four years earlier (see figure 7.2). As with the state GOP, 95 percent of the
funds the Democrats raised in the 2004 cycle were deposited into the party's
federal account. The party raised a paltry $247,924 for its slate account in
2004, some $229,116 less than in 2000 and roughly one-tenth of the $2.7
million it raised in 2002. Unlike the state GOP, which showed it could easily
raise federal hard dollars, the Colorado Democrats appeared still very much
dependent on the national party's transfers of hard dollars. During the 2004
cycle, 75 percent ($3.5 million) of donations made to the Democrats' federal
account were national party transfers. On its own, the party raised just $1.4
million federal dollars, less than one-third of its overall contributions. This
is in sharp contrast to 2000, when the party raised $1.5 million by itself in
hard and soft dollars, accounting for four-fifths of its total contributions.
During the 2002 cycle, the party's fundraising was quite similar to the
GOP' s, with the Democrats raising a total of $11.2 million.

Co111rib111io11s Summary

With higher allowances for hard money contributions under BCRA, the
state parties apparently concentrated their efforts on raising federal dollars.
The Florida state parties, especially the Democrats, were able to increase
contributions to their federal accounts, offsetting to some degree the loss in
soft money transfers. However, it is clear that the national Democratic Party
organizations, particularly the DNC, abandoned the state Democratic Party
in 2004, relying instead on 527 organizations to do grassroots outreach and
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mobilize partisans. Judging by Kerry's lackluster performance in Florida,
the Democrats' dual strategy-with the state party raising hard money and
the 527s soft money-did not work well. In contrast, the GOP national committees transferred more than $14 million in hard money to the state party
in 2004, suggesting that Republicans were intent on building a grassroots
mobilization effort in Florida. While the decline in contribution levels to the
parties' state accounts in Colorado was due, in part, to Amendment 27,
BCRA provided the state parties with an incentive to raise federal dollars.
Nonfederal money for state-level campaigns, in contrast, is seemingly being
raised by nonparty vehicles, such as 527s and nonprofits. 1
BCRA 's Effects on State Party Expenditures

In line with the findings at the aggregate level, we would anticipate that
media spending by state parties will decline in the post-BCRA era. Similarly, we would expect to see significant increases in candidate support expenditures as well as administration (since salary expenses are included in
administration). Due to the shift in contributions generally toward larger
funds in federal accounts, we would anticipate that a significant proportion
of expenditures will draw from federal account funds, indicating a continued
engagement with federal campaigns on the part of state parties.~
£1:pe11dit11res by Florida State Parties

In Florida there is considerable evidence that spending patterns of state
parties were affected by BCRA. In the 2004 cycle, Republicans spent $38.4
million, almost $11 million less than in 2000. Figure 7 .3 reveals that the
party spent far less on media expenditures and considerably more on administration and candidate support, which includes GOTV efforts, party
"hoopla" (signs, buttons, etc.), and direct mail. In terms of candidate support and party administration, a different trend emerges. In the 2000 cycle,
total spending on candidate support was roughly 21 percent of the party's
overall spending. In the 2004 cycle, spending by the party on candidate support nearly doubled to $19.7 million, accounting for 49 percent of the party's
total expenditures. The party spent more than $6.5 million on administration
in 2000; in the post-BCRA 2004 cycle, administration costs roughly doubled, eating up 27 percent of the party's overall spending.
Given the end of soft money transfers and the increase in allowable federal dollar contributions under BCRA, the ratio of expenditures from the
Florida GOP's federal and state accounts appears to have changed. In 2000,
26 percent of the party's total outlays flowed from the federal account; by
2004, the proportion had increased to 48 percent. The GOP increased the
proportion with respect to the three major categories of expenditures, the
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GOP increased the proportion of its federal account spending on candidate
support and administration in 2004 but ended almost entirely any federal
account spending on media. Despite the pronounced decline in federal account spending on media, the increases in federal spending on candidate support and administration demonstrate that the state party was still actively
participating in federal campaigns. It is likely that the state party was "federalizing" its activity so that it could continue to conduct voter mobilization
under the new "federal election activity" rules.
It is important to note the significant decline in transfer payments made
by the Florida GOP over the three election cycles. In the 2000 cycle, the
state party transferred $21.3 million to the national parties. accounting for
45 percent of the party's total disbursements; in 2002, the amount fell to
$6.5 million, and by 2004 it was only $2.4 million. The dramatic decline in
intraparty transfers across the two presidential elections was due to BCRA.
as the law eliminated the practice of swapping valuable hard dollars collected
by the state parties for soft dollars raised by the national parties.
The trends in spending patterns of the Florida Democrats closely parallel
those of the GOP. Total expenditures dropped to $28.1 million in 2004 from
$44.6 million in 2000. Once BCRA went into effect, the party's expenditures
on media declined, but spending on candidate support and administration
increased. In 2000, candidate support was 23 percent ($10.1 million) of the
party's overall spending; by 2004, it rose to 54 percent ($14.8 million). Figure 7.3 shows how the party's federal account expenditures on media in
2004 decreased as a proportion of total media spending and declined in real
dollars.
£tpe11dit11re.t by Colorado State Parties

There is considerable variation in the expenditure patterns of the two
state parties in Colorado, as figure 7.4 reveals. Because of Amendment 27,
though, it is difficult to discern to what extent the effects are a result of the
new state campaign finance regulations at the state or federal level. In contrast to the Florida state parties, overall spending by the two Colorado parties
was significantly higher in 2004 than four years earlier, due in part to the
two competitive House races in 2004 and the absence of a Senate race in
2000. Expenditures by the Colorado GOP in 2004 increased to $4.7 million,
37 percent more than the party spent in 2000. Spending by the Colorado
Democratic party more than doubled over the four years, from $1.5 million
to nearly $4 million. Spending by Colorado parties in 2002 surpassed that
of the two presidential cycles because of the gubernatorial election and the
contested Senate race. Colorado Republicans spent more than $16.7 mill ion
in 2002, with the state Democrats spending roughly half that amount.
Similar to the parties in Florida, those in Colorado increased the propor-
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lion of spending allocated to administration compared with the previous
presidential election. Neither state party spent much on media in any cycle,
the sole exception being the GOP in the 2002 midterm election. Overall expenditures (combined state and federal accounts) on media in the two presidential cycles comprised less than 7 percent of expenditures for both parties.
It is likely that the spike in media expenditures by the state GOP in 2002
($8.2 million) was driven by national party transfers lo assist the competitive
U.S. Senate and Seventh Congressional District races (Smith 2004). Spending on candidate support by both parties increased over the two presidential
cycles, with the Democrats leading the way. In the 2002 midterm cycle, the
Democrats devoted more than four-fifths of their expenditures ($6.7 million)
to candidate support, spending less than 1 percent on media; Republicans, in
contrast, spent a modest amount ($2.3 million) on candidate support and
more than half of their total outlays on media.
£tpe11ditures Summary

Expenditures by the four state parties during the pre- and post-BCRA
periods shed light on the issue of state party organizational strength. In both
states, the parties are spending less on media and more on administration
(including salaries for staff) under BCRA, which differs from the aggregatelevel findings. The parties are spending more on candidate support under
BCRA, with a consistent proportional increase in money coming from their
federal accounts. In Colorado, the impact of Amendment 27 appears to have
pushed the parties to draw more heavily on their federal accounts, as the
revenue of their state accounts has declined considerably. It is possible that
Colorado and other states with more restrictive laws on party financing may
actually benefit from the more generous funding levels for state parties under
BCRA.

Conclusion
Under BCRA, state parties were able to augment their voter mobilization
strategies, continuing a trend that developed in the 1990s. They deployed
expensive new technologies to identify and contact likely partisan voters.
With the ban on national party soft money, state parties no longer sponsor
issue ads, which were carried out under the direction and resources of the
national committees. State parties, however, continue to receive transfers of
hard money from the national parties-especially the Republicans-to support state party mobilization efforts, though these amounts are targeted more
heavily to battleground states than in the past.
Republicans state parties have made the transition lo BCRA better than
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the Democrats. They raised more money and outspent them on voter mobilization activities in 2004. Democrats, however, pursued a dual strategy that
relied heavily on outside 527s to campaign for the Democratic presidential
nominee. If 527 organization activities are included, Democratic partisans
may have outspent Republicans. Democrats, however, probably suffered
from their inability to coordinate these activities.
In assessing the impact of BCRA on state parties, an important distinction is whether the party organization operates in a battleground state. It appears that state parties in battleground states were equally active in 2004, if
not more so, than in the previous presidential election. In nonbattleground
states, however-especially where state campaign finance laws allow soft
money- the parties fared worse. This was particularly true for Democratic
organizations, which have been more reliant on soft money than their Republican counterparts. The use of Levin funds- which was supposed to
allow parties to use soft money for grassroots activity-was not exploited,
primarily because of complex Federal Election Commission accounting
regulations.
As the two case studies make clear, the fundraising and organizational
capacity of state parties is largely conditioned by the electoral context and
campaign finance regulations of each state. On the revenue side of the equation, when there are competitive federal races, the parties are able to raise
sufficient hard dollars to offset the loss of national soft money transfers,
though the Colorado Democrats showed less ability to do so. The ban on soft
money in federal elections appears to have had a negligible effect on the
ability of the Florida GOP to raise money for its state-level campaigns, as
Morehouse and Jewell (2003a) anticipated, but it has had more serious consequences for Florida Democrats. State party coffers have declined with the
end of soft money transfers from the national parties, but state parties seem
to have survived BCRA, collecting more hard dollars for their federal accounts. Data from the 2006 midterm cycle will certainly help to evaluate
these tentative conclusions.
On the expenditure side, the case studies reflect the national patterns.
Under BCRA, state parties have decreased expenditures on media and virtually eliminated hard money swaps with the national parties. In contrast, they
have increased their spending on candidate support and administration.
There is little evidence that state parties in battleground states have removed
themselves from federal campaigns under BCRA. In the 2004 cycle, most
state party spending on candidate support, which includes targeting and mobilizing voters, flowed from the parties' federal accounts, which is likely an
artifact of the new "federal election activity" requirements. Although it is
still too early to draw firm conclusions after one post-BCRA election cycle,
the spending patterns of state parties seems to be tied as much to a state's
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electoral context and campaign finance regulations as to changes brought
about by BCRA.
Ascertaining the fiscal and organizational strength of state parties under
BCRA is a difficult and somewhat subjective enterprise. The shift away from
media spending by state parties in the 2004 general election might indicate
that nonparty organizations are in a better position to set the campaign
agenda, at least when federal candidates are on the ballot. Overall media
spending in the 2004 cycle did not decline dramatically. Instead, media expenditures moved from parties (state and national) to nonparty organizations
(Weissman and Hassan 2006; Boatright et al. 2006; Armendariz and Pilhofer
2005). The incentives for national party leaders to use nonparty committees
instead of state parties for media may weaken the organizational ties between national and state parties. Yet, as the national data and case studies
show, state parties under BCRA increased their spending on candidate support and administrative costs, perhaps indicating that some organizations are
stronger, particularly in battleground states.
Among the many important questions in anticipation of the next election
are whether Republicans will increase their advantage over Democratic state
parties and whether Democrats will continue to pursue a dual strategy, relying on both 527s and state party hard money to mobilize voters. Much depends on decisions made by the Federal Election Commission regarding the
status of 527 organizations and whether they will be regulated like PACs,
which would compel them to use hard money. Another concern for Democrats is whether the national and state parties will inherit the voter data and
campaign expertise of 527s such as ACT. Finally, it is worth considering the
relative health of the national and state parties. The national parties broke
all records for raising hard money, but while state parties held their own
collectively, it cannot be said that they fared as well as their national committee counterparts. It remains to be seen whether they can raise hard money
from national constituencies that may prefer to give to federal candidates and
national committees in Washington. Further research should explore whether
the constraints of hard money fundraising for federal elections affect the
breadth of state party activities in state elections, especially where state laws
differ considerably from BCRA, and in nonbattleground states.
Although it still is too early to fully comprehend how the landscape for
state parties has changed under BCRA, the federal law should have contingent effects on the finances and organizational strength of state parties. As
was the case with FECA, the electoral and campaign finance regulatory contexts of a state need to be considered when examining BCRA's effect on
state parties. During election cycles when states lack competitive presidential, Senate, or House races, the national parties may politely ignore state
parties, as our findings suggest. But when there are competitive federal elections to contest, the national parties will continue to be involved in those

134

Raymond J. La Raja, Susan E. Orr, and Daniel A. Smith

states in the post-BCRA era. We hesitate to conclude, as Malbin (2006) does,
that BCRA has not had "a major effect on the activity ... or on the financial
health of the state parties." Rather, our findings suggest that BCRA has had
a co11ti11ge11t effect on the campaign finance and organizational capacity of
state parties.

Notes
I. Data for this chapter arc drawn from state party campaign finance reports filed with
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the Center for Public Integrity (CPI), and the state
elections authorities of Colorado and Florida. We thank Bob Biersack of the FEC. Agustin
Armendariz of the CPI, and Derck Willis of the We1shi11gum Ptw for providing data and helpful insights. Data were coded by the authors into the various categories of contributions and
expenditures.
2. Peter Blake, "GOP Jumping Merrily through Fund-Raising Loophole," Rocky Mm111wi11 Nell's, December 20, 2003.
3. Ibid.
4. Expenditure categories include spending on Media, Administration, Candidate Support, Transfers, and All Other, which includes fund-raising, political contributions, and other
or undetermined spending.

8
Rally 'round the Flag
When Interest Groups Invite Themselves to the Party
David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson

Interest in the 2004 election ran high. The razor-thin margin of President
George W. Bush's 2000 election, dissatisfaction in some quarters with his
domestic and foreign policies, and his low approval ratings all seemed to
indicate a tight race in 2004. The anticipated closeness and intensity of the
race led participants from both sides of the political aisle to investigate and
adopt new strategies that would help them to achieve a victory. By July
2003, the America Votes (AV) coalition was officially formed, consisting of
thirty-two progressive interest groups who each anted up $50,000 for a seat
at the table to work together on voter education and mobilization efforts during the 2004 election cycle. Though united in motive, AV and its members
did not confine themselves to a particular electoral jurisdiction or a specific
message. The scope and breadth of their cooperation resulted in an organization that rivaled a political party's ability to affect elections on a broad scale.
The creation of AV was widely publicized, but was only part of a broader
effort to revitalize progressive politics. Responding to favorable political circumstances and recent changes in the campaign finance regulatory environment, a group of prominent political donors provided the funds for new organizations that became part of AV. including America Coming Together
(ACT) and the Media Fund. 1 This up-front funding made it possible to retain
the services of a group of talented and experienced professionals, many of
whom had worked for the Democratic Party or individual Democratic candidates.
The activities and impact of AV raise questions about the conditions necessary for the emergence and effectiveness of such a coalition. While a handful of its largest member organizations, such as ACT and the Media Fund,
engaged in most of the electoral activity, our focus is on the AV coalition
itself. We seek to understand why and how it undertook its coordinated activities. First, we examine what the literature says about the conditions under
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which we expect interest groups to cooperate, and then we extend these insights to the electoral arena, where a slightly different set of incentives and
benefits foster cooperation. We next describe the formation of AV and the
motivations members expressed for joining this coalition. Finally, we compare the scope of this coalition's activities to the efforts of political parties
and comment on the long• term prospects for AV or other similar interest
group coalitions.

Interest Group Coalitions: Lobbying and Campaigning
Interest group scholars have theorized about the conditions under which
individuals join interest groups. Generally, this work relies on theoretical
explanations developed by Mancur Olson in his work The logic of Collective Action (1965) or by Robert Salisbury (1969) in his work on exchange
theory. Olson and Salisbury posit that individuals need to receive particular
benefits in order to participate in groups. Otherwise, there is a strong tendency for individuals to want to "free ride" on the efforts of others. The
research places the selective benefits that individuals can receive into three
distinct categories: material, solidary, and expressive. Groups need to offer
at least one of these particular incentives in order to overcome the individual's incentive to free ride. There are numerous examples of these kinds of
benefits. Material benefits include such things as T-shirts, reduced life insurance premiums, or any other sort of discrete benefit an individual may desire. Solidary benefits refer to the relationships that individuals can enjoy in
association with others of like mind through such interactions as group meetings or newsletters. Expressive benefits, or what Clark and Wilson ( 1961)
label "purposive incentives," pertain to policy or ideological goals of the
participants. Individuals wanting to receive such benefits from a group must
do so at a cost, whether monetary or otherwise.
The insights of Olson's and Salisbury's research have also been extrapolated to interest group coalitions (Almeida 2005; Hula 1999). Just as scholars
have sought to uncover the reasons why individuals combine to form interest
groups, they have also sought to understand the conditions under which separate interest groups combine into coalitions to pursue a particular goal. Essentially, each interest group must assess the various costs and benefits of
joining a coalition in much the same way that an individual must weigh the
benefits and costs of joining in and participating with a group. Thus, the
types of incentives that entice individuals to participate in an interest group
can also serve to bring organizations together in a coalition.
The interest group literature has identified several different types of benefits that normally fall under one of the three main headings mentioned
above. For example, a material benefit that a group may derive from joining
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a coalition may be lower operating costs. When costs can be shared, a group
has a material incentive to participate in a coalition. A group can also enlist
in a coalition to promote solidarity, mainly through sharing information from
other groups. This solidary benefit, in tum, can translate into achieving a
group's purposive goals, when the additional information gleaned from collaboration helps the group to achieve its policy goals more easily. The group
may also recognize the long-term strategic advantage from sharing information with other groups well positioned in the policy environment. With a
policy environment that can often be large and complex, individual groups
often realize they need assistance from others to effectively and meaningfully affect public policy.
Though coalitions can form relatively quickly under desirable circumstances, there are constraints on the formation of some kinds of coalitions.
Groups are more likely to select partners that share a similar ideology (Almeida 2005). This means that coalitions with a broad range of ideological
partners will be rare. There is also differentiation of workload once the coalition forms. Not all groups join the coalition at the same time, with the same
resources, or with the same motivation (Hula 1995). These differences basically ensure that each group will bear a slightly different burden or have
different responsibilities as the coalition seeks to achieve its goals. Even with
such complexities, however, groups regularly form coalitions for the purpose
of lobbying.
We can apply these insights from the world of interest group lobbying to
the world of campaigning. There are several reasons why campaign coalitions may form. First, groups can share the costs of campaigning. If groups
have similar motivations and goals in the electoral arena, then there are good
reasons to pool resources. Voter registration and voter identification projects
lend themselves to cooperative efforts to save costs. Second, groups can receive strategic information from collaboration. In a complex campaign environment, groups may not always know the best places or ways to expend
their resources. A coalition can provide the individual member with information and advice, minimizing duplication of effort and increasing efficiency.
For example, polling can be designed to address the needs of cooperating
groups because there is usually significant overlap in the concerns of related
groups. Third, lobbying for legislative votes is similar to "lobbying" for
popular votes. In both cases, groups seek to identify and persuade "swing
voters" through targeting specific messages (Patterson and Singer 2002).
With the right level of coordination, all members of the group are likely to
persuade more voters. Finally, groups may form coalitions to campaign so
that they can elect individuals whom the coalition can more easily lobby
after the campaign is over. All interest groups should desire to see elected
officials who are more sympathetic to their policy positions, and campaign
efforts may establish an even greater link between their campaign and their
lobbying efforts.
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We also recognize that there are hurdles groups must overcome to cooperate in a campaign environment. It is one thing for groups to collaborate in
a legislature; but it may be something entirely different for groups to collaborate during an election. First, campaigns involve several sorts of unique activities, including voter registration and identification, campaign communication, database management, voter mobilization, and possible litigation.
These activities are considerably more complex and costly than simply persuading a few select representatives or senators through direct contact or
grassroots lobbying. Second, campaigning and lobbying are different because coordinating so many campaign activities across electoral jurisdictions
may create insurmountably high transaction costs. Third, unlike an extended
lobbying effort that could span several years, elections occur in a relatively
short time frame; the nominees are normally selected only a few months
before the general elections. This abbreviated time frame can make it even
more difficult for groups to meet and decide on how to allocate resources.
In both settings, interest groups may be unsure of their financial resources,
but it is our sense that campaign budgets have more uncertainty than lobbying budgets. Finally, the goals in a campaign environment differ from those
in a policy environment. An electoral coalition may really claim success
only if a particular candidate wins office, whereas in a policy environment,
a lobbying coalition can achieve a degree of success by slowing down the
policy, seeking major amendments, or producing incremental outcomes.
Yet in spite of such obstacles, we find that interest groups in the 2004
presidential campaign assembled a formidable coalition for the purpose of
educating and mobilizing voters against President Bush. They shared an
ideological framework, vehemently disapproved of the policies of the Bush
administration, exchanged pertinent information, and developed technologies and contacts that they believed would be useful in future electoral contests. Just as the coalition-building literature on interest groups predicts, a
mix of material, solidary, and expressive benefits inspired the creation and
maintenance of a campaign coalition that seemed to be similar in size and
scope to a political party.
Recent research categorizes the coalition that emerged in 2005 as a
"shadow party" and argues that it is evidence for the idea of "party networks" (e.g., Skinner 2005). While the coalition relied on former party
workers and sought to help a particular candidate, it is still too early to conclude whether the conditions and incentives in 2004 can consistently foster
coalitions that merit the title of "shadow party." In part because of the decentralized and candidate-centered structure of U.S. elections, the various
participants often have conflicting goals (Magleby, Patterson, and Thurber
2002). Our research here focuses on the possibility that different incentives
can produce large campaign coalitions that resemble parties but remain outside a formal party structure.
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Campaign Coalition Building: The Formation of America Votes
AV was created in July 2003 for the purpose of increasing voter registration, education, and participation in electoral politics; it claimed to represent
twenty million Americans (America Votes 2003). Table 8.1 contains a list of

Table 8.1

America Votes Coalition Members during the 2004 Election

Org,miwtio11
AFL-CIO
AFSCME
America Coming Together (ACT)
American Federalion of Teachers
Association of Community Organizing for Reform Now (ACORN)
Association of Trial Lawyers of America
Brady Campaign 10 Prevcnl Gun Violence•
Clean Water Action
Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund
Democracy for America
Democrats 2000 (21st Century Democrats)
EMILY's List
Environment 2004, Inc.•
Human Rights Campaign
League of Conservation Voters
Media Fund
Million Mom March•
MovcOn.org Voler Fund
Moving America Forward•
Music for America
NARAL Pro.Choice America
NAACP National Voter Fund
National Educalion Association
National Jewish Democratic Council
National Treasury Employees Unionffreasury Employees
Democracy in Action
Partnership for America's Families
Planned Parenthood Action Fund
Service Employees International Union (SEJU)
Sierra Club
USAction
Voices for Working Families
Young Voter Alliance (Young Democrats of America)

Tow/ 527
Expe11dit11re:.
$6,494,316
$24.505,616
$78,040,480
$347,083

$231,796
$533,390
$603.771
$1,256.559
$8,100,752
$1,167,762
$5,749,006
$54.494,698
$21,346,380
$1,507,324

$3,906,333

$2,936,666
$595,288
$46,726,713
$6,261,811
$7,202,695
$723,781

Source: Center for Public Integrity. hnp-//www.publicintcgrity org/527/db.aspx'?act .. activity:!003
Norc.f; Since the 2004 election, the Alliance for Retired Americans (not listed above) has joined

America Votes.
• The Brady Campaign and Million Mom March joined America Vole~ together.
• Group has disbanded ~incc 2004 e lcc1ion.

140

David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson

the thirty-two AV members during the 2004 election cycle, along with the
total expenditures of AV member organizations who filed as Section 527
groups with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as reported in data compiled
by the Center for Public Integrity. Groups without spending totals listed are
most likely 50l(c) organizations, for which expenditure data on their 2004
election activities will not be available until they file with the IRS in 2006.
Each AV member paid $50,000 to join. 2
The table helps illustrate several points about the coalition. First, the coalition included groups with widely varying budgets and issue agendas, including environmental groups, gun control lobbies, labor unions, and unaffiliated political committees. Second, the overall 527 expenditures of AV,
approximately $2.8 million during the 2004 cycle, pale in comparison with
the total combined spending of the coalition members of at least $273 million.3 Our focus here is on AV as the hub of all of that spending. While AV
could not mandate how members spent their money, there was an effort at
unifying and coordinating the message. Two AV members, ACT and the
Media Fund, spent about $133 million, or 49 percent of the total AV 527
spending. Because of their large expenditures relative to the other AV members, it is easy to confuse the activities of AV, ACT, and the Media Fund.
Furthermore, AV and ACT shared office space, and their staffs interacted on
a daily basis throughout the campaign. Functionally, AV served as the umbrella to coordinate the activities of the coalition members; ACT and other
smaller groups concentrated on voter registration and mobilization; and the
Media Fund and others handled broadcast advertising. Because of this tight
coordination, we aggregate the spending of AV coalition members under the
AV banner.
Cecile Richards, a veteran labor political organizer and daughter of former Texas governor Ann Richards, helped create America Votes and served
as the organization's president. Early on in the election cycle, Richards explained that the purpose of AV was to coordinate the efforts of various 527
groups and make sure the groups avoided wasting money and manpower.4
The creation of the AV coalition marked an unprecedented effort to unite
some of the largest grassroots political organizations to coordinate events,
pool resources, and share information in a disciplined manner.5 AV sought
to coordinate a vast get-out-the-vote (GOTV) effort, including television
ads, door-knocking, canvassing, direct mail, and phone banks. Indeed, some
compared AV to a shadow party with a large membership in every battleground state (Magleby, Monson, and Patterson 2005), or as one observer put
it, "Richards' job is to run, what amounts to, the war room of the unofficial
campaign, enforcing cooperation and accountability among groups"
(Gwynne 2004, 114). AV's efforts were unprecedented in scale for an interest
group, amounting to the equivalent of a full-blown presidential campaign.
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Measured by both hard and soft money, it approached the size of the campaign waged by Al Gore in 2000 (Gwynne 2004).
The innovative idea behind AV was to "utilize the strong strategic abilities and large membership bases of the groups to break new ground in electoral politics. " 6 As we stated earlier, groups needed to be serious to participate in AV because they were asked to pay $50,000 to belong to the
organization. This membership fee helped to cover the organizational costs
of AV and to begin the process of assembling a database that would allow its
members to more effectively contact and mobilize voters. Members would
also receive strategic infonnation on message delivery and access to polling
data. The unique concept behind AV was that groups would raise and spend
their own political money, just as they had done in the past, but now their
expenditures would be coordinated with other groups in the AV coalition
(Gwynne 2004).

Incentives to Join AV

The difficult part of building a coalition of any size or level of effective•
ness rests in providing the necessary incentives for organizations to join and
to participate. The groups that joined the AV coalition did so for a variety of
reasons. We use the categories developed in the interest group literature to
understand how the AV coalition formed and operated.7
One important factor was the legal environment of the campaign. The
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) prohibits organizations from engaging in what is called "express advocacy"-calling for the election or defeat of a specific candidate-unless they spend hard dollars for that purpose.
However, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) did not impose the same
limitations on 527s as on other political committees, permitting them to raise
unlimited contributions from individuals. Section 527 organizations were
banned from using corporate or union treasury funds for BCRA-defined
broadcast electioneering communications within thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general election. Organizations registered under
Section 527 are permitted to raise large sums of unregulated money to promote voter education and turnout, but are prohibited from coordinating activities or sharing information with a candidate campaign or party committee. BCRA lifted ground activity limitations for 527 groups consequently
creating an added importance for groups to invest in voter registration and
mobilization, targeted mail and phone calls, and internal communications.
Within this regulatory framework, members of the AV coalition had a
strong expressive goal in mind when they embarked on their endeavor: educate citizens about the deleterious effects of President Bush's administration,
then register and mobilize them to vote. The seed money for AV and some
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of the other groups in the coalition came from donors who explicitly desired
to see Bush defeated in the 2004 election.8 Indeed, George Soros, one of the
leading donors to America Coming Together (ACT), created a controversy
when he made the defeat of President Bush his highest priority.9 However,
several groups also cared about publicizing their issue positions and identifying potential voters who agreed with them. Jim Jordan, a political consultant
to ACT, stated that his organization "wants to elect Democrats at all levels .
. . . It is an organization that is geared to electing Democrats up and down
the ticket."'°
Cathy Duvall, the national field director for AV, said that the organization
"wants to win." She also mentioned that it wanted to make the organization
viable for a longer period of time and to help to nurture community leadership-but winning elections was at the top of the list. Harold Ickes, president
of the Media Fund, pointed out just how difficult it is to "take down [a]
sitting president" and that it requires "single-minded focus with a purpose." 11 In fact, the difficulty of this task helps to explain why the AV coalition concentrated on the presidential race and excluded congressional races.
Furthermore, a look at the members of the AV coalition shows that the members all shared a progressive orientation toward politics. The environmental,
abortion rights, and other groups all believed that the policies of the White
House and the Republican-controlled Congress hurt their causes.
Ideological goals often do not have the strength to bring and keep groups
together. The structure of AV clearly anticipated the need to offer other benefits to participating members. And while groups paid $50,000 to join the
coalition, many concluded that they received substantial material benefits in
return. Members of the coalition most frequently mentioned access to the
voter file as a reason to participate. AV purchased voter registration lists and
worked to create a voter file that would make contacting potential supporters
more efficient and effective. The voter file also contained information from
the membership lists compiled by the specific interest groups. Most groups
regarded the list sharing as a significant enhancement to the voter file. Interest groups intensely value and protect their membership lists because such
lists are their most precious resource. However, the additional information
in the voter file made it possible for groups to divide up geographic regions
and reduce overlap. 12
Steve Rosenthal, the director of ACT, said that the same people getting
lots of mail over and over again-sometimes on the same day-was one of
the reasons it was so important to create AV. 13 In addition, the detailed information in the file meant that groups could tailor specific messages to voters.
Groups doing a canvass could check the voter file to see if the individual had
already been contacted by a particular group and what message had been
received. This trend of tailoring messages to voters has been discussed elsewhere (Magleby, Monson, and Patterson 2005). All of the groups believed
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the voter list enhanced their ability to communicate effectively with potential
voters.
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the voter file. AV
contained five separate interest groups that dealt with environmental issues
alone (the League of Conservation Voters, the Sierra Club, Defenders of
Wildlife, Clean Water Action, and Environment 2004). Only Environment
2004 did not plan to stay around after the election. These groups often eye
each other warily because they compete for some of the same members and
resources. As Cecile Richards shrewdly observed, "A lot of these groups sat
on huge lists, an asset. If these assets could be merged into a coalition, it
would provide a real opportunity to do more at the grass roots" and engage
in "more retail-style politics." Eventually, all of the groups were able to set
aside at least some of their competitive instincts to create a rich and diverse
voter file to which they could all gain access. Cathy Duvall estimates that 80
percent of the groups in AV "ponied up membership lists." To be sure, some
of the information in the list was restricted, and not all information contained
in the group's membership list was appended to the larger voter file. Yet the
creation of the voter file produced a significant benefit that all groups enjoyed. Some AV members told us that the quality of data and accuracy of the
AV list was disappointing, 14 and even Richards admitted that there were "all
kinds of glitches" with the database as a result of inexperience with a task
of this magnitude.
The groups also gained the benefit of information provided by political
polls. Smaller interest groups that could not afford to do their own polling
particularly appreciated this benefit. Whenever any group commissioned a
poll, it offered space on the poll to members of the AV coalition. ACT, a
prominent member of AV, commissioned most of the polls. Thus, the groups
all had access to polling data relating to the campaign and to the effectiveness of the messages they disseminated. Richards said that "America Votes
exposed the participating groups to more information, allowing them to finetune their mail, phone, media, and rap at the door. All groups, for example,
could watch focus groups online in D.C. as they were being conducted in
Tampa."
The polling information was also widely shared among AV members
through weekly briefings. This strategic information allowed all the groups
to test and refine their messages and proved to be a tangible benefit that all
groups consumed. For example, when pollster Cornell Belcher identified an
effective way to discuss the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste issue in Nevada,
a conference call was convened so that he could present the findings to all
AV members active in Nevada. 15
Richards summarized the importance of this shared polling in two ways.
First, in the past there had been an excess of polling, and it was underutilized. Second, speaking of interest groups generally, she said each is loath
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to give up on its issue and tries to make the issue important in the election
instead of trying to find out what is important to voters. With AV coordinating the polling and message delivery, this changed. She added, "For the first
time, progressives were able get over this and meet voters where they were."
This interaction also meant that groups now had a weekly opportunity
to reinforce friendships. AV facilitated the creation of the solidary benefit
that the interest group literature says coalitions need to produce in order to
ensure the longevity of the coalition. As Padrag Mehta, AV' s deputy political
director, observed, "The groups in the coalition have now started to meet
independently and to form relationships they didn't have." 16 The opportunities to learn from cooperation and to develop working relationships are powerful incentives to create and maintain a coalition.
Many of the groups we interviewed cited specifically the benefits they
derived from cooperation. Richards observed that "many of these groups
had worked in a silo. There were a lot of inefficiencies." But when a group
such as AV can bear many of the administrative costs for bringing groups
together, the groups have an even stronger incentive to collaborate with each
other, even if they have naturally been rivals. They can share costs and eliminate many of the inefficiencies that occur when groups in a similar policy
area all try to contact the same voters. Mehta noted, "There is a need for a
group like AV to coordinate. It helps small and large groups: large groups
learn about innovations and can take a fresh look at what they do; small
groups gain access to resources they wouldn't normally have." They all gain
from the elimination of redundant or wasteful allocation of resources in the
campaign environment.

Are You Big Enough and Strong Enough?
The coalition assembled under the AV banner included some of the bestknown and most experienced members of the interest group pantheon. There
is one question that remains: how effective can such a formidable coalition
be in the electoral arena? Coalitions of interest groups have had some success in defeating ballot initiatives (Magleby 1984), but how would they do
in candidate elections? Interest groups are not supposed to enjoy widespread
success in the electoral arena, especially when compared to political parties.
Some groups enjoyed success doing "issue advocacy" against and sometimes for candidates, but most of these same groups also invested heavily in
parties (Magleby 2000, 2003; Magleby and Monson 2004). Political parties
have the organizational and financial means to influence elections on a broad
scale, and in the past interest groups assisted parties by funding them. Indeed, the differentiation that E. E. Schattschneider ( 1975) makes between an
interest group and a party depends in large part on the scale of the electoral
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operation that each is able to maintain. Furthennore, political scientists often
differentiate political parties from other types of political organizations by
their goals. Parties try to elect individuals to office, and any other goal a
party has depends on its ability to succeed in the electoral arena (Aldrich
1995; Schlesinger 1994).
Interest groups play a different role. While some groups do participate
in the electoral arena and supplement what parties do, most others seek to
influence policy by other means as well (Key 1967). Interest groups are constrained in their electoral activities by legal barriers and by their own organizational mission, and those constraints were strengthened by BCRA (Cigler
2002, 2006). For example, interest groups can advocate election or defeat of
a candidate with broadcast advertising only if they use "federal" or "hard"
dollars for that purpose. Hard dollars must be raised in smaller amounts,
often making it difficult for the group to raise enough money to make a difference. Furthermore, the hard money contributions must be disclosedsomething not all donors desire. Interest groups also seek to influence policy
and have means at their disposal other than elections. It sometimes does not
make sense to allocate precious resources to electoral activities when the
prospects for success appear remote. Interest groups do have political action
committees that donate directly to candidates, but this activity does not require the same organizational structure necessary to mount major campaigns
to register, mobilize, or persuade voters.
These constraints make it very difficult for coalitions of interest groups
of any size or consequence to form and influence the fortunes of candidates.
Yet, this is precisely what the AV coalition seemed to accomplish. Table 8.2
contains a comparison of the campaign activities of the AV coalition and
its subsidiaries to the campaign activities of the two major parties in five
presidential battleground states: Florida, Ohio, Missouri, Iowa, and New
Mexico. We included estimates of spending on radio and television as well
as a count of the number of unique pieces of mail distributed by the AV
coalition and the two major parties in these states.
The sheer size of the spending in the battleground states leaps off the
table. Huge sums of money and resources were poured into these states by
both parties and the AV coalition. The Republican and Democratic parties
spent comparable amounts on television in all of the states except for Missouri (where the Republicans believed they had a decisive advantage and
did not devote nearly as much as the Democratic Party; Jones et al. 2005).
Surprisingly, the AV coalition, mostly through the Media Fund and
MoveOn.org, spent nearly as much on television in these states as each of the
major parties. While its spending did not keep pace with the major parties in
Florida, Iowa, and New Mexico, it actually outspent the two major parties in
Missouri and the pivotal state of Ohio. The media efforts of the major parties
and AV in Ohio demonstrated that all of the key political organizations be-
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David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Pauerson. "2004 Campaign Communic:uions Dalabase" (Cenler for the Study of Elections and
Democracy: Brigham Young Univer.;ily, 2005). Television spending is compiled rrom Campaign Media Analysis Group data. Radio spending is compiled from
ad-buy data collected at a sample of radio stations. For both broadcast media. 1he number of unique advertisements is shown in parentheses. Nonbroadcast
communications include direct mail, e-mail. print ads, per.;onal contacts. and telephone calls and v.-erc collected from a reconnaissance network of infonnants.
See Magleby. Monson, and Paucrson 2005 for a complete description of the methodology.
Note: In blank cells. a da.~h rcnects only the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization wa.~ inactive in that medium.
• The AV subsidiaries arc union affiliates of the union federJtion member.;, as v.-ell a.~ state•IC\'cl affiliates of national organizations. For this table, they include
the Communications Workers of America, Stronger America Now, National Air Traffic Controllers, the American fedemtion of Government Employees. the
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lieved the fate of the election hinged on that state. The AV coalition also
outspent the major parties in radio advertising in all of the battleground
states except New Mexico and Ohio, where the Democratic Party spent
more.
The AV coalition, true to its mission, saved its most impressive performance for the ground war. Table 8.2 also displays the number of nonbroadcast
communications, including direct mail, e-mail, print advertising, personal
contacts, and telephone calls. In all but one of the states, Iowa, the AV coalition distributed more nonbroadcast communications than either of the major
parties. Only in Iowa did the Republican Party exceed the AV coalition in
ground-war communications. In Florida, AV nonbroadcast communications
reached 179 unique pieces; in Missouri it was 87; and in the critical state
of Ohio, AV sponsored a whopping 214 ground-war communications. AV
promised a massive effort in the ground war and delivered an effort that rivaled anything accomplished by the two major parties.
In addition, AV launched Election Action Days-two hundred separate
events in sixteen battleground states (Skinner 2004 ). The series officially
began in New Hampshire with the Fifty Million Women Count on September
18, symbolizing the fifty million women who were eligible to vote but did
not cast ballots in the 2000 election. AV continued to organize volunteer mobilization events every weekend afterward leading up to Election Day (Skinner 2004).
In the final analysis, it was estimated that "AV organizations mobilized a
total of over 100,000 paid and volunteer campaign workers for collaborative
GOTV activities in 13 battleground states by sharing targeted lists, campaign
materials and infrastructure" (Skinner 2004). Tens of thousands of people
were canvassing, phone banking, poll watching, or driving voters to the
polls. Many of those involved said they had never before worked for a political campaign. 17 By most measures, the effort of AV to contact, register, educate, and eventually mobilize voters compared favorably in scope and intensity with what the two major parties undertook. The early publicity given to
ACT and AV reinforced a sense that the Democratic Party had "outsourced"
its GOTV to these groups. Aided by record-setting fundraising, however,
much of it late in the election cycle, the Democratic Party did undertake
significant GOTV activity (Magleby, Monson, and Patterson 2005, 27).
Table 8.3 displays the range of groups and activities in the battleground
state of Ohio. Communications were collected from sixteen of the AV coalition members, plus two AV subsidiary organizations. Following a pattern
typical of other states, ACT dominated the nonbroadcast communications in
Ohio, leading the way with twenty-seven unique pieces of mail. But the AV
activity in Ohio was shared by a broad range of groups. As described earlier,
AV would work with state organizations to develop common plans and goals
in an effort to reach the widest possible audience (America Votes 2003).
Though AV helped coordinate efforts, the coalition "explicitly sought to cap-
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Table 8.3 Nonbroudcust Communications by America Voks Coalition Members in
Ohio, 2004

T_,1,e of C11111paig11 Co111111u11icmio11
£ -mail Mail
Amcricu Votes Coalition
AFL•CIO
AFSCME
America Coming Together
America Votes
American Federation of Teachers
Human Rights Campaign
League of Conservation Voters
Media Fund
MovcOn.org
NARAL Pro-Choice America
National Eclucalion Association
NJDC Victory Fund
Planned Parenthood Action Fund
Sierra Club
21st Century Democrats
United Foocl and Commercial Workers International
America Votes Subsidiaries
United Automobile Workers Union
Working America

11
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6
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4
3

3

2
50
12

3
2
11

I
3

2

I
3
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3
J

I
2
6
9

2

Smm:e: David B. Magleby, 1. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Pancrson, ··2004 Campail!n Communications Database" (Center for the Study of Elections ;ind Dcmocrncy: Brij!ham Young University, 2005).
This is u subset or the data presented in Mockabce ct al. 2005.
N111es: Data represent the number or un iquc or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent
a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portmy comprehensive organization
activity within the sample rnccs. All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their
national affiliate to better render the picture of the organiZlltion's activity. In blank cells. a dash reflects
only the absence of collected data and docs not imply the organization wa.~ inactive in that medium. Sec
Magleby, Monson, and Pallcrson 2005 for a comph:te description of the methodology.

italize on the strengths of its members" (Magleby, Monson, and Patterson
2005, 29). It expected its coalition members to take the lead in mobilizing
their own members. "When planning a large canvass, groups would share
membership lists and volunteers to reduce overlap and to produce a more
systematic effort. Regions and states would be divided up, depending on the
strength of the AV members in those areas" (Magleby, Monson, and Patterson 2005, 29).
While the AV coalition amassed and expended resources on par with the
major parties in the presidential race, it did not participate on the same scale
in congressional races outside the battleground states. By contrast, the major
parties participated actively not only in the presidential campaign but also in
House and Senate races across the United States. In several House races
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alone, the National Republican Congressional Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee spent hundreds of thousands of
dollars to persuade individuals to vote for their candidates. The difference in
the scale of activity for the AV coalition and the political parties is important.
Parties were involved on all levels, including state and federal elections. AV
was a force only in the presidential election. Political parties enjoy a unique
status as an organization because of their ability to influence elections on
such a broad scale (Schattschneider 1975). AV up until now has not demonstrated the same breadth of commitment.
It is unclear whether the funds and incentives to maintain this coalition
even at the presidential level will persist in future election cycles. As of this
writing, the signals are mixed. ACT, AV's largest member, scaled back most
operations in August 2005 to evaluate iLc; future. 18 Yet during the first six
months of 2005, ACT's nonfederal account raised $4,433,907 and spent
$6,623,303. Meanwhile, over the same period, AV raised $330,000 and spent
$563,233, taking in contributions from EMILY's List, the League of Conservation Voters, the Service Employees International Union, the Sierra Club,
and the Media Fund. Whether AV and company will be back for another
election cycle or not, one commentator recently referred to this type of activity as "the first serious challenge to the industrial age structure of the modern
political party.... [George] Soros and [Peter] Lewis showed Democrats.
and more than a few Republicans, that there was a new way of doing
business, and it didn't require fealty to an inefficient party apparatus" (Bai
2005, 12).

Conclusion: Incentives Now and in the Future
We began this essay by discussing the conditions that led to the creation
of the America Votes coalition. Groups had incentives to create a coalition
to campaign in the 2004 presidential election. First, the groups shared an
antipathy toward the policies of the Bush administration. Second, AV and
some of its members also received an infusion of cash from wealthy donors,
which permitted them to bear the costs of coordinating the activities of the
coalition's members. Furthermore, the changes in the campaign finance law
also helped. As one staff member said, "AV found a hole and exploited it." 19
In other words, BCRA, as interpreted by the Federal Election Commission,
allowed the groups to engage in this sort of activity.
Once the coalition formed, it continued to provide incentives to members. Members received access to polls, advice on strategic information, and
the opportunity to interact with other groups. As the literature on coalition
formation predicted, groups specialized in the particular tasks to which their
organizations were best suited.211 The high degree of cooperation and special-
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ization in the AV coalition propelled it to amass and distribute campaign resources in amounts comparable to what political parties do.
However, it is not clear whether conditions will permit a coalition of this
size and breadth to persist in its efforts to participate effectively in campaign
activities. When President Bush is no longer in office, much of the antipathy
may dissipate. Some members of the coalition wanted it to be less partisan,
while others hoped the coalition could become even more partisan.~' The
inclinations and abilities of some groups may create tensions in the coalition.
Furthermore, a major unanswered question is whether the individuals who
initially funded the coalition and gave it several million dollars will do so in
the future. Despite the amount of work accomplished by AV, Bush still won
reelection.
In the future, coalition members may choose to invest their resources in
more traditional forms of interest group activity, or they may move back
toward congressional elections where they can pick and choose the races in
which they want to make a difference. This ability to select races only highlights the differences between an interest group and a political party. The
major parties seek to influence a much larger number of races. Many members of the AV coalition have expressed dissatisfaction with the Democratic
Party, but they may realize that it makes little sense to create an organization
that in some ways parallels what that party does. It is not yet clear whether
the donors who funded AV and its member organizations in 2004 will continue to fund 527s outside the party apparatus or will move to remake the
Democratic Party (Bai 2004b). Whatever happens to AV in the future, the
organization overcame several hurdles in the 2004 election cycle to create a
coalition that exhibited many of the properties of a political party.
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Deaniacs and Democrats
Howard Dean's Campaign Activists
Scott Keeter, Cary Funk, and Courtney Kennedy

Howard Dean, a physician and four-term governor of Vermont, was an
improbable candidate for president of the United States. He was from a small
state with a reputation for political eccentricity and had no national political
experience. Nevertheless, he mounted an impressive campaign for the nomination of the Democratic Party, leading the field in the preelection polls and
up until the Iowa caucuses. Given the polarization of the electorate and the
"anybody but Bush" attitude of many Democrats, Dean might well have
been competitive in November. Indeed, few would have predicted after his
demise as a presidential candidate that he would become the party's national
chainnan in 2005.
Dean not only became a serious national figure, but his campaign left a
strong imprint on the political world. It assembled a network of more than a
half-million active supporters and contributors, raised in excess of $20 million in mostly small donations onlioe, and demonstrated the power of the
Internet as a networking and mobilizing tool in politics. Thus, one important
political legacy of Dean's candidacy is that it established a model for a
twenty-first-century grassroots campaign. In his memoir of the nomination
contest, former Dean campaign manager Joe Trippi said of the populist Internet supporters, "The only reason the Dean campaign even got close
enough that it mattered was because of those people" (2004, 179). Despite
their importance, relatively little is known about the campaign foot soldiers-the so-called Deaniacs-who donated time, money, and other resources in hopes of seeing Dean win the nomination.
In this chapter, we present a multidimensional profile of the campaign
activists nationwide who helped propel Dean to such improbable prominence. We begin by examining the activists' demographic characteristics and
political orientation, as well as their self-reported motivations for supporting
Dean's candidacy. We then consider where Dean activists fit within the
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larger Democratic Party. Finally, we assess the activists' vision for the future
direction of the party and its role, relative to other political organizations, in
advancing progressive causes.
This analysis is based on data from a unique survey conducted by the
Pew Research Center with a random sample of 11,568 activists drawn from
the online database of those who had contributed money or otherwise
worked on behalf of Governor Dean. 1 The survey was conducted in two
waves: one before the election (September 13-October 12) and a second afterward (November 18- December 14). Further details about the survey are
provided in an appendix al the end of this chapter. 2

Who Are the Dean Activists? Who Came and Why?
The Pew study corroborates the view that the Internet played a critical
role in the Dean campaign. Fundamentally, however, Dean's candidacy was
made viable not by the technology but rather by the issue-driven supporters
who used the technology to create a movement of political and cultural significance. In that spirit, this section focuses on the foot soldiers of the Dean
campaign. We explore who these activists were, how they viewed the political landscape, and what motivated them to mount one of the most surprising
movements in recent political history.
Activism and Political Junkies

In many respects, Dean activists resembled other political activists on
the Left and Right. They were more interested and engaged in politics, more
ideological, and better educated than the average citizen or their fellow partisans. As befits a population heavily involved in politics, Dean activists were
heavy news consumers and relied on a wide array of sources- the Web,
newspapers, radio, and, to a lesser extent, television. Nearly as many said
they regularly get as much news from the network and cable news websites
as from the news broadcasts themselves. And 58 percent said they regularly
listen to National Public Radio, compared with just 16 percent of the general
public.
Moreover, their activism extended beyond just the Dean campaign (see
table 9.1 ). Dean activists were heavily involved in other political and social
causes. Nearly eight in ten (77 percent) had signed petitions for something
other than the Dean campaign. About half (51 percent) had boycotted a product or company. A similar number, 48 percent, had participated in a protest,
demonstration, or rally for an unrelated cause. This contrasts starkly with the
general population in 2004, of which just 4 percent had participated in a
protest or demonstration in the past year on a national or local issue (American.National Election Studies 2004).
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Tuble 9.1

They Reully Were Activists

Dea11 actfrists 11'/ro perfonned the f11llowi11g actimu;
During the primaries
Gave money to any candidate
Allended a Dean campaign event
Contributed to online chats/biogs

85%

47
33

During general election cumpalgn
Voted in November 2004
Gave money to the Kerry campaign
Sent campaign e-mails for Kerry
Attended a Kerry campaign event

99%
66

54
40

Sourct': Pew Research Cenler survey.

Drawn by the Issues and the Campaign

Dean's supporters were attracted to his campaign by issues (see table
9.2). This fact is true of most activist campaigners. In the case of Dean's
followers, a majority (66 percent) cited the war in Iraq as one of the two
most important issues. But two other issues that had defined Dean's time as
governor of Vermont also resonated with his supporters: health care (34 percent) and fiscal responsibility (24 percent). In addition, the economy and
jobs ( 19 percent), the environment ( 11 percent), and gay and lesbian rights
(9 percent) were also mentioned by significant numbers of supporters.
The transcendent quality of issues is illustrated by the remarkable similarity of the responses from supporters across the demographic spectrum.
Table 9.2

Most Important Issue in Decision to Support Dean

Age Group
All
War in Iraq
Health care
Fiscal responsibility
Economy/jobs
Environment
Gay/lesbian rights
Education
Terrorism
Abortion
International trade
Other

66%

34

/5- 29
57%
35
21

31

50+
71%
35
24
20
10

4

30- 49
64%

11

26
20
12

9

21

IO

5

11

5

3

4
4

4

4

5

7
2
8

4

2

13

14

24
19
II

I
13

Source: Pew Research Center survey.
Note~ Rc.~pondcnt~ could ~elect up to lwo issue~.

17

I
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For example, despite some differences in political attitudes between age
groups, younger and older Dean supporters were motivated by a similar set
of issues- with the notable exception that gay and lesbian rights were cited
by fully one-fifth of the youngest supporters but far fewer of the older Deaniacs. Predictable differences appear in certain subgroups: for example, the
least affluent were somewhat more likely to cite the economy and jobs, and
younger women were much more likely to cite abortion rights.
While many Dean activists were seasoned veterans of earlier electoral
battles, the Dean campaign attracted a sizable number of political newcomers (see table 9.3). More than four in ten Dean activists (42 percent)- and
66 percent of those under age 30-said this was their first presidential campaign. Of the majority with some previous campaign experience, most (36
percent of the total) said they were more involved in the Dean campaign than
in prior races, compared with 21 percent who were about as involved or less
involved than in the past.

Demographic Distinctiveness
Dean activists were a distinctive group within their own party (see table
9.4). Campaign supporters were equally likely to be men or women. As a
group, they were much more racially homogenous than the general public or
people who identify with the Democratic Party. More than nine in ten Dean
activists (92 percent) were white and just I percent were African American
(2 percent were Asian and 4 percent described themselves as being of another race or multiracial). By comparison, the public is 79 percent white, as
are about two-thirds of national Democrats (68 percent). More than one in
five Democrats (22 percent) are African Americans.
Dean activists tended to be not only significantly better educated but also

Tuble 9.3 Count Me In
Age Group

Sough! out campaign involvement on their own

All

/5-29

30-49

50+

79%

78%

72%

77%

42
57
36

66%

34

48%
51
32
5

28%
71
44
6
21

Cumpuign experience
First prcsiLlenlial campaign
Not first campaign
More active in 1his one
Less aclivc
Same
:-Io response
Source: Pew Research Center survey.

5
16
I

23
3
8

14
I

I
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Tobie 9.4 Deon Activist<;: White, Well-Educated, Wealthy

Dean
m:ti1•ist.1·

All

Ge11eml

Dems

public

Libemls

68%
22
10

79%
11
10

83%
6
11

18%
13
35

41%
15
32
12

Race
White
Black
Other/no answer

91%

I

7

Income
$75,000+
$50,000- 74.999
$20,000- 49,999
< $20,000

45%
20
26
6

l2

21%
15
34
17

18%
26
42
14

18%
28
33
20

21%
30
32
16

28%
29
32

79%
17
4

25%
22
53

26%
24
50

49%
26
25

21 %
13
7
21
38

53%

55%
24
2
6
11

36%
23
8
II
22

12%

6%

Age
Under 30
30- 44
45- 64
65+

IO

Education
College grad
Some college
HS grad or less

Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Other
No religion

27
3

5

to

Sexuality
Gay, lesbian. or bisexual

4%

NA

Sorirce.f: Dean ac1ivis1 figures from Pew Research Center survey of 11..5 68 Dean activists con,Juc1c,J
Scplcmbcr- Dcccmbcr 200-1; figures for Democrals from Pew survey.~ conduclcd January 2004- f-cbruary
2005; gcncr.il public figure~. excepl religion and sexuality. from U.S. Census Bureau A111rua/ Social mu/
Ecmwmic S11pple111c111, March 2003. with religious affiliation Jara from Pew surveys licldcd January
.2004- Fcbruary 2005; figures for Liberals (n · 359) ba~d on Pew Re~earch Center 2005 Typology Study,
~ xuality data for general public from NEP exit poll November 3, 2004. DK/Refu~ed category was omil•
tcd. therefore data docs not add up to one hundred.

wealthier than other Democrats. Nearly a third of Dean activists (29 percent)
reported a family income of more than $100,000 per year, nearly triple the
proportion who fall into this bracket among all Democrats (IO percent). An
overwhelming majority of the Deaniacs were college graduates (79 percent),
and 41 percent had earned a graduate or professional degree. Just a quarter
of all Democrats and 26 percent of the general public are college graduates.
Surprisingly, the age profile of Dean activists is similar to that of other
Democrats and the public. While news coverage of the Dean campaign fo.
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cused on his youthful support, the Dean activists were not especially young;
just 6 percent were under 23 and 12 percent were 23-29, compared with 8
percent and IO percent among Democrats nationally.
Dean activists were much more secular than the party as a whole. A
relatively large proportion of Dean activists (38 percent) had no formal religious affiliation. Far fewer Democrats (IO percent) and members of the public ( 11 percent) express no religious preference. Only about a third of Dean
activists were affiliated with either the Catholic or Protestant religious traditions (34 percent). One in five Dean activists (21 percent) identified themselves as Unitarians, nondenominational Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, or
another religion. Moreover, just 24 percent of Dean activists described themselves as a "religious person." Far more (68 percent), however, said they
think of themselves as a "spiritual person."

Where Do Dean Activists Fit in the Democratic Party?
Howard Dean once quipped that he represented the "Democratic wing
of the Democratic Party." Dean's followers are more precisely described as
part of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Across a range of issuesespecially military and national security matters, social and cultural issues,
and the role of government in solving societal problems-the Dean activists
hold much more liberal positions than does the average Democrat in the general public. Their liberalism stands out even when compared with delegates
to the 2004 Democratic convention, who themselves were significantly more
liberal than rank-and-file Democrats (see the New York Times/CBS delegate
survey). Roughly eight in ten Dean activists (82 percent) described themselves ideologically as liberal, compared with 41 percent of the convention
delegates and 27 percent of national Democrats.
When viewed from another angle, however, the liberalism of the Dean
activists doesn't appear to be that different from the subset of liberals within
the Democratic Party. As such, they do not constitute a new faction within
the party, but rather a more vigorous and high-profile expression of an existing faction.
To better understand how Dean's campaign supporters fit within the
Democratic Party, we compared them to a group classified as "Liberals" in
the Pew Research Center 2005 Typology Study. 3 The liberal classification is
not simply ideological self-identification but is based on a cluster analysis of
values across a wide range of topics. From a total of nine typology groups
in the general public, three were composed primarily of Democrats: Liberals,
Conservative Democrats, and Disadvantaged Democrats. Liberals constitute
a small plurality of the Democratic electoral base. Among all who identify
themselves as Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents, 34 percent
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are classified as Liberals, 30 percent as Conservative Democrats, and 20 percent as Disadvantaged Democrats; the remainder are classified in other typology groups.
The typology's Liberals are similar demographically to Dean activists;
both groups are largely white, are highly educated, and earn high incomes
relative to the general public. Liberals also hold remarkably similar positions
to Dean activists on a range of social and cultural issues. Both groups show
strong support for gay marriage and acceptance of homosexuality in society,
support for government assistance to the poor and environmental protection,
and a positive view of immigrants in U.S. society.
This is not to say that the two groups are perfect matches. Dean activists
are more positive than Liberals about government effectiveness but are more
pessimistic about the degree to which elected officials care about their views.
And, while both Deaniacs and Liberals are nearly unanimous in their belief
that using military force in Iraq was the wrong decision and in their belief
that diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace in the world, other views on
military policy are less in sync. Deaniacs are less likely than Liberals to say
that the preemptive use of military force is sometimes justified. Views about
the how well the war in Iraq is going and what to do with the troops from the
time of the survey forward also showed some differences between groups,
although some of this may be due to real differences in Iraqi war developments and the different timing of the surveys.
Thus, the Dean activists were clearly drawn primarily from the liberal
wing of the Democratic Party. Some version of the Liberal Democratic
group has been found in every Pew typology study conducted since 1987.
Thus, the Dean activists represent a new manifestation of a long-standing
segment of the Democratic Party's base. But Deaniacs were to some degree
a unique group because of the key role the Iraq war played in their motivation to participate in the campaign.

How Liberal Are They? Unified Opposition to the War in Iraq
Nearly all Dean activists believe that the decision to use military force
in Iraq was wrong (see table 9.5). And there are far fewer hawks among the
Dean activists than among Democrats nationally. Nearly all Dean activists
(96 percent) believed that diplomacy, mther than military strength, is the best
way to ensure peace. Only about a fifth of the Dean activists (19 percent)
said military force is often or sometimes justified against countries that may
seriously threaten the United States but have not yet attacked, while 21 percent would entirely rule out such preemptive military action. In comparison,
both Liberals and Democrats in general are more likely to say that preemptive force is at least sometimes justified (45 percent of all Democrats say
this, as do 33 percent of Liberals).
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Views on the Use of Force

De1111
Cll'li1 i.vlS

Wnr in lrnq
Right decision
Wrong decision
No answer/Don' t know
Whnt is the best wny to ensure pence?
Military strength
Diplomacy
No answer/Don' t know
Is preemptive force justified?
or.en
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
No answer/Don't know

1%
99

3~
96
I
1%

18
60
21

All
Dem.1·

General

21%
71
8

49%

pu/,/ic

44
9

15%

30%

76

55

9

IS

9%
36
18
21
6

14%
46
21
14

Li/,eml.r

11 %
87
2
6'li-

88
6
1%
32
44

23

5

Sources: Dean activist ligures from Pew Research Center .~urvcy of 11.56!! Dean activists conducted
September- December 2004; figures for Dcmocrnts (n .. 64)) from Pew Research Ccmcr survey taken
December 2004; ligurcs for Libcrnls (n =359) based on Pew Research Center 2005 Typology Study;
general public (n - 2()()0),

The activists were more divided on the question of what to do in Iraq at
the time of the survey. Compared with national Democrats, the Dean supporters in September 2004 were actually more supportive of keeping troops
in Iraq until the situation stabilized (44 percent said this, compared with 33
percent of Democrats in an August 2004 poll).
Younger and older Dean activists saw eye-to-eye on many issues: the
government's efficacy, keeping churches out of politics, the importance of
racial discrimination as a reason for racial inequality, the importance of the
social safety net for the poor, the value of immigrants, and especially the
view that corporations make too much profit. On military matters, though,
the older activists who came of age in the I 960s were significantly less supportive of keeping troops in Iraq (34 percent vs. 61 percent among the
younger group) and less likely to say that the use of preemptive military
force is sometimes justifiable ( 13 percent vs. 31 percent).

Libertarian Sentiment, at Least 011 Social Issues
On social issues, Dean activists stood out for their strong support for gay
marriage. They shared a near-universal belief (96 percent to 4 percent) that
homosexuality should be accepted, rather than discouraged, by society (see
table 9.6). In contrast, support for gay marriage was far less common among
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Table 9.6 Social nnd Cultural Issues

De,111
11ctil'fats
Books with "dangerous ideas" ...
Should be pcnnittcd in public school librnrics
Should be banned from public school libraries
No answer/Don't know
Homosexuality should be ...
Accepted by society
Discouraged by society
No answer/Oon·t know
Immigrant~ lodoy ...
Strengthen the U.S. because of hard work and
talents
Arc a burden because they take jobs, housing.
health care
No answer/Don· t know
Churcht!S should ...
Keep out of political issues
Express views on politics
No answer/Don't know

All
Democrats

liberals

I
I

54%
41
5

85%
13

96%
4
0

58%
36
6

92%

87%

47%

76%

12
I

43

15

10

9

69%
30
I

45%
51
4

98%

2

5

3

NA
NA
NA

S011rces: Dean activist figures from Pew Research Center survey of 11.568 Dean activists cnnductcd
Scplcmbcr- Dccembcr 2004: figures for Democrats from a Pew survey conducted in December 2004
(n =641) cxccpl churches issue from a Pew survey conducted in August 2004 (n =237), figures for Liberals (n - 359} based on Pew Rc.~carch Center 2005 Typology S1udy,

Democrats in the general public (43 percent favor and half oppose), and a
majority of black Democrats (59 percent) believe that homosexuality should
be discouraged. Liberals in the Pew Typology Study, however, were similarly lopsided in their support for gay marriage; eight in ten Liberals favored
gay marriage, while just 15 percent opposed it.
While there was a majority among Dean activists in support of legalizing
gay marriage, those under age 30 did so more strongly; 71 percent strongly
favored legalizing gay marriage, compared with 46 percent among those 50
and older. Younger activists also were much more apt to mention gay and
lesbian issues as a key reason they joined the campaign (21 percent vs. 4
percent; see table 9.2). Older Dean activists were also less likely to say homosexuality should be accepted by society, though most do accept it.
On other social issues, Deaniacs were just as liberal. They were nearly
unanimous in their opposition to censoring "dangerous" books from school
libraries. Fully 98 percent of Dean activists said public school libraries
should be able to carry any books they want; just 1 percent said that public
school libraries should ban books that "contain dangerous ideas." The idea
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of banning such books draws much more support among all Democrats (41
percent).
·
Most Dean activists (69 percent) said that churches should keep out of
day-to-day social and political matters, but a sizable minority (30 percent),
including nearly a quarter (24 percent) of those with no religious affiliation,
said churches should weigh in on the issues of the day. The difference between the activists and other Democrats is narrower on this question than on
some other social issues.
Nearly three-quarters (74 percent) of Dean activists believed that racial
discrimination is the main reason many blacks can't get ahead, but a majority (52 percent) of Democrats nationally say that blacks are "mostly responsible for their own condition." A similar chasm separates the opinions of
Dean activists and national Democrats on immigration. Fully 87 percent of
activists said immigrants are strengthening the country, while national Democrats are split: 43 percent consider immigrants a burden, while 47 percent
think immigrants strengthen the country.

Pro-Government So/11tio11s
Compared with rank-and-file Democrats, Dean activists are more supportive of government solutions to important national problems (see table
9.7). While three-quarters of Dean activists felt that the government often
does a better job than people give it credit for, nearly half of Democrats
nationally (47 percent) disagree, instead believing that government is almost

Table9.7

Views on Government

Dean
ac1fri.v1s

All
Democmls

Libeml.s

Government ...
ls almost always wasteful and inefficient
Often docs a better job 1han people give it credit for
No answer/Don't know

25%
75

6

11

7

Stricter environmental regulations ...
Arc worth lhe cosls
Cost loo many jobs and hurl the economy
No answer/Don'! know

96%

NA
NA
NA

NA

Poor people . , ,
Have it easy because of government benefits
Have hard lives because benefils don't go far enough
No answer/Don• t know

3
I
5%
93
2

47%
42

24%
64

12

45%
48

NA
NA

11%
80

9

Sm1rce.v: Dean activisl figures from Pew Research Center survey or 11,568 Dean activists conducted
Scp1cmbcr- Dcccmbcr 2004; figures for Dcmocrnts (n = 641) from a Pew survey conducted in December
2004; ligurcs for Libcrnls (n =359) based on Pew Research Center 2005 Typology Study.
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always wasteful and inefficient. Liberals tilt just slightly toward the more
positive view of government by 48 percent to 45 percent.
Fully 96 percent of activists want the government to step in to protect
the environment even if it hurts business profits and results in the loss of
some jobs. With respect to poverty, an overwhelming proportion of Dean
activists (93 percent) think government benefits do not go far enough to help
poor people live decently. Liberals are similarly inclined to think government benefits don't go far enough to help the poor (80 percent say this) but
a more modest majority (64 percent) of Democrats agree.

Where Would Dean Activists Take the Democrats? Leftward Ho!
One crucial test of the Deaniacs' relevance to the future of Democratic
politics came in the November 2004 presidential election. While they found
in Howard Dean a Democratic candidate they trusted, there was no guarantee
that Dean supporters would shift their allegiance to John Kerry in the general
election. Kerry was, after all, Dean's strongest rival throughout the run-up to
the Democratic primaries and caucuses. Given the Dean activists' opposition
to the war, Kerry's vote to authorize the use of military force in Iraq was
especially problematic.
Despite this, Dean's activist supporters overwhelmingly-if somewhat
unethusiastically- supported Kerry (see table 9.8). Throughout the general
election campaign, most Democratic voters consistently characterized their
vote as being against George W. Bush rather than for Kerry. This also was
the case among Dean activists- 69 percent said their vote was against Bush,
compared with just 30 percent who said it was a vote for Kerry.
Given their strong liberal tendencies, it is perhaps surprising that only I
percent of Dean activists threw their support behind Ralph Nader, the out-

Tobie 9.8

From Deon to Kerry, Reluctuntly

Dea11 actil>ists
Presldentlol vote
For Kerry
For Bush
For Nader
Other/Didn"t vote
Among Kerry voters, vote wns ...
A vote for Kerry
A vote against Bush
No answer/Don't know

97%

Democratic w,ters
89%*
11
0

2
30%

41%••

69
I

53

• NEP exit poll; n pcw Research Center Suney Del. 1- 3, 2004; • ••Oct. 15- 19

6
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spoken independent candidate and longtime crusader for progressive causes.
The activists' deeply held political values, such as opposition to the Iraq war,
support for social justice, and antipathy toward corporate interests, would
seem more at home in the platform articulated by Nader than the Kerry campaign. Based on issues alone, Nader seemed the natural candidate to rekindle
the activists' spirits in the aftermath of Dean's defeat in the Democratic primaries.
Nevertheless, fully two-thirds of Dean activists expressed an unfavorable
opinion of Nader, with a sizable proportion (30 percent) saying their opinion
of him was very unfavorable-perhaps because they remembered Nader's
impact in the 2000 election, where he captured far more votes in Florida than
the margin of Bush's victory there.

Dissati.\faction with Democratic leadership
While the activists stuck by the Democratic Party's presidential nominee, they were critical of the party in a number of respects. Dean activists
overwhelmingly faulted Democratic leaders for going too easy on the president. More than five out of six (86 percent) said the party was not critical
enough of President Bush and his policies. Just 12 percent said Democratic
leaders had criticized Bush the right amount. With respect to the Iraq, relatively few activists (19 percent) said that Democratic leaders voted for the
war because the leaders thought it was the right thing to do. Instead, the vast
majority of activists (80 percent) believed Democratic leaders voted for the
war out of reluctance to stand up and oppose Bush.
Most Dean activists did not think the party had done well in advocating
for its traditional constituencies or for liberal positions in 2004. Just 19 percent rated the party's efforts in promoting progressive/liberal positions as
good or excellent~ most believed the party had done only a fair (45 percent)
or poor (36 percent) job in this area. Dean activists also voiced disappointment with the party's efforts as an advocate for traditional Democratic positions. Fewer than a quarter of Dean activists (21 percent) said the party had
done an excellent or good job of standing up for such things as protecting the
interest of minorities, helping the poor and needy, and representing working
people.
Critical assessments of the Democratic Party put the Dean activists in
step with liberal Democrats across the nation. Pew's political typology
shows that Liberals are more negative than other subsets of Democratic or
Democratic•leaning clusters when evaluating the party. Like Dean activists,
less than one-quarter (23 percent) of Liberals said party performance in this
area had been excellent or good. Democrats nationally were a bit more favorable toward the party as of March 2005, though not overwhelmingly so. In
that survey, 33 percent of Democrats nationwide gave the party excellent or
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good marks; that figure is down significantly since from before the election
(49 percent in July 2004).
The Future of the Democratic Party

Given their numbers, their highly visible role in the 2004 campaign, and
their generally strong commitment to political activity, the attitudes of Dean
activists toward the Democratic Party will help shape the party's future direction. The Dean activists are highly critical of the Democratic Party in a
number of areas. But they are not ready to give up on it-rather, they want
it to reflect to a much greater degree their own liberal and progressive positions (see table 9.9).
Despite the Democrats' lack of bottom-line success in the last three elections (2004, 2002, and 2000), only a small fraction of activists thought the
Democratic Party should die off and be replaced by an entirely new political
party. But maintaining the status quo was also seen as unacceptable; just 8
percent of Dean activists wanted the party to remain more or less the same.
The Dean activists expressed the most support (67 percent) for the Democratic Party responding, instead, by adopting more liberal or progressive positions.
These attitudes contrast sharply with the opinions of both Democratic
officials and rank-and-file Democrats. A Gallup poll of Democratic National
Committee members in February 2005 showed that, by more than two to one
(52 percent to 23 percent), they want the party to become more moderate
rather than more liberal. That view is shared by Democrats nationally; in a
January 2005 survey, Gallup found that 59 percent of Democrats wanted the
party to take a more moderate course.
£r:traparty Advocacy for Progres.'iive Issues

While Deaniacs want the Democratic Party to move to the left, they do
not completely trust the party to take the lead in promoting their views. Only
38 percent identified the Democratic Party as the best vehicle to advance

Tobie 9.9

Dean Activists Favor Shirt to the Lert

Dca11 m::til'ists ' preference for rite f11111re of the Democratic Party:
Renect more progressive/liberal po,silions
Renect more centrisl posi1ions
Die off and be replaced by new party
Remain lhe same
No answer
Source: Pew Research Center survey.

67%
13
11
8
I
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progressive and liberal causes. Nearly as many (36 percent) cited privately
funded advocacy groups, the so-called 527s, and 13 percent thought a new
political party would be most effective.
Nonetheless, 527s were not universally loved. A majority of Dean activists (55 percent) approved of the role 527s have played in elections, but 41
percent disapproved. According to Byron York, organizations such as 527s
that arose after the adoption of new campaign finance rules "actually increased the influence of big money in politics. By giving directly to 'independent' groups rather than to the party itself, big-ticket donors could influence campaign strategy and tactics more directly than they ever had
previously" (2005, 7).
Still, a clear majority of Deaniacs (72 percent) think the major liberal
philanthropists such as George Soros, Peter Lewis, and Andy Rappaport are
helping rather than hurting progressive and liberal causes (see table 9.10).
Financially, at least, the philanthropists have been helpful. Federal campaign
finance records from 2004 show that the largest portion of funding for proDemocratic 527s came from just five people,4 and their collective contribution surpassed the $75 million in federal funds that John Kerry received to
run his postconvention campaign (York 2005).

Conclusion
Howard Dean's candidacy for the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination serves as a reminder that the right mix of candidate, issues, and effort
can mobilize grassroots supporters. The Dean campaign succeeded beyond
its own hopes and expectations in mobilizing about half of a million people
to take action in support of the campaign; this was a clear grassroots success,
with many supporters getting involved in presidential campaigns for the first
time. In contrast to some news media depictions of a campaign dominated

Table 9.10

Denn Activists' Views on the Impact or Liberal Philanthropists

Dean actil'ists' 1•iews of the impt1ct of libeml phila111hmpists s11cl,
lewi.1·, ,md Andy Rappaport 011:
Pmgressi1•e or
liberal Causes

Moslly helping
Mostly hurling
No impact
No answer

72%
6
16
6

Sm1rnt; Pew Research Center survey.
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Democratic
Pt1rty

57%
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26
7

George Soros. Peter
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51%
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7
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by college-age firebrands, the majority of Dean's campaign supporters were
well over 30. They were nearly unanimous in their opposition to the war in
Iraq and to President George W. Bush's policies more generally.
Dean campaign supporters' views across a range of issues are to the left
of the general population and of Democrats as whole but look roughly comparable to those of one of the three major subgroups within the Democratic
Party, the Liberals, as classified in the Pew Research Center's 2005 Typology Study. Liberals are the largest wing of the Democratic electoral base.
The newly flexed muscle of the Dean campaign supporters will play an influential role in shaping the future of the Democratic Party, regardless of
whether they remain associated with a future Dean campaign or align with
other liberal candidates and causes within the party.
Looking ahead to 2008, the behavior of the Dean activists and the larger
group of liberals from which they are drawn will have an important impact
on the Democratic Party's electoral fortunes. In 2004, antipathy to George
W. Bush unified and energized all factions of the Democratic Party, despite
a lack of enthusiasm for its presidential nominee. Without Bush heading the
Republican ticket in 2008, this unity may be harder to achieve. Intraparty
disputes over how liberal or conservative a candidate to nominate will be
more prominent, and the liberal wing will arguably play the largest role in
the outcome, given its size and the monetary resources it commands. Even
so, the ideological leanings of the 2008 party nominee cannot be predicted
for certain. Party centrists fear that the nomination of another liberal candidate will doom the Democrats' chances of regaining the White House. If the
war in Iraq is no longer dominating the political scene as the nomination
process gets under way, Dean activists and their fellow liberals may be willing to accept a more centrist presidential nominee if their desire to recapture
the White House convinces them that this is necessary.

Appendix: About the Surveys
The activists participating in the study were randomly selected from the
Democracy for America (formerly Dean for America) volunteer database.
Only active members of the campaign were eligible for participation.5 Democracy for America contacted these activists by e-mail on behalf of the
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Respondents were directed to a website managed by the Pew Research Center, where they could
complete the survey. Interviews were completed between September 13 and
December 14, 2004.
There were two separate samples: one group was interviewed in September and again after the election; a separate sample was interviewed only after
the election. The September survey drew 3,925 respondents, for a response
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rate of 13 percent. Slightly more than half (51 percent) of those responding
to the September survey also completed the postelection reinterview. In the
second sample, 19 percent of those invited to participate completed the
survey.
Although the response rates in the study were relatively low, auxiliary
information in the Democracy for America database enabled us to compare
the survey respondents with all Dean activists in terms of campaign activity.
We found only two substantive differences between the sample of respondents and the entire database, and we have reason to believe that neither resulted in a significant bias in the sample. Younger activists may have been
slightly underrepresented in the study, and people who participated in the
poll were more likely than the average activist to have contributed money to
the campaign. Despite the latter difference, the study participants and the
entire pool of activists had similar levels of campaign involvement on other
measures of activity, including membership in MeetUp for Dean and membership in Commons. On measures within the survey itself, those who contributed money tended to hold the same views on major political issues, the
party, and the campaign as those who did not make a contribution. Weighting the data so as to correct for the underrepresentation of younger activists
and the overrepresentation of contributors suggested that the error due to
nonresponse was minimal. Consequently, the analysis presented in this chapter is based on the sample of respondents without weighting. Further details
about the methodology are available from the authors.

Notes
I. Governor Dean and his political organization, Democracy for America (formerly
known as Dean for America), generously provided the Pew Research Cenler for 1hc People
and the Press with access lo their da1abase, from which Pew drew a random sample. Democracy for America then sent an e-mail message 10 those who had been selected, requesling that
they participate in the survey. Respondents completed the survey on a website created by
Pew. In order to protect the confidentiality of the respondents, Pew had no access 10 the names
and addresses in the database. Democracy for America officials did not view the complclcd
interviews and did not know who chose 10 participate in 1hc survey. Neither Dean nor his
organization had any conlrol over the drafting of the queslionnaires for this study or the con•
lent of this report.
2. The Pew Research Center first released results from this study in an April 6, 2005,
press release, "The Dean Activi!a~: Their Profile and Prospects." The release, which includes
complete toplincs from the surveys, is available online al hllp://people -press.org/reports/
display.php3?RcportlD ..._ 240. An earlier version of thi~ paper, which also includes a more
complete discussion of the importance or the Internet for the Dean campaign, was presented
at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (Keeler,
Funk. and Kennedy 2005).
3. For more details on the Pew Research Center 2005 Typology Study and the method
used to classify liberal Democrats, sec hup://whcredoyoufit.org. Nine value dimensions were
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used to create the typology: foreign policy assertiveness, religion and mor.ility, environmentalism and regulation, social welfare, immigration, business senlimenl, financial security,
antigovemment sentiment, and individualism. Each value dimension is based on combined
responses to two or more survey questions. Each of the questions used a "balanced ahernative" fonnat that presented respondents with two slalemenls and asked them to choose the
one that most closely rcnects their own views. To measure intensity, each question was fol•
lowed by a probe to determine whether or not respondents felt strongly or not about the
choice they selected. As in past typologies, a measure of political attentiveness and voting
participation was used lo extract the "Bystander" group, people who arc largely unengaged
and uninvolved in politics. A statistical cluster analysis was used to sorl the remaining respondents into relatively homogcnous groups based on the nine value scales, party identification,
and self-reported ideology.
4. The live biggest donors lo Democratic 527s were George Soros, Peter Lewis, Stephen
Bing, and Herbert and Marion Sandler (York 2005).
5. "Active members of the campaign" were defined as those having made a financial
contribution or engaged in at least one substantive activity, such as attending a MeetUp for
Dean.

Part III

Party Activities
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Machine Politics for the Twenty-First Century?
Multilevel Marketing and Party Organizations
Peter Ubertaccio

The organizational activities of the Republican Party since the 2000
election suggest a new future for party organizations in the United States.
Republicans used the techniques of multilevel marketing (MLM) companies
to strengthen their grassroots organizations. energizing both activists and
voters. These techniques may provide the institutional support for fundamentally transformed parties at the grass roots. Writing about the 2004 Bush
campaign in Ohio, Matt Bai claimed to be witnessing "the emerging portrait
of politics in a new century" (2004a, 44). This emerging party organization
extends naturally from the demise of traditional parties, with their history of
local autonomy and dependence on patronage, and the rise of consultantbased organizations that rely heavily on candidate-centered marketing strategies.
Political scientists have long viewed party activists and regular, grassroots members as a defining characteristic of the American party system.
Party scholarship has highlighted the weakness of party organizations and
the loose affiliation of citizens to parties. The authors of the American Political Science Association's (APSA) report "Toward a More Responsible TwoParty System" ( 1950) called for a more active party membership as one
component of a strengthened party organization that would complement a
new focus on party programs. The difficulty of that enterprise was demonstrated by Eldersveld (1964), who found that relatively few Democratic and
Republican precinct captains were actually engaging in "critical" activities:
party registration, canvassing, and Election Day efforts. Taking the authors
of the APSA report to task for neglecting to specify concrete steps to achieving its goal, Mileur suggests that "political parties are products of their environments- legal, historical, and cultural- and their reconditioning requires
confronting these factors squarely" ( 1992, 169).
The present political environment, with a closely divided electorate mir-
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rored in the partisan division in Congress and close presidential elections, is
increasingly amenable to the tactics of MLM. And these tactics may represent yet another step toward the kind of party organization the APSA authors
envisioned (see Green and Herrnson 2002 for other evidence of this trend),
perhaps in the form of "franchise" parties discussed by R. Kenneth Carly
(2004). Because the Republicans developed MLM as an explicit strategy in
the 2002 and 2004 campaigns, this chapter will focus on their efforts.

Multilevel Marketing Techniques
The leading name in multilevel marketing is Amway. The parent company of Amway is Alticor, the president of which, Dick De Vos Jr., is a
candidate for the Republican nomination for governor in Michigan in 2006.
De Vos's father, Richard De Vos, founded Amway in 1959, and the company
had 2004 sales in excess of $6.2 billion. The De Vos family has long had an
affiliation with GOP politics, and Dick De Vos's wife was the former chair
of the Michigan Republican Party. The formal entrance of the De Vos family
into elective politics is only the latest evidence of the synergy between MLM
and the GOP.
Amway's sales plan is exceedingly simple. According to the company's
website:
It allows you lo build your business through retailing products and sponsoring
other people who, in tum, can retail products and offer the business opportunity
to others. By passing your sales and marketing knowledge to your developing
team, you not only build your own business network but also enable others to
build one of their own. 1

MLM emphasizes a team approach to profit making and business organi•
zation. Kleeneze, a major British MLM firm, explains the approach this way:
By introducing (sponsoring) other people into the business, you arc entitled to
extra profits, based on the turnover of your group. This is the network marketing sic.le of the business and the higher your group turnover, the more money
you will make. Believe it or not there arc people earning over £10,000 per
month via this mcthod. 1

Tupperware describes its team-driven approach similarly:
As your recruits build you become an Associate Manager, hosting an average
of five Demonstrations per week. On top of your Demonstrator rewards you
will receive monthly bonuses for your team achieving sales targets, and for
your first 6 months we support you with our New Manager Development Program.3

Machine Politics for the Twenty-First Cellfury?

175

E11trepre11e11r.com published an article on the success of MLM that
makes clear the utility of this approach to party politics. The key components are:
I. Mentorship: "Practice what they teach. [To succeed,] you need to be
willing to listen and learn from mentors. The way this industry is
structured, it's in the best interests of the [veterans in your company]
to help you succeed, so they're willing to teach you the system.
Whatever [your mentor] did to become successful, it's very duplicatible, but you have to be willing to listen and be taught and follow
those systems" (Smith 2005).
2. Hierarchy: "The higher-ups. It can be called various things, but the
general term is the 'upline,' meaning the people above you. How supportive are they? Do they call you? Do they help you put a plan in
place? Are they as committed to your success as they are to their
own? You should be able to relate to [the people in your upline] and
be able to call them at any time to say 'I need some help.' How much
support there is from the people above you in the company is very
important" (Smith 2005).
3. Recruitment: "Take up the lead with your downline. There's a term
in the network marketing industry called 'orphans'-when somebody
is brought in and then the person who brought them in is just so busy
bringing in other people that they don't spend the time to teach and
train [the new person]. You should be prepared to spend at least 30
days helping a new person come into the industry-training them,
supporting them and holding their hand until they feel confident to
be able to go off on their own. You really need to ask yourself, are
you willing to do that? Are you able to do that? This is really about
long-term relationship building. It's not about just bringing people
into the business and just moving forward. It's about working with
these people and helping them to develop relationships" (Smith
2005).
Far from the quaint Tupperware parties in the l 950s, MLM emerged in
the twenty-first century as a multibillion dollar enterprise. The company's
success is due in no small measure to its pitch. An analysis in the alternative
online magazine EnergyGrid declared, "The reason why MLM can work so
well is that people are much more likely to fall for a sales pitch from a friend
or relative, or a stranger in a home setting, than they are from a stranger in a
shop or market, or an advert in a paper, magazine or on the Internet." In fact,
MLM techniques have become such a powerful wealth creator that major
corporations have developed their own network marketing client companies.
Citigroup's Primerica is a leading marketer of life insurance and financial
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products, while Colgate• Palmolive operates Princess House, a direct marketer of household goods.

Applying MLM to Party Organizations
The goals of the Republican Party after the 2000 election mirrored those
of a multilevel marketing company: to find an effective way to register and
tum out more voters at the grass roots (Racicot 2004). To this end, the GOP
instituted the 72-Hour Task Force in 2002. This program was designed to
increase the number of Republican voters by contacting them three days before the polls opened on Election Day in 2002 and 2004. In its implementa•
tion, the 72-Hour Task Force drew heavily on MLM techniques to create a
new organizational level of activism, the grassroots network, complete with
"upline" and "downline" participants who could reach voters effectively.
Dan Baiz described these efforts as "a throwback that both Democrats
and Republicans have rediscovered as an antidote to television ads. " 4 But
this "throwback" was applied with modern marketing techniques. For example, the Republican National Committee (RNC) ran experiments to test the
claims of MLM firms. According to Franke-Ruta and Meyerson (2004 ), in
2002 as an experiment, "four volunteers were pitted against a professional
telemarketing firm, each with an identical script and separate lists of voter
names. The four volunteers got almost 5 percent more people to the polls
than the pros." As Ken Mehlman noted, "The most important thing you can
do in politics is give someone a personal contact from a credible source. Not
just a personal contact from a paid person on the ground, but someone in
their church, their gun club or the PTA." 5
Volunteers were recruited by national, state, local, and collegiate party
organizations at rallies, at meetings, and through the Internet. The new recruits were assigned to localities in which they would network. All such volunteers reported to an RNC marshal who would organize them into units of
two or three individuals. Each unit was assigned a specific task: operating
phone banks, canvassing precincts, or assisting with campaign rallies. The
training involved in this approach was rigorous, often occurring over period
of months and often targeted at specific goals of expanding the GOP coalition and registering new voters.
In some respects, this type of organizational harnessing of activism
came naturally to Republicans, which had long used marketing techniques
for party building, such as the innovative use of direct mail in the late 1970s
and early 1980s (Herrnson 1988). And it fit with the personal experiences
of GOP operatives such as Karl Rove and Blaise Hazelwood at the RNC.
Hazelwood was quite cognizant of the fact that MLM tactics applied older
concepts of party organizations to the modern era of marketing campaigns.
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As Baiz pointed out soon after the 2002 elections, "In some ways, Hazelwood was a natural to oversee the 72-Hour Project. ... She began door-todoor canvassing as a 10-year-old in Arizona when her father was running for
precinct committeeman, and she learned firsthand the value of human contact, meticulous organization and volunteer muscle in political campaigns. " 6
Get-out-the-vote drives were not the only traditional party activities updated by MLM. A new type of patronage has infiltrated these organizations.
In his analysis of the role of money in Colorado's Seventh District race of
2002, Daniel A. Smith documented the use of campaign "volunteers" recruited through state and national party organizations:
Aided by a $250,000 soft money contribution from the RNC, the state party's
ninety-six hour program paid "volunteers" $200 for their efforts and included
114 Oral Roberts University students bused in from Oklahoma. During literature drops, the students were seen talking on cellular telephones provided by
the party and driving cars courtesy of a John Elway dealership. The NRCC
[National Republican Congressional Committee] also spent $14,559 in hard
money to target Latinos in a late surge of "robo-calls" staffing [Democratic
candidate] Fccley's legislative and lobbying record. (2004, 193)

Republican Bob Beauprez won the district by 121 votes. Smith credits
the victory to the coordinated campaign plan of the national party organizations and the party's financial backing and adds the concern that "the parties' outside money contributed to the widening disconnect between the
constituents residing in the district and the candidates who tirelessly campaigned to represent them" (Smith 2004, 198).
Other less selective incentives were employed as well, such as receiving
a signed picture of the president or tickets to Bush reelection events in 2004.
The Washington Post reported that "tickets to Bush events, distributed by
the Republican Party, go only to those who volunteer or donate to the party
or, in some cases, sign an endorsement of the GOP ticket and provide names
and addresses. " 7 In fact, the Bush campaign received a good deal of criticism
for restricting attendance to its campaign rallies and events. Civil liberty
groups and political opponents decried what was viewed as either extreme
security measures or hostility to open and free political discourse or both.
But viewed from the lens of MLM, the practice was a way in which to reward
downline workers with a tangible benefit for their organizational prowess.
In contrast to the concern raised by Smith, Bai's analysis of MLM tactics in the 2004 Ohio presidential campaign paints a different portrait of the
role of the national parties. Campaign manager Ken Mehlman was one of
the preeminent architects of what was referred to as "the Plan." Local parties and campaign organizations were to work in consultation with the national party and the Bush campaign to set goals for the volunteer aspect of
the reelection effort. Said Mehlman, "The lessons of reality TV are that peo-
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pie are into participatory activities . . .. They want to have influence over a
decision that's made. They don't want to just sit and passively absorb. They
want to be involved, and a political program ought to recognize that" (Bai
2004a, 45-46).
The Republican effort to coordinate the activity of thousands of volunteers and use them to target voters is a new twist on traditional party mobilization. Bruce Newman's 1994 study of political marketing details the transition of an older "party concept" of campaign strategy, where patronage and
a "lifetime of party affiliation" play a crucial role in a candidate's success,
to a "marketing concept" of strategy. In the latter, "strategy originates from
the voter and begins by breaking down the electorate into distinct and separate segments of voters." Using the techniques of political consultants, once
segmentation has been achieved, "the candidate creates an image for himself
and uses that to position himself. The strategy is then executed through information channels based on the results of marketing research and polling"
(Newman 1994, 38).
The party approach to Newman's candidate-centered strategy broadens
the techniques to include party and national campaign organizations. Where
Smith sees a worrisome trend of interference and disconnect, Bai sees the
layers of party and campaign organizations working together in a consultative fashion. "Rove and Mehlman gleaned a critical lesson from the 2002
Congressional and 2003 gubernatorial elections ... the way to build a grassroots movement is to get one volunteer to recruit several other volunteers,
and so on, so that the organization is constantly growing, feeding off itself"
(Bai 2004a, 47).
The process of mobilizing voters is left in the hands of local volunteers,
called Bush team leaders. For example, Bai (2004a) was introduced to Todd
Hanks, the Delaware County, Ohio, Bush campaign chair. Bush won Delaware County with 66 percent of the vote in 2000, so it was a solidly Republican county where Bush needed to win big to offset expected Democratic
gains in the urban areas of the state. In order to keep Ohio in the GOP fold,
Hanks was committed to maximizing the Republican vote. As a downline
participant, Hanks was recruited and kept in the organization in the same
way someone is recruited and kept in an MLM company. Despite his strong
political preference for Bush, "Hanks readily admitted that his ultimate goal
is to rise through the ranks of local and even state politics," wrote Bai. " For
Hanks, the Bush campaign offers a chance to recruit a 'downline' of new
volunteers who will, ideally, remain loyal to him in future campaignsincluding his own" (Bai 2004a, 68). The old-style, patronage-based machine
has thus been replaced by the pyramid goals of multilevel marketing organizations.
The organizational capacity of MLM exceeds in sheer numbers the limited scope of the consultant-driven candidate organizations from which it
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grew. The traditional party organizations of the early twentieth century, with
their dependence on party bosses, local autonomy, and patronage, gave way
in the 1970s and 1980s to new candidate-centered organizations separated
from the normal party structure. These candidate-centered entities were
dominated by a professional staff of consultants and pollsters and only tangentially related to their party organizations, which had become large funnelers of money to candidates. The Richard Daleys of an earlier era gave
way to the James Carvilles of modern electoral politics. The tried and true
methods of these traditional organizations were pushed aside by the new
communication techniques. In the late twentieth century, "The campaign's
theme and message are communicated through television and radio commercials, through direct mail pieces, and increasingly through campaign websites," Dennis Johnson (2001, 13) has written. "Those communications are
developed and honed through the use of sophisticated research analyses, especially survey research, focus groups, and dial meter sessions." In an important sense, MLM merges old-fashioned grassroots methods with sophisticated modem messages.

The Bush "Brand" and MLM in 2002
The Republicans' use of MLM techniques was a rational response to
their critical need to increase voter turnout in the wake of Bush's loss of the
popular vote in 2000. Garance Franke-Ruta and Harold Meyerson noted in
the American Prospect that Rove's prediction that Bush would win 50-51
percent of the popular vote in 2000 was off by a crucial two percentage
points. As the RNC's political director, Hazelwood, "had research showing
that union households in 1998 and 2000 were turning out to vote at rates
much higher than their percentage in the population. Evangelicals, meanwhile, were underperforming, putting Republicans at a distinct disadvantage
in the final seventy-two hours of a race, when union mobilizations led by the
AFL-CIO were having a strong impact in turning out households that would
vote Democratic" (Franke-Ruta and Meyerson 2004). Thus was the MLM of
parties put into action.
This new approach was implemented in the 2002 midterm elections, and
it had three prongs. The first was financial, and Bush used the summer
months to raise record amounts of money for Republican candidates while
focusing on get-out-the vote drives and defending the record of his party
during the fall months leading up to the election. This financial effort was
by all accounts quite successful (Magleby and Monson 2004).
The second prong was the use of Bush's leadership to unite the Republican Party. The "Bush leadership," specifically his wartime record post 9/11,
was the focal point of the strategy. In the spring of 2002, a GOP pollster
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called this development the "Bush brand." The branding was in part a product of "Bush's sky-high approval ratings" that have had the effect of extending his popularity far "longer than normal, making him the GOP symbol."
Having a product to sell is, of course, critical to any marketing technique,
especially for MLM where the personal contact of the sales force is on the
line. Wrapping a presidency in the cloak of party is both unusual by contemporary standards and fraught with political uncertainty. In this regard,
Bush's involvement in the party was not dissimilar to that of his predecessors, but was more intense and comprehensive. Arguably, the terrorist attacks of 200 I created a wave of public support for the president that allowed
him to reverse the historical course and demonstrate the strength of a strong
executive as party leader. In any event, the Bush "brand" was essential to
the success of the MLM techniques.
Unlike most of his predecessors, Bush took an active, if at times behindthe-scenes, role in promoting particularly strong GOP candidates in state primary elections. The White House very publicly let it be known that it supported Norm Coleman in Minnesota, Jim Talent in Missouri, Greg Ganske
in Iowa, and Richard Riordan for the gubernatorial nomination in California.
These efforts were not always successful-as when California Republicans
spumed the presidential advice, choosing William Simon as their nominee
and losing a surprisingly close election to incumbent Gray Davis-but they
worked more often than not.
After fielding a strong ticket in most states, the president returned to his
chief of state role. As the early glimpses of his campaign speeches indicate,
Bush called upon the American people to assist him in fighting the war on
terror and to protect homeland security by electing good people to Congress.
And Bush handled party politics differently from recent presidents, who
practiced the "politics of triangulation," scoring personal victories at the expense of their party fortunes. A good example was the willingness of the
White House to get involved in the selection of the congressional leadership.
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's praise of Strom Thurmond's segregationist presidential campaign in 1948 gave the White House an opportunity
to assert Bush's dominance. In response, the White House engaged in an
::ffort to bring about Lott's removal and install its favored candidate, Senator
Bill Frist of Tennessee.8
Once the financial and leadership elements were in place, the third prong
:>f the Republicans' MLM approach was organizational-the implementation of MLM techniques in the party and campaign. The key organizational
:.mits in battleground states became the living room of upline managers and
fownline recruits. "The big thing that brings them [campaign volunteers] all
.ogether is viral activity," claimed Ken Mehlman (Bai 2004a, 47). Because
.he goal of this vibrant grassroots organization was to reach as many voters
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as possible during the final seventy-two hours of the campaign and get them
lo the polls, human interaction and organization of efforts were al a premium.
Finally, Bush returned to the campaign trail, being the best upline salesman for the Bush brand. He was relentless in these efforts, visiting forty
states and more than a hundred congressional districts on behalf of Republican candidates in 2002. During the last five days of the 2002 campaign, Bush
participated in seventeen key candidate events. The Washington Post reported that "the work paid big dividends on Election Day, when a surge
of Republican voters in states such as Florida, Georgia, North Carolina and
Missouri overwhelmed the Democrats and turned what many had called one
of the most competitive midterm campaigns in history into a substantial Republican victory. " 9 The GOP won 73 percent of the seventeen key races
where Bush had personally campaigned, some by a margin of just I percent
of the vote. The relatively low turnout in the 2002 election assuredly assisted
the GOP. particularly because the turnout of GOP voters increased 4 percent
nationally over turnout in 1998.
The success of the 2002 campaign provided the evidence Republican
Party leaders needed of the effectiveness of not only Bush as party leader
but also the MLM of parties. Indeed, by 2004, Bush's efforts as party leader
bore fruit because of the organizational MLM techniques on the ground. According to Bush's chief strategist Matthew Dowd,
We were able to win some close races that we probably wouldn't have won
unless we had learned from what we had learned in 2000 through the 72-Hour
Task Force and done some things. I mean, we put a Jot of stuff in place in
Georgia, where we had some surprising victories in the Senate and the govcrnor' s race. We put some stuff in place in Minnesota, where [former Vice President Walter} Mondale was supposed to win and ended up losing to Senator
[Nonn} Coleman. Missouri. So there were some spots that we did some stuff
that I think we pulled some races out. We had good candidates, but also, wc
had such good tactics. But having a president with a 60 percent, 59 percent job
approval hclps. 111

MLM in 2004
Bush and the Republicans faced a similar strategic problem in the 2004
campaign and set out to implement MLM techniques on an even larger scale.
The 2004 election also presented the Bush campaign with a greater challenge
than its 2002 efforts on behalf of congressional candidates. The president's
public approval rating had dipped to 41 percent in May as concerns over the
war in Iraq and the nation's economy mounted, and Democrats had a high
degree of unity in their preference to have Bush removed from power. Bush
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would have to rely strongly on his own base, rather than winning over independents or Democrats, and that reliance would focus on particular states
such as Ohio. It was in that state that MLM was most crucial. Evidence of
the heightened emphasis on MLM is found in a series of PowerPoinl presentations put together by Karl Rove. According lo Byron York, the Rove presentation was "unintentionally made available" to Democratic strategists at
the outset of the campaign. In fact, knowledge of this document was a major
inspiration for the grassroots innovations among Democrats in 2004, including America Coming Together (York 2005).
The Rove document uses the language of MLM, including key phrases
such as "Back to People Power" and "The results were conclusive- It
Works!" It also borrows heavily from MLM techniques:
• "If you need votes from a constituency, go after them in a serious and
targeted way."
• "Don't wait for outside groups to turnout voters, do it yourself."
• "Customize mail and phone programs to individual voters and their
concerns."
• "Make all voter contact motivational, visually appealing."
• "Fight for this vote like you mean it."
• "Devote resources."
The GOP "Plan" in 2004 developed grassroots organizations in all fifty
states, but with special emphasis on sixteen "battleground states," using the
lessons of 2002 and the 72~Hour Task Force. The top of the upline managers
were at the campaign headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, overseeing regional coordinators and state-level coordinators; these three levels were paid
::ampaign officials. Beneath the state-level coordinators were the downline
managers and participants-county, city, and precinct officials-who were
volunteers. By Election Day, this cooperative operation had more than one
million volunteers nationwide and was described as a "national party ma;hine" (Milkis and Rhodes 2005).
The Ohio version of this organizatio~ was described as follows:
To conduct the ground war, the GOP constructed an extraordinary grassroots
organization that reached into every region or the stale. Based on roughly 150
field staff and involving some 12,000 local party orficials. ii recruited more
than 85,000 volunteers. The overall effort also included a full-time registration
coordinator, firty field personnel dedicated to registration, and ten coordinators
working with churches. These activists were recruited from social and political
networks and the Bush web site, which generated six different kinds or "team
leaders." The success or these efforts relied on detailed information about voters, clear goals, and a high degree of accountability for results. (Mockabec ct
al. 2005)
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The first step in implementing the Plan was to recruit Bush team leaders,
and a major part of this effort was six issue-based "coalitions":
The coalition program looked to idcntiry prominent individuals with credibility
within a specific coalition or formal leaders or coalition groups.... Party personnel were charged with hosting regular conforcnce calls with key leaders to
invest them in Republican efforts and to motivate them on issues they care
about. Events, in particular, were targeted- Republican representatives were
present al every gun show, state fair, Veterans or Foreign Wars convention,
Christian music fostival, husincss expo, anli•tax rally, and fish fry they could
find. (Shaw 2004)

According to the Plan, "The first thing is to determine where the most
important voting blocs/coalitions are that need to be penetrated and maximizing in order to achieve victory. It is important to prioritize to be effective."
This was followed by the movement to "target coalition groups on issues
that they care about and that will motivate them to vote. Some of these
groups include: social conservatives, agriculture, Catholics, Sportsmen, etc.
Targeting these groups can increase Republican turnout 4 percent." (East 2004)
The final element was to draft a countywide plan of action: "Now all
that is needed is to put all the information gathered in one plan and one timeline. This is critical. A plan lets everyone know what is expected of them
and the timeline allows volunteers to plan ahead and save the dates on their
calendars." This effort was similar in design to the Meet Up phenomena of
the 2004 election, used to great effect early in the campaign by the Howard
Dean campaign. But MLM techniques advanced by the GOP promised
greater results and organizational clarity.
The upline managers set specific goals for the downline participants, including recruiting volunteers, organizing campaign events, and registering
and contacting voters. Participants at every level of the organization were
held accountable for meeting these goals. Just as importantly, the Bush campaign provided highly targeted messages for the volunteers to deliver. This
"micro-targeting" was produced by extensive and sophisticated research. As
Dan Baiz and Mike Allen reported:
The Bush operation sniffed out potential voters with precision-guided accuracy, particularly in fast-growing counties beyond the first ring or suburbs or
major cities. The campaign used computer models and demographic files to
locate probable GOP voters. Once those people were identified, the RNC
sought to register them, and the campaign used phone calls, mail and frontporch visits- all with a message emphasizing the issues about which they
cared most- to encourage them to tum out for Bush. 11

The net result of the MLM techniques was greater attention to the grass
roots and more viral activity among potential Bush voters in 2004. Accord-
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ing to State Senator Jane Earll of Erie County, Pennsylvania, compared to
past campaigns, "There are more campaign people around, more coordination, more ground troops and grass-roots organizing." 12
After the 2004 election, RNC chairman Ed Gillespie e-mailed his followers with the good news:
1.2 million volunteers made over 15 million contacts, knocking on doors and
making calls in the 72 hours before the polls closed. 7.2 million e-activisls were
contacting their family, friends, co-workers. The RNC registered 3.4 million
new voters, enlisted 1.4 million Team Leaders, and contacted-on a person lo
person basis- 30 million Americans in the months leading up lo and including
Election Day, and in the final 72 hours we met 129 percent of our door-knock•
ing goal: and met 120 percent of our phone-calling goal. (East 2004)

Of course, President Bush was deeply involved in the 2004 campaign,
and the Republicans lavished extensive resources on television advertising
and other high-tech activities (Ceaser and Busch 2005). However, the grassroots operation made a critical difference, such as tipping Ohio into the Republican column and delivering the presidency to Bush (Mockabee et al.
2005). A good example is the case of Todd Hanks, the Bush team leader in
Delaware County, Ohio, described earlier: although Bush won the county by
the same percentage-66 percent-as in 2000, the actual number of Bush
voters increased dramatically due to the expanded turnout. The Columbus
Dispatch reported that Democratic counties saw turnout increase up to 24
percent over 2000 in some places, and Republican counties exceeded those
numbers: "Delaware County led the way with a 43 percent voter increase over
:WOO, followed by Warren with 34 percent, Union with 31 percent and Pickaway with 26 percent." 13 Republican consultant Barry Bennet explained the
focus on traditional GOP voters: "They live in counties that are so Republican
:hat their vote never really mattered before.... We just went in and maximized our vote. We called, mailed, knocked on doors and they came out." u
Many observers were impressed by these results, which suggested a his_orical comparison. The Los Angeles Times reported:
In some ways the technologically driven outreach is a throwback to the days of
the urban political machines, when ward heelers knew how to get out the vote
in their part of the big city. After decades of less efficient direct mail and cold
calls, the technology has evolved to the point that millions of residents living
in battleground states arc getting as much personal auention as a 1940s Demo•
crat did in Chicago.•~

Along the same lines, Bai commented, "To watch [the Bush volunteers]
·ecruit new voters and volunteers in exurban town houses, cajoling one
1eighbor at a time, is to imagine how it might have looked to see the Demo-
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cratic ward bosses organize their tenements in the days of Tammany Hall"
(2004a, 126). He concluded, "The comparison suggests a vision of the future: win or lose, a lasting political organization could well be the legacy of
the Bush pyramid. It's not unrealistic to think that these new precinct-byprecinct county organizations in fledgling communities all over America
may endure long after Karl Rove has retired to lead seminars at a Texas university" ( t 26).

Conclusion
The Republican application of MLM techniques to party organization
paid off with party victories in 2002 and 2004. Significantly, Republican
Party affiliation in the electorate has not changed since the election of Bush,
hovering around 31 percent of the population, with Democrats declining
from 36 percent to 33 percent (Harris Interactive 2005). MLM has not served
to increase the number of Americans who are members of the GOP, but the
processes are in place to maximize their role on Election Day. If the Republicans continue to fund MLM operations, they hold out the possibility of providing the organizational apparatus necessary for a sustained increase in
GOP turnout.
The unique role played by Bush and the use of MLM in 2002 and 2004
suggest that, however fleeting the Bush "brand" is in the early part of the
new century, a new model of presidential-party interaction and the multilevel marketing of such may transform party organizations. Bush's efforts as
party leader and the integration of national Republican themes to local party
organizations and campaigns is a remarkable turnaround for a party that had
witnessed three electoral landslides at the presidential level under Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan but watched its fortunes founder in other races.
Bush's decision to pursue a party strategy does not yet qualify the GOP
as a "franchise party" that would resemble the responsible party organizations proposed by the APSA authors ( 1950). As Carty explains:
Franchise systems exist to couple the efficiencies of scale and standardization
with the advantages of local participation in ongoing opcrutions and delivery
of the organization's product. Typically, a central organization, recognizable
by its common brand, determines the product line and sets standards for its
production and labeling, designs and manages marketing and advertising strategy, and provides management help and training as well as arranging for the
supplies needed by local outlets. (2004, ID)

However, a strong presidential "brand" and MLM techniques could move
the major party organization in that direction.
Democratic Party strategists studied the remarkable success of the GOP
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and formulated an MLM strategy of their own. In the aftermath of their 2002
loss, they unveiled Project 5104, "which denotes the DNC's goal of winning
51 percent of the national vote in 2004." Using a "comprehensive database
that features economic, demographic, and consumer data on about 158 million voters nationwide" (Mercurio 2003). Ruy Teixeira commented, "The
labor movement will match this expanded turnout initiative with its 'Partnership for Working Families,' which will target not just union voters, but also
non-union liberals and Democratic-leaning voters in the party's 158 millionvoter database" (2003). Similarly, the America Votes coalition of interest
groups- and in particular, America Coming Together-deployed a small
army of paid canvassers and volunteer activists to register and mobilize voters in 2004 (York 2005). However, these efforts suffered from a lack of coordination in practice and fell short of the GOP efforts in key battleground
states, such as Ohio (see chapter 8).
Despite the Democrats' setbacks, former chairman Terry McAuliffe and
current chair Howard Dean have moved their party in the direction of MLM
due to the strategic success of the GOP. The true test of the institutionalization of MLM tactics will be whether the major parties find the evidence of
2002- 2004 so compelling that they continue to use them and in the process
reinvigorate grassroots party organizations.
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The [Un]coordinated Campaign
The Battle for Mahoning County, Ohio
Melanie J. Blumberg, William C. Binning, and John C. Green
In 2004, both the Democrats and Republicans waged extraordinary campaigns to secure Ohio's twenty-one electoral votes, and the presidential contest was settled in the Buckeye State by some 118,000 votes out of 5.7 million cast (Mockabee et al. 2005). Compared to the 2000 campaign, the
Democrats and their allies enjoyed a larger net gain in campaign resources.
In 2000, George W. Bush had carried the state by an unexpectedly small
margin after the Gore campaign shifted the bulk of its resources to Florida
in the final weeks (Blumberg, Binning, and Green 2003). That close result,
plus President Bush's perceived weaknesses four years later, led the Democrats to believe it was possible to wrest Ohio from the Republican column
(Green 2004).
As a consequence, there were impressive innovations in the Ohio
"ground war" in 2004. However, the campaign suffered from a lack of coordination that made these innovations less effective than they otherwise could
have been. Indeed, this "uncoordinated" campaign helps explain why John
Kerry narrowly lost Ohio despite the extraordinary campaign on his behalf.
In large part, these problems stemmed from difficulties typical to presidential campaigns, but the new campaign finance laws created problems as well.
This chapter explores these issues in Mahoning County, Ohio.

Mahoning County and Democratic Campaigns
Mahoning County is one of the Democratic strongholds in Ohio (it includes the old steel city of Youngstown), typically producing majorities for
Democratic presidents far above those in other urban areas and the state as a
whole. For example, in 2000, Gore won the county by 63 percent, seventeen
points higher than his statewide margin. From the mid- l 930s until the mid-
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1970s, a Democratic machine dominated Mahoning County politics. A classic "party• in-control," it lingered until 1994, when a group of reformers
calling themselves Democrats for Change took over the party (Binning,
Blumberg, and Green 1996). These reformers introduced a modem "partyin-service" to candidates (see Aldrich 1995), which included President Bill
Clinton. In 1992 and 1996, both the remnant of the machine and the reformers ran effective get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts on behalf of Clinton, with
the latter far exceeding state expectations (Blumberg, Binning, and Green
1999). By the late 1990s, the original leaders of Democrats for Change had
left party politics and had been succeeded by less prominent reformers. This
shift in leadership weakened the local organization, and partly as a consequence, the 2000 presidential campaign was less effective (Blumberg, Binning, and Green 2003).
The mechanism for these grassroots campaigns in the 1990s was the
"Coordinated Campaign," an innovation of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in the 1980s (Corrado 1996). The underlying goal of the Coordinated Campaign was to provide services that were too costly for candidates
to do individually, a prime example of which was voter registration and
GOTV programs (Bibby 1990). To this end, the Coordinated Campaign
sought to integrate the party organizations, combining the financial resources of the national committees (including party "soft money") with the
political knowledge and volunteers of state and local committees.
In principle, the Coordinated Campaign was aimed at electing Democrats at all levels of government. However, its primary focus was presidential
elections, where the Democrats had done poorly despite continued success
in congressional, state, and local races (Margolis and Green 1993). Put another way, the Democrats wanted to harness their subnational electoral
strength to win the White House. In this regard, the Coordinated Campaign
had mixed results (Trish 1994; Heldman 1996), and Ohio was a good example: although Clinton won Ohio in 1992 and 1996, the Republicans dominated state elections in the 1990s. By 2004, Democratic operatives and allies
were again ready to innovate.
One innovation was America Votes, a coalition of liberal interest groups
designed to better coordinate grassroots activities in the 2004 campaign (see
::hapter 8). The coalition partners included groups long involved in Demo::ratic campaigns, such as labor unions, which ramped up their grassroots
!fforts. But other groups were newly founded, the most important of which
was America Coming Together (ACT). It was designed to deploy a sophisti~ated grassroots operation to register and mobilize voters, using paid canvassers, modern information technology, and efficient organization (Skinner
2005). Although ACT was run by well-known Democratic activists (and part
:>f the "shadow Democratic Party"), it was entirely independent of the rest
:>f the Democratic campaign effort. The most important reason for this sepa-
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ration was financial: ACT was largely funded with "soft money," funds once
raised by party committees with the help of their candidates, but newly
banned under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). Legally, ACT could use such funds for "nonpartisan" grassroots activities, but
it could not coordinate its efforts with party organizations or the presidential
campaign. Other features of the new campaign finance laws also inhibited
coordination among other elements in the Democratic campaign as well
(Malbin 2003).
The net result was an extraordinary level of resources available for the
ground war in 2004, but with a much lower level of coordination than in past
campaigns. It is worth reviewing each of the major elements in this "uncoordinated" campaign in Mahoning County.

ACT in Mahoning County
Ohio was one of the states targeted by ACT, and its operation was under
way by late 2003. Shortly thereafter, Bill Padisak, a vice president of the
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), was hired to run ACT's Mahoning Valley operation (including Mahoning and Trumbull counties).
Amply funded, the ACT program had three phases. The first was a voter
registration drive that lasted three months in summer of 2004 and registered
approximately 10,000 voters in Mahoning County. Padisak recruited and
trained sixty paid canvassers, many of whom were Youngstown Stale University students. They were provided with Palm Pilots, walking lists, and
scripts and were sent out to walk precincts, mostly in low-income urban
areas, in the late afternoon and early evening and on weekends. Using voter
data provided by the National Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC),
the canvassers worked in teams of ten, with typically thirty canvassers per
day. The canvassers used the Palm Pilots to identify targeted voters and also
to collect new voter infonnation. This information was eventually added to
the NCEC database for future use.
The second phase was a voter-canvassing effort that began after the voter
registration rolls closed, based on the updated NCEC targeting data. Here,
the paid canvassers and volunteers implemented a "CKCC" (card, knock,
call, card) program, with the goal of contacting all likely Democratic voters
four times; Palm Pilots were used to show commercials to prospective voters. These grassroots efforts were complemented by ACT telephone banks
and direct mail, which were run at the state level (see Mockabee et al. 2005).
Part of this effort was an absentee vote program among senior citizens,
which delivered four thousand absentee ballots in Mahoning County.
The third and final phase was the GOTV effort, culminating with Election Day activities. The canvassers targeted twenty thousand "progressive"

190

Melanie J. Blumberg, William C. Binning, and John C. Green

and "interested" voters, concentrated in heavily Democratic precincts. This
focus on "base" precincts was a scaled-back version of an original plan that
included "persuadable" precincts as well. Instead, ACT decided to concentrate its resources. Padisak was originally told to hire six hundred canvassers
for Election Day, but when it became clear Ohio was a toss-up, he was instructed to double his efforts. He hired 1,250 workers and rented 250 vans
to transport the canvassers out into the neighborhoods (but not to take voters
to the polls, a traditional party activity). ACT's Mahoning County Election
Day payroll was $175,000. The canvassers were organized into teams of six
with a supervisor, and each team made three passes in targeted areas on
Election Day: a note was put on the door, then a door hanger was put on the
knob, and, finally, a canvasser knocked on the door.
All told, ACT's activity in Mahoning County was impressive. There
were, however, a number of problems. First, there were the inevitable problems associated with starting a new operation from scratch. There was also
some question about the quality of the paid canvassers, especially on Election Day. 1 The biggest problem was targeting the same preci nets as other
Democratic groups. This resulted from the required lack of coordination between ACT and other organizations required by the federal campaign finance
laws, a requirement Padisak observed scrupulously.

Labor and Mahoning County
ACT was not the only grassroots innovation in 2004. Organized labor
reinvigorated its grassroots effort with a ten-point program called Take Back
Ohio. The state was divided into ten zones; Mahoning, along with four other
counties, was in Zone 1. In late February 2004, Debbie Bindas, an official
with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), was released from her work responsibilities to serve as the Zone
I coordinator. By the first week in March, the operation was in high gear.
Initially, there were two full-time workers and one part-time worker administering the Zone I program. The staff increased to ten by July and reached
its full complement of thirty-five a month before the election, drawn from
eleven states and a wide variety of unions.
The first task was to update the union leadership list, which necessitated
contacting the 497 locals in Zone I. Once this information was obtained,
Bindas made sure that every local had a coordinator, who was responsible
for recruiting fellow union members to volunteer. All volunteers received
training on how to become "communicators" to sell the Kerry-Edwards
ticket to the labor constituency. All told, it is estimated that labor recruited
several hundred volunteers in Mahoning County.
Take Back Ohio involved new tactics. For example, the traditional litera-
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ture drops, where volunteers hung candidate information on house doors,
were a thing of the past. Volunteers were mandated to do one-on-one contacts with all AFL-CIO affiliated members. Every union member was on a
home visit list: if the volunteer did not find the member at home, he or she
was contacted at work within twenty-four hours of the attempt. These efforts
were complemented by work-site leaflets, direct mail, and union publications
(see Mockabee et al. 2005).
Like ACT and its Palm Pilots, Take Back Ohio went high-tech. Bindas
had bar-coded lists with every union member's name and address. When the
volunteer found someone at home, the union member was asked to identify
the one issue most important to him or her. The response was recorded, the
sheet was scanned into database, and the union member was sent literature
from the Washington office. The volunteers registered and reregistered every
person because the unions did not want to take the chance that some were not
registered properly, such as not having changed their address at the Board of
Elections.
As Election Day neared, Take Back Ohio did telephone banking, concentrating on undecided voters. During the last two days of the campaign,
labor volunteers fanned out across the area to get out the labor vote. The
GOTV contacts were concentrated in areas with union households, typically
heavily Democratic precincts. Most observers agree this effort was impressive and that labor was quite effective in mobilizing its own constituency.
However, ACT and other elements of the Democratic campaign focused on
these areas as well. The campaign finance laws prevented Take Back Ohio
from coordinating with other elements of the Democratic campaign, but
long-standing relationships with the Democratic Party reduced the inefficiency somewhat (for example, Bindas was an Ohio Democratic state central
committeewoman).

The Mahoning County Democratic Party
In 2004, the local Democratic committee was a weaker organization than
it was in 1996 and 2000. The local party chair, Lisa Antonini, had been the
director of operations under the Democrats for Change and had taken the
post with the blessing of the original reform leaders. However, she faced a
number of new challenges. First, Antonini had limited personal resources.
Unlike the original chair of the reformed "party-in-service," she worked
full-time for the county treasurer, which precluded her from devoting significant time to party business. This lack of time limited her ability to maintain regular contact with the party faithful. In the service party, many precinct committee members participated for social or expressive reasons rather
than material incentives, such as patronage jobs, and required a great deal of
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personal attention. In addition, many of the original reform activists had lost
interest in the party as time passed. As a consequence, the party's activist
corps and volunteer base were attenuated.
The activist corps was also dispirited. A local scandal and the conviction
of nearly eighty officeholders and attorneys had left political enthusiasm at
low ebb. Under these circumstances, the local party had difficulty raising
money, compounding its personnel problems. In addition, Antonini's leadership skills were questioned when the party lost the juvenile court judgeship,
a position that controlled more than a hundred scarce patronage jobs. Governor Bob Taft had appointed a Republican judge to fill an unexpected vacancy, and the local party was forced to let the appointed judge run unopposed in 2002. In 2004, the juvenile court race was perceived by many party
insiders as a referendum on Antonini's effectiveness as party chair. Accordingly, she put the local party "in service" to the Democratic juvenile court
candidate. All other races were given lower priority-including the presidential campaign.
In sum, the local Democratic Party was not the asset to the 2004 presidential campaign that it had been in previous elections, when it was the
"point of the spear" in the Coordinated Campaign. The local party lacked
volunteers and finances and was distracted by a critical local contest. The
new campaign finance laws provided an additional barrier to participation in
the presidential race. Antonini felt constrained by the complicated federal
rules on what she could do or spend on behalf of the Kerry-Edwards ticket.~
The result was that the local party did little direct presidential campaigning.
Its efforts were limited to working the polls, providing voters with rides on
Election Day, and coordinating the GOTV efforts in downtown Youngstown.

The Coordinated Campaign in Mahoning County
One of the unexpected results of the new campaign finance laws in 2004
was the extensive funds raised by the Kerry campaign during the primary
season and by Democratic Party committees throughout the year (Malbin
2006). As a consequence, the Ohio Coordinated Campaign was especially
well funded (Mockabee et al. 2005). However, it was very slow to develop,
with two distinct phases.
In late spring 2004, the Kerry campaign began to assemble an Ohio organization, appointing John Poersch as director of the Coordinated Campaign, the same post he held in the 2000 presidential campaign. By May,
Rick Barga was appointed Mahoning County field director. Although from
Ohio, Barga was an outsider to Mahoning County and had worked for Kerry
in other states.3 The local party chair, Antonini, was irritated because she
was not consulted before naming a field director, a common practice in pre-
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vious Coordinated Campaigns (Blumberg. Binning, and Green 1999, 2003).
Initially. Barga had limited contact with Antonini and the local party.
Barga attempted to recruit local volunteers and immediately ran into difficulties. He initially relied on information given to him by the 1996 regional
field director, a local resident. This outdated information was almost as useless as the local party's "worthless" database. By late July, Barga had already gone through the precinct committee list twice and netted only thirty
volunteers. He lost two workers when they learned they would not be paid:
he had not heard of "street money," which is a common practice for campaign workers in Mahoning County. An intern in charge of staffing the telephone bank during the early part of the campaign indicated that she was
having difficulty getting even two people a night to make calls. When Barga
complained about the lack of party assistance to the 2000 field director,
Danny Thomas (a local resident), Thomas replied that "there was none to
give." Despite the Kerry campaign's hefty finances, early money was not
abundant in the Mahoning County operation.
Meanwhile, Barga had numerous disagreements with state party officials
and Kerry campaign operatives. They disagreed over event arrangements and
messages, such as automobile fuel efficiency standards in an area where one
of the largest employers was General Motors. The Kerry campaign. in particular, ignored local concerns. An egregious example occurred when Kerry
visited the old Sheet & Tube steel factory to show how Ohio's economy was
collapsing under Bush policies. The only problem was that the mill had
closed during the Carter administration twenty-seven years earlier.
There was a parallel African-American outreach effort that was at best
confusing and at worst inefficient. State Representative Sylvester Patton Jr.
was in charge of the local Ohio Legislative Black Caucus (OLBC), with two
paid staffers, but the DNC sent A. Robert Brown to Youngstown to oversee
its own African-American outreach program. Thomas said it was a like a
comedy, with Patton going out the back door of campaign headquarters and
Brown coming in the front door. These outreach efforts fell far behind those
of previous campaigns.
These difficulties appear to have been common across the Buckeye
State. One veteran Democratic operative, Joe Grandmaison, said the Ohio
campaign was as bad an operation as he had ever seen. He reported, "I have
been in a lot of campaigns, and I can't even discuss the Ohio operation without getting frustrated." The situation was addressed at the beginning of October when Jim DeMay, the Ohio director of the 1996 Coordinated Campaign. was deployed at the state headquarters. Shortly thereafter, Barga was
fired as the Mahoning County field director;' As with the initial appointments, these changes were made without consulting the local party officials.
Antonini and Barga finally came to a meeting of the minds, and she hired
him to help coordinate local races.
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The second phase of the Coordinated Campaign began approximately
three weeks before the election. Thomas was recruited to help organize the
GOTV effort, and two outside operatives arrived as well: Nancy Richardson,
a former education adviser to Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis and
a former Youngstown resident, and Cheryl Losser, a DNC official with extensive GOTV experience.
Richardson described the second phase of the Coordinated Campaign as
"one with multiple power and management centers." She managed one center at the party headquarters in downtown Youngtown, including telephone
banking, African-American canvassing, and other Election Day activities.
She also handled booking hotel rooms for the candidates and their staff,
finding accommodations for volunteers, and making sure everyone was fed.
Antonini and Barga added another center, coordinating inner-city precincts.
Losser ran a third center, an office in the suburbs, and coordinated nonAfrican American precincts.
The largest resource problem continued to be the lack of local party volunteers. Richardson found it extremely difficult to "energize people in a
dying area" to work for the party, and in addition, ACT and Take Back Ohio
had siphoned away many volunteers. This problem was eventually alleviated
by the continuing influx of outsiders. Grandmaison, a director of the ExportImport Bank and veteran operative, came to Ohio with a dozen friends from
Washington, D.C., nine days prior to the election as part of a "Road Trip to
Victory." This contingent revived the telephone bank operation, located in
the offices of a law firm in downtown Youngstown. One week prior to the
election, busloads of "Kerry Travelers" arrived, and more volunteers came
in private cars.
In addition, elected officials came from across the country. Assemblyman Joe Nation arrived from California with three staff members. Repressentative John Olver from Massachusetts came with approximately six staffers and Representative Joe Serrano from New York sent two people,
including his chief of staff. An assistant secretary of agriculture from the
Clinton administration also appeared, as did Ohio congressman Ted Strickland's aide, Chad Tanner, who was put in charge of press relations.
Richardson likened it to an "Internet start-up with teams assuming roles
that were needed at the time, creative ideas bubbling up, [and] no particular
hierarchy in the end, but everyone working toward one goal." However,
there were continuing "personnel problems" at the three management centers. In addition to the tension between the local party chair and Coordinated
Campaign staff, Losser angered many volunteers who were unwilling to deal
with her take-charge personality. According to Richardson, "Joe [Grandmaison] was a master at smoothing ruffled feathers." In retrospect, Richardson
said the "the [multiple] offices may have saved the campaign." Because the
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"personalities" had a difficult time coexisting, it was probably best to separate them, and everyone "had a place to go and work."
And there were continued tensions with state headquarters. A good example occurred on Election Day. Grandmaison was contacted by "some kid
in Columbus" who said he would be calling the office every thirty minutes
to find how many people were given rides to the polls and if there were any
problems. Grandmaison told him, "I will give you the numbers now, because
I'm going to lie to you anyway." He explained that the young staffers lacked
experience: "They just do it by the numbers. They don't understand. There's
no reasonableness. There's no judgment. It's like they are in charge of the
German army."
Finally, there was ongoing friction with the presidential candidate. According to Grandmaison, the Coordinated Campaign was "impossible"
when it came to arranging campaign visits by the candidate and surrogates.
Local activists complained that events were poorly planned and executed,
and that local notables were often offended. Perhaps the low point was Kerry's well-publicized goose hunting trip in October. The event was disorganized and subjected the candidate to ridicule.5 Similarly, the many Kerry surrogates who visited Mahoning County were often deployed ineffectively.6
According to David Skolnick, the political reporter for the Youngstown Vindicator, "most of the special events and campaign itself were anything but
coordinated."
Richardson reported that plentiful funds became available once the
Kerry campaign determined that Ohio was a targeted state, and the Mahoning field operation finally came together at the end of campaign. The local
operation eventually mustered several hundred volunteers from one source
or another. Many out-of-town volunteers went door-to-door, "knocking and
talking" rather than doing the traditional literature drops. Another hundred
volunteers worked the telephone bank, and the output expanded to ten thousand calls per day.
The state headquarters sent a list of swing voters that was reworked by
the local operation. Priority I precincts had a low turnout and high Democratic Performance Index (DPI); Priority 2 precincts had 65 percent turnout
and high DPI; and Priority 3 precincts had 75 percent turnout and high DPI.
These were many of the same precincts targeted by other groups. Unlike
1996 (Blumberg, Binning, and Green 1999), the campaign did not work all
precincts in the county. Here, too, the new campaign finance laws were an
impediment to communication with the other elements of the Democratic
campaign.7
On October 31, Kerry spoke to an estimated twenty thousand people
packed into Warren's Courthouse Square, joined by former senator John
Glenn, local congressmen Tim Ryan and Ted Strickland, retired admiral
William Crowe, and singer Bon Jovi.8 This was the proverbial shot in

196

Melanie J. Blumberg, William C. Bi1111i11g, and Joh11 C. Green

the arm the campaign needed, and it reached a classic fever pitch on Election Day.

The Results
These multiple campaign efforts produced a record level of voter registration, expanding the rolls by some sixteen thousand over 2000. In fact, it
appeared that the entire voting-age population of the county was registered
at least once, if not more often: according to the Mahoning County Board of
Elections records, there were 195,092 registered voters on Election Day, but
the 2000 U.S. Census counted only 186,928 people over 18 years old living
in the county. The local election officials offered a variety of explanations
for this discrepancy, including names not having been purged from the rolls.9
The multiple GOTV efforts paid off, as well: turnout rose by six percentage points to more than 67 percent of registered voters. Kerry garnered
13,857 more votes than Gore did in 2000. He won Mahoning County with
63 percent of the two-party vote, fourteen percentage points better Kerry's
statewide performance of 49 percent. As impressive as these results were,
Kerry obtained almost exactly the same percentage of the two-party vote as
Gore had in 2000. Indeed, Bush gained an additional 8,252 ballots in Mahoning County. Put another way, Kerry failed to make up any ground on
Bush's 2000 margin of victory in this Democratic bastion. This story was
pretty much the same across Ohio: Kerry was able to reduce 2000 Bush's
vote margin by just 46,000 votes-which could be accounted for by the absence of Ralph Nader from the 2004 ballot (Green 2004).
Mahoning County experienced a number of balloting problems on Election Day, although not the kinds of legal challenges that were anticipated. 10
These problems generated charges that the election was "stolen," but there
is no evidence to support this claim. According to Grandmaison, Kerry's
defeat can be attributed to the Democrats' ineptness rather than to fraud or
Republican shenanigans. A DNC report supports this perspective: "The statistical study of precinct-level data does not suggest the occurrence of widespread fraud that systematically misallocated votes from Kerry to Bush"
(Democratic National Committee Voting Rights Institute 2005, 10).
Many factors contributed to these close results, one of which was the
poor coordination of the Democratic campaign efforts. This problem is well
illustrated by the fact that all the major groups targeted the same heavily
Democratic precincts while other precincts were passed by. Some of the
problems are commonplace in presidential campaigns, including friction between presidential campaigns and party officials, a Jack of party integration,
and local party organizational problems. However, these challenges had
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been met in recent presidential campaigns, and in 2004 there were extraordinary resources available. Indeed, ACT. Take Back Ohio, and the Kerry campaign did impressive work that went a long way toward remedying the internal weaknesses of the Ohio party organizations. But they were unable to
provide a critical resource: teamwork.
One reason for the lack of teamwork was the new campaign finance rules
under BCRA. ACT, Take Back Ohio, the Kerry campaign, and the Ohio
Democratic committees were prohibited from communicating with each
other-and there is good reason to believe this prohibition was followed.
This meant that the campaign would be "uncoordinated," with unfortunate
consequences: the "outsourcing" of traditional grassroots party operations
to ACT was inefficient; the strength of traditional party allies, such as labor,
was not effectively harnessed; and critical resources were concentrated in the
most transient of political organizations, a presidential campaign. In 2004,
party organizations also obtained new resources (see chapters 6 and 7), but
the impact on the Ohio Democratic state and local parties was limited.
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Organizational Strength and Campaign
Professionalism in State Parties
David A. Dulio and R. Sam Garrett

Despite a steady stream of research on the strength of party organizations, some important ways in which parties are involved in campaigns remain unexplored. Much of the existing work on party strength appeared in
the 1980s, a period when political consultants were establishing a strong
presence in campaign politics, including work with party organizations. Observers soon discovered consultants, and a lively debate followed over
whether consultants and parties are adversaries or allies. There is a growing
consensus among political scientists that parties and consultants are allies,
meaning that each group helps the other provide services and win elections.
But the relationship between parties and consultants remains controversial.
Although party elites- those running and employed by political partiesoften value consultants, sometimes party activists do not. In this chapter,
however, we find evidence that behind the scenes, weak and strong state
party organizations forge relationships with political consultants, even if activists sometimes criticize consultants for usurping the party. Some of the
circumstances surrounding the 2005 election of Howard Dean as Democratic
National Committee (DNC) chairman illustrate the tension between parties
needing consultants to build viable organizations but also limiting their public reliance on consultants.
This chapter explores the connection between campaign consultants and
party organizational strength at the state level in the early twenty-first century. Relying on surveys of state party officials performed by John Aldrich
and his colleagues (Aldrich, Gomez, and Griffin 1999) and James A. Thurber (2002), we have created a dichotomous measure of state party organizational strength and examined how different parties evaluate and utilize political consultants. In keeping with recent scholarship, we find that political
consultants do not weaken political parties, and in fact, parties and consultants perform complementary roles in the campaign process. We determine
that consultants provide help in areas where parties are less effective in assisting their candidates. And while we find that weaker parties are more in
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need of the services consultants perform, even strong parties make extensive
use of these services.

Political Consultants, Political Parties, and Organizational Strength
Political consultants are a relatively new set of actors in American campaigns. By the 1980s, political consultants had become major strategic players in many campaigns at the national and state levels (Dulio 2004; Herrnson
2004; Sabata 1981; Thurber and Nelson 2000). Consultants are now used
extensively to provide specialized services, including polling, fundraising,
direct mail, media production, opposition research, and press relations
(Dulio 2004; Herrnson 2004).
Unfortunately, consultants were largely excluded from the research on
party strength published during the 1980s. This omission may reflect the
debate among political scientists over whether consultants are good or bad
for parties. Some scholars subscribed to the adversarial view of partyconsultant relationships, seeing consultants as a negative influence on party
organizations (Agranoff 1972; Petracca 1989; Rosenbloom 1973; Sabata
1981 ). Put simply, as consultants grow stronger, parties weaken (Kolodny
and Logan 1998; Abbe and Hermson n.d.). Consultants encouraged candidates to develop short-term strategies to win elections, especially downplaying their candidates' party affiliation. For example, Magleby, Patterson, and
Thurber (2002) argue that parties and consultants should be seen as the
agents of two sets of principals: parties and candidates. While consultants
seek to serve both sets of principals, at times the desire to win elections will
override the party's goals of winning legislative majorities and coordinating
issue agendas. This results in weaker ties between candidates and party organizations, as well as between candidates of the same party.
In fact, many scholars have linked party decline with the rise of candidatecentered politics (Sabata 1981 ). This was true for several reasons. During
the "golden age" of political parties at the end of the nineteenth century,
"an individual candidate's 'organization' was often little more than a loyal
following within the party" (Herrnson 2004, 69). Political parties and their
loyal band of cronies played significant roles in orchestrating House and
Senate campaigns until the mid-twentieth century. However, by the 1950s
few candidates could depend on parties to win nominations and elections on
their behalf, as more open primary systems weakened party elites' control
over the nomination process. Moreover, changes in campaign finance law,
especially the enactment of the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), seemed at first to seriously weaken parties. In the 1980s political
action committees (PACs) exploded in importance, as favorable campaign
finance laws encouraged candidates to seek PAC donations. The overall ef-
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feet of these changes appeared to make party labels less irrelevant, as citizens more frequently split their tickets, incumbency rates increased, and divided government became a regular part of state and national politics
(Fiorina 1996; Wattenburg 1998).
Countering the adversarial view is a growing consensus among scholars
that parties and consultants do not have an adversarial relationship. According to this allied view of party-consultant relationships, the two sides enjoy
a symbiotic connection (Kolodny and Logan 1998; Abbe and Herrnson n.d.;
Kolodny 2000; Dulio and Thurber 2003). Party organizations continue to
be relevant precisely because they have developed a division of labor with
consultants. Consultants manage some electioneering tasks-for example,
polling, media production, and direct mail-that parties cannot do as efficiently. Meanwhile, party organizations perform other tasks, such as research and voter mobilization, which consultants cannot do as well (Abbe
and Herrnson n.d.; Kolodny 2000; Dulio 2004; Dulio and Thurber 2003).
At the same time that the role of consultants in politics has been growing, numerous studies have also shown that party organizational strength at
the state and national levels has increased considerably over the previous two
decades (Cotter et al. 1984; Aldrich 1995, 2000; Jewell and Morehouse
2000; La Raja 2003a). As Aldrich argues, one reason some scholars still see
parties as being in decline is because of a substantial change in the way parties are organized. The nineteenth-century "party-in-control" in which the
party held a "monopoly of resources" (Aldrich 1995, 269) has given way
to the "party-in-service" in which parties seek to assist candidates in their
development of personal campaign organizations.
We argue that consultants are a major part of this new type of party system. This allied view of the party-consultant relationship has led to the inclusion of consultants in research on party organizations. It is this nexus that
we explore here.
Data and Expectations
To assess the impact of organizational strength on the use of campaign
professionals in state parties, we turned to two unique data sets. Both are
surveys of state party officials, with each focusing on one aspect of the relationship between parties and consultants. First, in I999, John Aldrich and
his colleagues Brad Gomez and John Griffin conducted the State Party Organizations Study at Duke University. They conducted a mail survey and received sixty-five responses from state chairs across the nation.
The second survey we employed was conducted in 2002 by James Thurber and his colleagues at American University's Center for Congressional
and Presidential Studies (CCPS). 1 The CCPS study explores state party use
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of political consultants during the 2002 elections, including why parties hire
consultants, whether stale parties would recommend that their candidates
hire consultants in the next election cycle, and the division of labor between
consultants and parties in modem campaigns. Respondents included executive directors and other party elites responsible for hiring consultants (e.g.,
political directors, communications directors). The CCPS survey, conducted
by telephone, included eighty-seven respondents in the final sample. 2
We combined the data sets by matching the party affiliation and state of
the respondents from each data set. Not all responses from the Aldrich survey matched the responses from the Thurber survey. For instance, the CCPS
study had responses from elites in both the Democratic and Republican parties in Alaska, while Aldrich received a response only from the Democratic
state chair. After sorting through the responses and eliminating the cases that
were unavailable, fifty-six cases were included in our analysis.
We do not believe that either the different survey methods (mail for Aldrich and phone for CCPS) or the different time frame ( 1999 for Aldrich and
2002 for CCPS) pose any significant problems, because the two data sets
address different questions and were used for two different purposes in our
study. The Aldrich data were used solely to create a list of "strong" and
"weak" state party organizations; the more recent CCPS data were used
solely lo investigate the role and use of consultants in state parties.
To analyze the differences between organizationally strong and organizationally weak state parties in their reliance on outside political consultants,
we first needed to create a measure of organizational strength. There is no
universal operationalization of political parties' organizational strength. In
general, however, organizational "strength" refers to a party's ability to
compete at the ballot box. Hershey notes, for example, that in addition to
traditional measures of party strength such as the size of a stale party's budget and staff, "there are other ways to measure party strength. A strong party
would work effectively to register voters, tell them about party candidates,
and get them to the polls on Election Day. It would be successful in filling
its ticket with viable candidates" (2005, 48).
However, most works- including the two we rely on for the underpinnings of this chapter- use quantified indices of party strength. Gibson and
colleagues (1983, 198)- the forerunners to Aldrich's survey, which is central lo this chapter- measured party strength using three dimensions: bureaucratization, recruitment, and programmatic activity. Bureaucratization
refers to the formal party structure and includes the size of the party staff
and budget and levels of professionalization. Recruitment includes activities
related to enlisting and funding candidates, while programmatic activity
measures the role of parties in mobilizing voters, conducting polls, and providing services to candidates.
We relied solely on the Aldrich data to build a multiple-measure index
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of party strength. Most of those variables are used in Aldrich's own measures of party strength. We omitted others included in his assessment from
our calculation of party strength, however, because they either closely or
explicitly dealt with activities that outside consultants would provide. Our
revised party strength index included:
• whether the chair was full- or part-time
• whether the state party offices operated out of the chair's home, business, or separate building
• whether the chair was salaried
• if the state party contributed to various campaigns (governor, U.S.
House, U.S. Senate, state house, state senate, or other state constitutional or local office)
• if the party employed an executive director
• how active the party was in recruiting candidates in races around the
state
• if the state party engaged in activities with county party organizations,
such as sharing mailing lists or conducting joint fundraising programs,
get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives, or registration drives
Each of these variables was converted to a dichotomous 0-1 variable (although many were already dichotomous in the original Aldrich data set). The
fifteen variables we used were then aggregated to create an overall party
strength index. State parties that scored a 10 or higher on this index were
coded as strong, and those scoring 9 and lower were coded as weak.3 The
results are listed in table 12.1.
We believe there are competing expectations that might explain any differences in the ways that strong and weak political parties utilize political
consultants. For instance, it might be that strong state parties employ professionals more than their weaker counterparts because they have the structure
and budget to do so. Alternatively, perhaps weaker state parties look to consultants more than stronger ones because weak parties need more help to be
competitive than strong parties do. Building on the prior work discussed
above, we also examined state party elites' attitudes on whether their relationships with consultants are allied or adversarial.

Party Elites' Attitudes about Campaign Professionalization
Before assessing how state parties with different levels of organizational
strength utilized consultants, we examined how state party elites viewed the
roles of parties and consultants generally. This continues previous work that
has shown that party elites generally believe that consultants are increasingly
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Maryland Republicans
Massachusetts Democrats
Minnesota Democrats
Minnesota Republicans
Mississippi Republicans
Missouri Republicans
Montana Democrats
Montana Republicans
Nebraska Democrats
Nebraska Republicans
Nevada Democrats
New Hampshire Republicans
New Jersey Democrats
New Jersey Republicans
New York Democrats
North Carolina Democrats
North Dakota Democral~
Ohio Democrats
Ohio Republicans
Oregon Democrats
Pennsylvania Democrats
Rhode Island Democrats
Rhode Island Republicans
South Carolina Democrats
South Carolina Republicans
Tennessee Democrats
Utah Democrats
Utah Republicans
Vermont Republicans
Virginia Democrats
Washington Democr,lls
Wisconsin Democrats
Wisconsin Republicans
Wyoming Democrats
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involved in elections at all levels (Dulio and Thurber 2003; Dulio and Nelson
2005). Here, we find some interesting trends and differences between strong
and weak state party organizations. Table 12.2 reports party operatives'
mean responses on the question of whether the role of both parties and professional consultants has increased or decreased. At every level, more party
operatives in states with strong organizations report that party roles have increased, as seen by their higher mean ranking. In terms of differences across
levels of organizational strength, the smallest difference was at the local
level (3.75 for strong parties compared to 3.72 for weak organizations). Putting aside the parties' roles in primary elections for a moment, local parties
also received the lowest mean ranking for both strong and weak organizations, indicating that the local level is where the fewest party operatives saw
an increase in party power.
The greatest differences between operatives' views in strong and weak
parties appear at the national level (mean rating of 4.05 vs. 3.75) and in primary elections (4.06 vs. 3.26), with operatives from strong parties more
likely to indicate that the parties' role had increased significantly in recent
years in both areas. In contrast, operatives in both strong and weak party
organizations saw that parties' roles at the state level have increased as well
(mean rankings of 4.10 and 3.83). Reinforcing this point is the fact that operatives in both types of organizations reported their highest mean ranking

Table 12.2 State Party Elites' Views or the Role or Parties and Consultants, by
Organizational Strength
Heu the role ofthe followi11g i11creased or decreased?"

Political parties at the local level
Political partie~ at the stale level
Political parties at the national level
Political parties in primary elections
Political consullants at the local level
Political consullants at the state level
Political consultants at the national level
Political consultants in primary elections
• Mean rnnkings based on a scale of 1- 5, where:
5 = increased very much
4 • increased somewhat
3 .. stayed lhe same
2 • decreased somewhat
I = decreased very much
• difference of means 1es1, p = 0.11
' difference of means tcsl, p ,. 0.002
4
difference of means lesl. p "' 0.014
• difference of means 1es1, p
0,I6

Wellk Pcinie.1·

Stro11g Pllrties

All Parties

3.72
3.83
3.75
3.26
3.69
4.08
4.15
3.94

3.75

3.73
3.93
3.86
3.53
3.61
3.91
4.06
3.91

4.IO
4.05•
4.0fr

3.45
3.60J
3.89•
3.84
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here. These high rankings for stale parties must be viewed with some caution
since the data come from state party employees.
Very different results were found when party elites were asked about the
role of political consultants at different levels of campaigns. In every instance, fewer respondents from strong party organizations said that the role
of consultants had increased. Once again, only a small difference between
operatives from strong and weak party organizations was found at the local
level (mean ranking of 3.45 vs. 3.69 for strong and weak parties, respectively). Furthermore, the lowest mean ranking for consultants' roles occurred
at the local level for operatives from both weak and strong organizations. We
should also not be surprised by this result, given that professional consultants have not become as dominant in local elections as they have in higherlevel races.
At the stale level, however, there are significant differences between
strong and weak parties (3.60 for those from strong parties and 4.08 from
weak parties). More operatives from weaker state parties reported that consultants' roles had increased. Perhaps this result reflects the fact that these
parties do not have the resources they need to assist their candidates as much
as they might like, and as a consequence, consultants have become major
players in their party's state campaigns. Elites in strong party organizations,
on the other hand, may not see the same kind of impact from outside consultants due to the parties' greater institutional capacity.
On average, operatives from both strong and weak party organizations
see the greatest increase in consultants' presence at the national level (mean
ratings of 3.89 and 4.15). Given the ubiquitous nature of professionals in
campaigns for Congress and the White House, this finding is not surprising.
Overall, the mean scores on the role of consultants were all more than 3.5showing a greater role for consultants at all levels. This evidence reveals that
state party operatives perceive that consultants have a pervasive influence in
modem campaigns.
Prior work has also shown that party operatives in the states believe that
there are some services that candidates demand during a campaign that are
better provided by professional consultants than by parties, but that there are
other services that are better provided by parties (Dulio and Thurber 2003;
Dulio and Nelson 2005). Generally, these tasks fit into a two-category division of labor: consultants are regarded as better suited for message creation
and delivery (polling, media, and direct mail), while parties are better at providing labor-intensive services and staff resources (opposition research,
GOTV. and fundraising):' Party elites also believe that parties maintain a
strong role in providing campaign management or strategic advice.5 Given
the differences between strong and weak party operatives on the role of consultants, there may also be differences on the division of labor between consultants and parties. Table 12.3 addresses this possibility.
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Tuble 12.3 Slule Purty Elites' Views or the Level or Consullunts' Services, by
Orgunlzutionul Strength

Hm•e co11.mltc111t.1· taken Ol'er pro11isio11 of the followi11g elrL·tioneering sen•ices ?•
Campaign advertising
Fundr.iising
Get out the vote
Polling
Opposilion research
Direct mail
Management or strntegic advice

Weak Parties

Strong Parries

All Parries

3.17
2.44
1.83
3.22
2.56

2.85h
2.45
1.75
3.00:
2.55
3.00
2.53

3.05
2.45
1.80
3.14
2.55

2.80

2.50

2.88

2.51

• Mean rankings based on a scale or 1- 4, where:
4 ,. slrongly agree
3 = somewha1 agree
2 • somewhal disagree
I • slrongly disagree
~ difference of means 1es1, p = 0.08
' d iffercnce of means lest, p "' 0.13

First, there is no difference between those in strong or weak party organizations when it comes to their general attitude on whether consultants are
better able to provide some services than are parties. They agree with equal
vigor- more than 60 percent of operatives in each group said that there are
some services that consultants provide that parties cannot.6
Second, in the areas of fundraising, field operations and GOTV efforts,
and opposition research-the areas that consultants and parties agree are
best provided by parties-there is also little or no difference between those
from strong or weak organizations ( see table 12.3 ). In addition, the low aggregate responses, especially for GOTV efforts, reflect the feeling that operatives from both strong and weak party organizations say that consultants
have not replaced parties in these areas. In a finding that is consistent with
prior work, party elites from both strong and weak parties also were skeptical
that consultants had taken over in the area of management and strategic advice. As Dulio and Thurber (2003) argue, party operatives still believe they
have something to offer in the area of management and strategic advice.
In the areas of polling and campaign advertising, there were significant
differences between elites in strong and weak party organizations, with those
from weak parties more likely to say that consultants had taken over for parties in these areas. However, we should be careful to say that even though
they had a lower mean rating, operatives from strong party organizations did
not fully reject the idea that consultants had taken over the provision of these
services, either. One area where we may have expected this pattern was direct mail, but there was a small difference in the opposite direction.
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Campaign Professionalism in Strong and Weak Parties
There are at least two ways that state parties can involve professional
political consultants in campaigns: they can recommend specific consultants
to their candidates, and they can pay for their services directly (either for
candidate use or their own purposes). It is well established at the national
level that political parties are not shy about recommending consultants to
their candidates (Herrnson 1988; Sabato 1981 ). However, we know less
about the importance of this practice at the state level. When asked about
recommending consultants to candidates, state party operatives reported the
practice was nearly universal. In both strong and weak party organizations,
80 percent or more of the respondents said that they recommend outside consultants to their candidates. We believe that one reason these figures were
not closer to 100 percent is the presence of competitive races in the states.
In states without serious competitive races, party organizations, be they
strong or weak, may not feel the need to recommend outside consultantstheir candidates will likely either coast to victory and not need as much help
in their campaign, let alone in identifying professionals, or never be in the
running as token opposition and not even think about hiring professionals.
Clearly, however, state parties are heavily involved in funneling consultants
to their candidates through recommendations.
What kind of consultants do state party operatives recommend to candidates? Overall, huge majorities of operatives from both strong and weak
party organizations say they would recommend pollsters (87.5 percent and
92.3 percent, respectively), media consultants (93.8 and IOO percent), and
direct mail specialists (81.3 and 92.3 percent) to their candidates. This pattern is not surprising, since all these services are central to message creation
and delivery, the very kind of services where consultants are viewed as dominant. The parties- especially weak state parties- choose not to provide
these services in-house presumably because they do not have the infrastructure to do so.1
However, an interesting and large difference between strong and weak
party organizations appears on recommending fundraising consultants. A
full 73 percent of party operatives from weak party organizations say they
would recommend a fundraiser to their candidates, compared to only about
44 percent of those from strong party organizations. While fundraising is an
integral part of what political parties do-both to fill their own coffers and
to help their candidates- weaker state party organizations are less well
equipped in this area. For weak parties, fundraising is therefore just another
service that they do not have the resources to provide, making consultants
the only real alternative.
Party elites were also asked about which factors influence their decisions
to recommend particular consultants to candidates. Specifically, they were
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asked about seven attributes of the consultant: ideology, win/loss record, ex•
perience in that particular state, fees and affordability, experience in the particular type of race, past record on ethical issues, and experience working for
state or national parties. The order of the mean ratings (see table 12.4) provides some indication of the impact of party strength on consultant recommendations. For instance, the highest mean ranking for weak party organizations was on the importance of the consultant's experience in the state. By
contrast, this was only the sixth-highest rating for operatives from strong
parties. The highest mean rating for strong party organizations was the consultant's experience in the particular type of race, followed closely by fees
or affordability. These factors were tied for third in the ratings of weak party
organizations. We believe that these figures are a clear signal that the operatives from weak state parties are referring candidates to consultants who
have a track record in their states because the party alone cannot provide the
same quality of advice to candidates. Interestingly, although in these cases
consultants are clearly replacing parties, the party-consultant relationship is
not necessarily adversarial. Indeed, it appears that weak parties are willingly
reducing their roles in campaigns. In doing so, they are ironically allied with
political consultants.
In addition to consultants' experiences in the particular type of race, assessment of their past ethical conduct was also important to operatives in
both strong and weak party organizations-but was more important for weak

Tuble 12.4 Stute Parties' Criteria ror Recommending Consultunts, by Organizulional
Strength

Holl' important t1re the ft11/mri11g fi1c1or.~ i11 recom111e11di11g cm1s11/u1111s 10 cc111diclme.r?•
Wet1k Parties

S1ro11g Parties

All Pc1r1ies

4.25
4.19
4.00
4.00
3.72
3.58

3.5Qb
3.79'
4.00
3.95
3.60
3.60

3.98
4.05
4.00
3.98
3.68
3.59

2.94

2.95

2.95

Experience in the stale
Past record on ethical issues
Experience in the type of race
Fees or affordability
Ideology
Win/loss record
Previous experience in another state or
national party
• Mean rnnking~ based on a scale of l - 5. where:
5 "' cxlrcmcly important
4 = very important
3 "" somewhat importanl
2 ... nol very important
I ,. not at all important
~ difference of means test, p
0.001
' difference of means test, p = 0.04
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parties. This pattern may also reveal the importance of consultants as allies
to weak organizations. It is interesting to note the relative lack of importance
of consultants' experience working for a state or national party organization:
this factor had the lowest mean ranking by operatives from both strong and
weak party organizations. This result is surprising given the fact that prior
research has shown that parties act as training grounds for consultants (Kolodny and Logan 1998; Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000) and that consultants with party experience get more party business (Kolodny and Logan
1998).
When examining the hiring practices of state political parties, we again
see evidence of the pervasiveness of consultants in today's campaigns. State
party elites were asked whether or not they planned to hire the same four
types of consultants noted above-pollsters, media consultants, direct mail
specialists, and fundraisers-in the 2002 cycle. There are no substantive differences between strong and weak party organizations with regard to pollsters or direct mail specialists; in both cases, large majorities said they
"probably" or "definitely" would hire these types of consultants (88.9 and
83.4 percent for pollsters and 94.4 and 88.6 percent for direct mail specialists
among strong and weak party organizations, respectively). Again, this
speaks to the division of labor noted above: parties are not as engaged
in message creation and delivery in modern campaigns, relying instead on
consultants.
In terms of the parties' hiring of fundraisers, there is a small difference
between strong and weak party organizations. Strong party organizations
likely have the staff and resources to do as much fundraising as they need
without much outside help. This may also be the case with weak party organizations, but it might also be the case that weak parties simply do not raise
enough money to warrant the help of an outside professional. However,
the absence of a large difference in this case is not because of the nearunanimous response that parties would hire this type of consultant but rather
the parties' relative lack of interest in hiring a fundraiser. Here, only about
one in three party organizations (both strong and weak) said that they "definitely" would hire a fundraiser.
One curious result is the party operatives' response to the question of
whether they would hire a media specialist in 2002. Overall, fewer operatives
said their organizations would hire a media consultant (70.6 percent would
"probably" or "definitely" hire one) compared to pollsters (85.2 percent) or
direct mail specialists (90.6 percent). With the cost of media buys always
increasing, it is not likely to be cost-effective for state parties to engage in
their own media campaigns when compared to in-house production of direct
mail. However, there was a large difference between strong and weak party
organizations in this regard: operatives from weak party organizations were
more likely to say their organizations would hire a media consultant than
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those from strong parties (80 percent to 50 percent). This result is exactly
the opposite of what we might expect. It is not likely to be the case that
strong parties do not need the services of media consultants because they
have the in-house capacity to produce television ads, since even parties at
the national level have moved away from providing this service. It is also
unlikely that weak party organizations could hire a media consultant and
then buy airtime required to put the spot on the air, given their smaller budgets.
It could be that this result is a function of the 2002 election cycle. Perhaps those operatives from weak state party organizations that said they
would hire a media specialist were expecting financing from outside sources,
such as the national parties, for consulting fees and airtime. Indeed, weak
party organizations with high-profile competitive races-for the U.S. House,
U.S. Senate, or a governorship-could reasonably have expected such aid.
By the same logic, it may also be that those operatives from strong party
organizations that said they would not hire a media consultant may have
lacked competitive races.
We can begin to better understand the results on hiring decisions by examining factors behind the decision as well as for whom the consultants
would perform services (the party, its candidates, or both). Considering the
latter first, there was agreement between strong and weak party organizations
on the ultimate beneficiaries of the consultants' work. In polling, media, and
direct mail, sizable majorities of operatives from both kinds of states said
that the consultants they hired would work for both the party and its candidates. Meanwhile, between one-quarter and one-third said that consultants
would work exclusively for the party, and very few said that they would
work exclusively for candidates. Media consultants are a slight exception.
More state party elites said that the media consultants they hired would work
solely for a candidate- I I percent of those from weak parties and 14 percent
from strong parties reported this arrangement. As for fundraisers, the majority of operatives from both kinds of parties said that the fundraisers would
work only for the party, and the rest said that they would work for both the
party and its candidates (not one party operative said the fundraiser they
hired would work exclusively for a candidate). This finding is curious given
the preponderance of evidence that parties do not tum to outside professionals for help in fundraising. Of course, relatively few party operatives said
that their organization would hire a fundraiser in the first place, and this
question was asked only of those who said they would do so.
We can get more of an indication about party hiring practices by looking
at some of the reasons party operatives report for hiring consultants. These
data are presented in table 12.5. There are several reasons state parties may
want to hire outside consultants. For instance, they might find it more economical to pay consultants for a small amount of work that needs to be done
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Tobie 12.5 Foctors in State Parties' Decisions to Hire Consultants, by Consultnnt Type
nnd Orgnnizntionnl Strength
How importalll llrc 1ftc following facwrs i11 ,Jecidi11~ ll'hetlter or 1w1 to hire an outside
cm1.ml1t1111 '!•

\Veak Partie.r

Strong P"rties

All Parties

4.00
2.93
2.70

3.38~
1.56
2.56

3.78
2.80
2.65

3.71
3. 19
2.61

2.73•
2.24"
3.00

3.39
2.85
2.75

3.54
3.04
2,61

3.38
2.75•
2.75

3.50
2.97
2.64

2.35
2. 72
3.06

2.25
2.58
2.83

2.31
2.67
2.79

Pollsters
Par1y docs not pcrfonn that service
Party likely to be directed by national party
Allows party lo save on staff salary

Direct moil
Party docs not pcrfonn that service
Party likely Lo be directed by nalional party
Allow~ party lo save on staff i;alary

Medin
Party docs not pcrfonn lhal service
Party likely to be directed by national party
Allows party to save on staff salary

Fund raiser
Party docs not perfonn that service
Party likely lo be directed by national party
Allows party lo save on staff salary
• Mean rnnkings based on a scale of t-5. where:
$ "' e,uremcly important
4 • very important
J "' somewhat important
2
not very important
I "' not at all important
• difference of means test. p "' 0 .04
• difference of means test, p - 0.005
~ difference of means test. p • 0.001
• difference of means test, p • 0.12

rather than to invest in the infrastructure and staff needed to produce the
same service in-house. Parties might also be encouraged by the national
party organization to hire consultants, or state parties simply may not perform that service. Here again, we see some complementary evidence for the
existence of an "allied" division of labor between parties and consultants.
In the cases of pollsters and media consultants, operatives from both
strong and weak party organizations indicate that the most important reason
for hiring a consultant is that their organizations do not provide this particular service. The mean ratings for weak (4.00 for pollsters and 3.54 for media
specialists) and strong (3.38 for both) parties far outpaced the reason with
the second-highest mean rating, namely, that the national party was likely to
pay for the service. The third reason, to save the cost of staff salaries, was
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even less important. Here, the pattern of rankings for both strong and weak
party organizations was the same. However, all the average ratings from
strong party organizations were significantly lower than those from weak
parties, indicating that fewer operatives in those states saw each factor as
important.
As for hiring direct mail consultants, the fact that their party does not
provide that particular service was again the highest mean reason for weak
party organization operatives, while strong party organization operatives had
much lower rankings. Indeed, more operatives from strong party organizations said that cost savings on staff were the biggest reason for hiring a direct
mail specialist. There is an important regularity behind these patterns: both
strong and weak party operatives find that they need consultants because
they do not provide certain services to candidates. As one might expect, this
pattern is the strongest in the weak party organizations.
The story is much different, however, with regard to fundraising consultants. There were no differences between strong and weak parties in the order
of importance of the different factors or the importance of individual factors.
For instance, the fact that their organizations did not perform this particular
service was the least important reason for hiring a fundraiser or any other
consultant. The highest mean rating for fundraisers (which was relatively
low, compared to the other factors) was to save money on salaries.K

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the relationship between campaign consultants and state party organizational strength. We find additional evidence of
the view that political parties and consultants are allies in electioneering. In
fact, party officials look to consultants for help in areas where they cannot
effectively help their candidates. This pattern holds for both organizationally
strong and weak parties. However, weak parties may tum to consultants for
help slightly more often because of their lower levels of resources. These
data reveal additional evidence of a division of labor between consultants
and parties that helps achieve the goal of winning elections.
Overall, we find that strong state party organizations share the national
parties' view that consultants are important resources, skilled at providing
polling, media, and direct mail. In contrast, weak party organizations often
tum to consultants to make up for their lack of resources. Interestingly, while
strong state parties, like the national parties, do not generally emphasize
consultants' roles in fundraising, weak state parties have little choice but to
use consultants as fundraisers.
Of course, the relationship between parties and consultants does not
occur in a vacuum. Ultimately, elections are decided by a relationship be-
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tween candidates and voters, which parties and consultants often mediate.
Given the multifaceted nature of modern party organizations, however, the
use of consultants can produce tensions between party professionals and
party activists because, to some extent, each has a different set of goals. The
use of consultants threatens to exacerbate these tensions.
For example, even after his dramatic defeat as a 2004 presidential candidate, Democrat Howard Dean reconnected with a nationwide grassroots base
to be elected DNC chairman in early 2005. DNC leaders reportedly chose
Dean in the hopes that he could reinvigorate state parties in the same manner
that had "propelled President [George W.] Bush to a victory in pivotal Ohio,
thanks to a strong state party and a network of local volunteers.'"' Democratic state party leaders in so-called red states found Dean's message particularly attractive. After reportedly receiving only $12,000-of $400 million
raised nationally-from the DNC during the 2004 cycle, for example, Nebraska Democratic state chairman Steve Achelpohl complained, "There are
a lot of unhappy people [among Democratic state chairs] like me who have
been disappointed by the unconscionably small piece of the pie we've been
allocated." w Democratic officials in other states echoed similar sentiments.
Dean responded by promising to strengthen state parties, saying that
doing so "is a central part of our plan to make the Democratic Party competitive in every race, in every district, in every state and territory." Dean also
drew a sharp distinction between party activists-long recognized as the
lifeblood of strong parties-and political consultants, which, as we have
shown, can have a significant connection to party strength. Moments after
his election as chairman, "a thousand party diehards sprang from their
chairs" when Dean declared, "Strength does not come from the consultants
down, [it] comes from the grassroots up!" 11
Although our findings strengthen the claim that state parties and consultants are allies, consultants are not always popular, even if they make parties
stronger. As Howard Dean's rhetorical style demonstrates, while parties and
consultants are often allies, party activists-another pillar of party
strength-might prefer to believe that parties and consultants are adversaries. Like most matters in American politics, the debate over party strength
and consultant relationships is impassioned but not absolute.

Notes
This paper rcprcsenls the views of the authors. It docs nol necessarily represent the views of
the Library of Congress. the Congressional Research Service. or any other inslilution with
which the authors arc affiliated. The authors 1hank John H. Aldrich and James A. Thurher for
generously providing data.
I. The CCPS survey was adminislercd by Harris lnteraclive. Thurhcr's co-researchers
were David A. Dulio and Candice J. Nelson.
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2. More infonnution on the CCPS survey is available from the authors of this chapter.
3. This is admiucdly an arbitmry cutoff for what defines "strong" or "weak" parties.
However, we have confidence in the cut point because it is a conservative onc-rJthcr than,
say, the median value- that includes a relatively small number or state parties (in the final
analysis, we had twenty state parties in our "strong" category and thirty-six in our "weak"
category). In addition, we had a limited theoretical foundation from which to work.
4. This division of labor rcnccts the "allied" vision or party-consultant relationships
discussed previously.
5. However, using in-depth qualitative data, Garrett (2005, chaps. 4-5) finds that political professionals of all stripes say that parties generally play a limited role in providing strategic advice.
6. In these differences, it is interesting to note that those from weak stale parties illuslmte views similar those of professional consultants; sec Dulio and Nelson 2005 for consultant data.
7. In each instance reported in table 12.3, more state party opcmtivcs from weak party
organizations than from strong parties said that they would recommend these consultants.
8. Recall that few state party elites said that they would hire a fundraiscr at all.
9. Dick Polman, "Dean's Victory Marks Historic Shifl in Party," Philadelphia illtJuirer, February 13, 2005.
10. Don Walton, "State Dems Seek More from National Party," linco/11 Swr Jo11nu1/,
February I, 2005.
11. Polman, "Dean's Victory."
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Local Parties and Mobilizing the Vote
The Case of Young Citizens
Daniel M. Shea and Jo/r11 C. Green

By all accounts, American party organizations are strong and vibrant at
the beginning of the twenty- first century. The national committees have
never been stronger in organizational terms, and the state committees are by
and large viable organizations (Bibby 1990), while local party committees
have gained some new organizational vitality as well (Frendreis and Gitelson
I993). But such organizational prowess begs an important question: how effective are these strong party organizations at connecting with the citizenry?
On this score, some scholars have expressed some serious doubts about the
significance of organizational strength, noting these improvements occurred
during a period of weak partisanship in the public and relatively low levels
of turnout (Coleman 1996; Shea 2003). This question is particularly relevant
when it comes to the future: What are the party organizations doing for the
next generation of partisans? That is, what are parties doing to connect with
young citizens and mobilize them to vote?
In this chapter, we investigate these questions with a study of local party
organizations and the youth vote ( 18- 25 years old). It appears that many
local party committees have the capacity to mobilize young voters and are
heavily engaged in the electoral process. However, local party leaders are
not especially interested in the youth vote-despite agreeing that youth disengagement is a serious problem and believing that local parties can make a
big difference in bringing the youth into the electoral process. We argue that
local parties have the potential to play a major role in mobilizing the youth
and thus revitalizing political participation in America. Real innovation in
this regard would allow strong and vibrant party organizations to live up to
their promise as instruments of democracy.

The Youth Vote and Party Politics
From the 1960s to 2000, there was a steady decline in citizen participation in politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Putnam 2000). Shrinking

218

Daniel M. Shea and John C. Gree11

voter turnout was one indicator of the problem-surely the most recognizable- but other modes of political behavior such as sending letters to elected
officials, helping a candidate or a party, wearing a campaign button, and
talking about politics with family and friends have declined as well. According to the American National Election Studies, the number of Americans
"very much interested" in political campaigns has dropped by nearly 40 percent since the l 960s. This withdrawal from politics is both perplexing and
troubling.
The problem is especially pronounced among younger Americans, especially those 18 to 24 years old. In 1972, the first election in which 18-yearolds had the right to vote, 50 percent did so. In subsequent elections, the
figure dropped roughly 30 percent. And in the 1998 and 2002 midterm elections, this figure fell below 20 percent. A recent study of younger Americans, commissioned by the Center for Information and Research on Civic
Leaming and Engagement (CIRCLE), found that while attitudes toward government may have improved in the wake of 9/11, the number of young
Americans willing to take part in our political system has continued to
shrink. Only about two-thirds of the 18- to 25-year-olds in the CIRCLE survey had registered to vote, a decline from two years before, and 49 percent
of the overall group (15- to 25-year-olds) said that voting was "a little important" or "not at all important" to them. Many other indicators in this study,
and in numerous other studies, have suggested the same thing: younger voters were turned off by politics. This departure of young citizens from the
electoral sphere during the past few decades has profound implications for
the quality of American democracy (Galston 2001; Patterson 2003).
But then, much to the surprise of all manner of observers, youth voting
increased dramatically in 2004. Surely this was part of the overall surge in
voting in the close and fiercely contested 2004 campaign. But while overall
turnout expanded by about 6 percent, it increased most among the youngest
voters. Whereas just 36 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds voted in 2000, some
47 percent did so in 2004. This changed represented a stunning eleven percentage point increase- about double the rate of increase among ~ny other
age group. Although the youth still voted at a lower rate than older Americans, the gap at the polls narrowed.
Is this dramatic change just a short-term phenomenon occasioned by the
special circumstances of 2004, including the candidates and controversies of
the moment? Or does it represent a long-term increase in engagement of
young citizens- and perhaps the citizenry at large? Full answers to these
questions won't be known for some time, of course, but a brief review of the
conventional wisdom on youth participation is helpful.
The most common explanations for the low levels of youth voting focus
on the character (and deficiencies) of the individual citizen. The decline of
participation is due to changes in attitudes, especially among younger
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Americans, who are seen as apathetic and self-centered. They are also seen
as ignorant of their duties as citizens, in part due to poor civic education in
high school.' The solution to this problem has been to change youth attitudes. For instance, many high school and college programs have been developed to promote students' interest and knowledge of politics. MTV's Rock
the Vote, which emerged in 1992 and was reenergized for the 2004 presidential contest, is prominent example. And there has been no shortage of hectoring of the youth by their more civic-minded elders.
Certainly there is some validity to this perspective, but it is not much
help in explaining the sudden increase in youth voting in 2004. After all,
there is no evidence of a sudden change in the attitudes or knowledge of
young citizens in this particular election.
A less common approach has been to focus on political elites, candidates, public officials, and campaign professionals. Here the main culprit is
"new-style political campaigns," which have focused on negative campaigning, extensive fundraising, and the precise targeting of voters, compounded
by sensational media coverage of politics. This style of politics alienates
many voters, but especially the youth. The solution to this problem has focused on changing the style of campaign and campaign coverage to more
effectively engage younger citizens. Efforts to develop codes of conduct for
campaigns, campaign finance reform, and improved media coverage are
good examples.
Once again, while these proposals certainly have merit, they don't help
much in explaining the sudden increase of youth voting in 2004. After all, a
rash of reforms did not suddenly change the new-style campaigns-and in
fact, 2004 was in many ways the epitome of it.
A final approach has received relatively little attention-the role of organizations dedicated to mobilizing citizens to vote. Simply put, there has been
a decline in this most basic of democratic functions, and the key culprits in
this regard have been the local political parties, once the dominant electoral
organizations in the United States (Milkis 1999; Putnam 2000). This decline
was partly in capacity to mobilize the vote- local parties became weaker in
both absolute and relative terms, losing out to candidates, interest groups,
and higher-level party organizations. But there was also a decline in the interest in voter mobilization as local parties became adjuncts to the new style
of campaigning and the organizations that practice it. Writing in the Atlantic
Monthly, Don Peck captured this last point well: "In recent decades parties
have moved away from grassroots mobilization efforts, which reach out to
nonvoters, to focus on 'switching' independents that have a strong history of
voting" (2002, 48). Young voters were especially affected by this change.
The solution to this problem is to reinvigorate mobilizing institutions,
especially local political parties. This perspective may help explain the dramatic change in the 2004 vote, because there was a sudden and dramatic
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expansion of mobilizing institutions in the 2004 campaign. The Republicans
built an extraordinary grassroots program within their party organizations
(see chapter IO), and on the Democratic side, liberal interest groups and
labor unions instituted large and innovative grassroots activities (see chapters 8 and 11 ). The growth of the Internet as a tool, as demonstrated especially by Howard Dean's primary campaign (see chapter 9), and the efforts
of Christian conservatives in opposition to same-sex marriage (Abramowitz
2004) are additional examples of this expansion. All these efforts may have
reached young voters, but there were also a large number of special programs aimed at the youth vote, both within and outside of party organizations (Shea and Green 2006, appendix).
If reinvigorated institutions were crucial to the 2004 vote, then maintaining these institutions and their activities in the future will be critical to maintaining a high level of youth participation beyond 2004. Here local party
organizations may be especially important. After all, they have a permanence that other organizations lack and, like other party organizations, a
long-term interest in voter mobilization. Scholars have long noted that voter
participation was highest when local political parties were vibrant. In 1942,
Schattschneider observed, "Once party organizations become active in the
electorate, a vast field of extension and intensification of effort is opened up,
the extension of the franchise to new social classes, for example" (47).
There is some evidence that local party organizations have been growing
stronger over the last several decades, and this strength has been associated
with higher turnout (see, for example, Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz 1990;
Frendreis and Gitelson 1993, 1999; Frendreis et al. 1996). Our questions are
these: do local party organizations have sufficient capacity to mobilize
young voters, and do they have an interest in doing so?

The Study
This chapter is based on a telephone survey of a random sample of Democratic and Republican local party chairs drawn from the thousand most populated counties across the country. According to the 2000 census, these
counties contain 87 percent of the American population, so this sample covers the local parties most capable of influencing the electorate. The survey
was conducted between October I and November l 0, 2003, producing a total
of 403 Democratic and 402 Republican responses, with a cooperation rate of
about 50 percent. The responses were found to deviate only slightly from the
geographic and demographic characteristics of the original sample of counties; the data were weighted to correct for these modest differences.
Each interview lasted roughly thirty minutes and included batteries on
organization strength, party activities, and the political environment as well

Local Partie,i, and Mo/Jili.,ing the Vote

221

as extensive questions on youth mobilization. This study was supported by
a grant from CIRCLE to research the current and potential connections between local party organizations and the youth. (For early reports of this project, see Shea and Green 2004.)

Local Party Capacity
What kind of organizational capacity do local parties have in the early
years of the twenty- first century? Several studies conducted in the 1990s
suggest that many local parties were strong organizations and had become
stronger over time (Frendreis and Gitelson I 993, 1999). Our survey produces similar findings, as can be seen in table 13.1, which lists several basic
features associated with organization strength (see Cotter et al. 1984).
Overall, about three• fifths of the parties surveyed maintained a party
headquarters during campaign season, a basic organizational feature on
which the Democrats and Republicans were very similar. Almost the same
proportion reported having a website, evidence of using modern campaign
technology; here the Republicans were more modestly more active. However, less than two-fifths of the organizations maintained an office yearround even when campaigns were not under way; here, too, the Republicans
were modestly better off. Only one-quarter of the parties had a full-time
chair. Most of the chairs interviewed had other occupations, often in government or politics. Finally, very few local parties had paid staff-overall, just

Tuhie 13.1 Orgunizutionul Feutures or Local Party Committees, 2003
Democrat

Rep11blica11

Both

During the cumpulgn, did the purty hove o •••
Headquarters
Website
Year•round office
Full-time chair
Paid staff

63.1%
57.6
34.8
26.2
6.5

60.6%
64.3
41.5
23.8
9.0

61.9%
61.0
38.1
25.0
7.8

30.8%
42.8
18.8
7.8

33.4%
40.3
19.4
6.9

67.6%
$40,838
$242

66.6%
$39,151
$232

Proportion or parties thot, or the above, had ...
None or one feature
Two features
Three features
Four or five features

36.2%
37.9
20.0
6.0

Addltlonol measures or orgunlzutionul strength
Commiuce positions filled (mean)
Mean annual budget
Mean per capital budget

65.6%
$37,464
$221
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7.8 percent. There was no statistically significant difference between the
major parties in terms of the full-time chairs or paid staff.
These findings fit well with previous research on the organizational
strength of local parties, and in some cases, these figures are higher. For
example, in Frendreis and Gitelson's 1999 study, about 4 percent of the
county committees boasted full-time staff, while we found roughly twice
that amount. It could be that local party strength has continued to grow.
However, such conclusions must be viewed with great caution because of
the differences in samples surveyed in these studies.
A simple additive index of these organizational features provides a crude
measure of the distribution of local party strength. Overall, one-third of these
committees reported none or just one of these attributes. These would appear
to be weak organizations; the Democratic committees were a bit more common in this category. Another two-fifths of these committees reported two
of the organizational features; the Republican committees were a bit more
common in this mid-range category. Finally, the remaining quarter of the
parties had three or more of these attributes. Democrats and Republicans
were equally common in this category of strong organizations.
Two additional measures of organizational strength are located at the
bottom of table 13.1. The first is the mean percentage of the party committee
offices that were filled, usually precinct committeemen and committeewomen. Since such local party officials tend to be party activists, this is a
crude measure of the volunteer labor force available to local committees.
Here the overall mean is an impressive two-thirds of the seats filled. As one
might imagine, there is considerable variation in this figure, but the major
parties did not differ significantly in terms of these resources. The final entry
in the table is the average budget for the local parties measured on a per
capita basis (to control for the great variation in population). Here the mean
party's budget was about $230, with an average yearly budget of about
$40,000. The Republican committees were a little wealthier than the Democrats, but not dramatically so.
What activities do the local parties undertake with these resources?
Table 13.2 reports responses on the mean percentage of the committee's total
effort directed at five types of activity: get-out-the-vote (GOTV) activities,
campaign services to candidates, campaign events, voter registration, and
noncampaign activities (such as regular fundraising and social events).
Consistent with past research, GOTV activities ranged first, on average
accounting for 30 percent of the local parties' efforts. Three activities essentially tied for second place, averaging between one-sixth and one-fifth of the
committees' total effort: campaign services to candidates, campaign events,
and voter registration. Of course, some of these activities may be connected
to GOTV efforts, such as the mailing of party slate cards to voters and holding rallies right before the election. Finally, only about one~tenth of commit-
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Locul Purty Activities, 2003
Democml

Re1m/Jliam

Both

Mcun distribution or locul purty clTort
GOTV activities
Campaign services
Campaign events
Voter registration
Noncampaign activities

31.0%
17.4
17.8
17.5
II.I

30.1%
19.6
19.2
15.3
11.0

30.6%
18.5
18.5
16.4
11.1

53.0%
13.0

52.3%
12.4

52.6%
12.8

75.9%

76.1%

76.0%

59.8

72. I

65.9

60.4

66.3

63.3

58.1

66.3

62.2

Pereentoge receiving uid from ...
Stale party
National party

Locol purty ogrecmcnt "'Ith the following statements
Local party relics on volunteers, not
consultants
Campaign consultants arc allies or parties,
not adversaries
Local party is heavily invoh·ccl in
campaigns
Primary goal or party is to win elections,
not to develop partisanship

tees' total effort on average was directed toward noncampaign activities. It
is interesting to note that there was no significant difference between the
Democrats and Republicans in terms of the relative distribution of activities.
These party committees report receiving some aid from their state and
national party committees, much of it directed at GOTV activities. Overall,
just over half of the committees reported receiving state assistance. However
many fewer reported national committee assistance-just 13 percent. It
could be, of course, that national support came through state parties and was
carefully targeted to competitive areas.
In this regard, the respondents' views of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) are interesting, since these reforms banned party
committees from raising "soft money," some of which had been used to
fund grassroots activities. Indeed, an objection to BCRA was that it would
have a negative effect on voter registration and GOTV programs. In response, a special provision was put in the legislation allowing for "Levin
committees," whereby local party committees could raise soft money under
carefully regulated circumstances (La Raja 2006). In fall 2003, the local
party chairs had a largely negative view of the impact of BCRA on local
parties. Overall, one-third thought the impact would be negative, and only
one-tenth thought it would be positive (with the remainder expecting no significant impact). Here, the Republican chairs were more pessimistic than
their Democratic counterparts (38.6 and 26.5 percent, respectively, expected
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a negative impact). However, only one-tenth of the chairs reported knowing
about Levin committees, and only two-fifths said they were "very likely" to
take advantage of the provision. On this point, the chairs were prescient: very
few Levin committees were established in 2004, partly because of their complex regulations and partly because BCRA did not inhibit party fundraising
(La Raja 2006). Indeed, BCRA may not have the negative effect on local
committees the chairs feared.
The remaining entries in table 13.2 reinforce the clear emphasis on voter
mobilization by local party committees. When asked if their committee
largely employed volunteers or campaign consultants to run campaigns ,
three-quarters of both parties' chairs said volunteers. But when asked if consultants were "adversaries" or "allies" of local party committees, two-thirds
overall chose allies, a pattern found in other studies of party leaders (see
chapter 12). Here, there was a sharp partisan difference: the Republicans
chose the allied response much more often than did the Democrats (72.1 to
59.8 percent). In a separate question, just 6 percent of the chairs reported
that campaign consultants were "very important" to their organization; another one-third said "somewhat important." Overall, two-thirds of the chairs
reported that their organizations were heavily involved in campaigns, and
more than three. fifths believed that the principal goal of the local party was
to win elections, as opposed to building party attachment. The Republican
chairs had modestly higher scores on these questions than the Democratic
chairs.
In sum, it does appear that many local party committees do have the
capacity to mobilize voters, including the youth.

Interest in Young Voters
But how interested are local parties in mobilizing young voters? Our survey provides a mixed assessment. In order to measure the priority that local
chairs assign to youth mobilization, we asked the chairs, "Are there demographic groups of voters that are currently important to the long-term success of your local party?" Almost 88 percent of the chairs could think of
such a group. We asked this question three times to allow the respondents to
mention a wide variety of groups-which they did.
Overall, just 8 percent of the party chairs mentioned young voters
( 18-24 years of age) in their first response; an additional 12 percent mentioned young voters on the second try, and I 8 percent on the third. In all,
local party leaders were given three opportunities to suggest that younger
voters are important to the long-term success of their local party, but less
than two-fifths did so. In contrast, senior citizens were far more likely to be
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mentioned: they were named by 21 percent on the first opportunity, 19 on
the second, and JO on the third, for a total of one-half of the party chairs.
There was some variation by party. Republican leaders were nearly
twice as likely to mention young voters on the first question (8 percent compared to 5 percent), but Democrats were more likely to mention young voters, on the two follow-ups. In total, 32 percent of Democrats and 26 percent
of Republicans mentioned young voters. Although not entirely absent from
the political radar screen of the local chairs, the youth were not a prominent
focus.
The chairs were then asked if they have developed specific get-out-thevote programs for young voters. Here, just 41 percent of party leaders said
yes (a figure remarkably similar to the 38 percent who mentioned youth as
an important group). A follow-up question asked them to describe their program. On closer inspection, we find that a vast majority of these programs
might be dubbed "modest" or "traditional." For example, common responses were "Some people in our party have spoken at area schools" or
"Our people set up booths at fairs and malls." Only a handful of party chairs
mentioned what we might call "significant" activities-programs that require a substantial amount of time or resources. Roughly half of the responses were limited to college programs. "We make contacts with campus
College Republicans," noted one; another said, "We work with Young Democrats organizations on college campuses." Moreover, many of the respondents who mentioned that they had programs were unable to provide much
specificity. While it is fair to say that these efforts might make a difference,
college students are already much more likely to vote than noncollege students, who make up about half of this age group. 2
One explanation for these findings could be that local party chairs are
not especially interested in the youth vote and do not see the lack of youth
participation as a problem. But this is not true. When asked if they agreed
with the statement "The lack of political engagement by young people is a
serious problem," some 88 percent agreed- and 52 percent "strongly
agreed." Here the party differences are interesting: 96 percent of Democratic
chairs agreed that the lack of youth political engagement was a problem,
compared to 82 percent of Republican chairs. This difference may reflect
strategic calculation: perhaps some of the chairs concluded that young voters
were more likely to be Democratic voters. But even so, large majorities of
the chairs saw the lack of youth participation as problematic.
We then asked the respondents a battery of questions on the causes of
youth disengagement; the results are reported in table 13.3. According to the
party chairs, the major reason for youth disengagement is inadequate education of the youth: 71 percent disagreed with the statement " high schools do
a lot to prepare young people for their role as citizens." On this question,
Republicans were much more critical of the high schools than the Democrats
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Table 13.3 Reasons Given by Local Party Chairs ror Youth Disengagement from
Politics, 2003
Democ rat

Rep11/Jlicm1

High schools do a lot to prepare young people ror their role as citizens
Agree
30.6
21 .4
Neutral
l .8
3.0
Disagree
66.7
75.6
Yuung people arc turned off by the negativity or campaigns
Agree
74.6
Neutrnl
6.7
Disagree
18.7

Both
26.0
2.9
71. I

65.0
9.0
26.1

69.8
7.8

Media has done much to turn young people away from politics
Agree
58.2
Neutral
7.0
Disagree
34.8

72.6
5.5
21.9

65.4
6.3

Candidates ignore the youth vole
Agree
Neutral
Disagree

53.9
7.6
38.5

59.3
7.8
32.9

Young voters are turned olT to politics because
campaigns
Agree
Neutral
Disagree

64.6
8.0
27.4

22.4

28.3

or lhe amount of money involved in

43.4
10.5
46.1

33.5
7.1

59.4

38.4
8.8
52.8

(75 to 66 percent). Negative campaigning scored a close second, with 70
percent of the chairs agreeing that negative campaigning turns off young voters. The Democratic chairs were more likely to agree with this proposition
than the Republicans (75 to 65 percent). And the media get their share of the
blame: 65 percent of the respondents agreed that the "media has done much
to tum young people away from politics." Here, it was the Republicans who
agreed most (73 to 58 percent). Finally, 58 percent of the chairs agreed that
"people do not become interested in politics until they reach middle age,"
an issue upon which there was agreement across party lines.
So, the local party chairs agreed with both the notion that youth disengagement is an individual problem (young people are not well educated and
not interested in politics) and the criticism of political elites (negative campaigning, poor media coverage). They did not, however, agree with the proposition that the amount of money spent in campaigns turns off young voters.
Overall, 53 percent disagreed with the statement (59 percent of Republicans
and 46 percent of Democrats). But the chairs were willing to assign some
blame to the political process as well: 59 percent agreed that "candidates

Local Parties and Mobilizing the Vote

227

ignore the youth vote." Here, Democrats had a more negative judgment than
Republicans (65 to 54 percent).
The chairs did express considerable optimism about the possibility of
mobilizing young voters. For instance, 87 percent agreed that "young voters
will respond to the right candidates and issues." Furthermore, 93 percent
agreed that "local parties can make a big difference getting young people
involved in politics." On these positive points, there was a bipartisan
consensus.
Why would so many party chairs suggest youth engagement is a serious
problem and that their efforts have the potential to make a difference, but at
the same time be uninterested in mobilizing young voters? For one thing, a
local party might consider numerous groups to be of critical importance to
their efforts. Minority voters, union members, and women, for example,
were frequently mentioned by Democratic leaders, and blue-collar workers
and middle-class citizens were often noted by Republic leaders-just to
mention a few. Given that younger voters typically make up only 14 percent
of the electorate, we might expect political operatives to pay a limited
amount of attention to this group. Indeed, perhaps they are giving this group
enough attention.
Another reason may be the perceived difficulty of mobilizing young voters. Local party chairs were asked, "In your experience, how difficult has it
been to mobilize young voters, 18 to 25 years of age?" Some 46 percent
noted that it has been "very difficult" and another 45 percent said it was
"difficult." There is some variation by party: 56 percent of the Democrats
and 37 percent of the Republicans said youth mobilization was "very difficult." Conversely, only 5 percent of Democrats and 13 percent of GOP
chairs said it was "not at all difficult." One interesting caveat to these figures
is highlighted by the differences between chairs that report youth programs
and those that do not. Only 37 percent of the former reported that mobilizing
the youth was "very difficult," while 58 percent of those without such programs gave this answer. This suggests the possibility that youth programs
may not be as difficult as commonly perceived.

Conclusion
In sum, local political parties appear to have the capacity to effectively
mobilize the youth into the political process. And if present trends continue,
this capacity will continue to expand. Indeed, it may well have expanded in
the 2004 election, especially in battleground states where strong party and
interest group activities, including a large number directed specifically at
young people, may have played a decisive role in expanding youth turnout.
However, local party leaders as a group to not appear strongly interested
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in mobilizing the youth vote. Young citizens are not high on the radar screens
of many party leaders compared to other groups, such as senior citizens, who
vote at very high rates. And even when youth are a political priority, many
local parties appear to have only modest programs to register young voters
and get them to the polls. This situation may result from strategic considerations or the difficulty of mobilizing young people. Perhaps local party leaders, given their increased emphasis on helping candidates win electionsrather than cultivating long-term party loyalties-have concluded that it is
more profitable to persuade undecided voters than to mobilize a group traditionally on the sidelines. The good news is that local party leaders recognize
the disengagement of youth citizens as a serious problem and believe local
parties can do something about it. One would surely hope that the dramatic
increase of youth voting in 2004 caught their attention.
We believe the time is ripe for local party committees to create innovative programs to reach out to young voters and bring them into the electoral
process. Young voters are increasingly up for grabs politically, and in the
closely divided electorate, they are a resource that can win elections. The
sudden upswing in young voter turnout in 2004, whatever its source, presents
local party committees with a golden opportunity. And of course, it is in the
long-term interests of political parties to develop positive relationships with
young people, who are the middle-aged and older voters of tomorrow. If
local parties make good on this opportunity, then the strong and vibrant
party organizations of the twenty-first century will live up to their promise
as instruments of democracy.

Notes
I. Sec, for example, a recent report by the Representative Democracy Project, a federally funded partnership among the national Conference of State Legislatures, the Center for
Civic Education, and the Center on Congress at Indiana Uni\·ersity; numerous stm.lics commissioned by the Center for Civic Education; and several studies by the Center for lnfonnation and Research on Civic Leaming and Engagement.
2. For a discussion of the "college connection" and voting rates, sec CIRCLE infonnation at http://www.civicyouth.org/quick/non_collcgc.htm.
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The Dynamic of Third Parties
and the Perot Constituency

Twelve Years and Counting
Ronald B. Rapoport and Walter J. Stone

Ask a political scientist why the United States has a two-party system,
and you are likely to get an institutional- or policy-based explanation. The
winner-take-all system of single-member districts and the Unit Rule in the
Electoral College encourage factions to remain in their party rather than
striking out on their own. Campaign-finance and ballot-access laws stack the
electoral process in favor of the existing parties and against upstart independent candidates or third parties that manage to attract a few votes. Each of
these explanations has considerable validity.
However, there is another, more overtly political, explanation for why
the American two-party system persists. We call this explanation the "dynamic of third parties." Third-party candidates are most likely to emerge
and attract a significant vote share under conditions of "major-party failure"
(Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996). This failure may be a recession or
scandal that implicates both parties or a persistent policy problem such as
lingering deficits or a divisive war that neither party has adequately addressed. When a third-party or independent candidate (we use the terms interchangeably) attracts a significant share of the vote in an election, it signals
the two major parties that there is a substantial disaffected constituency in
the electorate. In response, one or both of the major parties make a bid for
the third party's constituency by adopting policy positions designed to attract its support. If the major-party bid is successful, the third party's constituency shifts to that party, taking the wind out of the movement's sails.
As a result, successful third-party movements generally do not last very
long. The larger their vote share is, the more tempting their constituencies
are to a major party and the more likely a takeover bid is to be vigorous and
successful. But another consequence of this bid is change in the major party
itself. The effect third parties can have on major-party change has been rec-
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ognized by scholars for some time. Walter Dean Burnham (1970) and James
Sundquist ( 1983) give third parties a significant place in their explanations
of changes in the two-party system. The authors of the most systematic account of the emergence of third parties describe this dynamic of third parties
in this way:
Thus the power of third parties lies in their capacity to affect the content and
range of political discourse, and ultimately public policy, by raising issues and
options that the two major parties have ignored. In so doing, they not only promote their cause but affect the very character of the two-party system. When a
third party compels a major party 10 adopt policies it otherwise may not have,
it stimulates a redrawing of the political battle lines and a reshufning of the
major party coalitions. (Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996; cf. Mazmanian
1974, 143)

Figure 14.1 summarizes the logic of the dynamic of third parties.
Although the dynamic of third parties is widely recognized in American
political history, its implications have never been examined thoroughly by
exploring the impact of a significant third-party movement. In this chapter,

Figure 14.1 The Dynamic of Third Parties
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we relate the dynamic of third parties to Ross Perot's independent electoral
movement in the 1992 presidential election and to its aftermath in national
elections from 1994 through 2004. We summarize an argument developed
more fully in our book on the Perot movement and its effects (Rapoport and
Stone 2005) and extend the analysis through the 2004 elections. In studying
this case, we hope to illustrate the potential impact third parties can have on
change in the major parties by revisiting an example most scholars dismissed
as of little long-term significance.

Surveys of Potential Perot Activists as Data Sources
Our primary sources of data are surveys of potential Perot activists in
1992 and 1996, with parallel samples of major-party potential activists in
1996. 1 The 1992 survey of potential Perot activists was based on a national
sample of callers to Perot's toll-free number. This study was extended into a
six-wave panel in which we recontacted respondents in 1994 and subsequent
election years. In 1996 we added national samples of Reform, Democratic,
and Republican contributors to their respective national parties in the period
before the 1996 election season. We also recontacted these respondents in
subsequent elections, generating a second long-run panel.
We refer to our respondents as "potential activists" because calling
Perot campaign headquarters or writing a (typically small) check to a political party does not constitute activism in a candidate's campaign. Why focus
on potential activists for a third-party movement rather than ordinary voters?
One reason is convenience and accessibility. Callers to the Perot campaign
and party contributors identify themselves as unusually interested in the
third-party movement. Ordinary voters for Perot (or any third-party candidate) do not identify themselves as such except in surveys of the entire population of citizens. A random sample of ordinary citizens, even in a year such
as 1992 when the third-party candidate was extraordinarily successful,
would produce a relatively small number of respondents who voted for the
candidate.2 To study the dynamic of third parties as it plays out in subsequent
elections, we must study third-party supporters through time following the
election in which the third party appeared. A small baseline sample of voters
in the initial election quickly dwindles to meager numbers over any significant period of time.3
Our surveys of potential Perot activists do not suffer from the limitations
of general population surveys. And potential Perot activists defined in advance were likely to yield a substantial number of actual activists. Indeed,
about three-quarters of the 1992 sample engaged in some sort of campaignrelated activity for Perot during the spring and summer campaign, before he
temporarily dropped out in July. Just over half of the sample was active in
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some way beyond voting during the abbreviated fall campaign after he reentered:' Moreover, we began with a large sample of almost two thousand callers in 1992, which yielded 1,321 respondents to the first wave of the panel.
Because we had high response rates to the first and subsequent waves of the
panel, we have unique data not only on what motivated activist supporters
during Perot's initial campaign but also on what they did in the elections that
followed. We thus have unusually complete data on a third-party candidate's
core supporters during the election in which the candidate emerged and in
the third party's aftermath, allowing us to observe the consequences of a
major-party bid.
There are several advantages to studying activists in a third-party movement. Activists mobilize ordinary voters, both by leading opinion and by
stimulating others to participate (Beck 1974; Eldersveld 1956; Gerber and
Green 2000; Katz and Eldersveld 1961 ; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993 ). Indeed, 64 percent of the 1992 sample tried to convince others to support Perot
during the spring-summer phase of the campaign. Moreover, Perot's name
could not have appeared on any state's presidential ballot without extensive
grassroots efforts by volunteer activists to organize and collect ballot petition signatures. Activists are better informed about politics than the average
voter, and they are relatively well versed in the choices and issues at stake.
As a result, the issue basis of a party or campaign comes into sharper relief
by studying activists compared with looking exclusively at voters (McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara 1960; Miller and Jennings 1986).
Of greater importance, campaign activists are likely to be especially sensitive to changing opportunities and choices as events unfold (Carmines and
Stimson 1989; Jacobson 2000; Miller and Schofield 2003). Third-party activists, for instance, should be more responsive than third-party voters to a
major-party bid for their support, and a successful bid would have to appeal
to activists as part of its ultimate strategy of attracting voters (Miller and
Schofield 2003). Thus, we rely on our activist samples for most of the information we report about the Perot constituency and for evidence on individuals' behavior in elections after 1992. In the larger project, we flesh out the
story of the Perot movement and its impact on the major-party system in
much more detail (Rapoport and Stone 2005).

The Dynamic of Third Parties and the Perot Movement
We need not tarry over the first two stages of the dynamic of third parties
depicted in figure 14.1. There was substantial discontent with both the Republican and Democratic parties before Ross Perot announced his intention
to run. Indeed, a significant reason behind support for Perot in the 1992 was
the "push" potential supporters felt away from both parties. At the same
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time, however, people were strongly pulled toward Perot as a candidate. His
candidacy exploited (and probably helped stimulate) dissatisfaction with the
Democratic and Republican parties, but, as we will show, it had more sub•
stance than merely registering discontent.
Perot was also extraordinarily successful in attracting support from ac•
tivists and voters. His "legions" of volunteers completed the Herculean task
of getting his name on the ballot of all fifty states. He won the largest popular
vote share since ex-president Theodore Roosevelt ran as an independent in
1912, and his was the first third-party movement to win more than 5 percent
in two consecutive elections since the Republican Party emerged in 1856.
Thus, by any standard, Ross Perot's electoral movement was significant; the
question is whether its significance extended beyond its own successes in
1992 and 1996 and had a lasting impact on electoral politics. For that to have
occurred, the conditions described by the dynamic of third parties would
have to apply both to the movement in 1992 and 1996 and to the elections
that followed.

An Issue Constituency for Perot?
One of the conditions for the dynamic of third parties to work is the
existence of a clearly defined issue constituency that supports the insurgent
candidate and can be attracted by subsequent major-party appeals. One of
the reasons Ross Perot's campaign was dismissed by many observers was
the perception that he did not have an issue agenda that unified his supporters
and differentiated them from the major-party supporters. Is it true, as Washington Post columnist E. J. Dionne put it during Perot's campaign, that "Perot's vote suggests his supporters were bound together only by anger over the
nation's economy and a rejection of the two major party nominees"?5
A third party's constituency is distinctive to the degree that it differs
from that of the major parties, and in tum this distinction is affected by the
degree of choice offered by the major parties on the issues in question. When
the major parties converge to the same position on an issue or issues and a
significant number of people disagree with that position, there is an opportunity for a third party to appeal to the disaffected constituency. A third party
could emerge to articulate a distinctive position on the issue or issues of
concern, point out the absence of choice between the Democrats and Republicans, and attract significant support. Its success would signal the existence
of many supporters of the third party's issue positions, which could set up a
bid by one or both major parties. In contrast, when the major parties offer a
clear choice on issues, the opportunity for a third party is less propitious,
because potential supporters have a greater stake in major-party conflict.
There is no reason to expect the major parties to converge or distinguish
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themselves on every issue, so opportunity for third-party traction may occur
on some issues and not on others.
Ross Perot emphasized three issue clusters in his 1992 campaign: balancing the federal budget, reform, and economic nationalism (Rapoport and
Stone 2005). On issues related to these dimensions, potential Perot activists
were consistently supportive of the Perot agenda. They favored term limits,
amending the Constitution to require a balanced budget, and increasing taxes
to reduce the deficit, and they backed measures to limit foreign imports and
decrease foreign involvement.
In contrast to their support for these "Perot issues," the potential activ•
ists could be found on both the liberal and conservative sides of the issues
that traditionally divide the major parties. For example, Perot callers were
strongly opposed to eliminating the death penalty and they staunchly opposed a constitutional amendment to limit abortions. They favored national
health insurance and further government regulation to control pollution,
while they adopted conservative positions on two other issues by opposing
affirmative action and permitting gays in the military. On the overall liberalconservative spectrum, they placed themselves on average just to the right of
center, but this position reflected a pattern of diverse positions on specific
issues rather than a consistently centrist position across the issues (Rapoport
and Stone 2005, chap. 4). Indeed, when we compare Perot supporters with
major-party activists, the Democratic and Republican constituencies diverge
most sharply on the traditional Left-Right dimension, with Democrats taking
consistently strong liberal positions and Republicans occupying equally
clear positions on the right. On the Perot issues of reform, economic nationalism, and balancing the budget, potential Perot activists were unified in
favor of all three and were distinct from the position of both major partiesalthough they were not as distinct from the major parties as the two parties
typically are from each other.
Figure 14.2 depicts the placement of the Perot movement and the two
major parties in 1992 on a graph with the traditional Left-Right issues on the
horizontal dimension and the Perot issues on the vertical.6 The advantage
Perot had on his key issues was that while Democrats and Republicans were
sharply different on the liberal-conservative dimension, they were close to
indifferent or in opposition on the Perot issues. Meanwhile, Perot's relatively
centrist position on Left-Right issues gave way to a distinctly supportive position on budget, reform, and economic nationalism issues.
This seems about as close to an ideal situation as a third party can hope
for in American politics, and it helps explain the historic levels of electoral
support Perot enjoyed in the 1992 election. In addition, of course, the 1992
issue map indicates the strong signal sent by the Perot movement- a signal
unlikely to be missed by entrepreneurial party leaders seeking to add to their
base in a competitive electoral environment.
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The Major-Party Bid for Perot Supporters
Although the administration of Bill Clinton made an overt bid for the
Perot constituency early on, the Republicans were in a much better position
to appeal to Perot supporters because they were not in control of any of the
major institutions of national government. In addition, they had a natural
affinity with Perot on the budget issue (Rapoport and Stone 2005, chap. 7).
Despite the fact that some Republican leaders resisted the idea of cozying
up to the man whom many blamed for their loss of the presidency in 1992,
House Republicans under the leadership of John Kasich and Newt Gingrich
made concerted overtures to Perot, especially on the deficit issue.
Clear evidence of a centrally coordinated bid from the Republican Party
is found in the Contract with America, a unique attempt by a congressional
party to impose a national frame on U.S. House races in the 1994 elections.
The Contract was signed by virtually all Republican House candidates and
was written with the 1992 Perot constituency expressly in mind (Rapoport
and Stone 2005, chap. 7). It was as remarkable for what it left out as for
what it included. Included in the Contract were a number of commitments
specifically linked to the Perot agenda: on reform issues, term limits, balanc-
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ing the federal budget, and foreign involvement. On the other hand, the Contract said nothing about the party's commitments to a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion, which would have been expected if it were
designed to appeal to the Republican base, nor did it mention the Republican
Party's long-standing commitment to free trade. Overall, the Contract was
significantly closer to the Perot agenda, as represented in Perot's book
United We Stand, than it was to the 1992 Republican platform (Rapoport and
Stone 2005, chap. 7).
Interviews we conducted with Republican strategists indicate a concerted effort to identify and contact 1992 Perot voters in the 1994 campaign
by concentrating their efforts where Perot won a substantial share of the
1992 vote. According to Dave Sackett, a polling strategist working for the
Republican Party, one project identified selected precincts nationwide with
high Perot voting. Registered voters who habitually voted in either party's
primary were removed, and telephone canvassers contacted the remaining
households to identify individuals who had voted for Perot in 1992. All individuals identified as actual or potential Perot supporters in 1992 were directly contacted by telephone, sent direct mail tailored around Perot's issues,
and canvassed door-do-door prior to the 1994 elections.' Our survey of potential Perot activists indicates these efforts paid off. The more active individuals were for Perot in 1992, the more likely they were to have been contacted by Republican House campaigns in advance of the 1994 elections
(Rapoport and Stone 2005, fig. 7.3).
Another way a major party could make a bid in subsequent years is by
putting up more experienced candidates who are able to effectively appeal
to the third party's former supporters. Experienced candidates may run for
the House as a result of national party efforts to recruit them, or they may
individually recognize the third party's vote share as representing the same
opportunity for them that was seen by national party leaders. Under either
scenario, if the size of the Perot vote in a district signaled an opportunity for
1994 Republican House candidates, we should find a clear relationship between that vote and the emergence of experienced challengers. In fact, we
do find that experienced challengers were much more likely to run in 1994
in districts where Perot had done well in 1992 than we would expect based
on a host of factors ordinarily used to explain why experienced candidates
in a party run for the House (Rapoport and Stone 2005, 159- 61 ). There is
also a significant relationship between the 1992 district vote for Perot and
the amount of money expended on the race by the Republican Party (Rapoport and Stone 2005, 162).

The Perot Constituency's Response
The 1994 elections are important to our thesis, because if the dynamic
of third parties is to apply to the Perot case, it must help explain the historic
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Republican victory in that year. Prior to the 1994 elections, the Republican
Party bid for the Perot constituency. Therefore, our expectation is simple:
the Republicans should have benefited from former Perot voters' support in
their drive to win control of Congress.
There is a strong relationship between the size of Perot's 1992 vote in
districts held by the Democrats before the 1994 elections and the probability
that the district would flip to the Republican column in 1994. In marginal
Democratic districts where Perot won 5 percent of the vote, the probability
that the district would flip to the GOP was only .03, whereas in districts
where Perot won 30 percent of the popular vote, the probability it would flip
soared to .81.8
Based on a simulation of the 1994 elections that employs a multivariate
statistical model to explain the Republicans' vote share in each district, we
conclude that the GOP owed its majority to the size of the Perot vote in 1992,
and that if Perot's share in 1992 had been under about 13 percent of the
popular vote, the Democrats would have retained majority control. In sum,
therefore, our analysis means that the Republican victory in 1994 was directly attributable to the size of the Perot vote and logic of the dynamic of
third parties, which the Republicans exploited well. In contrast to many interpretations of the 1994 elections, the "Gingrich Revolution" owed its success not to a rightward shift in the electorate, but to the Republicans' success
in responding to the signal sent by a moderate insurgent candidacy committed to budgetary responsibility, reform, and restraint abroad.
As mentioned, mass public opinion surveys generally are not up to the
task of testing our theory. Nonetheless, it is important to our argument to
demonstrate a link between behavioral shifts among individuals consistent
with the change in fortunes experienced by the Republicans and its source
in the Perot vote at the aggregate level. We do this by demonstrating a "spillover effect" from the 1992 Perot campaign to Republican House campaigns
in 1994 among activists. A spillover effect would occur if active participation in the 1992 Perot campaign increased involvement in subsequent GOP
House campaigns- the greater the activism for Perot, the greater the activism for Republican House candidates in 1994. In addition, spillover from the
Perot to the Republican campaigns should depend on contact by the Republicans. We expect a spillover effect because active involvement for Perot
should have made individuals more visible to Republican campaigns and because those who were active in Perot's campaign would have been more sensitive to the Republican Party's bid for their support.
Figure 14.3 shows that in our panel of potential Perot activists, there was
an effect of activism in the 1992 Perot campaign on active involvement for
Republican House candidates in 1994, but only when there was contact from
a House candidate's campaign. This effect, in other words, provides a microbehavioral mechanism consistent with the dynamic of third parties because the stronger the bid (the more contact) made to individual Perot activ-
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Figure 14.J Spillover Effect of 1992 Perot Activism on Activity in 1994 Republican
House Cumpuigns by Contuct from Republican Cumpuign
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ists, the greater the tendency for them to shift activity to the Republican
Party; and the stronger their involvement for Perot, the more the activists
moved into Republican campaigns.'>
We have already seen that the Republican mobilization strategy in 1994
was to identify and contact Perot activists; here we see that effort paid off
by stimulating those most involved for Perot to move into the Republican
camp. It is likely that the same processes were at work in the electorate as a
whole. Moreover, the movement of the most active elements of the Perot
constituency to Republican campaigns surely brought many ordinary citizens with them, as activists' convictions and behavior permeated their social,
work, and political networks. The evidence, in other words, provides confirmation of individual change consistent with the electoral shift to the Republican Party after the 1992 election and the dynamic of third parties. 10
Additional analysis reveals that spillover into Republican campaigns continued through the 2000 elections and included spillover into the Buchanan and
McCain nomination campaigns in 1996 and 2000, respectively.

Continuity in the Perot Constituency through 2004
We have seen that the Republican bid for the Perot constituency was successful in mobilizing former Perot supporters into GOP campaigns, which
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helps explain the aggregate election outcomes that favored Republicans, especially in 1994. 11 However, we have yet to examine whether the Perot constituency remained committed to its issue agenda in the years after 1992.
This is important for two reasons: (1) continuity in the issue commitments
of the Perot constituency is essential to Perot supporters' ability to effect
change in the Republican Party as they responded to the GOP bid for their
support in 1994 and in later years, and (2) continuity may affect the constituency's ability to have a lasting impact on national politics after the Republicans backed away from their bid following the 2000 presidential election.
We will examine each of these implications after demonstrating the degree
of continuity we find among Perot supporters between I 996 and 2004.
Figure 14.4 presents comparative data from our surveys of major-party
and Reform contributors, summarizing the degree of commitment to the
Perot agenda in each of four groups of respondents: core Republicans, by
which we mean Republican contributors who were never active in the Perot
movement; Democratic contributors; Reform contributors as a whole; and
the subset of Reform contributors who were mobilized into Republican Party
campaigns between 1994 and 2000 in response to the Republican bid.
The figure demonstrates that the Perot constituency remained intact and
distinct through the 2004 elections in its commitment to the Perot agenda,
compared with core Republicans and Democrats. In 1996, Reform contribuFigure 14.4 Mean Position on Perot Issues for Core Republicans, Democrats,
Reformers, and Reformers Mobilized by the Republican Party, 1996-2004
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tors who were active in Republican campaigns as well as those Reform contributors who remained outside the Republican Party were strongly committed to the Perot issues. In the same year, Republicans were more modestly
supportive of Perot issues, and Democrats were opposed. The same basic
pattern holds through the 2004 elections, except that Democrats' opposition
to the Perot agenda softened to the point where by 2004 they were indifferent, while Republicans' support was cut about in half. Meanwhile, Reformers maintained relatively strong support for the issues that motivated Perot's
campaigns.
Figure 14.4 provides striking evidence of continuity and distinctiveness
in the Perot constituency, up to twelve years after Perot's initial campaign.
It is perhaps not surprising that Reform contributors as a whole remained
strongly committed to the Perot agenda, but there was little difference between them and those drawn into the GOP ranks. And by 2004, both groups
of Reformers were sharply more committed to the Perot issues than core Republicans. Moreover, when we break down the Perot issue index into individual issue items (data not shown), Reformers are consistently distinct from
core Republicans with the exception of increasing taxes to reduce the
deficit. 12

The Republican Agenda under President George W. Bush
The persistence of the Perot constituency through the 2004 election is
potentially of great political significance because the Republican Party,
under the leadership of President George W. Bush, has retreated spectacularly from the positions it took in its bid for Perot supporters. Indeed, across
the three issue dimensions that define the Perot agenda, the Republicans
since the 2000 election have adopted positions and policies opposed to those
articulated by Ross Perot and consistently held by his constituency since
1992.
Under President Bush, the United Stutes committed to its most important
military venture since Vietnam when it invaded Iraq in 2003. More troubling
than the invasion, from the perspective of Perot supporters' long-term policy
interests, was the decision to undertake in Afghanistan and Iraq the most
extensive nation-building projects since the Marshall Plan after World War
II. This commitment is not in keeping with Perot's emphasis on domestic
priorities or with his economic nationalism emphasis on limited foreign
involvements. 13
Bush's renunciation of the economic nationalism part of the Perot
agenda extended to trade and immigration as well. In contrast to Perot activists' persistent support of limiting immigration, Bush early on offered strong
support for an agreement between the United States and Mexico that would
"pave the way for many illegal Mexican immigrants-up to 3 million-to
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remain in the United States and would 'serve as a precedent for other nationalities."' 1~ Although the 9/11 attacks prevented immediate follow-up on this
initiative, the administration maintained its guest-worker program, especially
for farm workers.
Bush's support for NAFTA and CAFTA, the North American and Central American free trade agreements, remained a linchpin of Republican
trade policy, despite the opposition of Perot and his supporters. Indeed, Bush
backed down on his only trade policy likely to appeal to Perot's supporters:
his promise to impose tariffs on steel imports for up to three years in order
to help domestic producers. 15
Finally, in the areas of the federal budget and reform, Bush's performance was, if anything, even less in keeping with those of Perot and his supporters than it was on other Perot issues. Under Bush and the Republican
majorities in Congress, the budget surplus of $236 billion in fiscal 2000 was
wiped out and the deficit ballooned to $412 billion in fiscal 2004. As tax
revenues declined and spending increased, the prospects for ever-increasing
deficits became a prominent aspect of President Bush's legacy.
The most significant reform initiative during Bush's first term dealt with
campaign finance in the guise of the McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan
proposals to limit soft money-positions with overwhelming support from
Perot activists. Although President Bush did not threaten a veto, neither did
he endorse the bill, saying he would "reserve judgment until he sees the final
product."1<, Without Bush's support, only thirty-nine Republicans voted for
the House version, and it passed on a close vote. Bush further signaled his
ambivalence by failing to arrange a high-profile signing of the legislation
and by not inviting Senator John McCain, the leading Republican proponent
of reform in Congress, to attend the signing.
In sum, the Bush administration and the Republican Party have effectively reneged on the bid the GOP made for the Perot constituency following
the 1992 election. We have seen that the issue commitments behind the Perot
constituency remained largely intact through the 2004 election. Does Perot
activists' continuing support for Perot issues combined with Republican ambivalence or opposition on those same issues mean that Perot activists withdrew from their previous involvement in the Republican Party in 2004?
In Rapoport and Stone 2005 (fig. 9.1 ), we showed that Perot callers to
the 1992 toll-free number maintained by the Perot campaign were more active in Republican than in Democratic campaigns from 1994 through 2000.
In this section, we will examine whether there was a change in relative campaign activity between 2000 and 2004 in response to the Bush administration's policies contrary to the Perot agenda. Our measure of Republican
campaign activity is a simple count of the number of activities that respondents performed for Republicans in presidential and House campaigns, as
well as for the Republican ticket as a whole. We create identical counts of
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Democratic campaign activity in both years and compare them by taking the
ratio of Republican to Democratic activity. The advantage of using a ratio is
that it controls for different levels of mobilization and activism that occur in
both parties in different election years.
Figure 14.5 reports the ratio of Republican to Democratic activities for
2000 and 2004. A score above 1.0 indicates a Republican advantage in activity, below 1.0 greater Democratic than Republican activism. Consistent with
our earlier results (Rapoport and Stone 2005), there was substantially more
Republican activism than Democratic activism in all campaigns in the 2000
election. 17 In fact, the Reformers were again about half as active in Republican campaigns as they were for Democratic candidates. However, by 2004,
there was a radical shift in overall activity. Not only did the Republican advantage disappear in 2004, but there was slightly more activity in Democratic campaigns than in Republican campaigns. In the presidential campaign, there was only 87 percent as much Republican activity as Democratic,
a decline in the ratio between 2000 and 2004 of almost 40 percent. Republican House candidates continued to retain a slim advantage over their Democratic counterparts, probably owing to the larger number of Republican incumbents running for reelection, but even here the GOP advantage over the
Democrats in House races declined to virtual parity.111

Figure 14.5
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We have seen the spillover that occurred between the 1992 Perot campaign and 1994 Republican House campaigns (figure 14.3). Similar spillover
effects occurred to the Republican Party's advantage in 1996 through 2000
(Rapoport and Stone 2005). There is no evidence of spillover from the 1992
Perot campaign into Democratic campaigns during this period. We interpret
all of this as evidence of a favorable response by core Perot supporters to the
GOP bid that occurred in various ways throughout the 1990s and into the
2000 elections. The question, then, is did the Republican renunciation of the
Perot program result in spillover into Democratic campaigns in 2004 for the
first time since 1992?
An analysis of relative campaign activity in Republican and Democratic
campaigns between 2000 and 2004 reveals that Perot activity was strongly
associated with a decline in Republican activity relative to Democratic activity- as the number of activities in the 1992 Perot campaign increased, respondents became less engaged in 2004 Republican campaigns, controlling
for 2000 activity. For every activity for Perot performed twelve years earlier,
our sample shifted by .15 activities away from the Republicans.
The effects of contact by major-party campaigns in 2004 were also
strong. But while Democratic contact produced a relative increase in Democratic activism and Republican contact increased activism in that party's
campaign, each Democratic contact again had half as much effect as each
Republican contact (.329 vs. 216). However, because Republicans contacted
Perot supporters more frequently than Democrats did (an average of 2.4 contacts by Republicans vs. 1.8 by Democrats), the net effect of contact for the
two parties is about the same. Thus, in 2004 both parties had the opportunity
to mobilize former Perot supporters, unlike in previous years when Republicans alone were effective in mobilizing activists for Perot.

Conclusion
Third parties in American politics face a number of barriers to their formation and success in national elections. As a result, serious national thirdparty efforts are rare, and candidacies that attract a substantial share of the
popular vote are rarer still. Nonetheless, despite the institutional and political
barriers to third parties, occasionally one emerges that captures a significant
vote share. When that occurs, the dynamic of third parties has a chance of
producing significant change in the two-party system. A necessary condition
for the dynamic of third parties to play out is for the third-party movement
to be supported by a constituency with a reasonably coherent issue agenda.
An issue-based constituency can then motivate a major-party bid for its support in subsequent elections.
Contrary to the views of many academic and other close observers of
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American politics, Ross Perot's followers were united by a common set of
issue concerns that differentiated them from major-party supporters. As a
result, there was a programmatic basis for the Republican bid, which was
successful in attracting a significant portion of the Perot constituency to its
cause. Several consequences followed from the success of the Republican
bid. First, Republican electoral fortunes changed dramatically for the better.
The GOP won majority control of the House and Senate for the first time
since the 1952 elections, and they won an excruciatingly close presidential
election in 2000, while continuing to hold thin majorities in Congress. The
dynamic of third parties, in other words, played out in the post-Perot era by
helping to create one of the most competitive and partisan periods in American history. Additions to the Republican Party from the ranks of the Perot
constituency also changed the GOP in discemable ways, for example, by
shifting the aggregate policy commitments of its activist and congressional
ranks in a direction more consistent with the Perot issue agenda (Rapoport
and Stone 2005, chap. 10).
One implication of our analysis is that the Perot constituency appeared
10 be alive and well twelve years after the 1992 election. We should be cautious about exactly how we interpret the idea of a "Perot constituency." We
do not think that it necessarily means that former Perot activists and voters
would necessarily think of themselves as Perot disciples or still part of his
political movement. Indeed, we found that by the 1996 election, when Perot
ran a second time, a large percentage of 1992 Perot activists had dropped
out of his campaign and evaluated him much less positively. Despite the
candidate-centered nature of much of our politics and the fact that Perot epitomized this development in many ways, he nonetheless tapped into and/or
helped create a sizable constituency committed to a reasonably coherent
issue agenda of reform, deficit reduction, and economic nationalism. Because these commitments still animate the individuals involved, the possibility that the Perot constituency could continue to play a pivotal role in our
politics is real.
Despite the fact that the Republican Party took on a more Perot•friendly
cast in the 1994-2000 period, after the 2000 election, under the leadership
of President George W. Bush, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, and others, the Republican Party effectively renounced its commitment to the Perot
constituency. It has since presided over record-breaking deficits, led the
charge to a new and more aggressive form of internationalism, and dragged
its feet on reform issues of keen interest to the Perot constituency. As a result, we have seen that, beginning in the 2004 election, former Perot activists
have partially withdrawn from Republican campaigns, and they have shown
significant signs-again for the first time-of shifting their support to the
Democrats.
This leads to a second implication of our analysis, which is that the Bush
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renunciation of the Perot agenda creates an opportunity for the Democratic
Party to bid for its support. Even though Democratic contact with Perot supporters was less than Republican contact, our results from 2004 suggest former Perot supporters shifted strongly toward Democratic activity. Perot supporters in 2004 were ripe for the picking. An entrepreneurial Democratic
candidate or leader might well articulate a program that could plausibly appeal to Perot supporters and, as the Republicans did in 1994, target former
Perot backers for direct campaign appeals. A strategy of this sort could tip
the national electoral balance in the Democrats' favor. Such a leader might
point to the balanced federal budget and surplus during the Clinton years, to
a more measured form of internationalism built on dissatisfaction with the
Iraq experience, and to domestic economic insecurities stemming from a
global economy. If so, our data suggest there may be more than a remnant
of the Perot movement available for mobilization, waiting in the wings to
stimulate a new direction in major-party politics.
Notes
I. Details about lhe surveys may be found in Rapoporl and Stone 2005, appendix A.
2. The 1992 American National Election Study (ANES) panel survey of the U.S. electorate yielded only 128 respondents who reported voting for Perot.
3. The ANES panel included only sixty-one 1992 Perot voters who reported casling a
presidential vole in lhe 1996 election. Al that, of course, it was only a four-year panel.
whereas our potcnlial-activist panels stretch more than twice that period of time.
4. Only one respondent held a paid position in the campaign; all others who were active
were volunteers.
5. E. J. Dionne, "Anger at the Economy Was lhe Gluc Binding Supporters to Perot,"
Wm/ri11gtrm Post, November 12. 1992.
6. The placements of all three parties and candidates arc based upon lhc perceptions of
Perot activists.
7. Authors' interview with Dave Sackcu, Alexandria, VA, July 31, 2003.
8. This analysis was carried oul on Democratic-held seats where the Democrat won in
1992 with 60 percent or less of lhe popular vote. The analysis controls for a variety of other
explanations for why ii might switch to lhe Republican Party, including lhe size of lhe twoparty vote share in 1988 and 1992, the experience and spending ofbolh parties' House candidales, the level of support Democratic incumbents gave to President Clinton (as a control for
the possibility lhat voters were reacting against President Clinton's policies), and whether the
district is in the South.
9. The analysis controls for previous Republican campaign activism, party identification, and lhc degree of preference for 1994 House candidates.
10. There is no evidence of spillover between the Perot and Democratic campaigns in
1994, even in the presence of contact from lhe Democrats. This suggests thal the Republican
contact was lied specifically to the Perot program, as we have suggested. We also find longlerrn effects of spillover to the 2000 House campaigns, indicating a remarkable staying power
lo Perot's effect on Republican fortunes (Rapoport and Stone 2005, chap. 9).
11. Sec Rapoport and Slone 2005 for an analysis of the impact of Perot on elcclions from
1996 lhrough 2000. The general poinl is that the Republican "resurgence" owed its strength
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and staying power to the succcsi, of the Republican bid, as illustrated here in the 1994 elections, The one national election that the Republicans did not win in thi~ period, the 1996
presidential contest, was nonetheless one in which their candidate, Bob Dole, wai, helped by
the Perot vote.
12. In the 2004 survey, the items composing the Perot index were: limiting immigration,
limiting imporh, limiting foreign involvement, support for term limits, eliminating sofl
money contributions to parties, and r.ibing taxes to reduce the deficit. Only on the latter item
were core Republican.~ more supportive than Refonneri,.
13. Our 2004 survey shows that Rcfonn contributors were much more strongly opposed
to the Bush administration•~ Iraq policy than Republicans, though they were not quite ai,
strongly opposed as Democratic contributors.
14. Frank Davies, "Relief for Mexican Workers a Top Priority" San Diego U11im1•
Trib1111e, Augui,t 4, 2001.
15. Richard W. Stevenson and Elizabeth Becker, "After 21 Months, Bush Lifls Tariff on
Steel Imports," Ne11• YtJrk Time.~. December 5, 2003.
16. Greg Gordon and Lawrence M. O'Rourke, "Senate Bar!> 'Soft Money': CampaignFinance Baule Moves Next 10 House,'' Mi111rellpoli.v Swr Trih1111e, April 3, 2001.
17. In Rapoport and Stone 2005, we report on the 1992- 2000 caller panel, whereai, ligurc
14.5 reports results from the 1996- 2004 contributor surveys. We use the contributor surveys
here because of lower attrition ratei, in that panel than in the caller study.
18. Essentially the same picture emerges when we restrict the analysis to Refonners who
had been active between 1996 and 2000 in Republican campaigns. The decline in the Republican advantage is sharp, although the ratios remain slightly in favor of the Republicans in both
House and presidential campaigns.
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The Declining Significance of Ralph
Chris1ia11 Collet and Jerrold Hansen
Following a surprising campaign in which many considered him to hold
the balance of power between the two major parties, Ralph Nader' s third run
for the presidency in 2004 was something far less auspicious. Attacked by
the Left, strategically promoted by the Right, and shunned by his Green
Party base, "Nader-the-Independent" seemingly spent as much time in court
vying for ballot access as on the campaign trail competing for votes. His
appearances diminished from "Super Rallies" in raucous concert arenas to
the sedate confines of university lecture halls. He lacked the money for ads
but became the target of ads attacking him. In the end, Nader qualified for
nearly three-quarters of state ballots, representing a variety of party labels.
But he received less than half the votes he got in 2000 and saw his share
exceed the two-party margin in only one state, Wisconsin, which was carried
narrowly by Senator John Kerry. Four years prior, the Nader vote was a factor in at least eight states, two of which-Florida and New Hampshire-went
infamously to then governor George W. Bush.
Failure is rarely a source of inspiration in political science, perpetual
failure even less so. Even the body of literature that concerns itself with
those who rarely win American elections-call them "third," "minor," or
"alternative" parties and candidates- often concentrates on such movements at their peak rather than their decline (e.g., Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996).1 Nader's run in 2004, however, remains extraordinary if for no
other reason than because two-party electoral politics in the twenty-first century is extraordinary-extraordinarily competitive. If much of what we
know about alternative politics is true- that significant independents emerge
in a climate of major party vulnerability, not strength, "after landslides, not
cliffuangers," as Rosenstone and his colleagues put it2-we would not have
expected a candidate of Nader's stature to come forth in 2004. Yet, with no
party structure, a reputation in decline, and the Republicans and Democrats
nearly deadlocked in the Electoral College, he did.
In this chapter, we look at this unique and highly controversial presiden-
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tial run. We begin by unfolding the events of 2004, marking the points of
contrast between this and the past Nader efforts in 1996 and 2000. Here we
give particular attention to the effect of state ballot-access laws-an issue
that, in and of itself, came to dominate the Nader campaign. We then analyze
the changes in Nader's constituency by using survey data provided by the
Gallup Organization and aggregate data gathered at the state and county
level. We conclude by addressing the consequences of Nader's decline and
considering its broader implications for multiparty and independent politics
in America.

The Anatomy of Descendence: The 2004 Campaign
It seems odd to describe as compelling a presidential campaign that receives 0.4 percent of the national vote, appears on just over two-thirds of
ballots, and finishes fourth, fifth, and sometimes even sixth behind other
minor party candidates in several states. Yet, in a climate of celebrity fascination as well as tight two-party competition, Ralph Nader somehow remained a story in 2004: the anticandidate, the consumer's crusader defying
embittered Democrats and suddenly pragmatic progressives, as well as journalists who seemed to simultaneously dismiss and cover his every move.
Perhaps at no time in recent American history has a political figure with so
marginal a constituency been so closely watched or so readily feared. Governor George Wallace in 1968 could lay claim to the South. And Ross Perot,
leading the polls in early 1992, could claim almost anything due to his wealth.
But the Nader 2004 campaign rested solely on potential-the mere hypothesis that he might affect another dramatically close election by tapping anger
simmering over the Bush administration's incursion into Iraq. As Michael
Moore's controversial documentary Fahrenheit 9/11 became a surprise hit
in the spring and Vermont governor Howard Dean surged to an early lead for
the Democratic nomination, it seemed certain that antiwar sentiment would
spill over into the fall campaign. Nader, this time with no party to satisfy,
would unquestionably be the most freewheeling critic of the Bush doctrine.
The irony was that when Nader finally announced his intention to mount
another presidential run on Meet the Press on February 22, 2004, Moore,
like Noam Chomsky and other icons of the Left, had long since taken public
stands against such a campaign. The Nation, as early as December 2002,
begged on its pages "Ralph, Don't Run" and, in an open letter to Nader
published six days before his announcement, repeated its plea. After Dean
dropped out on February 18, he explicitly cautioned his supporters "not to
be tempted by independent or third party candidates."
For his part, Nader played down his potential threat to the Left, saying
"the liberal establishment" should "relax and rejoice," since his "candidacy
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is not going to get many Democratic votes." Conservatives and independents
disaffected from Bush would be his primary constituency this year, drawn to
his clear stances against free trade and corporate crime. "The party-out-ofpower members come back into the fold," he told National Public Radio.
"It's the party-in-power that has the difficulty on the edges."

A Breakfrom the Greens
Within the Green Party, a long debate has centered on the value of running candidates for the presidency. In some ways, it is reflective of a fundamental paradox facing minor parties in the United States: should they marshal their scant resources in an attempt to grow, even at the risk of losing
their philosophical raison d'etre? Or should they stay ideologically pure,
even at the risk of being electorally stagnant (Collet 2002)? The purismpragmatism dilemma is a unique one for the Greens, because considerable
emphasis is placed on local activism-and because the party has shown success in some towns and cities by running focused, parochial campaigns.
"Grassroots democracy" is at the top of their Ten Key Values, even before
"ecological wisdom."
So when Nader told the party in a letter dated December 22, 2003, that
he would not seek its nomination for the presidency, the news came as a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, Nader-who had never registered as
Green-was slapping the party in the face and recalling the fears of some
who never wanted to become involved in presidential politics in the first
place. On the other hand, it was clear he still wanted their support. "The
occasion for this letter," he wrote, "is not simply that there are robust contending views about whether to have a Presidential candidate ... but that ...
it is not feasible within the difficult parameters of state and federal election
laws to wait and see what the Green Party will do." Because party rules
required the decision to be made by delegates at its national convention the
following June, Nader explained that it was too risky to wait; in many states,
the requirements for getting on the ballot would require longer preparation.
Nader's semi-withdrawal from the Green nomination quest left an opening for David Cobb, a public interest lawyer who helped to found the Texas
Green Party in 1999 and organized the successful ballot-access drive there
for Nader in 2000. Cobb's mantra was for the Greens to pursue a so-called
safe states strategy: in areas where the major parties were competitive, Cobb
would abstain. It was antithetical to Nader's pursuit of being the relevant
pivot, but Cobb argued that it would help to keep progressives from tuning
the Greens out in the future. Nader, for his part, tried to maintain ties to the
party by nominating longtime activist Peter Miguel Camejo as his running
mate. In early 2004, Camejo had begun his own campaign for the Green
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presidential nomination in California, but just before the party convention in
Milwaukee began, he joined the Nader ticket.
When the convention met on June 26, the Greens' decision boiled down
to three choices: ( 1) abstain from the presidential race altogether; (2) nominate Cobb; or (3) endorse Nader (Martin 2005). Camejo carried a so-called
Unity Resolution that would have allowed Greens to endorse both Cobb and
Nader and then allow each state party to use the party's ballot line at their
own discretion; it was rejected (Camejo 2005). After the first round of voting, which by party rule is held under an instant runoff system, Cobb received 309 delegate votes compared to 119 for Camejo and 117.5 for Nader.
In the second round, Cobb prevailed over "no nominee," 408-308, and won
the nomination.j
Without the Greens, Nader was still able to qualify for thirty-five state
ballots (see table 15.1 ). Although his campaign was nominally independent,
he appeared in eighteen states as the nominee of eight different political parties- ranging from the Reform party (in Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Mississippi, and Rhode Island) to the Peace and Justice party in New York. In four
states, he ran under the designation "The Better Life." He qualified as an
Independent (or "By Petition") in seventeen, mostly smaller, states (totaling
115 electoral votes). The four states in which Nader was barred entirely included three crucial elements of his influence-oriented campaign: Oregon
and Hawaii, which each had given him 5 percent in 2000, and Ohio, which
was promising to be the Florida of 2004. Symptomatic of the backlash
against his candidacy, these failures distinguish this run from his run in
2000, where the three states in which he failed to qualify-South Dakota,
Oklahoma, and North Carolina-were strategically inconsequential. On the
bright side, Nader had somehow managed, under extremely difficult circumstances (Winger 2005), to make it onto two-thirds of the state ballots.4 On
the dark side, these states nominated only a little over half of the electors in

Tuble 15.1

Nuder Bullot Stutus und Electoral College lmpuct, 1996-2004

1996

2004

2000

Stmes•

EV'•

Stmes

EV

States

EV

Appeared on stale ballots
as a parly candiclarc
as an inclcpcnclcnl

22
19
3

225
192
33

44

39
5

481
435
46

278
163
115

Ccrtificcl as a writc•in

15
14

225
88

4

32

35
18
17
12

3

25

4

Failed lo qualify

Source: Federal Election Commission.
• Numhcr of sta1cs in each category. including 1hc District of Columbia
• EV • Total number of electoral votes fo r the relevant stales

222
38
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the Electoral College. In more than two-fifths of the College, as in 1996,
voters would have to write in his name.
A Spoiled Image

As Nader became bogged down in legal trenches, his reputation took a
further beating. The austerity of his campaign- he raised just $2.5 million
in individual contributions- not only fostered a plodding image but also left
his growing armada of antagonists free lo attack. Several websites launched
in response to his candidacy, but TheNaderFactor.com (funded by a group
of Democratic activists calling itself the National Progress Fund) was perhaps the most vigorous, using its resources to air spots in battleground states
that portrayed a phony "Bush-Nader '04" ticket and linked the candidate to
the GOP right wing. A thirty-second radio ad in Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Florida asked listeners, "Remember Florida and the 2000 election? Well, the
same right-wing Republicans that are anti-choice and anti-environment are
suddenly pro-Nader." In New Mexico and Wisconsin, a television ad from
TheNaderFactor.com showed a remorseful Nader voter from 2000 who had
concluded afterward that the decision was wrong (Appleman 2004).
The respect that Nader had garnered over decades of leading the cause
of consumer advocacy began to seem like ancient history. In a 1976 Roper
poll, more than two thousand Americans were asked to identify the characteristics that described Ralph ,Nader. Topping the list were "dedicated"
(checked by 40 percent of the respondents), "honest" (34 percent), and
"public spirited" (30 percent). 5 Nader was often mentioned in other surveys
as one of the most admired Americans; in both 1972 and 1976, his name was
floated as a presidential nominee. As recently as 1989, 70 percent of Americans had a "favorable" view of Nader, according to an NBC News/Wal/
Street Joumal poll.6 His visibility receded through the 1990s, but rebounded
in 2000 lo enjoy a nearly two-to-one ratio of favorable to unfavorable ratings
throughout most of that campaign.
In the interregnum between the Supreme Court verdict on the election in
December 2000 and becoming a repeat candidate in early 2004, Nader
started to fall into disfavor. This is shown in detail in a series of surveys
conducted by Stanley Greenberg for the Democratic-leaning Democracy
Corps/Institute for America's Future.' Measuring Nader's popularity
through 100-point "feeling thermometers," figure 15.1 shows only small increases in his "cold" ratings through October 2000; a plurality were still
neutral. But then two large increases in "cold" feelings occurred, the first
from May 2001 to July 2002, and the second between May 2003 to May
2004.8 Nader thus began the 2004 campaign with roughly half of America
holding an antipathetic view of him. And as the campaign wore on, public
perceptions- seemingly like the candidate himself-hardened. Between
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Figure IS.I Democrucy Corps Poll Feeling Thermometers Rcgurding Rulph Nuder,
August 2000-November 2004
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which is of voters who par1icipatcd in that election, N varies from 988 to 1,027 for the former, 2,000 for
the laller. Data points noted by (* ) indicate that the question wording was modified to "Green Party/
Ralph Nader' s Par1y." Sec note 6 for the actual question wording.

Gallup surveys in March and September 2004, Nader went from 26 to 33
percent "favorable" and from 44 to 48 percent "unfavorable." In the Greenberg polls, he went from 52 percent "cold" in March 2004 to 54 percent on
Election Day.
In a deliberate, almost self-fulfilling fashion, Nader thus encountered the
twin political pillars of expediency and entrenchment. It was more than a
surly Left and the "corporation disguised as a human being" in the White
House, as Nader liked to say, that he ran against. It was the very system-a
Byzantine structure of laws and rules, made and preserved by the corporatebeholden major parties- that suffocated anyone with the temerity to challenge it on the ballot or in the debate hall. Above all, it was a society driven
by money. Journalists began to note that Nader's once inexhaustible energy
seemed to diminish as his opponents grew larger; at times, Nader would
wield his broadening brush and attack the very culture that put shopping
and sports over education and activism. With his popularity in decline, was
the public becoming as much his target as the corporations who corrupted
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them? Independent candidacies had prospered before by telling Americans
things they didn't want to hear. But in Nader's case, it seemed the messenger
was becoming as bitter as the message. His relevance was still a question
mark, though, depending on the closeness between Kerry and Bush- and
whether history would repeat itself in Florida, where Nader was on the
ballot.
On November 2, the answer came. Bush comfortably won the national
vote by more than 3 million; Nader garnered 465,650 votes out of
122,295,345 cast, a microscopic 0.4 percent that put him much closer to Libertarian candidate Michael Bednarik (397,265) than to having any effect on
the outcome between the major parties. In only one county- Grand in
Utah- did Nader match the 2.7 percent share he earned nationwide in 2000;
in a handful of others in the Deep South and Mountain West, Nader actually
finished behind Bednarik, and sometimes behind Constitution party candidate Michael Peroutka and Green Party candidate Cobb. It was easily the
worst of his three presidential runs, amounting to less than a sixth of the
votes he had earned in 2000- and just two-thirds of what he earned in 1996,
when he only passively campaigned. What happened?
Individual-Level Analysis: More Conservative, Less Committed
Between 2000 and 2004, some noteworthy changes took place in the
Nader constituency (see table 15.2). Relying on data provided by the Gallup
Organization," we focus on three. The first is a social/demographic shift
away from well-educated, non-churchgoing supporters to less-educated,
Protestant, occasional churchgoers. The second is a partisan and ideological
shift from independents, Democrats, and liberals toward moderate and conservative Republicans. The third is an apparent shift toward lower propensity
voters- the group that had strong intentions to vote in 2000 receded in intensity in 2004.
Looking at table 15.2, we see that Nader made slight gains among
women in 2004; his support, however, remained majority male-a contrast
with Gore and Kerry, who have relied more on support from women. Nader
made further gains among those Americans already known to be a significant part of the Nader coalition: those who are 18-29 years old. Both Nader
and Kerry lost married voters, as well as union households. More significant,
however, is that Nader appears to have ceded to the Democrat some of the
better educated- another key element of his prior campaign. Seventy-one
percent of Nader's 2000 constituency had gone to college; four years later,
this had declined to 61 percent. By comparison, 69 percent of Kerry backers
had gone to college and 44 percent took a diploma-an increase of twelve
percentage points from Al Gore's.
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Tuble 15.2 Nuder und Kerry/Gore Preelection Supporters
Nm/er
Nader
Net
2004
2000
Clumge
Kerry
Gender
Male
Female

Gore

Net
C/umge

52%
48

54%
46

- 2
+2

45%
55

42%
58

+3
-3

22%
40
25
13

17%
43
25
14

+5
-3
0
- I

14%
35
29
22

11%
40
26
24

+3
-5
+3
- 2

44%
9
7
16
21

49%
5
6
14
24
20%

- 5
+4
+I
+2
- 3
-4

49%
7
10
16
19%

51%
5
12
16
17
22%

- 2
+2
- 2
0
+I
-3

30%
27
34

24%
33

+6
- 6
-4

24%
25
44

36%
32
32

- 12
- 7
+ 12

42%
23
20
13

28%

+14
- 3
- 2
-6

45%
26

40%
29

+5
- 3

17
11

18

7

+4

22%

+I
+I
+3
-7

25%

13
56

21%
7
10
63

32%
11
14
41

-7
0
0
+8

31%
19
50

21 %
26
54

+ 10

11%

14%
26
38
16
2
4

- 3
- 6
+2
+6
+2
- 2
- 18

Age

18- 29
30- 49
50- 64
65+
Marital stm11s
Married
Live with partner
Widowed
Divorced
Single, never married

Union /11mselllJld

16%

18

Ec/11rn1ic111
High school diploma
Some college
College graduate

38

Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Other

None

26
22
19

- I

Frequency ofch11rch t11te11dc111ce
Once per week
Almost every week
Once a month
Seldom/Never

8

11

14
49

Party idemijirntim,
Republican ( + lean)
lnclepcnclent (no lean)
Democrat ( + lean)

- 7
- 4

7%
3
90

7%
4
89

0
- I
+I

lcleology
Very liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very conservative
Don't Know

High likelilllJocl c,f l'lJti11g1
(N)

20
40
22
4
2
62%
919

80%

591

8%

26
46
16

3

4%
23
46
20

3
3
86%
84%
10,446
8,096
I

+4
+3
0
-4
0
- 2
+2

Nme.1: Data arc pooled from preclcction Gallup polls throughout 2000 and 200-t They arc unweighted.
• l11c polls asl..cd respondents to usscss their likelihood of voting on a 1- IO scale, with JO being Clt•
trcmcly likely. '"High likelihood" is dclined as those who gave a 9 or 10.
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Religion is another area of difference. Naderites in 2000 were distinguished by low levels of religiosity: 19 percent reported they were not affiliated with an organized church and 63 percent said they "seldom" or
"never" attended services. Four years later, this declined to 13 and 56 percent, respectively, as the proportion that identified as Protestants increased
substantially (from 28 to 42 percent). Kerry may have picked up some of this
non-churchgoing crowd as he posted gains in the proportion of those who
"seldom" or "never" attend services.
The second important shift revolves around partisanship and ideology.
In 2000, 54 percent of Nader supporters identified as Democrats, 26 percent
as independents. But as the Kerry/Gore base attracted just a handful of Republicans over two elections (7 percent), Nader's campaign grew from onefifth (21 percent) to nearly one-third GOP-identifying (31 percent). The proportion of Democrats in his campaign declined to 50 percent, and independents shrank to less than one-fifth (19 percent). Further, consider Nader's
loss (and Kerry's gain) of liberals. Those reporting themselves to be very or
somewhat liberal were a combined 40 percent of Nader's 2000 backing, just
27 percent of Gore's. But four years later, liberals constituted a larger proportion of Kerry's (34 percent), not Nader's (31 percent), support. As conservatives declined from Gore to Kerry, they became a larger part of the
Nader campaign, growing from 18 to 26 percent.
The last area of contrast-and in some ways the most important-is in
the likelihood of voting. As the last of seven screening items in their likelyvoter model, Gallup asks the question, "If 'I' represents someone who will
definitely not vote and 'IO' represents someone who definitely will vote,
where on this scale would you place yourself?" To be considered a likely
voter, a poll respondent would answer 7 or higher. In table 15.2, we show
the percentage of those who gave a response of 9 or I0-the Americans
most motivated to cast a ballot. In 2000, 80 percent of Nader backers fell
into this high-propensity category- a proportion in the ballpark with Gore's
backers (84 percent). But in 2004, as Kerry's share of these voters grew to
86 percent, Nader's fell dramatically to just 62 percent.
Where the 2000 Nader campaign revealed itself as a small but active
center-left following, the 2004 version came to resemble the loose, perpetual
fragments of major party dissent, the fringe Hoaters inclined either to abstain
from politics or to cast ballots, perhaps on a whim, for anything but the establishment. We can see this in greater detail in the Edison/Mitofsky National Exit poll (data not shown). In many ways, those who went to the polls
for Nader in 2004 look more like those who voted for "Other" (that is, an
alternative candidate unmeasured or categorized in the survey) than those
who backed the Democratic nominee: they are more conservative and give
higher approval ratings to Bush and more support for the war in Iraq (although two in three nonetheless opposed the decision to go to war). This
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is a change from the 2000 election, when Nader voters were decidedly less
supportive of establishment policies than Gore voters (Collet and Hansen
2002). Voters for Nader and "Other" in 2004, furthermore, share the twin
traits of being late deciders and less likely to say their vote was "for [their]
candidate."
At the Aggregate Level

When looking at the aggregate-level returns for Nader in 2004 compared
to 2000 and 1996,10 one can witness demographic continuity in the midst of
substantial numerical change.
To get a sense of Nader's decline, one needs to consider first his initial
rise between 1996 and 2000. 11 The New England states saw the most dramatic movement in this period, with Nader surging in states such as Rhode
Island (from 1.5 to 6.1 percent) and New Hampshire, where he was unqualified in 1996 but took a pivotal 3.9 percent as a Green four years later (Bush
defeated Gore there by less than 1.3 percentage points). His growth was
steadier in the five Pacific states. In 1996, he was qualified in four as a Green;
in Washington, he was on as an independent. Nader went from 3 percent
across the region in 1996 to almost 5 percent in 2000, seeing his vote go as
high as IO percent in Alaska and 6 percent in Hawaii. He had grown respectably in California, and Oregon, it seemed, was becoming a crucial stop on
the Nader campaign map. His 5 percent there in 2000, it was thought, played
a role in the nail biter that saw Gore prevail by 0.4 percentage points.
To say the bloom had worn off Nader's rose would be a poetic understatement, for the declines were profound across the most important constituencies he had established in the two prior elections: in the Pacific, where
he had ballot-access problems, his vote dropped by more than five percentage points; in New England, he made the ballot, for the most part, but saw
his vote plummet by a similar margin; and in the Mountain states, he also
saw an above-average drop. Nader's decline was generally higher in the
smallest states (defined as those with three to six electors), such as Vermont
and New Hampshire, than in larger ones. And he dropped more precipitously
in Gore and Kerry states than in states won by Bush, perhaps further indication of liberal alienation and the tactical efforts to keep him off the ballot.
Too, it seems as if Nader may have suffered without the Green Party label.
He fell harder in states where he was on as party candidate in 2000 than in
states where he had been an independent.

Nader's Legacy
In his last public appearance of the 2004 campaign, Nader met with a
small gathering in the dimly lit basement of the Capitol View Library in
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southwest Washington. He was asked by one journalist whether his candidacy was worth it. "Of course," he replied. "The fight for justice is always
worth it. What's the alternative, surrender?" (D'arcy 2004).
In an increasingly rigid and competitive two-party system, Nader's question, though intended as rhetorical, is worth pondering. Nader's 2004 run not
only came to symbolize the near impossibility of qualifying for the ballot as
in independent in fifty-plus-one states but also the self-fulfilling prophecy of
centering a campaign around the ambiguous theme of one's own futile crusade: fighting the system itself. In 1996, and particularly in 2000, Nader
deftly tapped into progressive frustration that built during the Clinton years,
and he did so under the banner of a growing, futuristically minded-and
at that point, largely unknown-Green Party. The message, though critical,
remained upbeat. By 2004, having heard the spoiler scenario repeated countless times, Americans were unconvinced that Nader could do anything other
than hurt the Democrats. His campaign was, by definition, a negative from
the beginning.
As our analysis shows, the younger, single, well-educated liberals that
animated Nader's previous runs abandoned him and consolidated behind
Kerry. He suffered without Green Party ballot access, particularly in the Pacific states, and saw his vote collapse everywhere-most significantly in the
New England and Mountain regions where he had done well (in a relative
sense) in 2000. His support became more diverse, including more Republicans and conservatives, but increasingly tenuous: supporters were less inspired by Nader as a person; less inclined to know about, or agree with, many
of his issue positions; and most importantly, less likely to vote. In contrast
to the movement of progressive "raiders" that seemed to grow naturally out
of his 1970s anticorporate crusades, the Nader constituency today is something akin to a disparate, expressive, and possibly perpetuating "other" vote.
Nader's predictions of antiestablishment, conservative support proved somewhat accurate, even if the size of that constituency was exaggerated.
From the standpoint of building continued support for fundamental
changes in national party politics, the Nader campaign in 2004 will be
looked upon as a setback. Despite making an explicit appeal to unify alternatives into a single crusade, Nader eschewed the Greens and disdained their
nominating system- and he suffered as a result. He not only lost the opportunity for ballot access in the Pacific and other regions but also undermined
his own party-building principles. Like Jesse Ventura, he could be seen as a
party wrecker. Like John Anderson and Ross Perot, his once-serious persona
was transformed by the American presidential process into a national punch
line. And with him, some might argue, went his most relevant issues: the
role of money in politics, access to presidential debates, changes to the electoral system.

260

Christian Collet and Jerrold Hansen

Was Ralph Nader merely a phenomenon created by an era of historically
competitive elections? Or is there a substantive legacy for his three presidential campaigns? At the very least, it may be said that Nader has kept the light
on alternative politics in a post• Perot era, where otherwise it might have been
overshadowed by intense major-partisanship. However, it may also be said
that the light he brought was by 2004 casting dark shadows. Nevertheless,
even if his vote seems increasingly unstable and peripheral, our analysis suggests a geographic base remains for any challenger to the major partiesprimarily in New England states and in parts of the West. Significant num•
bers of young voters remained with Nader in 2004 and would seemingly be
attracted to him or a viable successor. Further, through his national effort
to gain ballot access, he helped to expose to a new voting generation the
extraordinary barriers (and undermining tactics) faced by those who want a
chance to compete. Losing an election- not to mention a reputation- seems
a taxing way to prove the point, but the point was nonetheless made.
Will Nader continue? The answer, in and of itself, seems irrelevant, perhaps as irrelevant as his 2000 campaign might have been if the election were
not so excruciatingly close. Future close elections may continue to compel
him. Few precedents exist, however, for a four-time minor-party presidential
candidate to improve his standing among the American public. The only one
to do so was Socialist Eugene Debs in 1912. So the deeper question is not
about Nader, but whether any alternative candidate of national stature will
be willing to endure the process of running for president in such a climate-or to run with a constituency that can only alter an outcome, not win
an election. In 1968 or 1992, following landslides, Americans could accept
the idea of an outsider throwing a wrench into the system. In 2004, they
could not.
Notes
I. There arc exceptions (e.g., Green and Binning 2002), including valuable work by
Rapoport and Slone (2005) on the movement of minor party activists over time (sec also
chapter 14).
2. Roscnslone and his colleagues explain, "Third party candidates run lo gain votes, not
10 affect election outcomes. If nationally prestigious candidates were mounting campaigns in
an effort lo change outcomes, then close presidential elections-when a shifl of a few voles
to a third party candidate could make a big difference in who wins- would prompt them to
run. But just lhc opposite holds: nationally prestigious (third party] politicians appear after
landslides, not cliffhangers" (Roscnstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996, 201).
3. In personal correspondence elated December 17, 2005, Theresa Amato, Nader's campaign manager, informs us that "many, if not mo~, of the [first round] votes for Camejo and
olhcr 'favorite son/daughter• stand-ins were meant for Ralph Nader and most of these voters
were rclcasccl from their pledge to vote for a particular candidate after the first round."
4. The authors thank Richard Winger for his correspondence regarding Nader's ballotaccess situation.
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5. Roper Report 76- 10. Survey taken November 6 - 11, 1976 (n ~ 2,002). Question:
"Herc's another card with a lbt of words ancl phrases on it. Would you call off all of them
that describe your feelings about Ralph Nader'/" Accessed via R-POLL, the Roper Center
online database available through LEXIS/NEXIS Academic Universe.
6. Survey taken January 14- 17, 1989 (n "' 2,025). Question: "In general, do you have a
favorable or unfavorable opinion of Ralph Nader'/" Accessed via R-POLL.
7. 1l1e Democracy Corps polls arc of likely registered voters or registrants who had
already voted. Question: ''I'd like to rate your feelings toward some people ancl organi1.ations,
with 100 meaning a very warm. favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold. unfavorable
feeling. and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from O to
I 00, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings arc toward that person or organization. If you have no opinion or never heard of that person or organization, please say so.
Ralph Nader. Give ... Ralph Nader a rating, with 100 meaning a very warm favorable feeling,
zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or
cold."
8. Along with an overwhelming public perception that he ruined Al Gore's chance of
keeping the presidency in Democratic control (a debatable topic in academic circles- sec,
e.g.• Burden 2004; Herron and Lewis 2004; Collet and Hansen 2002), there arc several
smaller events that may have slowly innucnced the tum in public opinion on Nader. In mid2001. James Carville began to openly auack Nader at Democratic gatherings; at the same
time, Nader continued to draw thousands to his rallies and generally positive media for the
launch of his "Democracy Rising" movement ancl his book Crmhi11g the Party. From 2002,
however, his press turned increasingly negative. In June of that year, he was roundly anacked
for criticizing NBA officiating ancl for asking I 8-ycar-olcl Cleveland Cavaliers rookie LcBron
James to take a stand against Third World sweatshops. Such issues, it seemed, fell out of the
purview of a presidential candidate during a nonclcction season. In January 2003, Al Sharpton and Dennis Kucinich began to campaign for the presidency- in Sharpton's case, explicitly in pursuit of Nader's progressive constituency.
9. The Gallup Organization polled Americans on their presidential vote choice at
twenty-six intervals between January 9 ancl October 31. 2004 (eighty clays of interviewing
spread over eight months). Pooled. these surveys included interviews with 28.242 adults ( 18
and ovcr)- among them were 1,049 firm or leaning Nader supporters. The authors thank
Lydia Saad of the Gallup Organi1.ation for help with these data.
I 0. Election returns were gathered from usclcctionsatlas.org and merged to form a single,
usable data set.
11. The divisions arc defined as follows: New England = CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, and
VT; Middle Atlantic = NJ, NY. and PA: East North Central = IN, IL, Ml. OH. and WI; West
North Central = IA. KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, and SD: South Atlantic = DE. DC. FL, GA.
MD, NC, SC, VA, and WV; East South Central "' AL, KY. MS, ancl TN; West South Central
= AR, LA. OK, and TX: Mountain "' AZ, CO. ID. NM. MT. UT, NV. and WY; Pacific ::::,
AK, WA, OR, CA, and HI.
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The Growing Polarization of American Voters
David C. Kimball and Cassie A. Gross
When Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast in late August 2005, it left
in its wake several long-term challenges for government at the local, state,
and national level. However, it took only a few days for people to form opinions about the government's response to the crisis, and those opinions split
along predictable partisan lines. A Washi11gto11 Post/ABC News poll conducted on September 2, 2005 Uust four days after the hurricane), found that
74 percent of Republicans approved of the way President Bush was handling
the crisis, while only 17 percent of Democrats approved. 1 A CBS/New York
Times poll conducted roughly ten days later found a very similar partisan
split in evaluations of the president's response to the hurricane.1 The highly
partisan public reaction to a natural disaster is further evidence of political
polarization in the United States.
Surging party polarization in the United States has recently received
considerable scholarly attention. There is clear evidence of a growing influence of party and ideology on voting behavior during the last twenty years
(Miller 1991; Bartels 2000; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, 2005; Jacobson
2003; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003). As party loyalty among voters
has increased, rates of split-ticket voting have decreased. The same trends
are evident in common measures: ticket splitting began increasing in the
1950s, peaked around 1980, and then declined substantially. The 2004 election produced the lowest levels of ticket splitting seen since the l 950s and
1960s. Thus, aggregate voting trends clearly point to growing party polarization in the United States.
In this chapter, we examine the political attitudes behind party polarization in the United States. We measure party polarization by examining responses to "feeling thermometer" ratings of political parties and presidential
candidates collected in National Election Study (NES) surveys. Using these
measures, we find that the 2004 election stands out as the most polarized
campaign since NES began using feeling thermometers in 1964. In comparing levels of polarization among different groups of people, we find evidence
that party polarization in the United States is an elite-driven development.
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A current subject of debate is whether the resurgent partisanship in the
United States is a result of elite polarization alone or whether the mass public
is simultaneously polarizing as well. There is clear evidence of polarization
at the elite level. For example, roll-call vote studies indicate that Republican
members of Congress have become more unified and more conservative during the last thirty years, while the Democrats in Congress have become more
uniformly liberal (Rohde 1991; Poole and Rosenthal I 997). Similarly, the
issue distance between Republican and Democratic party activists on social
and economic issues has grown during the same period (see chapter 4 in this
volume; Layman 2001 ; Wolbrecht 2002; Cotter and Fisher 2004; Layman et
al. 2005).
At the same time, there is some disagreement about whether polarization
has also taken place in the mass public. The debate focuses on whether there
is a "culture war" in the United States, often summarized in the red stateblue state dichotomy used by journalists and pundits (Hunter 1994; Green et
al. 1996; Williams 1997; Layman 2001; Frank 2004; Fiorina 2005; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2005). Much of the scholarly debate has examined whether different groups have moved farther apart in their positions on
particular issues. Some argue that most Americans still hold moderate views
on a host of economic and cultural issues (Fiorina 2005; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2005). If this perspective is true, then the increased partisanship in voting is simply the result of moderate voters having to choose between more extreme candidates than in the past.
One of the strongest challenges is a study by Fiorina (2005), who claims
that mass polarization is a "myth." He argues that partisan, geographical,
and social cleavages have not grown much over time and actually have diminished on some issues. Some studies of public opinion have found support
for Fiorina's claim that Americans have not moved further apart on many
issues (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Evans 2003; Mouw and Sobel
2001). On the other hand, several studies find growing issue distances between Democrats and Republicans on several types of issues (DiMaggio,
Evans, and Bryson 1996; Layman 2001; Fleisher and Bond 2001; Layman
and Carsey 2002; Evans 2003). Part of the debate between Fiorina and others
is whether Democrats and Republicans have moved substantially further
apart in their issue positions (Fiorina 2005, 25-32).
Furthermore, other studies find a growing gap between Republicans and
Democrats in terms of ideological identification, with Republicans becoming
more conservative and Democrats more liberal over time (Abramowitz and
Saunders 1998; Jacobson 2000). Still others find growing party differences
in public evaluations of parties, candidates, and government institutions
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(Fleisher and Bond 2001; Hetherington 2001; Jacobson 2003; Kimball
2005).
While studies of the issue distance between partisans are important, they
may miss a psychological aspect of polarization. Political polarization is
more than just holding different positions on hot-button issues. Polarization
is also accompanied by an us-versus-them mentality, in which partisanship
shapes the way people see the political world. As stated in The American
Voter, "Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which
the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation"
(Campbell et al. 1960, 133). This view is consistent with long-standing research emphasizing the importance of group perceptions in party identification and mass political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960; Berelson, Lazarsfeld,
and McPhee 1954, 77-86).
Partisans are motivated to perceive events and even facts in ways that
support their party (Fischle 2000; Bartels 2002). For example, in the 2004
NES survey, the mean placement of the Democratic Party on the seven-point
ideology scale is 3.0 (slightly liberal). However, the mean placement of the
Democratic Party by Democrats is 3.4 (between middle-of-the-road and
slightly liberal), while the mean placement of the Democratic Party by Republicans is 2.4 (between slightly liberal and liberal). Clearly, the Democratic Party is perceived as more liberal by Republicans than by Democrats.
An example of public opinion on President Bush's policy agenda may
be more instructive (Andres 2005). In recent public opinion surveys, respondents were asked about their support for two of President Bush's domestic
policy proposals (private accounts for Social Security and school voucher
programs). The survey questions explicitly identified President Bush as the
source of the proposals. Elsewhere in the same survey, respondents were
asked whether they supported private accounts for Social Security and school
vouchers without naming President Bush as the architect of the proposals.
The results (shown in table 16.1) indicate that public support for both
proposals drops significantly when President Bush is identified as the one
proposing them. More specifically, support for the two policies drops substantially among Democrats when the policies are tied to President Bush,
while Republican support for the policies is largely unaffected by the change
in question wording. For some Democrats apparently, the moment they discover that President Bush is behind a policy proposal is the same moment
they decide not to support the proposal. In contrast, Republicans generally
have a positive view of President Bush, so their support does not drop after
the president's name is attached to the policies. The vast majority of survey
questions on public policy matters do not identify the politician or party advocating the policy. Thus, to mainly consider a respondent's self-placement
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lmpuct or President Bush on Public Support for Policy lnitiulives

Policy Propo.ml
Support for private Social Security
accounts (no Bush menlion)•
Support for President Bush's Social
Security proposals"
Support for school 1/'ouchcn; (no Bush
mention)"
Support for President Bush's school
voucher program"

All Respm1de111s

Democmts

Rep11blicc111.1·

56%

4::?Sf.

77"if,

31

11

74

62

55

70

45

31

65

Source: An<ln:s 2005.
• ABCll¼1shing1,111 Posl poll con<luc1c<l March I0-13, 2005
• Gallup poll con<luclctl January 200 I

on issue or ideological scales may miss some degree to which people exaggerate group differences, thus missing an important aspect of polarization.
Another way to understand the psychological side of partisan polarization is to consider social identity theory, which holds that partisans are motivated to praise their own group, denigrate the opposing group, and exagger;
ate intergroup differences (Tajfel and Turner 1986). In other words, people
tend to believe there are greater differences between groups than actually
exist. This insight has a ready application to American politics. Despite studies indicating that most citizens hold moderate positions and that rank-andfile partisans may not be very far apart on many issues, voters may still see
their own party as good and the other party as bad. In addition, political
campaigns in the United States tend to exaggerate party differences. For example, in the 2004 presidential campaign, the Republican Party spent more
than $3 million compiling commercial databases on the consumer habits of
Democrats and Republicans. The party conducted surveys to identify "anger
points" (i.e., issues that made voters angry) that mirrored President Bush's
policy agenda for different consumer groups then used the information to
target those groups during the campaign.3 Targeting consumers on the basis
of issues that anger them may be an effective vote-getting strategy, but it is
also likely to exaggerate the differences between the two major political parties. The in-group versus out-group perspective of social identity theory has
also been used to study partisanship and attitudes toward other groups in the
United States (Greene 2004; Boice and De Maio 1999).
We measure polarization by the correlation between the party and candidate feeling thermometer ratings in National Election Study surveys. Thermometer scales ask respondents to rate an object on a scale ranging from 0
(indicating very cold feelings toward the person or group) to 100 (indicating
very warm feelings). Measuring the correlation between thermometer ratings
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of the Democratic Party and thermometer ratings of the Republican Party,
for example, captures the us-versus-them mindset that is an important feature of polarization. In a highly polarized citizenry, we would expect a strong
negative correlation between the two party thermometer ratings and between
the two presidential candidate thermometer ratings, as people rate their own
party positively while rating the other party negatively. In a nonpolarized
citizenry, conversely, one might expect no correlation. Finding a negative
correlation between different objects on feeling thermometer ratings is
actually hindered by a "response-set bias," a tendency for survey respondents to give similar ratings to all groups (Green 1988; Wilcox, Sigelman,
and Cook 1989; Weisberg, Haynes, and Krosnick 1995). Thus, correlations
between thermometer ratings provide conservative estimates of levels of
party polarization.
Many other studies have used thermometer ratings to measure attitudes
toward political parties and candidates (e.g., Wattenberg 1998; Boice and De
Maio 1999; Hetherington 200 I; Fleisher and Bond 200 I; Greene 2004; Fionna 2005). These studies tend to compare mean thermometer ratings of the
same object by different groups of respondents, or they compare the number
of group respondents rating a political object positively (above 50) versus
the number rating the object negatively (below 50). To our knowledge,
Weisberg's studies of presidential elections are the only reports of correlations between thermometer ratings (e.g., Weisberg and Hill 2004; Weisberg
and Kimball 1995). In the following section, we use the correlation measure
to see whether party polarization has increased in recent elections. We then
apply the measure to the 2004 election more closely to see which segments
of the public are most polarized.

Trends in Party Polarization
We first examine correlations between thermometer ratings of political
parties and presidential candidates in elections since 1964, when NES introduced the thermometer questions. The results (see table 16.2) suggest that
party polarization reached new heights in 2004. The 2004 election produces
the strongest negative correlation between party and presidential candidate
thermometer ratings in the time series. In comparing presidential elections
over time, we do not find evidence of a secular increase in party polarization.
Polarization increased after the 1970s but then remained fairly level until
rising sharply in 2004.
Wattenberg ( 1998, 158- 62) argues that Americans have become more
polarized in evaluations of specific political figures (especially President
Ronald Reagan) but not in evaluations of political parties. The evidence here
tends to suggest otherwise. The elections of 1972 and 1976 (featuring no
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Tobie 16.2 Measures or Porty Polurizution in Presidential Elections
Correlatio11 betwee11

party themwmeter.~

1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000

2004

- ,37
-. 18
.02••
O'>••
-.23
-.40
- .39
-.27
- .40
- ,36
- .47

t'cmdidme thermometers

NA
- .17
- .42
-,30
-.29
-.53
-.38
-.39
- .42
-.39
- .61

So11rce: American National Election StudiCJ;.
NA .. not available
"' nonsignificant

correlation between party thermometers and negative correlations between
candidate thermometers) support Wattenberg's thesis, and correlations between candidate thermometer rulings are usually stronger than correlations
between party thermometer ratings. However, each election since 1980
shows fairly reliable polarization between the two parties.-' In addition, other
presidential candidates after Reagan have generated similar levels of polarization. Finally, the strong correlations in 2004 suggest that President
George W. Bush is a more polarizing political figure than either Reagan or
President Bill Clinlon.
A by-product of increasing party polarization in the United States is
more intense feelings about presidential campaigns. Figure 16. l provides
more evidence that the 2004 election stands out as one of the most intensely
contested campaigns in recent history. The trend lines in figure 16.1 indicate
growing campaign intensity over time. In 2004, 85 percent of NES respondents said they care a good deal about who wins the presidential election,
the highest percentage recorded since the NES began asking this question in
1952. Similarly, the 2004 election produced the highest percentage of respondents who see important differences between the parties (76 percent)the second highest figure, recorded in 2000, is a distant 64 percent. While
not pictured in figure 16.1, the 2004 election also produced the highest percentage of NES respondents who participated in campaign activities (Abramowitz and Saunders 2005). 5 Finally, a relatively large portion of voters
made up their minds early in the 2004 campaign, and only 30 percent of
NES respondents reported making their presidential voting decision after the
national party conventions. This is tied for the second lowest such percent-
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By-producl~ or Partisan Polnri1.ntlon, 1952-2004
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- - - Important party differences

Source: American National Election Studies

age recorded by NES behind the Eisenhower-Stevenson rematch in 1956.
Thus, several measures indicate that the 2004 presidential election was one
of the most intense, polarizing campaigns of the last fifty years.

Who Are the Most Polarized People?
We next take a closer look at the 2004 election to find groups most likely
to view the political world in a polarized fashion. We hypothesize that party
polarization in the United States is largely an elite-driven phenomenon. People do not form political opinions in a vacuum. Many citizens tend to follow
the opinion leadership of elites (elected officials, pundits, and party and interest group leaders) who share their point of view (Zaller 1992). The growing ideological distance between parties at the elite level has increased the
salience of party labels and ideological considerations when citizens evaluate politicians and make voting decisions, in effect "priming" the general
public to be more partisan as well (Kimball 2005). Thus, as political parties
at the national level have become more unified in ideologically driven dis-
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putes, the public has come to see politics in more partisan terms (Hetherington 2001; Burden and Kimball 2002; Jacobson 2003).
There is additional evidence suggesting that political elites are leading
the charge toward more polarized politics in the United States. Several studies indicate that party polarization at the elite level began in the 1970s
(Rohde 1991; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Layman 2001), while party polarization at the mass level lagged behind, not starting until the 1980s (Miller
199 I; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Bartels 2000; Hetherington 200 I;
Jacobson 2000). Furthermore, other studies have demonstrated elite leadership of public opinion on several important issues (Carmines and Stimson
1989; Brody 1991; Zaller 1992).
If party polarization is driven by political elites, then which citizens
should exhibit the highest levels of polarization? Layman and Carsey (2002)
found that as elites have become more polarized across issue dimensions
(what they label "conflict extension"), party identifiers that are most aware
of those differences are the most likely to become similarly polarized across
issue dimensions.
We first examine strength of partisan political commitment. We expect
that people most committed to a partisan agenda are most likely to mimic
elites and view politics through a partisan lens. The results in table 16.3 support this hypothesis. As expected, strength of partisanship is fairly strongly
associated with levels of party polarization. Strong partisans are much more
polarized in their evaluations of the parties and presidential candidates than
are weak partisans and independents. In addition, partisans active in campaigning are more polarized than the rest of the electorate. Strong partisans
and people involved in many campaign activities produce the highest levels
of party polarization among the various subgroups we examine in this chapter. Similarly, those who care about the outcome of the presidential election
are substantially more polarized than politically apathetic citizens. In fact,
those who professed no interest in the presidential campaign produced no
evidence of polarization-the correlations between party and candidate thermometer ratings are statistically insignificant for this group of politically disinterested citizens. Those citizens most committed to partisan politics
(through campaign activity or their own party identification) produce the
highest levels of polarization.
It is worth noting the sizable numbers of people in the strongly committed categories of table 16.3. In 2004, one-third of the NES respondents were
strong partisans, while only IO percent were pure independents. Similarly,
22 percent engaged in high levels of campaign activity (two or more activities). The strongest and most active partisans, therefore, are not exactly a
thin slice of the electorate.
We also compare overtly partisan activity to other political activity that
is often nonpartisan (see the bottom of table 16.3). We examined two NES
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Table 16.3 Party Polarization by Political Commitment In 2004

Cm:re/aticm be111·ee11
party tlremwmelers

cmuliclate tlienmmreters

Stre11g1/r of parti.fcmsliip
Pure independent
Independent leaner
Weak partisan
Strong partisan

.30

- .28
- .51

- .17
- .32

- .47

- .70

- .78

- .29

- .50
- .55
- .80

Cc11111111ig 11 ac1i1,i1y
None
One
Two or more

- .51
- .60

Cares who 11 iru election
No

Yes

- .08"'
- .50

- .06"'

- .65

Member ofcm orgc111i:.a1im1 (11mrreligio11s)
No

- .43

- .57

Yes

- .52

- .68

No

- .46

Yes

- .52

- .59
- .68

Worked with others in tire cc11111111111ity

Source: American National E lection Study 2004.
•• nonsignilicant

questions that asked whether respondents worked with others in their community on local issues or whether they belonged to any kind of nonreligious
organization (such as a union, school group, or hobby club, for example).
While we see that people who work with others in their community or are
members of an organization are more polarized than nonparticipants in their
views of the parties and presidential candidates, the differences are fairly
mild. This suggests that it is a commitment to partisan activity rather than
political activity per se that is the stronger predictor of polarization.
If party polarization is elite driven, then we also expect levels of polarization to be highest among citizens who are most attentive to the politics
that elites produce. We test this hypothesis by examining some measures of
political awareness and interest (see table I 6.4). As expected, party polarization is more severe among the highly knowledgeable and highly interested
segments of the public.6 Furthermore, people who see important differences
between the political parties are more polarized than those who see no party
differences. Thus, party polarization rises among the segment of the general
public that is most attentive to politics in the United States.
In another element of the elite-driven theory of party polarization, we
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Party Polarization by Awareness and Mobilization In 2004
Corrdmim1 betn·een
party thermometers

c·,mdidme tliermometer.1·

Sees cm important differe11ces between parties

No
Yes
Political knowledge
Low
Medium

High
/II/ere:;/ i11 politirnl camJmiKll.'i
Not much
Somewhat
Very much

- .18
- .53

- .49
- .64

- .36
- .47

- .47
- .63
- .72

- .57
- .25
- .39

- .58

- .37
- .56
- .70

- .36
- .60

-.57
-.67

Ccmlllcted hy a politirnl pllrt)'

No
Yes

Se111ru : Amcr1ean Na1ion.al Ek1::1ion S1ud)' 200,t.

expect higher levels of polarization among people who are mobilized by po•
litical parties. We examine whether mobilization efforts by political parties
may be a source of increased polarization (see table I 6.4 ). As expected,
those who have been contacted by one of the political parties indeed are
more polarized than those who avoid party contact (particularly in their evaluations of the two parties). This is significant because 45 percent of NES
respondents in 2004 reported being contacted by a political party, a substantial increase from previous years. By comparison, for example, only 20 percent reported contact by a political party in the 1992 presidential election.
The mobilization efforts of political parties, which have expanded dramatically in recent elections, have likely contributed to the growing polarization
of the American public.
We also examine the news media as an elite influence on public opinion.
Perhaps party polarization is shaped by these sources of news and other political information, especially by the new forms of media in the United
States. For example, some scholars see the Internet as a polarizing force in
American democracy because of the user's ability to filter out opposing
views (Sunstein 200 l; Bimber and Davis 2003 ). Others suggest that talk
radio is a source of political persuasion (Barker 2002) and may polarize the
public due to the red-meat content of some talk radio programs.
Indeed, we find higher levels of polarization among people who get campaign information from the Internet and listen to political talk radio (see
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table 16.5). However, this may reflect self-selective attention to politics
among Internet users and talk radio listeners, rather than the independent
effects of talk radio and the Internet on the public. We also find somewhat
higher levels of polarization among people who get campaign news from
newspapers and from television, two staples of the old mainstream media.
Thus, it appears that attention to politics through any medium-not just new
forms of media-contributes to party polarization.
Finally, we examine several demographic factors to look for other correlates of party polarization in 2004 (see table 16.6). First, we examine the
familiar red state-blue state divide, and we find little difference in party polarization between Republican (red) and Democratic (blue) states. Furthermore, party polarization was no higher in the "purple" battleground states
of the 2004 presidential election than in the noncompetitive states. 7 Finally,
there does not appear to be a strong regional basis for party polarization in
the United States. Thus, party polarization is not confined to a particular set
of states based on region or partisanship.
In terms of other demographic variables, we find somewhat higher levels
of party polarization among women, whites, upper income earners, elderly
citizens, and married couples. However, most of these demographic differences in party polarization are not nearly as strong as those associated with
political awareness and political commitment (presented above). Further-

Tobie 16.5

Medin Usage Correlates or Party Polarization in 2004

Correlc11ic111 be1wee11
party themwmeters

cm1didate tllen11m11eters

Listens to political talk mdio
No
Yes

- .37

- .53

-.56

- .70

- .37
- .45

- .55
- .57

-.55

- .69

Saw campaign irifon11atim1 ml 1l1e /111emet
Has no internet access
No, but has Internet access
Yes

Read about rnmpaig11 in a newspaper i11 past week
Did not read a newspaper in the
past week
No, but did read a newspaper
Yes

- .40
- .49
- .49

- .49
- .62
- .65

- .38
- .44
- .53

- .59

A11e111io11 to campaign 011 11atimwl TV llell's
Did not watch national TV news
Some, very iillle, or none
Quite a bit or a great deal
Source: Amcrkan Nalional Elcclion S1utly 2004.

- .54
- .67
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Demogruphic Correlutes of Purty Polurizutlon in 2004

Correltllicm hetwee11
party ther1110111eter.1·

nmtlidate ther1110111eter.1·

State p,mi.w111J/iip
Red
Purple (baltleground)
Blue

- .49
- .50
- .43

- .58
- .62
- .63

Region
Northeast
North Central
South
West

- .44
- .54
- .48
- .40

-

Ge11der
Male
Female

- .41
- .52

- .58

Race
Nonwhite
White

- .26

- .52

- .43
- .64

.63
.63
.60
.58

- .64

/11co111e
Bottom third
Middle third
Top third

- .62

- .49
- .63
- .67

Age
18- 35
36- 60
Over 60

- .39
- .47
- .54

- .57
- .61
- .64

Marital .1·1,1111.1·
Married
Unmarried

- .54
- .34

-.66
- .51

- .39

- .44

So11rce: Aml!rican National Ekction Study 2004.

more, several of the demographic measures, including income, age, race, and
marital status, may simply be proxies for political activity and proximity to
the political system. For each of the demographic comparisons in table 16.6,
the subgroup with the highest voter turnout rate produces the highest levels of
party polarization. The results in table 16.6 tend to reinforce the conclusion
that party polarization is strongly related to political activity and awareness.

Conclusion
In studying political polarization in the United States, it is important to
consider the us-versus-them mentality that accompanies diverging positions
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on important issues. We have attempted to measure this psychological component of party polarization using questions common to the NES battery for
several elections. We find that the 2004 election stands out as the most polarized presidential campaign in forty years. This finding is consistent with several studies that have documented growing party polarization in the American public (Hetherington 200 I; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, 2005;
Layman 200 I). One dissenter is Fiorina (2005, 25), who argues that there
is partisan polarization but not "popular" polarization along other lines of
disagreement. The resurgence of parties in recent years, however, means that
parties are once again the primary organizing force in American mass politics. To look for another type of polarization is to look for a straw man.
In examining sources of party polarization in the United States, we find
evidence consistent with the theory that polarization is an elite-driven phenomenon. People tend to follow the opinion leadership of elites who share
their political predispositions, and people tend to view politics through more
partisan-colored glasses when elites engage in partisan conflict. We find the
strongest levels of party polarization among those most committed and attentive to political elites in the United States. In addition, mobilization efforts by the political parties appear to contribute to polarization in the general public. By comparison, we find little evidence that regional differences
are sources of party polarization.
Once unleashed, it is difficult to rein in the forces creating party polarization. It might be defused by the emergence of a group of elite political
figures who reach across party boundaries, as senators John McCain and Joe
Lieberman have done. However, recent history does not offer much encouragement, because politicians who reach out to the other political party often
get punished by their own party. Senator Lieberman was soundly defeated
when he sought the Democratic nomination for president in 2004. Senator
McCain, too, was defeated when he campaigned for the GOP presidential
nomination in 2000, and there is tremendous distrust of Senator McCain
among Republicans after his attempts to find legislative compromises with
Democrats on issues such as campaign finance reform, global warming, and
immigration.
Party polarization among the mass public tends to reinforce a political
strategy of pleasing the party base. For example, President Bush's nomination of White House counsel Harriet Miers to be a Supreme Court justice
was not derailed by Democrats but by Republicans who were uncertain of
her qualifications and conservative bona fides. After the Miers nomination
was withdrawn, the president responded by nominating Judge Samuel Alito,
who holds more firmly established conservative views.
From our vantage point, polarization at the elite level shows no signs of
abating. As a result, party polarization among the public will likely continue
as well.
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Notes
I. Dan Baiz, ..For Bush, a Deepening Divide," \VcHhi11gto11 Post, September 7, 2005.
2 . The poll numbers were retrieved from PollingReport.com, h11p://www.pollingrcpor1
.com/disasters.him.
3 . Thomas B. Edsall and James V. Grimaldi, ~on Nov. 2, GOP Gol More Bang for its
Billion, Analysis Shows," Waslii11gtm1 Past, December 30, 2004.
4. The weaker correlation between party thermometer.; prior to 1980 may be a queslionwording artifact. Prior to 1978, lhe NES asked rcspondenls to rate "Republican~" and "Democrats" on the reeling thermometers. Since then, ii ha~ asked people 10 rate the .. Republican
Party" and 1hc "Democralic Party."
5. Our campaign activily measure is constructed from six item~ that asked rcspondenls
whether or nol they participated in specific actions: tried to influence others. allended a meeting, wore a campaign button, donated to a candidate, donated to a party, or other campaign
ilClivity.
6. Our political knowledge measure is constructed from eight factual questions in the
NES survey (identifying individual polilicill figures, which party is more conservative, and
which party controls more scats in the House and Senate). We summed the number of correct
re~ponses to the eight items and then collapsed the resulting scale into thirds.
7. We categorize red, purple, and blue ~talcs using the same classification as Abramowitz ,1nd S,1unders (2005). George Bush won the red s1a1es by at least six percentage poinls,
and John Kerry won the blue states by a1 least six poinls. The margin of victory in the purple
states was less than six points.
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Party Coalitions in the American Public
Morality Politics, Issue Agendas, and the 2004 Election
John R. Perrocik
The New Deal party coalitions were defined by region, religion, national
origin, race, and social class. These particular cleavages were not novel. 1
Similar social differences distinguished party supporters in comparable
Western European party systems. The distinctiveness of the American parties was in the weakness with which these differences correlated with party
preference. Moreover, although Catholics and Protestants preferred different
parties, neither party embraced the "religious impulse." The class basis of
the party system was extremely weak. The Democratic Party was associated
with "average" Americans, while the GOP was linked to the wealthy and
big business, but party identification correlated only weakly with measures
of social status.
These previously missing social cleavages in American party politics
have become prominent within the last twenty years. The religious impulse,
expressed in the concern of Republican politicians and activists with moral,
ethical, and religion-based issues, has become an increasingly important aspect of interparty debate (Abramowitz 1997). Simultaneously, social class
has become one of the strongest correlates of party preference: Republican
and Democratic identifiers have become increasingly distinct in their religiosity and social class. The changes have had an effect on the issue agendas
of the parties.

Social Cleavages and Party Systems
The key to this connection between groups and parties is the influence
of social characteristics and their associated structures on the perceptions,
beliefs, and interests of citizens. Social characteristics place us within networks of common experiences that buttress our already powerful tendency

280

Jolin R. Petrocik

to develop social identities (see Tajfel and Turner 1986; Sidanius and Pratto
200 I). We think of ourselves as, for example, Irish Catholic, African American, Jewish, Christian, or an average working person. We look at the world
through this identity; others are inclined to see us in these terms as well and
conduct themselves accordingly. A group's members experience similar advantages, disadvantages, and relationships with others within and outside the
group. Such common experiences lead to ever more distinctive beliefs and
perceptions. The salience of any social identity varies among individuals and
groups but their existence is a virtual constant. When the identity is linked
to real and imagined material and symbolic wins and losses, the groups frequently organize into opposing political parties.
Social Groups and Electoral Issues

Political issue conflict is affected because the party-group alignment dictates the issue concerns and policy prescriptions of a party. The linkage is
completely recursive: groups support a party because of the policies it promotes; the party promotes certain policies because it draws supporters, activists, and candidates from particular groups. Tangible economic interests
are often behind party competition, as when managers and employees are
locked into disputes over wages and terms of employment. At other times
the conflict is largely symbolic: ethnic self-esteem and cultural beliefs are at
issue. Indeed there are probably as many symbolic conflicts as there are material ones in modem societies-and the intensity of the former is at least as
great. A party's candidates and leaders may offer policy proposals as public
goods in which all will share, but a party's proposals have their origins in
the values and interests of their supporters.
Not surprisingly, therefore, a party's vision of the "common good" is
often unshared or even opposed by those outside the party. These latter issues tend to arise from the concerns of groups associated with only one
party. Democrats, reflecting the prominence of African Americans and other
ethnic minorities among their supporters, commonly see serious racial discrimination problems in need of attention by the government. Republicans,
with few supporters from minority ethnic groups, tend not to see racial discrimination as particularly pressing. Their attention is much more likely to
be drawn to government spending and taxes, reflecting the values and interests of the upscale and business interests that are overrepresented among
contemporary GOP supporters.
The specificity of the party's position on any issue depends on the diversity of the party's constituency. A party with a support base that is specific
to a small number of groups has, ceteris paribus, a greater likelihood of
adopting highly specific and detailed positions on issues, because there is
only a small chance that the position will be internally divisive. A diverse
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coalitional party, by contrast, has a greater likelihood of alienating important
coalitional segments with any given (but not every) issue position because
of the greater probability that one or more of the groups in the coalition will
be opposed. Their positions on issues are often more general, or even nonexistent. Indeed, both parties can broadly agree about some matters as a result
of the presence of the affected group in both parties. In the case of the diverse "big tent" Democrats and Republicans, for example, issue specificity
is often low, issue differences between the parties are comparatively small,
and the issue space-defined as a range of support and opposition within
each party for any given issue-can be relatively large (see Carmines and
Stimson 1989; Ladd 1970; Petrocik 1981, 1987, 1998; Sundquist 1983).

Religion and Social Class as American Party Cleavages
Religion and social class differences between the parties have been particularly weak. While it is conventional to think of the GOP as the party of
business and the middle and upper classes, upscale Americans were only
slightly less Democratic (at 53 percent Democrat compared to 39 percent
Republican) than those in the bottom half (who were 58 percent Democratic
and 33 percent Republican). Divisions between Catholics and Protestants
confounded class; national origin and regional cultures divided coreligionists and made it difficult to develop or sustain class or religiously linked
party loyalties (see Benson 1961; Kelley 1979; Kleppner 1970; Upset 1963;
Wolfinger 1965). Religious observance was meaningful only within the context of a religion: the most religiously observant Catholics and Jews were
the most Democratic, but religious observance per se was unrelated to party
preference and voting (see Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Campbell et al. l 960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson,
and Gaudet 1944; Lenski 1961; Upset 1960, 1970; Lubell 1952). Overall,
the insignificance of religion and class in shaping party loyalty set the United
States apart from the norm (Rose and Urwin 1970).2

The New Deal Party Coalitions
Region was the dominant distinction between Democrats and Republicans in the New Deal party system. The regional difference was not a mask
for race, religion, or any other social characteristic. Individuals otherwise
identical by religion, social class, and so on were significantly more likely
to be Democrats if they lived in the Deep South or a Border South state.~
Outside of the South, Catholics were significantly more Democratic than
Protestants, and Jews were measurably more Democratic than Catholics. But
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social class had virtually no effect on the Democratic preference of either
group. Ethnic loyalties and socialization made their Democratic allegiance
"sticky" and resistant through the 1950s to crosscutting class pressures. The
only factor that significantly affected the partisanship of these groups to any
degree was union membership. Catholics and Jews who lived in union
households were more Democratic than those who lived in nonunion households. The effect was larger for Catholics largely because Jews were so
Democratic that the influence of union membership was held down by something of a "ceiling effect."
Northern Protestants were the most politically heterogeneous and divided by social differences. Race mattered; blacks were forty-three percentage points more Democratic than Republican, while whites had a fourteen•
point Republican bias. Union membership had a big effect on the party identification of white Northern Protestants (hereafter, "WASPs"). Social class
influence was a weak overall influence on party preference, but it made a
difference among some groups. Upscale WASPs were thirty-five percentage
points more Republican than Democratic; less well•off WASPs had a party
bias that was only twelve points more Republican.
Table 17.1 organizes the social differences in a way that identifies the
discrete social groups that define the elements of each party's coalition:' It
reports the party bias of each group and the contribution each made to the
Democratic and Republican electorate of the 1950s. African Americans are
collected as a group because they were measurably more Democratic than

Tobie 17.1 The New Deni Party Coulitions us or the 1950s
Proportio11 of U.S.
Pop11lmio11
Southern whites
Border South whites
Jews
Blacks
Catholics
Union households
Immigrant Southerners
Downscale WASPs
Upscale WASPs
Others

Ai•emge

16%
5
3
9
13
19
2
14
16

5

Democmts
26%
6
4
10
14
21
1
10
7
2

Rep11blicw1.1·
7%
5

I
5
9
15
3
21
30
4

Party Bicu
- 59
- 29

- 51
- 33
- 29
- 29
18
12
35

35
- 17

Sm1ra: American National Election Studies.
Not,·s: The party bias is the difference in the proportion identifying as Dcmocrntic. lcss the proportion
idemifying as Republican. Negative numbers indicate a plurnlity of Dcmocr,us, positive numbers a plur,llity of Republicans. The other columns arc pcrccmagcs which tolal 100 percent. with some rounding
error.
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any comparable group of white citizens-and no other social trait differentiated their partisanship. In addition, reflecting the impact of union affiliation
on party preference, Catholics or WASPs from a union household are classified as "union households." Blacks, Jews, and Southern whites were given
priority status both because no variable further specified their party identification and because of the substantive political salience of the social groups
they represent.
The parties were most divided on the social welfare issues that defined
the policy agenda of the New Deal realignment. The mean difference between the party's supporters on racial issues was trivial because Southern
whites, a significant element in the Democratic coalition, were as conservative on racial matters as other parts of the Democratic coalition were liberal.
Foreign policy issues throughout the period also did little to differentiate
Democratic identifiers from Republican partisans.
The diverse and often contrary position of the groups within each party's
coalition-but especially the Democrats-mandated campaigns that centered on social spending, social welfare, and role of government issues (Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003-2004 ). Welfare issues were a source of
party voting and other issues shaped defection rates while simultaneously
being responsible for one of the hallmarks of American voters: their low
levels of issue voting. Americans were party voters (upwards of 75 percent
cast a vote consistent with their party identification for president and Congress), but because their partisanship was poorly related to their attitudes on
many matters, they were not issue voters.'

The Contemporary Party Coalitions
A substantial relationship among party preference, class, and religiosity
emerged by the 1980s. Figure 17. I shows this change. A slight overall erosion in Democratic strength was dominated by a large shift to the GOP
among upscale and religiously observant Americans by the 1980s. Religiosity and class created a party divide in excess of twenty points by the start of
the 1990s. Class differences are sharper now (since lower-SES Americans
are clearly Democratic), but religiosity is also a substantial current influence
on partisanship (see Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld
1989; Layman 2001; Miller and Shanks 1996; and Stonecash 2000 for similar findings).
A Religious and Class Cleavage

A party difference of more than twenty points exists between observant
and less observant Catholics; the class difference in partisanship is forty

284

John R. Pelrocik

Figure 17.1

The Effect or Religiosity and Class on Partisanship

(White Catholics and Protestants only)
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points. Upscale Catholics prefer the GOP over the Democrats by almost fifteen points, while less-well-off Catholics prefer the Democrats over the Republicans by more than twenty points. Today, observant Catholics are
slightly Republican overall, while less-religious Catholics are about twenty
points more Democratic than Republican (Gilbert 1993; Guth and Green
1992; Jelen 1991; Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Smidt 1993).
Southern whites are a good group with which to observe the change. The
sixty-point Democratic plurality that was undifferentiated by social class or
religion in the 1950s became a slight GOP bias with substantial religious
and class dimensions in the 1990s. Religious and upscale Southern whites
changed the most. They made a disproportionate contribution to the increase
in the class and religious differences between Democrats and Republicans.
Today, upscale Southern whites are about forty points more Republican than
Democrat; lower-SES Southern whites are evenly divided. Religiously observant Southern whites identify about thirty points more with the GOP,
while those who are not observant are evenly divided in their party preference.6 The national pattern appears in figure 17.1.
Religion and class effects have not been uniform. African Americans
became more Democratic irrespective of religiosity or social class.7 There is
a slight party difference associated with social class and religiosity among
Jews, but no longitudinal trend to the difference.H With these caveats, markers of class and religiosity differentiated partisanship by the end of the
1990s: upscale, religious, and nonunion Catholics and Protestants were more
inclined to the Republicans than their lower-SES, union, and less religiously
observant counterparts.

The New Coalitions
Table 17 .2 reports the party coalitions that emerged from the changes
since the I 970s.9 Religiously observant whites are 59 percent Republican
and 32 percent Democratic and contribute 35 percent of all GOP identifiers.
Further, the magnitude of the religiously observant among Republicans (35
percent) makes them the single largest group in the GOP coalition. Their
movement into Republican ranks is the largest contributor to the erosion of
the Democratic plurality in party identification between the 1950s and the
current period. Upscale respondents (identified with the GOP by a margin of
54 to 38 percent) contribute another 17 percent to the Republican coalition.
Upscale and religious Americans constitute more than 50 percent of all Republicans; the Democratic electorate receives about 26 percent of its support
from these two groups. The Democratic core is the 37 percent who are African American, Hispanic, Jewish, or Asian. The remaining groups make relatively similar contributions to both parties.
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The Contemporury Purty Coulitions, 1992-2004

Proportio11 of U.S.
Pop11lmi011
African Americans
Hispanics
Jews
Union household
Low-SES Catholics
Low-SES WASPs
No religious preference
Upscale Catholics
Upscale WASPs
Religious Calholics
Religious Pro1es1ants
Asians/Others
A1•1m1ge

12%
8

3

Democrms

20%
10
4

Rep11hlic1111s

2%
6
I

Party Bicu

-

72
33
67
15
22

II
4
10

14

II

4
8

10

-4

12
5
7

13
5
5
7
9
3

II
5

- 15

12

31
5
39
14

8

17
4

4

8

27
4

-4

-7

Source: American Na1ional Election StudiC>"
Notes: The parly bias is the difference in the propor1ton identifying as Democmtic, le..s 1he proportio■
identifying as Republican. Negative number.. indicate a plurality of Dcmutrats. po~itivc numbers a plu•
rality of Republicans. The 01hcr columns are pcrccnla!!c~ which total JOO percent, with ~ome rounding
error.

The 2004 Election
In general, George W. Bush assembled the typical coalition of a winning
GOP presidential candidate (see table 17 .3). The elements of the party coalitions voted in 2004 much as they have since 1992, and not much differently
from each group's voting pattern since the mid-1980s. Bush received substantial majorities from the religiously observant, upper-status whites, and
white voters in general. He did poorly among blacks, Hispanics, and Jews;
lost voters in union households by a substantial margin (as Republicans frequently do); and essentially split the vote of whites with below-median incomes.
There is some indication that the 2004 vote may have had a CatholicProtestant dimension. Religious Catholics and lower-SES/nonreligious
Catholics were slightly less supportive of Bush than both normally are when
Republicans win the presidential election. Bush's support among religious
Protestants and lower-SES/nonreligious Protestants was correspondingly
higher than his win might have led an observer to expect. All four groups
might have been responding to John Kerry's public (albeit low-key) embrace
of his Catholic faith. However, some caution is in order here. It is easy to find
significance in this Catholic-Protestant difference, but it may be statistical
oscillation that indicates nothing of substantive significance. It is worth noting only because religion, religiosity, moral-cultural issues, and social iden-
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Table 17.3 Contemporary Party Coalitions and the Presidential Vote, 1992- 2004

Percent mti11g Rep11blica11for presicle111 in
2004
African Americans
Hispanics
Jews
Union household
Low-SES Catholics
Low-SES WASPs
No religious preference
Upscale Catholics
Upscale WASPs
Religious Catholics
Religious Prote~tants
As ians/Others

All 1•aters

10%
33
17
42
33

2000

8%

35

/996

1%
20

8

7

39
59
50
40
52

20

67

61

50
76
74

56
70
40

23
40
33
46
50
54
67
33

52%

487,::

4/%

62

52
57

/992
6%

35
9
30
19
34
45
31
50
43
62
54
38'1,

S011rce: American National Election Studies.
Note: The relatively low GOP prcJidential vote umong ~omc 11roups in 1992 rcnccts Ross Pcrol's success in 1992.

tifiers seemed to be stimulated by this election a bit more than in recent elections simply because the religious faith of the candidates was a topic for
observers, the candidates, and the respective party campaigns.

Issues in the Comemporary Part)' Coalitions
We expect the government and the political process to spend a considerable amount of energy dealing with issues that arise from the economic and
social features of the nation. But what constitutes an issue for government
action is clearly in the eye of the beholder. Different groups are differently
positioned relative the dynamics of the society, and this tangible self-interest
factor shapes what is perceived to be an "important" issue (e.g., agreements
that facilitate production overseas by U.S. companies mobilize opposition
from those whose livelihoods may be threatened), but material interests are
not the only source of conflict.
Ethnic groups that promote bilingual education are often as motivated
by a commitment to carve out a place for their culture as they are for educational programs that improve prospects for the success of their children.
Campaigns to establish holidays for significant figures within minority
groups, the renaming of public facilities, or lobbying that attempts to produce foreign policies desired by the countries from which their families emigrated are typically motivated by ethnic or racial identification.
Religious groups and those with strong religious impulses attempt to in-
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fluence policies that create a public space that recognizes and promotes values and beliefs rooted in religion. They care about these matters and view
the political process and government in these terms.
Measuring Issue Effects

There are several ways to examine the issue effects of the contemporary
party coalitions. This analysis focuses on evaluations of the parties and candidates.10
First, one would expect that the ties between the parties and the various
social groups would be reflected in the comments made about the parties by
voters. A simple example: among union members and their family members,
an identification of the GOP with business might be expected to elicit references to labor policy as a reason to dislike the Republican Party but like the
Democratic Party. If this issue was particularly prominent in the party conflict, it might also emerge as a reason to like the GOP and dislike the Democratic Party among Republican identifiers, especially the most upscale Republicans. This measure may be more information-rich than a series of
cross-sectional correlations between the issues of the moment and party assessments, because it is a slightly better indicator of long-term assessments,
although the evaluations also reflect immediate concerns of the election at
hand.
Second, and this is implied in the previous point, the open-ended evaluations allow one to examine the penetration of issues throughout the electorate. If one side's reasons for liking a party or candidate are offered as reasons
for disliking the same party or candidate by the other side, it suggests that a
particular issue or group of issues are central elements of the party cleavage
and will be prominent in partisan elections. By contrast, an issue that arises
among partisans of only one party might be regarded as less central and consequently less likely to be a regular point of contention.
Finally, responses to open-ended questions about problems requiring
government action are a particularly demanding test of the degree of politicization of various classes of issues. They allow citizens to proffer, largely
without the limitation imposed by the prior expectations of the researcher,
what they find to be the most prominent features of the parties and candidates. Compared to closed questions, the open-ended format tends to elicit
responses for more salient issues, thereby also permitting the analysis to
identify the sources of the issues that provide policy debate. Further, as is the
case with the party and candidate evaluations, there are at least two plausible
predictions about the sources of the problem mentions. Minimally, one
might expect only the groups most likely to care about a problem to mention
it (for instance, the religiously oriented might be particularly inclined to
mention moral and value issues). But it is possible that the issue would be
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so identified with a party that it would be mentioned as a problem by many,
not just those with a particular investment in it. The salience of these problems can be further assessed by examining their influence on the Bush-Kerry
vote. As before, we could observe asymmetry- issues linked to the GOP
coalition might matter most to Republicans or the groups most sensitive to
an issue. It is also possible that the issues are so endemic to the partisanship
of the electorate that that they provide voting criteria on both sides.

Party and Candidate Images in 2004
Four issue categories, representing the bulk of all mentions, are reported
in this analysis. The most common comments about the candidates referred
to personal qualities (strong, decisive, weak, experienced, and so forth). But
the discrete issue comments largely fell into four categories: moral and value
references (hereafter also referred to as "cultural issues" or "cultural and
moral issues"), social welfare issues, matters dealing with economic policy,
and foreign policy and defense (including terrorism). Foreign policy and defense references were the most common comments about the candidates, reflecting, one might surmise, the facts of U.S. military involvement in the
Middle East and the national emphasis on terrorism and security. The interesting responses for this analysis are the prominence of cultural and moral
references, and that they were more common than social welfare issues.
Party issue evaluations confirm the candidate comments. The noteworthy feature of the party mentions, which differ slightly, is that moral and
cultural issues are prominently mentioned as reasons to like and dislike both
parties, while social welfare issues were a feature of the Democratic Party,
and economic policy was identified with the Republicans.
Particularly noteworthy is the differential prominence of the issues in
the assessment of the candidates and parties. Cultural issues were a particular strength of Bush. Thirty-five percent offered a cultural or moral issue as
a reason to prefer Bush over Kerry, with 19 percent giving it as a reason to
like Bush and 16 percent mentioning the issue as a reason to dislike Kerry.
About one-third of those mentioning a cultural issue as a reason to like
George Bush or dislike Kerry mentioned the issue as a reason to both like
Bush and dislike Kerry. Kerry, by comparison, was much more likely to be
viewed in tenns of social welfare concerns: 29 percent offered this type of
issue as a reason to like him ( 18 percent) or dislike Bush ( 11 percent), but
only 7 percent mentioned social welfare issues positively in connection with
Bush (with 4 percent finding this a reason to like Bush and 3 percent a reason
to dislike Kerry). Economic issue mentions followed a similar pattern. Foreign policy references were also asymmetric and mostly reflected a positive
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assessment of Bush (probably not surprising for an incumbent president who
projected strong leadership in the middle of warlike conditions).
The likes and dislikes of parties that were mentioned are slightly different but illustrate more sharply the issue links to the parties. There is imbalance on issues of social welfare (favoring the Democrats) and economic policy and foreign affairs (favoring the Republicans). But cultural issues are
balanced in their mentions of likes and dislikes for both parties. In the aggregate, 34 percent mentioned cultural issues as a reason to prefer the Republicans, with nearly equal proportions offering it as a reason to like the GOP
( 19 percent) as to dislike the Democrats ( 15 percent). The proportions for the
Democrats were slightly different. Overall 32 percent referred to this type of
issue in commenting on the Democrats. Fewer respondents stated it as areason to like the Democrats ( 12 percent) than offering it as a reason to dislike
the Republicans (20 percent). The data on cultural issues indicate how salient they are as issue cleavages between the parties and show that there is
considerable agreement on this issue as an appropriate criterion to evaluate
the parties. Most of those who mentioned morality or values as a reason to
like Bush also gave morality and value reasons to dislike Kerry-and vice
versa.
The social groups that define a party's coalition provide its issue agenda.
Table 17.4 focuses on just cultural and social welfare issues, the two that
plausibly are the most likely to be linked to the groupings that define the

Tuble 17.4 Issue Mentions In Evoluutions or the Cundldutcs by Coalition Groups
Type of Positil'e Me111im1 of1/11: CanJida/e.1'
Kerry

811sl,

Party Bias
African Americans
Hispanics
Jews
Union household
Low-SES Catholics
Low-SES WASPs
No religious preference
Upscale Catholics
Upscale WASPs
Religious Catholics
Religious Protestants
Asians/Others

A1•erage

- 72

C11h11ral
3%

Welfare
2%
4

- 33
- 67

12
2

0

- 15

IO

5

- 22

4

-4

3

18

- 15
- 4
31

5

2
6
4
2

5

39
14

- 7

4

12
27
32
16

14%

I
4
5
3%

C11l111ral
4%
11
29
II
II
5
14
16

5
9
3
3
9%

Welfare
15%
II

12
19
13
II
13
8
4
20
6
14

12%

Source: American Na1ional Election Studies.
Nolt!: The table reports the proportion of each coalition group that made at least one positive mention

of a cultur.11 or social welfare issue in evaluating the candidates.
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contemporary coalitions. The table reports the proportion of each coalition
group that made at least one positive mention of a cultural or social welfare
issue in evaluating the candidates. The table ignores the fact that some
groups tended to mention some issues more than once, thereby not producing a complete enumeration of the proportion of all issue mentions that fall
into the category. However, this decision doesn't distort the pattern, and it
eases the presentation of what would otherwise be extensive tabular data.
Twenty-seven percent of religious Catholics mentioned cultural issues at
least once in explaining why they liked George Bush.1 1 Religious Protestants
were even more likely to do so. If it were not for these groups, the rate of
cultural mentions would have been well below IO percent overall, and given
the prominence of these groups in the GOP coalition, the incidence of cultural references within the Republican Party would have been drastically
less, because upwards of 50 percent of the positive assessments of Bush and
the GOP were contributed by these two groups. Welfare concerns were rarely
mentioned as a positive comment about Bush.
John Kerry's assessments are not quite mirror images of references to
Bush. Social welfare references are more prominent among reasons to like
Kerry, but cultural issue references are slightly more prominent in reasons
to like him also. The key difference is that for Kerry they do not come from
groups that are religiously defined. The cultural issue "mentioners" are more
identified by class and status or, in the case of Jews, with a religious minority
traditionally opposed to the religious and values references that are categorized as cultural in these data. The net result is that, between these two issues,
the Republican Party's constituency views candidates in terms of cultural
issues, while Democratic groups give considerable attention to social welfare
issues.
Table 17.5 repeats the preceding breakdown for the comments about the
political parties, with similar results. The religiously observant were particularly likely to mention cultural issues and unlikely to mention social welfare
issues as one of the things they like about the Republicans. Interestingly, the
most Democratic groups-the secular, those from union households, Jews,
and low-SES Catholics-also mentioned cultural issues as a reason to prefer
the Democrats. The cultural issue mentions of these groups, however, were
mirror images of the reasons offered by respondents in the religious groups.
This difference between candidate and party evaluations seems meaningful. Immediate issues, which may be short lived, are likely to have a
strong effect on the way individual candidates are evaluated by the electorate. However, the parties are more enduring, and the relative consensus of
the electorate-even across the party divide-about the issue reasons for liking one party and not the other is a noteworthy marker of the status of the
issue as central to the programmatic divisions of the party system. In this
case, the fact that partisans of both parties mention cultural issues more often
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Issue Mentions in Evuluations of the Political Parties by Coalition Groups

T)1ie of Positil>e Me111im1 11f the Pllrtie.1·
Rep111,/ic,m
Pllrty Bill.\'
African Americans
Hispanics
Jews
Union household
Low-SES Catholics
Low-SES WASPs
Secular
Upscale Catholics
Upscale WASPs
Religious Catholics
Religious Protestants
Asians/Others

C11/t11ral

33
67
15
22
-4
- 15
-4
31
5

39
14

- 7

Ai•emge

Welfwe

5%
7
5
5
3
7
6

- 72

-

De11wcru1ic
C11/tura/

1%
3
12
2

10%
7
29
17
19
7
22
17
22

I
6

3

17%
12
12
12
9
15
9

9

9
II
5

7
6
15
7
11

5%

14%

11%

8

5

16
21
27
13

10

3
8

11%

\Ve/fare

Source: American National Election Studies
Nore: The table reports the proportion of each coalition group that made al least one positive mention
of a cullur.al or social welfare issue in evaluating the parties.

than any of the others suggests that these issues will be prominent in politics
and governance.

Issue Concerns and the 2004 Vote
Whether the voters were reporting likes and dislikes about Kerry and
Bush or the Democrats and the GOP, those who mentioned cultural, eco-

Table 17.6

Evaluation Dimensions and the 2004 Presidential Vote

Cct11didate Em/rw1io11.1·
811.rh Vote

Party Ew1/11aticms
B11.rh Vote

Type of Issue Me11tio11ed £rpected Reported Gai1r/Los.1· Etpel'red Reported Gaiir/loss
Cultural
Social welfare
Economic
Foreign/Defense

55%
36
51
52

61 %
27
56
54

+6
-9
+5
+2

52%
42
57
52

54%
37
61
55

+2
- 5
+4
+3

Source: American National Election Studies.
Note: Table entries an: the Republican vote in percentages. fur the c.ikulation of the expected vote,
sec Converse ( 1966) and Pctrocik (1989).
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nomic, or foreign policy issues were, ceteris paribus, more likely to cast a
Republican vote than those who mentioned a social welfare issue in their
party or candidate evaluations (see table 17.6). The expected Republican
vote among those who mentioned a cultural issue in evaluating the candidates was 55 percent; the expected vole among those who mentioned a cultural issue in expressing their likes and dislikes about the parties was 52
percent Republican. The differences between the candidate and party expected vote columns reflect, as noted earlier, a difference in the way candidates and parties are viewed. Cultural issue perspectives are a more widely
distributed and salient perspective on the parties than they are on the candidates. Bush and Kerry may have differentially prospered (or suffered) from
this view of the parties. However, it is noteworthy that the cultural issues
shaping candidate evaluations are not candidate specific (and are perhaps
transient by virtue of that), but a more enduring aspect of the party systems
for the Democratic and Republican parties.
The low expected GOP vote among those mentioning social welfare issues is a second notable feature of the expected vote data. Democratic identifiers were much more likely than Republicans to offer social welfare issues
as a reason to like or dislike the candidates or parties, but especially as a
reason to like Kerry and the Democratic Party. Consequently, Bush's expected vote among respondents mentioning social welfare issues in evaluating him and Kerry was only 36 percent, and only slightly better (42 percent)
when the issue was mentioned as something they liked or disliked about the
parties.
A comparison of the expected and reported Bush vote by the type of
issue mentioned illustrates the additional impact of these issues. The second
and fifth columns of table 17.6 list the reported Bush vote associated with
these different mentions; the third and sixth columns report how much that
vote exceeded what was expected given the partisanship of the individuals.
Bush's majorities among those mentioning cultural issues in connection with
him and Kerry exceeded the partisan vote by approximately six percentage
points. It exceeded the partisan vote among those mentioning economic and
foreign policy issues by five and two points, respectively. The gains from
these issues were smaller when these issue mentions are connected with the
parties, but his vote exceeded the party baseline there as well- and the baseline party vote (column 4) is very Republican.
Bush's losses were concentrated among those who mentioned social
welfare issues in evaluating the candidates or the parties. When social welfare likes and dislikes were offered as evaluations of Bush and Kerry, Bush's
vote was only 27 percent (column 2)- a full nine percentage points below a
quite low baseline (column I). Social welfare mentions regarding the parties
did not seem to be so concentrated among Democratic partisans, but, as be-
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fore, Bush's vote was lower, by five percentage points, than the expected 42
percent.

The Issue Agenda of the 2004 Vote
Cultural issues were not at the top of voters' concerns in 2004. In response to a question about what problems were the most important issues
facing the country during the preceding year, cultural issues were among the
least frequently mentioned. Terrorism topped the list at 37 percent, and the
three most frequently mentioned- terrorism, Iraq, and foreign policy in general- were arguably nondomestic and constituted 62 percent of all the problems mentioned in the survey. But cultural and social welfare issues were
sufficiently compelling to moderate the effect of these issues on the vote.
Lurking (and that may be the apt word) behind this recognition of the prominence of defense and security issues was a set of enduring images of the
parties and concerns of voters- which were not front and center in 2004 but
nonetheless had a substantial impact on George Bush's reelection.
Table 17.7 stratifies the problem mentions by whether cultural and social
welfare evaluations were offered in the "like" and "dislike" mentions of the
candidates. The top half of the table contrasts those who mentioned cultural
issues with those who did not; the bottom half of the table contrasts those
who did and did not refer to social welfare issues. The impact of cultural and
welfare issues is impressive. Nominally hurtful (for Bush) issue concerns in

Tuble 17.7

Cumpuign Issues, Culturul Issues, and the Presidential Vote

l.uue 111e11tio11ed i11 e1•a/11<11i11g cw,didmes
Cultural issue

Most importam
20()4 i SJl/t!

Terrorism
Irnq
Foreign Policy

Not memicmed

Me111io11ed

69%

77%

29

46

53

51

Sodul Welfare issue
Not 111e11tio11ed

Terrorism
lrnq
Foreign Policy

Me111im1ecl

35

51%
17

57

33

74%

Scmrce: American National Election Studies.
Nme: Table entries arc the percentage voting for George W. Bush in 2004

Party Coalitions in tire American Public

295

2004 were trumped by cultural issue assessments of the candidates. On average, cultural issue mentions increased Bush's vote thirteen percentage
points, with increases in Bush's vote among those mentioning terrorism as
the major problem faced by the country during 2004. Impressively, even
those who mentioned Iraq as a major problem during 2004 were Bush voters
when they were also inclined to think of the candidates in cultural issue
terms, a result that probably demonstrates that Iraq was mentioned by two
very different groups in the electorate: those who supported the overthrow
of Saddam Hussein's regime and those who opposed this undertaking.
In contrast, voters who made social welfare assessments of the candidates-compared to those who did not-were strongly inclined to support
Kerry regardless of the problems they saw as important during 2004. Voters
who thought terrorism was a major problem for the country overwhelmingly
voted for Bush. Approximately three-quarters of them voted for Bush if social welfare issues were not part of the candidates' profiles, but Kerry took
half of the group who saw terrorism as a major problem but viewed the candidates in terms of social welfare issues. Indeed, as one goes down the second half of the table, Bush's support drops considerably-occasionally to a
very nominal level-whenever the voter also views the candidates through
the lens of social welfare issues.

Christian Democracy and the American Parties
The mix of sectarian, national origin, and immigrant-versus-native divisions that helped to suppress the link between party conflict and the religious
impulse through most of American history has largely vanished. The religiosity of Americans, however, remains high at the same time that new beliefs
and lifestyles have competed with traditional, often religiously linked, beliefs. Parallel efforts to reduce the heretofore overt role of religious belief
in the public space has also mobilized the religious and the most socially
conservative. The mobilization of the religious impulse by the GOP has created a Republican coalition that is highly similar to the coalitions that support Christian Democratic parties through much of the rest of the world. Its
impact on American electoral politics is to make cultural and moral issues a
centerpiece of party conflict, often able to trump economic concerns and
major international events.

Notes
I. In almost every society, party divisions correlate with social characteristics (Alford
1963; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Benson 1961; Converse 1974: Hays 1975: Kelley 1979; LaPa-
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lombara and Weiner 1966; Lijphart 1977, 1979, 1989; Upset 1963, 1970; Lipsel and Rokkan
1967; Maguire 1983; Powell 1982: Rokkan 1970; Rose 1974: Rose and Urwin 1969, 1970:
Ware 1996). They continue to maller today, and the nascent party systems of Eastern Europe
arc developing similar social cleavages (sec Evans and Whitefield 1993).
2. Consider, for example, Holland, which from the late 1940s until the early 1970s opcr•
alcd a very highly aligned party syslem. During this period, the five major parties drew their
support from very limited groups (sec Lijphart 1968). The Catholic People's party (KVP)
drew more than 90 percent of its support from religious Catholics, and 75 percent of religious
Catholics voted for the KVP-making it the largest of the five major parties. Religious Protestants surportcd the Christian Historical Union (CHU) or the Anti -Revolutionary party
(ARP), the former for theological liberals and the latter for conservatives. The rolitical party
link for the religious Protestants was as strong as the party link for religious Catholics. In
both cases, more than 70 percent of all CHU and ARP suprort came from "their" confessional groupings, and greater-than•60•rcrccnl majorities of each religious group supported
their group's party. The less religious supported the class-based Liberal (VVD) and Labor
(PvdA) parties, which drew massively disproportionate shares of their support from the mid·
die class (VVD) and working cla~s (PvdA). ;rhis has changed dramatically in the last twenty•
five years. Sec Rochon 1999 and Irwin 1984.
3. The Deep South refers to the states of Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Aorida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. The Border South states
arc Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
4. The party coalition profile resulted from an asymmetric analysis of variance of party
preference. The technique described in Sonquist, Baker, and Morgan ( 1973) is commonly
used by marketer.; in an attempt to identify the combinations of social characteristics that best
explain the variance in some derendent variable-party identification, in this case. The analysis is described in Petrocik 1981 and 1998. Detailed code to construct these groups can be
requested from the author.
5. Ultimately, these issue cleavages (and others) became the proximalc cause of the erosion of the Democratic plurality as the most disaffected Southern whites moved into the Republican Party in the 1970s and 1980s.
6. Changes among whites in the Border South have been smaller and similar to the patterns observed for Catholics: class differences arc quite strong, religious differences more
muted, and their aggregate party preference has a distinctive Democratic tilt.
7. However, the difference was small, and it distinguished only Democratic supermajor~
itics. The party bias of the less well off was sixty-eight percentage points Democratic. Upscale blacks gave an eighty-point plurality to the Democrats.
8. Upscale Hispanics were also Jes~ Democratic, but again there was no trend to the
difference. Religious observance was substantially unrelated to party preference.
9. The contempor.iry coalition profile is bused on the same kind of segmentation analysis used for the New Deal coalitions (sec note 4). The analysis merged the 1992, 1994, and
1996 NES ~urvcys. The data sets were weighted so that sample sizes did not allow any one
of the years to exert a disproportionate effect on the results. The same variables (region, religion, race, social class, religiosity, and size of place of residence) were analyzed. These re•
suiting groups arc, again, exclusive. The partisan homogeneity of African Americans, His•
panics, and Jews made them priorily groups irrespective of their social class, union
membership, or religiosity. Union membership emerged as u dominant charactcri~tic. Anyone
from a household with a union member is in the union category, except for respondents who
arc Jewish, black, or Hispanic. The religious categories, therefore, arc limited to avowed Prot•
estants and Catholics who arc not union members. Status difference among Catholics and
Protestants is limited to those who arc not union members and not categorized among the
religious. Detailed code to construct these groups can be requested from the author.
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10. These arc the standard "master code" party and candidate questions. Respondents
arc asked whether there is anything they like about a candidate or party (each is identified by
name). If they indicate that there is something they like, a follow -up question asks them what
it is that they like about the candidate or party. The specific codes assigned to the issue men•
tions arc available on request.
11. This numbers in this table and table 17.S slightly undercount the references because
some 7- 10 percent had nothing lo say about Bush. Nonmentions of likes and dislikes about
the parties was even higher (about 25 percent). However, it ~eemed belier to include those
who had no reply to the questions in order to not introduce other distortions. This count algorithm has the virtue of faithfully counting the proportion of each grour who made the men•
tion. It is a conservative way of counting and Jlrobably has fewer distortions than alternative
methods.
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The Rise of the Ideological Voter
The Changing Bases of Partisanship in the American Electorate
Kyle L. Saunders and Alan I. Abramowitz

In Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities
of Voters, Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler (2002)
argue that party identification in the United States is based on voters' social
identities rather than on a rational assessment of the parties' policies or performance in office. Green and his colleagues make four major claims about
the nature of contemporary party identification:
I. Party identification is more stable at both the aggregate and the individual level than most recent scholarship has suggested. Outside of
the South, there has been little change in the distribution of party
identification in the United States for several decades (52-84).
2. Voters' party loyalties are largely insulated from the effects of current
issues such as the state of the economy and the performance of the
incumbent president (85- 108).
3. Party loyalties exert a powerful influence on citizens' issue positions,
evaluations of political leaders, and voting decisions (204- 29).
4. Most importantly, party identification is based mainly on identification with social groups rather than a rational evaluation of the parties'
ideological orientations or policies (25- 51 ).
According to them, "People ask themselves two questions when deciding
which party to support: What kinds of social groups come to mind as I think
about Democrats, Republicans, and Independents? Which assemblage of
groups (if any) best describes me?" (8).
In proposing this social identity theory, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler
explicitly challenge rational-choice explanations of party identification such
as those proposed by Downs ( 1957) and Fiorina ( 1981 ). Green and his colleagues view party identification as an emotional attachment grounded in
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enduring group loyalties rather than as a deliberate choice based on a preference for one set of policy positions over another-a choice that can be modified if parties' policy positions change or new issues arise (Page and Jones
1979; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Carmines, Mciver, and Stimson 1987;
Luskin, Mciver, and Carmines 1989; Franklin 1992).
Like Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes ( 1960), Green and his colleagues downplay the role of issues and ideology in the formation of party
identification. While recognizing that party loyalties can be influenced by
dramatic changes in the parties' policy stands or ideological positions,
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler argue that such shifts are relatively rare and
generally confined to periods of major realignment, such as the New Deal
era in the United States. In this regard, social identity theory stands in sharp
contrast to ideological realignment theory, which claims that as a result of
the growing ideological polarization of the two major parties since the
1980s, Americans have increasingly been choosing a party identification on
the basis of their ideological preferences, leading to a gradual realignment
of party loyalties along ideological lines (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998;
Saunders and Abramowitz 2004).
According to Green and colleagues, even the one exception to the rule
of partisan stability in recent American political history-the dramatic realignment of Southern white voters' party loyalties since the end of World
War II-was based more on changing perceptions of the parties' ties to social groups than on issues or ideology. They argue that as Southerners began
to assume leadership positions in the Republican Party during the 1980s and
1990s, Republicanism came to be seen as a respectable affiliation among
white Southerners. According to Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, "As the
Republican image improved, Republican identification became increasingly
prevalent among all segments of the ideological continuum" (160).
They argue that "the growing correlation between liberalism-conservatism
and party [among Southern whites] reflects cohort replacement as older conservative Democrats pass away" (161). With this process of generational
replacement largely completed, they claim that "the pace of partisan conversion [in the South] appears to have slowed to the near-standstill characteristic
of party identification in the non-South" (I 63 ).

Trends in Party Identification
One of the key claims made by Green and his colleagues is that outside
of the South there has been little change in partisanship since the 1960s.
However, this claim appears to be contradicted by a considerable body of
research that has documented changes in partisanship based on such factors
as gender (Wirls 1986; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999), marital status (Weisb-
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erg 1987), religiosity (Guth and Green 1990; Layman and Carmines 1997),
and social class (Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003).
In order to test the claim that partisanship outside of the South has been
stable, table 18.1 presents data from American National Election Study
(NES) surveys on trends in party identification in the United States since the
1960s. 1
The evidence presented in table 18.1 does not support the conclusion
that party identification outside of the South has been stable since the 1960s.
Although the most dramatic change has occurred among white Southerners,
there has also been a substantial increase in Republican identification among
whites outside of the South. During the 1960s, the Democratic Party enjoyed
an average advantage of thirteen percentage points over the Republican Party
among non-Southern whites. Since 1980, however, this advantage has disappeared: in the 2002-2004 NES surveys, non-Southern whites favored the
Republican Party over the Democratic Party by a five-point margin. 2
Outside of the South, Republican gains have been much larger in certain
white subgroups than in the overall white electorate. Table 18.2 presents data
from NES surveys on trends in party identification since the 1960s among
various subgroups of Northern whites. Because the data for the most recent
period are based on only two elections, some caution is warranted in distinguishing long-term trends from short-term shifts such as the recent movement of white women toward the Republican Party. However, there is little
question that Republican identification has increased dramatically since
1980 among several groups: men, married voters, Catholics, and the religiously observant.
Among white Catholics, for example, the Democratic advantage, which
was forty-two points in the 1960s and thirty-six points in the 1970s, has
completely disappeared. In the 2002-2004 NES surveys, Republican identifiers slightly outnumbered Democratic identifiers among non-Southern white
Catholics. Similarly. in the 2004 national exit poll, Republican identifiers

Table 18.1

Net Party Identification in the United Stales by Knee and Region

/9621970

/9721980

/9821990

/9922000

20022004

All respondents

+24

+20

+ 13

+II

+7

- 17

African Americans
Whites
South
North

+72
+ 18
+36
+ 13

+74
+ 13
+25
+9

+72
+ IQ
+9
- 2

+72
- 7
- 7
+3

+75
- 25
- 17
- 5

+3

Change

- 53
- 18

Source: American National Election Studies.
Note; Net party identification • percentage of Dcmocmtie identifiers and (caners minus percentage
of Rcpubl ican identifiers and leaner.;.
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Net Party ldcntilication of Northern While Subgroups

/962/970

/972/980

/982/990

/9922000

20022004

C/11111ge

Males
Females

+14
+ 12

+8
+9

- 6
+2

- 6
+ II

- JO
- I

- 24
- 13

Married
Unmarried

+ 13
+ 12

+6
+ 16

- 7
+6

- 5
+ 14

- 14
+10

- 27
- 2

Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Other/None

-5
+42
+72
+29

- 10
+36
+58
+28

- 18

- 14
+ 13
+72
+23

- 20
- 2
+67
+ 15

- 15
- 44
- 5
- 14

Observant
Nonobservant

+60
+27

- 9
+21

- 16
+ 18

+ 15

+ 17
+46
+16
- 16

+9

- 22
- 12

Source: American Nalional Elcc1ion Studies.
Note: Ncl party idcntilicalion - pcrccn1age or Dcmocmtic idcnlilicrs and !caners minus percentage
or Republican identifiers and !caners.

outnumbered Democratic identifiers by 41 percent to 34 percent among nonSouthern white Catholics. The Republican gains in this group are very significant politically because, according to the national exit poll, Catholics
comprised more than 30 percent of the white electorate outside of the South
in 2004.

Ideology in the American Electorate: Meaning and Measurement
The evidence examined thus far indicates that since the 1970s there has
been a substantial increase in Republican identification among whites both
outside the South and within the South and that this increase has been quite
dramatic among certain subgroups such as Catholics. But why has this shift
occurred? Contrary to Green and his colleagues, we believe that ideology has
played a major role in producing a secular realignment of party loyalties in
the United States since the 1970s. According to this ideological realignment
hypothesis, the increasing clarity of ideological differences between the parties during the Reagan and post-Reagan eras has made it easier for citizens
to choose a party identification based on their ideological orientations.
Before examining the impact of ideological orientations on party identification, however, we need to demonstrate that members of the public, or at
least a substantial proportion of them, have meaningful ideological orientations. While the concept of ideology has been defined in many different ways
(Gerring 1997), political scientists generally view an ideology as a set of
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beliefs about the role of government that shapes responses to a wide range
of specific policy issues (Converse 1964; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). Among
political elites in the United States, positions on a wide range of economic,
social, and foreign policy issues appear to be structured by a single liberalconservative dimension (Poole and Rosenthal 1991 ). However, the extent of
ideological thinking in the public has been a subject of debate since the publication of Converse's 1964 seminal study of belief systems in mass publics,
which suggested that awareness of ideological concepts and use of such concepts by ordinary citizens were quite limited.
Although some subsequent studies have supported Converse's conclusions about the lack of ideological sophistication among the general public
in the United States (Axelrod 1967; Bishop et al. 1978; Sullivan, Piereson,
and Marcus 1978; Conover and Feldman 1981; Knight 1985; Jennings
1992), other studies have suggested that the ability of ordinary citizens to
comprehend and employ ideological concepts depends on the extent and
clarity of ideological cues provided by political elites. According to this
view, the greater the prevalence and clarity of ideological cues in the political environment, the higher the level of ideological comprehension and reasoning should be among the electorate (Field and Anderson 1969; Nie and
Anderson 1974; Nie and Rabjohn 1979; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979;
Craig and Hurley 1984; Jacoby 1995). From this standpoint, the increased
ideological polarization of the parties in recent years and the increased salience of ideological conflict in the media should have produced an increase
in ideological comprehension and reasoning among the American public.
While we do not claim that ordinary citizens in the United States now
possess belief systems as elaborate or constrained as those evident among
political activists and elites (Jennings 1992; Saunders and Abramowitz
2004), our evidence does point to a substantial increase in the ability of citizens to apply ideological labels to the political parties, an increase in the
coherence of citizens' views across different issues, and a growing connection between the ideological labels that citizens choose and their positions
on a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues.
In 1972, when the NES began asking respondents to place themselves
and the two major parties on a seven-point liberal-conservative scale, only
48 percent of respondents were able to place themselves on the scale and to
place the Democratic Party to the left of the Republican Party. By 1996 and
2004, however, 67 percent of respondents were able to place themselves on
the scale and to place the Democrats to the left of the Republicans. These
results indicate that public awareness of ideological differences between the
parties has increased substantially in the past three decades.
The NES data also indicate that there has also been an increase in the
ideological coherence of citizens' policy preferences and in the correlation
between ideological identification and policy preferences. Table 18.3 dis-
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Tuble 18.3 Anulysis or un Eight-Item Liherul-Conscrvutive Scule, 1984- 2004
Cronbach's alpha

/984

/988

/992

/996

2000

200-I

.65

.66

.70

.75

.74

.77

.36
.39
.38
.37
.35
.37
.31
.60

.35
.3 1
.46
.32
.35
.39
.32

.43
.43
.42
.37
.34
.33
.32
.62

Correlutlon or liberul-conservutive ldentlficutlon with ...
Jobs/Living standards
Health insurance
Spending/Services
Aid to blacks
Defense spending
Abortion
Women· s role

All xe1•e11 policy issues

.36
.19
.24
.31
.27
.14
.19

.44

.23
.23
.33
.26
.30
.21
.23
.46

.28
.30
.32
.27
.28
.32
.28

.5/

.60

Source; American National Election Studies
Nole: Correlations arc Pcarson·s r. All cocnicicnts arc statistically signilicant (p < .001).

plays a measure of the internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of responses
to eight items that were included in every presidential election year survey
between 1984 and 2004. The eight items include liberal-conservative identification and opinions on seven policy issues: government responsibility for
jobs and living standards, government responsibility for health insurance,
government services and spending, defense spending, government aid to
blacks, abortion, and women's roles. The table also shows the correlation
between liberal-conservative identification and responses to the seven policy
issues.
The increasing value of Cronbach's alpha over lime indicates that citizens' responses to these eight questions have become more internally consistent since 1984. In addition, contrary to the claim that ideological labels have
little policy content for most Americans (Conover and Feldman 1981 ), the
evidence in table 18.3 shows that liberal-conservative self• identification was
related to preferences on every policy issue in every survey and that this
relationship has grown stronger over time. These results indicate that there
is an ideological structure to Americans' opinions on policy issues and that
ideological self-identification is a valid indicator of the liberalism or conservatism of citizens' policy orientations.3

Group Membership, Ideology, and Partisan Change
In order to test the ideological realignment hypothesis, we will first examine trends in party identification among some of the white subgroups that
have experienced the largest Republican gains since the 1970s, while controlling for ideological identification. If the ideological realignment hypothe-
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sis is correct, we should find that Republican gains have been greatest among
conservative identifiers and smallest among liberal identifiers.
The evidence presented in table 18.4 provides strong support for the
ideological realignment hypothesis. For every subgroup examined, the increase in Republican identification was much larger among conservative
identifiers than among moderate or liberal identifiers. In fact, Republican
identification declined among liberal identifiers in every subgroup except
Catholics. Among Southern whites, for example, there was a fifty-four-point

Table 18.4 Net Party Identification of Selected White Subgroups by Ideological SelfIdentificotlon

/9721980

/9821990

/9922000

20022004

Change

All Whites
Liberals
Moderates
Conservali vcs

+53
+20
- 29

+52
+10
- 44

+66
+II
- 54

+66
+ 12
- 67

+ 13
- 8
- 38

South
Liberals
Moderates
Conservatives

+55
+33
- 6

+49
+27
- 31

+60
+6
- 59

+62
+3
- 60

+7
- 30
- 54

North
Liberals
Moderalcs
Conservatives

+52
+16
- 37

+53
+7
- 49

+68
+ 13
- 52

+68
+II
- 70

+16
- 5
- 33

Males
Liberals
Moderates
Conserva1i ves

+53
+22
- 30

+49

+63

+ 12

+ 10

- 49

- 59

+62
+14
- 70

+9
- 8
- 40

Married
Liberals
Moderates
Conservatives

+ 51
+ 20
- 31

+ 49

+ II
- 48

+ 68
+8
- 56

+ 63
+7
- 69

+ 12
- 13
- 38

Catholics
Liberals
Moderates
Conservatives

+ 70
+ 43
- 7

+ 54
+ 28
- 30

+ 71
+21
- 42

+ 59
+6
- 59

- II
- 37
- 52

Observant
Liberals
Moderates
Conservatives

+ 42
+ 18
- 29

+ 54
+ 13
- 46

+ 65
+9
- 60

+ 60
+ 13
- 69

+ 18
- 5
- 40

Saurce: American Nalional Election Sludies,
Nme: Ncl party identification = percentage of Democratic identifiers and lcancrs minus percentage
of Republican identifiers and (caners.
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increase in net Republican identification among conservatives and a sevenpoint decrease in net Republican identification among liberals. Similarly,
among religiously observant whites, there was a forty-point increase in net
Republican identification among conservatives and an eighteen- point decrease in net Republican identification among liberals.
The end result of the process of ideological realignment has been a
marked increase in the correlation between ideology and party identification.
Table 18.5 displays the trend in the correlation between ideology and party
identification between the 1970s and 2004 for the entire electorate and for
several major subgroups. The correlation between ideology and party identification increases in all groups including Southern and non-Southern whites.
In fact, the increase in the correlation between ideology and party identification is just as great for non-Southern whites as it is for Southern whites.
The increasing correlation between ideology and party identification was
not simply a result of generational replacement. Table 18.6 presents the results of a cohort analysis of the relationship between ideology and party
identification among Northern and Southern whites from the I 970s through
the I 990s. Almost every ten-year age cohort shows an increase in the correlation between ideology and party identification over time. For example,
among Southern whites who were in their twenties during the 1970s, the
correlation between ideology and party identification was only .27. However.
among members of the same cohort during the I 990s, the correlation between ideology and party identification was .54. Similarly, among Northern
whites who were in their twenties during the 1970s, the correlation between
ideology and party identification was only .34, but among members of the
same cohort during the 1990s, the correlation between ideology and party
identification was .61.

Table 18.5 Correlation between Party Identification and Ideological Self-Identification
by Decade

All Respondents
African Americans
Whites
South
North
No College
College
S1111n:e:

19721980
.35

/982-

1992-

2002-

/990

2000

2004

Clumge

.39

.49

.58

+ .23

.14
.34
.26
.38
.26
.47

.14
.42
.33
.45

.24
.53
.50
.54
.34
.65

.23
.64
.55
.66
.49
.71

+
+
+
+
+
+

.27
.54

.09
.30
.29
.28
.23
.24

American Nalional Election StudiC!i.

Nme: Produc1-momcn1 corrcla1ions between scvcn•point party idcniificalion scale and seven-point

libcr.il ~ onscrvutivc si:ulc. All ~ocfficicnts arc slati~tically significant (p < .001 ),
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Table 18.6 Cohort Analysis or Correlation between Ideological Self-Identification and
Party Identification for White Respondents by Decade
Region

Age Group

South

20-29

1972- 1980

1982- 1990

1992-2000

30- 39
40-49
50- 59
60+

North

20- 29
30- 39
40-49
50- 59
60+

Sourcl': Amerkan National Election S1udics.
Nm<': Pearson producl•momcnl correlations between scvcn -poini libcral•conscrv:nivc , ;calc and SC\'Cn•
point party idcnlification scale. All cocrficicnts arc statistically significant (p < .001).

Ideological Realignment versus Partisan Persuasion:
White Southerners and Catholics
The evidence examined thus far indicates that the relationship between
ideology and party identification became considerably stronger among both
Northern and Southern whites who remained in the electorate between the
1970s and the l 990s. However, cohort analysis does not allow us lo determine whether ideology was influencing party identification, as the ideologi-
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cal realignment hypothesis suggests, or whether party identification was influencing ideology, as Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) suggest.
It is possible that the increasing clarity of ideological differences between the parties during the 1980s and 1990s caused Democratic and Republican partisans lo adopt ideological positions consistent with their existing
party loyalties in a process that might be termed partisan persuasion. However, partisan persuasion cannot explain increasing Republican identification
among major subgroups within the electorate. Moreover, evidence from
NES surveys indicates that for white Southerners and Catholics-two subgroups within the white electorate that experienced substantial increases in
Republican identification between 1972 and 2004-ideological realignment
rather than partisan persuasion was the primary mechanism of change.
If partisan persuasion was at work, increases in Republican identification
among white Southerners and Catholics between 1972 and 2004 should have
led to substantial increases in conservatism in these groups as the growing
ranks of Republican identifiers adopted the conservative ideology of their
new party. But in the survey data, there was no increase in conservatism
among either white Southerners or white Catholics. Throughout the period
from 1972 though 2004, the mean conservatism score of white Southerners
hovered around 4.5, while that of white Catholics remained in the vicinity
of 4.2.
Contrary to the partisan persuasion hypothesis, white Southerners and
Catholics did not become much more conservative between 1972 and 2004;
however, conservative white Southerners and Catholics did become much
more Republican. Between 1972 and 2004, the proportion of conservative
Southern whites identifying with the Republican Party increased from 39
percent to 80 percent and the mean score of conservative Southerners on the
seven-point party identification scale rose from 3.7 to 5.5. During the same
period, the proportion of conservative Catholics identifying with the Republican Party increased from 48 percent to 82 percent and the mean score of
conservative Catholics on the seven-point party identification scale rose
from 4.1 to 5.7. This evidence clearly indicates that ideological realignment
rather than partisan persuasion was responsible for the increasing correlation
between ideology and party identification among white Southerners and
Catholics.

Evidence from the 1992-1996 NES Panel Survey
Additional evidence concerning the relative importance of ideological
realignment and partisan persuasion can be obtained from the only major
long-term panel study conducted by the NES between 1976 and 2000: the
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1992- 1996 panel survey. Although the study covers only a four-year period
and the sample is fairly small (only 597 respondents were interviewed in
both 1992 and 1996), the panel design of the study allows us to estimate the
influence of ideology on party identification, as well as the influence of party
identification on ideology.
Figure 18.1 presents the results of a path analysis of ideology and party
identification among white respondents in the survey. These results indicate
that there was a high degree of stability in both ideological orientations and
party identification among survey respondents. In fact, ideological orientations were even more stable than party identification over the four years of
the panel. Despite the high degree of stability of party identification, however, the results of the path analysis provide strong support for the ideological realignment hypothesis. Twenty-seven percent of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans switched parties between 1992 and 1996. In
contrast, only 5 percent of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats
switched parties between 1992 and I996. Even after controlling for 1992
party identification and a wide variety of social background characteristics, 1992 ideological orientations had a significant impact on 1996 party
identification.
Figure 18.1 Path Analysis orJdeology and Party Identification ror White Respondents
In 1992-1996 NES Panel Survey

1992
Libcon
Scale

.704*

1996
Libcon
Scale

1992
Party

.657*

1996
Party

Id

Id

Source: 1992- 1996 American Nalional Eleclion S1udy Panel Survey.
Note: Party idcnlificalion measured by slandartl seven-point scale. Ideological orien1:11ion measured
by eleven-ilem scale. Figure~ shown arc slandanlized regression coerfidcnls. Con1rol variables included
in regression analyses arc age, church anendance. religion. region. gender, marilal .~1.11us, education. fam•
ily im:omc. :md household union membership. Cocrlicienls marked with asterisk arc stalis tk ally significant at p < .00I.
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Social Identity, Ideology, and Party Identification
According to the social identity theory, party identification is based
largely on membership in social groups-citizens choose a party identification based on their perception of the fit between their own social characteristics and the social characteristics of supporters of the two major parties.
Since the New Deal, the Democrats have generally been viewed as the party
of the poor, the working class, union members, urban dwellers, racial and
ethnic minorities, Catholics, and Jews, while the Republicans have more
often been seen as the party of the wealthy, business executives, smalltown
and rural residents, and white Protestants outside of the South. However, the
social images of the Democratic and Republican parties have undergone
considerable change in recent years. As Green, Palmquist, and Schickler
(2002) point out, Southern whites, who were once a key component of the
Democratic coalition, have been moving into the Republican camp since the
I 950s. More recently, gender, marital status, sexual orientation, and reli•
gious beliefs have emerged as important correlates of party affiliation: members of traditional families and those with strong religious convictions tend
to be Republicans, while singles, gays, and less-religious voters tend to be
Democrats.
The changing relationship between social groups and the parties raises
the question of whether membership in social groups has a direct impact on
party identification, as the social identity theory proposes, or whether partisan differences between social groups are simply a result of the policy preferences of group members. According to the latter ideological differences
hypothesis, the reason some groups, such as white evangelicals, have become increasingly Republican in recent years while other groups such as
gays and lesbians have become increasingly Democratic is because of the
policy preferences of their members.
As a first test of the social identity and ideological differences hypotheses, table 18.7 presents data from the 2004 national exit poll on net party
identification among members of a number of groups that are closely aligned
with either the Democratic or the Republican party, controlling for ideological orientation. We measured the ideological orientations of respondents in
the exit poll with the three-point liberal-conservative identification question
because this question was included in all three versions of the exit poll
questionnaire:'
The results in table 18.7 show that, except for African Americans, the
differences between white liberals and conservatives within each social
group were much larger than the differences between social groups. African
Americans, regardless of their ideological orientation, strongly favored the
Democratic Party. Otherwise, across all social groups, white liberals
strongly preferred the Democratic Party and white conservatives strongly
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Tuhlc 18,7 Net Purty Idcntificutlon by Sociul Identity und ldcologicul ldcntificutlon,
2004

Liberal

Moderate

Co11sen·atil'e

African Americans

+ 76

+71

+ 44

Hispanics

+ 44

+ 16

- 42
- 70

+ 52

- 4

Income < $15,000
Income $200,000 +

+ 50
+ 73

+ 33
- 21

- 47
- 88

Union members

+ 65

+ 24

- 53

Northeast
South

+ 53
+ 38

+I
- 6

- 61
- 75

Big city dwellers
Small town, rural residents

+ 61
+ 30

+8
- 2

- 83
- 62

Protestant
Catholic
Jewish

+ 46
+ 49
+ 87

- 6
+ 27

- 74
- 61
- 50

Most observant
Least observant

+ 39
+ 53

- 9

- 75

- 2

- 55

Born again/Evangelical

+ 22

- 11

- 73

Male
Female

+ 29
+ 45

- 19
- I

- 57
- 46

Married
Single

+ 53
+ 52

- 6
+2

- 73
- 60

Gun owners

+ 43

- 8

- 71

Gay, lesbian, bisexual

+ 45

+ 24

- 28

Whites

- 4

Sa11rce: 2004 National fail Poll.
No1e: Net party identification
percentage or Democratic identifiers minus pcn:entagc of Republican

=

identifiers.

preferred the Republican Party. While the large majority of Hispanics identified with the Democratic Party, most conservative Hispanics identified with
the Republican Party. Jews overwhelmingly identified with the Democratic
Party, but conservative Jews strongly identified with the Republican Party.
Wealthy liberals favored the Democrats, and poor conservatives favored the
Republicans; conservative gays and lesbians preferred the Republican Party
by a wide margin, while liberal evangelicals (yes, there were some) preferred
the Democratic Party.
The results in table 18.7 provide only limited support for the social iden~
tity theory. It is true that the partisan orientations of certain groups cannot
be completely explained by their policy preferences. For African Americans,
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in particular, social identity and party identification seem to be closely connected. African Americans, regardless of ideology, tend to be Democrats.
For other groups, however, the connection between objective social identity
and party identification is much weaker or nonexistent. Even for members
of groups with very close ties to one party or the other, such as Jews or
evangelical Christians, ideology trumps social identity. The reason most
Jews identify with the Democratic Party and most evangelical Christians
identify with the Republican Party is because of their policy preferences, not
because of their social identity.
The data in table 18.7 show that there were some differences among
groups even after controlling for ideology. Liberal and moderate Jews were
much more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than liberal and
moderate evangelicals. Similarly, wealthy moderates were much more likely
to identify with the Republican Party than poor moderates. Moreover, these
data do not allow us to examine the impact of group identification on political attitudes. Individuals who feel close to a group may hold views that are
more typical of that group than individuals who do not feel close to a group.
Nevertheless, the fact that the connection between objective group membership and political attitudes is relatively weak raises serious questions about
the explanatory power of the social identity theory, because group membership is generally considered a prerequisite for the development of social
identity (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980; Miller et al. 1981; Taj fel 198 I;
Turner 1982; Gurin 1985; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1987).

Social Identity, Ideology, and Party Identification in 2004
In order to directly compare the effects of ideology and group membership on contemporary party identification, we performed a logistic regres~
sion analysis of party identification. Our dependent variable in this analysis
was a dichotomous measure of party identification, by grouping strong,
weak, and independent Democrats together as Democrats and by grouping
strong, weak, and independent together as Republicans. Pure independents
were excluded from the analysis.5 Independent variables in the analysis in~
eluded a sixteen-item liberal-conservative scale and a variety of social background characteristics including age, education, income, gender, marital
status, religion, church attendance, and household union affiliation. The results of the logistic regression analysis are presented in table 18.8.
To facilitate comparisons of the effects of the independent variables on
party identification, we converted each of the logistic regression coefficients
into a change-in-probability score. This score can be interpreted as the
change in the probability of identifying with the Republican Party associated
with a change between categories of any of the dichotomous independent
variables such as gender, union membership, or martial status, or the change
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Table 18.8 Logistic Regression Analysis or Party Identification or White Respondents
with Liberal-Conservative Policy Scale and Social Background Characteristics, 21)04
/11depe11de111 Vt1rit1/Jle

Liberal -conscrva1ive scale
Age
Education
Income
Female
Married
Nonunion
Religion
Catholic
Jewish
No religion
Church frequency
Constant

Clumge in
Pmfm/Jilit_\'

B

(S.E.)

;:

.313
.254
.005
- .230
.342
. I 16

(.025)
(.006)
(.074)
(.021)
(.208)
(,222)
(.064)

12.35
- 1.57
3.43
.26
- 1.10
1.54
1.72

.63
- .06
.16
.01
- .05
.08
.10

- .584
-.672
-.024
.031

(.242)
(.621)
(.323)
(.076)

- 2.41
- 1.08
- .07
.41

- .14
- .16
- .01
.02

- 1.068

(.745)

- 1.43

- .OIO

Sig.

.001
NS

.001
NS
NS
NS

.05

.OJ
NS
NS
NS
NS

Pseudo RI ., .38
N • 706

Source: American National Election Study 2004.
Note: Dependent variable is dichotomous party identification (strong. weak. and independent Republi•
can vs. strong. weak. and independent Democrat). Change in probability is the estimated tliffcrcnce in
probability of Republican identification between categories of dichotomous variables (nonunion vs. union
household; female vs. ma!e; Catholic. Jewish, or no religion vs. Protc.stant; married vs. not married) or
between 25th and 75th percentiles of continuous variables and scales (age, education. church frequency,
libcral-<:onservativc).

in probability associated with a change between the 25th percentile and the
75th percentile on any of the continuous independent variables such as age,
education, or ideology.
The major conclusion that emerges from table I 8.8 is that the impact of
ideology on party identification was much stronger than that of any of the
social background variables. Most of the estimated coefficients for the social
background variables are not statistically significant. In addition, the changein-probability scores for most of the social background variables are generally small, with the largest effect (.16) being for education. Many social
characteristics, including age, income, gender, martial status, and church attendance, had little or no impact on party identification after controlling for
ideology. In contrast, the estimated coefficient for the ideology scale is statistically significant and its change-in-probability score is almost four times
larger than that for education. Even after controlling for social background
characteristics, the probability of identifying with the Republican Party was
sixty-three percentage points higher for a voter at the 75th percentile of the
liberal-conservative scale than it was for a voter at the 25th percentile.
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According to Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002), the questions
most voters ask themselves in deciding which party to support are: "Whm
kinds of social groups come to mind as I think about Democrats, Republicans, and independents?" and "Which assemblage of groups (if any) best
describes me?" Based on our evidence, however, it appears that the questions most voters ask themselves in deciding which party to support are actually: "What do Democrats and Republicans stand for?" and "Which party's
positions are closer to mine?"

The Consequences of Ideological Realignment for Voting Behavior
The growing consistency between ideology and party identification has
important consequences for voting behavior, because voters whose party
identification and ideological orientation are consistent are much more loyal
to their party than voters whose party identification and ideological orientation are inconsistent. In the 2004 presidential election, according to data from
the national exit poll, 96 percent of liberal white Democrats voted for John
Kerry, compared with only 62 percent of conservative white Democmts. Similarly, 97 percent of conservative white Republicans voted for George W.
Bush, compared with only 58 percent of liberal white Republicans.
Overall, according to both national exit polls and the NES postelection
surveys, more than 90 percent of Republican identifiers and almost 90 percent of Democratic identifiers voted for their own party's presidential candidates in the 2000 and 2004 elections. These two elections produced the highest levels of party voting in the history of the National Election Studies.
Party voting was also very prevalent in recent congressional elections, especially in competitive races (Abramowitz and Alexander 2004 ).
The high level of partisan voting in recent presidential and congressional
elections is due largely to the fact that an ideological realignment has taken
place among white voters in both the South and the North since the 1970s.
As a result of this realignment, voters' party affiliations are now more consistent with their ideological orientations than in the past. According to data
from the American National Election Studies, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans made up only 42 percent of all white party identifiers in
1972, while conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans accounted for
20 percent. By 2004, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans made
up 59 percent of all white party identifiers, while conservative Democrats
and liberal Republicans were down to 9 percent. Because of this growing
consistency, the outlook for the 2006 and 2008 elections is for a continuation
of high levels of partisan voting.
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Notes
I. We have grouped the data by decade in order to minimize nuctuations due to short•
tcnn forces or sampling variation. The measure presented here is simply the difference he•
tween the percentage of Democratic identifiers and (caners and the percentage of Republican
identifiers and (caners in the overall electorate. Excluding leaning independents and calculating net party identification based on the difference between the percentage of Democratic
identifiers and the percentage of Republican identifiers produce~ almost identical result:,.
2. Data from national exit polls also show a substantial increase in Republican identification among non-Southern whites since the 1970s. Between 1976 and 2004, the percenrnge
of non-Southern whites identifying with the Republican Party in national exit polls increased
from 28 percent to 43 percent. Moreover, contrary to the claim by Green, Palmqui~t. and
Schickler (2002) that the party loyalties of white Southerners have stabilized in recent years,
the national exit poll data show a continuing movement toward the Republican Party in this
group: the Republican advantage in party identification among white Southerners increased
from seventeen points in 2000 lo thirty-one points in 2004.
3. In testing the ideological realignment hypothesi~. we use different measures of ideol ogy with different data sets. We use the seven-point ideological idenli ficalion scale to classify
respomlcnls in NES surveys as liberal ( 1-3). moderate (4), or conservative (5-7) bccau~c this
question is correlated with preferences on a wide range of policy issues and has been included
in every survey since 1972. We use a similar ideological identification question with three
response categories-liberal, moderate, and conservative-in our analysis of 2004 national
exit poll data because the split-sample procedures used in the exit poll make it impossible 10
create a multiple-item scale for the entire sample. However, in our analyses of the 1992- 1996
NES panel survey and the 2004 NES survey, we measure ideological orientations with
multiple-item scales that include the seven-point ideological identification question along
with a number of questions about specific policy issues.
The 1992-1996 ideology scale is based on eleven items included in holh the 1992 and
1996 waves of the panel: liberal-conservative identification, abortion, government aid to
blacks, defense spending. the death penalty, laws barring discrimination against gays and lesbians, allowing gays and lesbians to serve in the military. government vs. personal responsibility for jobs and living standards, government vs. private responsibility for health insurance,
government spending and services, and the role of women in society. Because of the small
number of respondents interviewed in both waves of the panel, we recoded all of the sevenpoint issue scales to place respondent:, with no opinion in the middle position (4) in order to
avoid losing cases due to missing data. The 1992 scale has a reliability coefficient (Cron•
huch's alpha) of .70. The 1996 scale has a reliability coefficient of .75.
The 2004 ideology scale is based on sixteen items: liberal-conservative identification,
abortion, abortion funding, partial-birth abortion, gay marriage, government vs. private re•
sponsibility for health insurance, government vs. personal responsibility for jobs and living
standards, government services and spending. gun control, the death penalty, government aid
to blacks, government aid to Hispanics, environmental protection vs. job creation, defense
spending. use of diplomacy vs. military force, and the role of women in society. This scale
has a reliability coefficient (Cronbach's ulpha) of .77.
4. However, responses to this question were strongly related 10 opinions on three policy
questions that were included in different versions of the questionnaire: abortion (r ""' .40),
gay marriage (r ::::i .42), and the role of the federal government (r = .31 ).
5. An OLS regression analysis using the seven-point party identification scale as the
dependent variable produced almost identical results.
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The Rise of the Right
More Conservatives or More Concentrated Conservatism?
Jeffrey M. Stonecash

By many accounts, America has become a more conservative nation in
recent decades (Frank 2004; Micklethwait and Woolridge 2004). Republicans, long in the minority in the House, won a majority in 1994 with a con•
servative antigovernment agenda. Entitlement rights in the federal welfare
programs were significantly curtailed by Republicans in 1996. George W.
Bush was able to secure the enactment of large tax cuts in 200 I, 2002, and
2003, with most of the benefits going to the most affluent. He cut environ•
mental regulations, worker safety inspections, and regulations imposed on
businesses. ' He opposed same-sex marriages and sought to further limit
abortion rights. Perhaps most important, he pursued this conservative agenda
with full support from the Republican majority in Congress. Moreover, Bush
and his congressional party allies were retained in office by the American
electorate in the 2004 elections. It is not difficult to conclude that the country
has become more conservative.
While that conclusion is plausible, it remains asserted more than examined- and another explanation is equally plausible. It may well be that the
apparent increase in support for conservative policies reflects an increase not
in conservatives themselves but in their "organization" and framing of issues. Over the last several decades, conservatives have increasingly moved to
identify with the Republican Party, making them a significant and dominant
presence within the party. The electoral base of conservatives that was split
between two parties became much more unified within the one party. That
created a cohesive ideological group within that party and provided a basis
for a more forceful argument for conservative views. As V. 0. Key argued
in Southern Politics (1949), the crucial matter in politics is whether those
advocating a set of positions can create a coherent coalition with continuity
of an electoral base and positions to create pressure on opponents. It may
be that the important matter is the consolidation of conservatives within the
Republican Party, not the general drift of opinion in society.
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Further, the ability of conservatives to capitalize on their concentration
within the Republican Party was helped along by the efforts of conservative
scholars and think tanks to represent the argument for less government. That
allowed the party to frame issues in a way more conducive to American political culture with its emphasis on individualism. The combination of a more
coherent conservative base and a more aggressive critique of liberalism focused the conservative argument and gave it more force within the political
process. Voices scattered across the political landscape became more organized, focused, and prominent within the process.
This analysis will explore these alternative explanations. First, the gen•
eral trends in public opinion over the last several decades will be reviewed
to assess whether there has been an increase in support for conservative positions. Then the mobilization of conservatives into the Republican Party in
recent decades will be examined, using both individual and aggregate- level
results.

Trends in the Presence of Conservative Views
If the nation has become more conservative, then presumably there
should have been an increase within the electorate in the percentage of those
who hold conservative views or say they are conservative. Figure 19.1 presents time series of the percentages of National Election Study (NES) respondents reporting that they hold conservative views. The responses reported
involve whether the respondent:

Figure 19.1

Trends in Conservative Positions, 1970-2004
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• attends church weekly or more often
• believes abortion should be prohibited
• believes individuals, rather than government, are responsible for finding a job
• identifies as a conservative when asked his or her position
The trends do not suggest any sort of consistent drift toward conserva•
tive views over the last thirty years. The percentage of respondents opposed
to abortion has declined, as has the percentage saying they rely heavily on
religion in daily life and the percentage who report they are "cool" to gays.~
One of the important indicators of support for traditional patterns of livingwhether someone attends church weekly or more often- has not increased
in thirty years. However, the percentage who identify themselves as conservative has increased from about 26 percent to the upper 30s over thirty years.
and there is an erratic increase in support for the idea that individuals should
be responsible for finding their own jobs.
These trends indicate that we might accept the idea that some indicators
suggest a more conservative society, while others do not. Perhaps most interesting is that the ones often presented as embodying the conservative movement- abortion opinions and attendance at church- do not follow a pattern
of becoming more prevalent. While some indicators could be selectively
pointed to, these data do not provide strong support for the idea that America
is moving toward more conservativism.

Greater Support for Republicans
While there is not much evidence that the electorate as a whole has become more conservative, there is clear evidence that the Republican Party
has developed a more conservative record and that a higher percentage of
the electorate now identifies with the party and fewer identify with a Democratic Party that is becoming more liberal. The drift in party positions is
evident from the voting record of members of Congress. While the average
voting record of all members has not changed much in the last fifty years,
Republicans have become more conservative. Since the 1970s there has been
a steady drift of Republicans to more conservative positions and of Democrats to more liberal ones (Stonecash 2006).
While the congressional Republican Party has grown more conservative
(and the Democrats more liberal), there has been a general, if erratic, drift
toward greater identification with the Republican Party. Democrats fluctuated around the 55 percent level for much of the 1960s and 1970s and since
then have ranged around 50 percent. Republicans varied around the 35 per-
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cent level during the 1960s and l 970s and have been between 40 and 45
percent since then (see chapter 16).
The trends present an important puzzle. The Republican Party has
gained seats in Congress and held those seats. The party has compiled a
more conservative voting record in Congress, and as that has happened, identification with the party has increased, while identification with the Democratic Party has declined. Yet, a review of survey data does not provide any
clear indication that the electorate has become any more conservative. Thus,
while the country does not appear to have become more conservative, the
Republican Party has, and it has maintained its majority status.

Explaining the Rise or Republicans: Mobilizing Conservatives
How have Republicans been able to emerge as the majority party while
becoming more conservative in a country that is not changing ideologically?
The answer is secular realignment. For much of the last fifty years, conservatives (both fiscal and social) were distributed, if unevenly, between the two
parties. Beginning in the 1960s (Hodgson 1996; Frank 2004; Micklethwait
and Woolridge 2004), conservatives began a steady effort to mobilize conservatives and bring them into the Republican Party. In other words, the
presence of conservatives has not increased, but they have been mobilized
into the Republican Party. As they have become a larger portion of the party,
they have become a more forceful presence in American politics.
The first matter to be documented below is the mobilization of conservatives into the Republican Party. Then their role as articulators of the conservative cause will be addressed.

Presidential Changes
Presidential elections often lead change in American politics, and that
appears to have occurred in the attraction of conservatives to the Republican
Party (Abramowitz 1994; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). The NES survey
does not ask many questions about ideological or policy positioning, but responses to several questions show that those who hold conse rvative positions
were voting for the Republican presidential candidates at least as far back as
the early l 970s.
While Republican presidential candidates have been attracting conservatives for several decades, the ability of the party as a whole to attract them
has taken longer. Figure 19.2 tracks these patterns. While there have been
erratic movements, the general pattern is of a gradual movement of conservatives to broader support for the Republican Party. With some lag, congres-
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Figure 19.2 Percentage with Conservative Position Identifying with Republican Porty,
1970-2004
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sional candidates and the party itself have also developed conservative support. It is likely that the presence of incumbents in office delayed the
development of conservative support for Republicans, but the transition has
gradually occurred.
The consequence of this development is that Republican House and
presidential candidates and the party in general all have consistently high
levels of support from those with conservative views. Thirty years ago, only
presidential candidates received such support, but it is now more consistent,
as figure 19.3 indicates. What has changed over time is that Republicans
have been able to mobilize existing conservatives to support their party.
The result is that a much larger percentage of the Republican Party is
now comprised of those with conservative views. Figure 19.4 indicates the
percentage of self-identified conservatives that say they identify with the Republican Party and the percentage of the party comprised of conservatives.
Over the last thirty years, conservatives have gradually come to align themselves more with the Republican Party and less with the Democrats. This
transition has made them more dominant within the party. In 1972, the first
year the question about self-defined ideology was asked, 53 percent of the
Republican Party was conservative, 33 percent were moderates, and 13 percent were liberals. In 2002 and 2004, averaging the two years, 76 percent
were conservative, 13 percent were moderate and 11 percent were liberal.
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Figure 19.3 Percentage or Those with Conservative Views Voting ror Republican
Prcsldentiul und House Candidates, 1976- 2004
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Figure 19.4 Percentuge of Those with Conservulive Views Identifying with the
Republican Porty und Percentuge of Party from Conservatives, 1976-2004
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The Congressio11al Shift

While the party was attracting more conservatives at the individual level,
it was also experiencing a change in the composition of iL-; congressional
party. The OW-Nominate scores provide a means to assess how the party's
composition has changed.3 The scores, on a scale of - 1 to 1, can be (somewhat arbitrarily) grouped as follows: liberals are those with scores of less
than - 0.2, moderates are - 0.2 to 0.2, and conservatives are greater than
0.2. As figure 19.5 indicates, the Republican Party, conservative for much of
the early part of the century, experienced a rise in the presence of moderates
in the l 950s-l 970s. The party then began to again attract more conservatives, and by the 1990s conservatives once again dominated within the party.
Over the last forty years, the Republican Party has increasingly become
comprised of conservatives. As figure 19.6 indicates, conservatives are now
more concentrated within the Republican Party. As the transition in party
bases occurred beginning in the 1930s (Stonecash 2006), conservatives were
present in both parties, but by the I 960s, 30 percent of all conservative
House members were in the Democratic Party. The rise of conservatives in
the Republican Party is in many ways a resurgence of their presence within
the party. If we adopt a longer time frame, the last several decades are a
return to a prior situation. Nonetheless, it is clear that it is correct to see the
Republican Party as becoming more conservative over the last several decades. The party has become a more coherent representative of the conservative views that exist within the nation.

Figure 19.S

Distribution of House Republican Members' Voting Records, 1900-2000
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Figure 19.6 Percentuge or House Conservatives within the Republican Porty,
1900-2000
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Co11celllratio11 and Clarity of Argument

The attraction of conservatives to the Republican Party did not occur by
accident. By the mid-1960s, conservatives within the Republican Party were
troubled by the expansion of the role of the federal government. The conservative wing of the party sought to reassert the conservative argument that
government should be restrained (Rae 1989). It set out to attract fiscal conservatives in the South to the Republican Party (Phillips 1970) and eventually succeeded (Black and Black 1987).
This appeal on fiscal issues was combined during the 1970s and I 980s
with initially tentative and then more focused efforts to attract social conservatives (Dionne 1997). There were troubling trends in American society, and
Republicans thought they could attract social conservatives by focusing on
those problems. Beginning in the 1960s there were substantial increases in
the number of people on welfare (until welfare reform of 1996), divorce,
the percentage of births that are illegitimate, single-parent families, sex on
television, and the availability of pornography on the Internet, among other
trends (Brewer and Stonecash 2006). Conservatives saw a society heading in
the wrong direction and believed there was an urgent need to restore appropriate values and reduce the fiscal size of government and taxes on those
more successful.
The ability to frame issues in a way that appealed to conservatives was
supported by a significant increase in the presence of conservative think
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tanks, which have generated studies and position papers to help present conservative arguments. These think tanks have developed analyses of disturbing trends, provided explanations of what has gone wrong, commissioned
focus groups and polls to help frame and focus arguments in appealing ways,
and then provided lobbying support lo present all this to members of Congress (Micklethwait and Woolridge 2004).
The framing of conservative critiques has been particularly important.
Welfare has been opposed not on the grounds that welfare recipients are just
lazy and undeserving but rather because it reduces individual accountability
and responsibility and ultimately encourages behavioral patterns that prevent
people from succeeding and being independent (Murray 1984); that argument appeals to American notions of individualism and personal responsibility. Abortion has been opposed as morally wrong. That argument has some
appeal because many people are pro-choice but still uneasy about supporting
this activity. The estate tax-labeled the "death tax"-is opposed on the
grounds that it taxes people at death and is double taxation (Graetz and Shapiro 2005). Each of these frames appeals to pervasive views in the electorate
and makes the conservative argument more compelling. All this has helped
increase the impact of conservative arguments within the political process.

Conservatives in the "Right" Party
All these efforts helped move conservatives out of the Democratic Party
and into the Republican Party, and the result has been a much more coherently conservative Republican Party. The party encompasses more and more
of the conservatives in the nation, and this greater-though not completeuniformity within the party provides the basis to make a more sustained and
aggressive presentation of conservative principles. A set of views that was
previously distributed between two parties is now concentrated in one.
The result is a twist on the V. 0. Key argument that the less affluent fare
better when there is a cohesive party based on the less affluent ( 1949). His
argument was that a party that mobilized and consistently derived its electoral base from the less affluent was able to more effectively make its case
in the political arena. This pattern was particularly likely if party leaders
were in agreement on policy concerns within and across elections and were
able to present a sustained argument for their cause. If these conditions prevailed, then it would be possible for a group advocating a set of positions to
produce a coherent argument to create pressure on opponents.
A similar situation has developed for Republicans. Presidential and
House candidates draw on the same electoral base, and the partisan vote
within districts is increasingly similar. Figure 19.7 presents the correlation
of House and presidential results across districts for the last century. Since
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Figure 19.7 Correlation of House und l'rcsldcntlal Vote Results, 1900-2004
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1964, the low point for this association, this correlation has steadily increased, and after 1996 it reached its highest levels since the 1940s. This
consistency of results means that the presidential and congressional (at least
as represented by the House) wings of the party have the same electoral base,
which has become more predictably supportive of Republican candidates. At
the individual level, the association between party identification and presidential and House voting has also increased (Bartels 2000). As George W.
Bush's approval ratings have declined since 9/11, Republicans have remained loyal and inclined to support his various initiatives (Jacobson 2003).
The results have been a stable, cohesive, and a more forceful expression of
conservative views, more polarized political parties, and much less inclination to be tentative about presenting conservative positions.
This strenuous advocacy of conservative positions is unlikely to decline.
The Republican Party electoral base has been stable for some time. Republicans have improved their percentage of seats in the House and the Senate.
Unless they suffer a serious setback in the future, conservatives are likely to
continue to believe that political events are moving in directions favorable to
their position . The stability of their success has allowed conservatives to
make their views more central to American politics. The presence of conservatives in American society is not necessarily greater, but they are more concentrated in politically relevant ways.
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Notes
I. Joel Brinkley, "Out or Spotlight, Bush Overhauls U.S. Regulations," New Yr,rk
Times, August 14, 2004.
2. The NES surveys ask respondents to indicate if they have a "cool" or "wann·· reaction lo gays. Each respondent is prc~cntcd with u scale, with 0 - 49 cool and 50- 100 wann. In
the 1980s, 62 percent were cool. In the 2000, 2002, and 2004 surveys only about 32 percent
were below 50 on this scale.
3. These data have been developed by Keith Poole. The data arc available at http://votevicw.com/dwnl.htm. The method is explained in "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call
Analysis," Americ,111 Jmmwl of Political Science, May 1985, 357- 84, (with Howard Rosenthal), and "The Polarization of American Politics," Jou ma/ of Politics, December 1984,
1061 - 79 (with Howard Rosenthal).
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The Partisan Presidency
Richard M. Skinner
Traditionally, political scientists have tended to see the modem presidency of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as the enemy of strong parties (see Davis 1992; Greenstein 1978; Jones 2002; Milkis 1993, 1999).
Through an "objective" media, modem presidents appeal directly to voters,
over the heads of party leaders, seeking to project a nonpartisan image. They
build ad hoc coalitions of support in Congress without regard to party lines.
They preside over an executive branch staffed by nonpartisan experts, more
interested in policy than politics. Modern presidents show little interest in
their party's performance in down~ballot races, let alone its long-term fate .
All of these propositions held true for presidents of the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s, especially Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson, and Jimmy Carter.
But since 1980, we have seen the rise of a new kind of presidency- a "partisan presidency."
Partisan presidents (see table 20.1) have polarized the electorate along
partisan lines to an extent unimaginable a generation ago, often experiencing
an "approval gap" of forty points or more (the "approval gap" is the difference between the approval given to a president by his own partisans and by
members of the other party). Relatively few members of the other party have
voted for them. Partisan presidents have received overwhelming support in
Congress from their own party. More notably, they have confronted strongsometimes near-unanimous- opposition from the other party. They have
often relied heavily on their party's leadership to deliver votes on Capitol
Hill, and they have been unable to enjoy the cozy relationship that earlier
presidents had with the opposition (e.g., Eisenhower and Sam Rayburn,
Johnson and Everett Dirksen). In recent decades, even a president predisposed to such a friendly relationship-George H. W. Bush-was unable to
have one.
Partisan presidents have sought to put a stronger partisan imprint upon
the executive branch, centralizing personnel decisions and favoring ideological loyalists or spinmeisters over career civil servants or nonpartisan experts.
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Table 20.1

The "Modern Presidency" und the "Purtisun Presidency"

S11b)t'l'I

''Modem PresiJell(:_
\'"

"'Partisan Prt:Jic/e11c,r"

Congreli.~ional relations

President's party often
cliviclccl~ works across part>'
line~

Partisan polarization: work!,
closely with own party, hut
ha~ difficult relations with
opposition

Executive administration

Relics on nonparti\an expert~
and civil servants; patronage
in decline

"Administrative presidency"
for partisanli<lcological ends

Policy advice

Nonpartisan experts

Political consultants,
ideological think tanks

Public opinion

Gains support across party
lines

Polarized public

Media relations

Cooperative~ uses
broadcasting lo reach mass
public

Antagonistic; u~es
"alternative media" or
"partisan press" to reach
niche publics

Electoral politics

Cancliclate-centerecl politics;
plays clown party affiliation;
wins support across party
lines

Increasing polarization;
revival of party organization!.

It's hard to imagine presidents less interested in "neutral competence" than
Ronald Reagan or George W. Bush. Partisan presidents, those two in particular, have actively campaigned for their party's candidates and sought to use
the national party committees as tools of governance. This behavior contrasts sharply with Eisenhower's apathy toward the GOP, or Johnson's and
Richard Nixon's distrust of their national party committees. Reagan, Bill
Clinton, and George W. Bush have all shown more interest in their party's
long-term fortunes than, say, Carter. George W. Bush, perhaps the exemplar
of a partisan president, has shown limited interest in wooing the conventional, "objective" media. Instead he has sought to get his message out
through arguably more partisan outlets-Fox News, conservative talk radio,
and "Christian" media.
We need to move beyond outdated notions that presidents are above
party politics and instead understand that there are presidents who are passionately engaged with their parties and seek to use their parties as tools of
governance. This chapter begins a project examining the changing relationship between presidents and their political parties, with special emphasis on
George W. Bush.
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The Presidency and Political Parties
Most scholars of the presidency agree that a distinctive "modern presidency" emerged in the first half of the twentieth century, first under Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, and then most fully under Franklin D.
Roosevelt (Greenstein 1978).
Generally speaking, the heyday of the modern presidency-roughly
from the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt through those of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon-saw political parties in decline in the electorate, in
government, and as organizations. Milkis ( 1993, 1999) identifies 1937-1938
as the key period of change in the relationship between presidents and their
parties. Roosevelt alienated Southern Democrats through his wages-andhours bill and his attempt to "pack" the Supreme Court; increasingly, these
Southerners aligned with Republicans as part of a "conservative coalition"
opposed to expansion of the New Deal. This split grew over the next generation, making it difficult for Democratic presidents to look to their party to
serve as a base of support in Congress and elsewhere. Roosevelt attempted
to diminish conservative influence within the Democratic Party through his
"purge" of 1938; after he failed to defeat New Deal opponents in primaries,
Roosevelt abandoned his goal of a more nationalized, programmatic party.
Instead, he turned to the politics of administration, seeking to accomplish his
liberal policies through executive action (Milkis 1993, 1999). 1
The past quarter-century has seen a reversal of the trend toward weaker
relationships between presidents and their parties. Beginning with Ronald
Reagan, recent presidents have increasingly relied upon their parties for support both in the electorate and in the Congress. They have presented a more
distinctively partisan image to voters and have found it difficult to cultivate
support from the opposition. They have sought to lead their parties, using
the national committees to gamer support for their policies, campaigning extensively for their parties' candidates, and even seeking to mold their parties'
futures.
This presidency is partisan in more ways than one. Most obviously, such
presidents are partisan through the close ties binding them to their parties.
But they are also partisan in that the executive branch is used as a tool to
support the president's agenda, and expert advice is valued to the extent that
it promotes the party's platform and the president's political future, rather
than how it fulfills the ideals of "neutral competence." Finally, this presidency is partisan because the president perfonns as a partisan in the combat
of the "permanent campaign." The president, rather than floating above the
political system as "leader of all the people," leads the battalions of a partisan anny into the battlefield of contemporary Washington. The parties that
these presidents lead are not the decentralized, nonideological federations of
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the nineteenth century. They are nationalized, ideologically coherent, and
headquartered in Washington- ultimately in the Oval Office (Aldrich 1995).
While some of the elements of the partisan presidency emerged under
Nixon, it was Reagan that defined the partisan presidency as surely as Franklin Roosevelt did the modem presidency. Reagan sought to remake the Republican Party in his own conservative image and to vault it into majority
status. To this end, he repeatedly campaigned for Republican candidates. He
used the Republican National Committee (RNC) to win support for his programs, and he worked closely with Republican leaders in Congress, especially Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker. He polarized the electorate
more than any of his predecessors-even Nixon. Through centralization of
policy decisions and appointment of ideological loyalists, Reagan managed
to make the executive branch a tool of conservative governance. Even a
skeptic of presidential partisan leadership such as Sidney Milkis admits that
the Reagan era may have "marked the watershed ... for a renewed link
between presidents and the party system" ( 1993, 270).
Despite his previous service as chairman of the RNC, George H. W.
Bush harkened back to a less partisan style of leadership with his willingness
to work with a Democratic Congress. But the era of detente did not last.
Conservative Republicans angrily opposed Bush's agreement to raise taxes
in the 1990 budget agreement; Bush found himself desperately tacking to
the right to win back his base as the 1992 election approached. Meanwhile,
congressional Democrats increasingly blocked his legislative proposals in
anticipation of a Democratic win in November.
Bill Clinton was not as relentlessly partisan as his successor, but he still
fits into the partisan mold. While he had his own brief period of detente with
congressional Republicans beginning in late 1996 and climaxing with the
1997 budget agreement, he usually faced a remarkably united and determined opposition. In 1993- 1994, Republicans almost unanimously opposed
Clinton's budget and health care plan; in 1995- 1996, an empowered GOP
sought to impose its own agenda, attempting to overturn one of the defining
characteristics of the modern presidency; and in 1998- 1999, congressional
Republicans attempted to remove Clinton from office, despite widespread
public opposition. Clinton deeply polarized the electorate, experiencing an
"approval gap" even larger than Reagan's. Even during his second term,
when his overall popularity often soared above 60 percent, he continued to
inspire intense loathing among evangelicals and conservative Republicans
(Guth 2000; Harvey 2000; Rae 2000).
But George W. Bush has set a new standard for partisanship by a president. If Reagan was the Franklin Roosevelt of the partisan presidency, Bush
has been the Lyndon Johnson, building upon his predecessor's legacy to an
amazing extent. Unlike Reagan, Bush has been able to work with mostly
Republican Congresses, freeing him of the need to win over Democrats.
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With the exception of the rally-around-the-flag period after 9/11, Bush has
been intensely unpopular with Democrats. Now that his support among independents has fallen to about one in three, Bush is forced to rely almost exclusively on his GOP base.

The President as Party Leader
Modem presidents placed little priority on leading their party and often
found allies across the aisle. Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon showed
scant interest in their national party committees; Dwight Eisenhower
avoided partisan appeals and distributed patronage to "Citizens for Eisenhower" activists as well as to traditional Republicans. By contrast, partisan
presidents have served as active party leaders, campaigning for candidates,
working with party committees, and even trying to mold their party's future.
Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush both sought to make the Republican
Party both a majority and a more clearly conservative party. Bush set a new
standard for presidential campaigning through his involvement in the 2002
and 2004 congressional elections, which included calling for the defeat even
of moderate Democrats who had often supported Bush's policies (Bass
2004; Nelson 2004). Bill Clinton, while less disciplined in his commitment,
tirelessly raised money for the Democratic Party and outlined a "New Democrat" vision to appeal to the center (Rae 2000). Partisan presidents have
not shown the apathy that Johnson and Jimmy Carter displayed toward their
parties. If the "reformed" presidential process of the 1970s produced nominees such as Carter and George McGovern who had had little contact with
their party establishments, the "post-reformed" process of the past quartercentury has produced nominees backed by party insiders during the "invisible primary" (Cohen et al. 2003; Rockman 2004).

A Partisan Public?
Operating in an environment of declining partisanship, modem presidents sought to win over voters across party lines. Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon all won substantial support from voters in
the other party; alt three downplayed partisan themes in their campaigns.
Before 1980, presidents rarely experienced an approval gap of more than 40
points; Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy enjoyed popularity across party
lines, while Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter confronted significant opposition
within their own parties. Partisan presidents have experienced much larger
approval gaps than their predecessors. From Eisenhower through Carter, no
president had an average approval gap of more than 41 points, and the ap-
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proval gap never exceeded 48 points in any quarter. By contrast, Ronald
Reagan had an average approval gap of 52.9 points; Bill Clinton's was 55
points, falling below 50 points in only two quarters (Jacobson 2002).
But again, George W. Bush has set new standards for approval gaps. He
has experienced the largest approval gaps ever measured, the first president
to ever exceed 70 points, which he did during most of the 2004 campaign
(Dimock 2004; Jacobson 2005b). Bush has usually received more than 90
percent approval among Republicans, making him one of the most popular
presidents ever with his own party-but during 2004, his support among
Democrats was among the worst ever received for a president within the opposition party. Independents tended to be closer to Democrats in their view
of Bush, forcing him to rely on his own partisans for support (Jacobson
2005b). Even before the campaign began, Bush campaign operatives were
open in their belief that large numbers of voters would never back the president; instead they emphasized turning out loyal Republicans.
When polarization reaches such an extent, one wonders if the phrase
"public opinion" has much meaning, at least as a singular noun. Certainly,
with the divergence in electoral constituencies and the decline in "splitticket" states and districts, Democratic and Republican officeholders are operating in radically different contexts (Jacobson 2002).
Partisan presidents are also operating in a political system in which public opinion has become much more polarized along party lines (Bartels
2000; Brewer 2004; Fleisher and Bond 200 I; Hetherington 2001; Jacobson
2000; Lawrence 200 I; Layman and Carsey 2002). Americans perceive far
more ideological distance between themselves and presidents than they did
in the 1950s and 1960s. Arguably, more and more citizens see an enemy, not
a leader, in the White House (Hetherington and Globeui 2003 ). According to
the National Election Studies, the 2004 elections showed the highest level of
party loyalty ever measured.

Congressional Relations
Modem presidents often could not depend upon their congressional parties for legislative support. Those parties were usually divided; the NorthSouth split within the Democratic Party was most notable, but there were
divisions among Republicans as well, such as that between internationalists
and isolationists after World War II, which forced Dwight Eisenhower to
look to Democrats for support of his foreign policy (Davis 1992; Jones 2002;
Milkis 1993). But the period of the partisan presidency coincides with the
rise of polarization and party leadership in Congress (Bond and Fleisher
2000; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 199 I). In an era of increased partisanship, presidents find it more difficult to win support across party lines in

The Partisan Presidency

337

Congress (Jacobson 2002; Sinclair 2000b). Opposition parties not only unite
against the president's policies but may even adopt a "no" strategy, refusing
to cooperate on virtually anything, as did Republicans during Bill Clinton's
first two years. Fewer members are likely to support the policies of an
opposition-party presidency, as Southern Democrats had done so frequently
for Republican presidents (Fleisher and Bond 2000).
But it is also true that partisan presidents are better able to rely on their
congressional party for support than their predecessors could. There is some
evidence that united and divided control matter more in a polarized era than
they did a generation ago (Sinclair 2000a, 2000b; Nelson 2004). Both
George W. Bush and Clinton enjoyed close relationships with the congressional leadership of their own parties and both had deeply troubled relations
with the leaders of the opposition (Owens 2004; Wayne 2004). Whereas John
F. Kennedy had refused to campaign against Senate Minority Leader Everett
Dirksen in 1962 even though the senator faced a tough race in a state that
had voted for Kennedy, in a similar situation in 2004 Bush led a successful
Republican drive to oust Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (Davis 1992).
In late 2002, the Bush White House, dissatisfied with Senator Trent
Lott's leadership and dismayed by the uproar over his remarks at Strom
Thurrnond's 100th birthday party, helped engineer his removal as majority
leader. Contrary to Jones (2002), not only are Vice President Dick Cheney
and White House strategist Karl Rove familiar figures at meetings of Capitol
Hill Republicans but representatives of the Bush White House also regularly
attend the gatherings of conservative activists hosted by Grover Norquist.
Given congressional Republicans' unwillingness to challenge Bush on virtually any issue, one wonders how "separated" the "powers" of the federal
government are today.
But congressional partisanship, of course, goes far deeper than the personalities of particular presidents. The voting records and constituencies of
congressional Democrats and Republicans increasingly diverge, and party
leaders wield more clout than they once did (Jacobson 2002; Sinclair 2000a,
2000b, 2004). Clinton's brief period of detente with congressional Republicans ended not only because of the Lewinsky scandal but also because
Speaker Newt Gingrich nearly lost his position in an uprising by conservatives angry that he had "sold out." Partisan presidents may have helped polarize the political system, but they also must operate within it.

Partisan Administration
Modem presidents led an executive branch where party politics played
a diminishing role. Technocrats and personal loyalists replaced patronage
hacks in key jobs, especially under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson,
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who centralized many personnel decisions in the White House. But even
Franklin Roosevelt, after lavishing patronage on a starved Democratic Party
during his first term, gradually evolved to favor career civil servants and New
Dealers of questionable partisan background (Milkis 1993). Modem presidents preferred advisers from policy-oriented backgrounds, even when they
came from the opposite party or from outside politics altogether. Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower relied heavily on the "neutral competence" of
the Bureau of the Budget in shaping their domestic policies. Johnson had
nonpartisan task forces, dominated by academics and other specialists, to
formulate his leading policy proposals. Richard Nixon appointed as his first
domestic policy adviser Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Democrat and veteran
of the two preceding administrations; in fact, his first cabinet was so ideologically diverse as to lack coherence (Milkis 1993; Moe 1985; Nathan 1983).
While Nixon's "administrative presidency" strategy was often interpreted as a means of a president "governing alone" without the support of a
political party, it can also be a means of turning the executive branch into a
tool of partisan governance, as both Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush
have shown (Aberbach 2004; Moe 1985; Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989). The
administrative strategy lends itself especially well to an era when party activists are motivated more by ideology than by patronage. Yet one cannot dismiss the role of material incentives entirely; today, a prominent government
position can open the door to a lucrative lobbying career-perhaps a new
kind of patronage.
Nixon set the pattern for presidents taking greater control of the executive branch. Frustrated by the tendency of appointees to "go native" and by
the continuing power of civil servants and clientele groups, Nixon sought to
remake his administration in 1972- 1973 (Nathan 1983). He centralized
power in the White House and in a handful of trusted aides, increased the
power of the White House Personnel Office, appointed loyalists to cabinet
and subcabinet positions, and tried to use the Office of Management and
Budget (0MB) to rein in regulatory agencies (Nathan 1983). While Nixon's
efforts were thwarted by the Watergate scandal, Reagan and George W. Bush
showed that his methods could reorient government in a more conservative
direction. Both presidents selected ideologically sympathetic subordinates,
centralized policy and personnel decisions in the White House, and used the
0MB to curb regulatory excess. Bush took the "administrative presidency"
a step further by seeking to curb the power of public employee unions (Aberbach 2004; Bass 2004; Moe 1985, 2003). These administrations also sought
to secure greater partisan/ideological control of the judiciary, using recruitment processes that emphasized philosophy as much as competence or political connections (Mc Keever 2004; O'Brien 2004; Yalof 2003).
Neither Reagan nor George W. Bush showed much regard for "neutral
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competence" or disinterested expertise. Both men pursued policies widely
denounced by scientific "experts": supply-side tax cuts; opposition to efforts to curb environmental dangers such as acid rain and global warming;
and support for socially conservative policies such as abstinence-based sex
education, teaching "intelligent design," and opposition to the "momingafter" pill. During the preparation for the invasion of Iraq, Bush and his allies showed little interest in the concerns raised by career officials in the
CIA, the Pentagon, or the State Department.
Partisan presidents are more likely to tum to political consultants or
ideologically driven think tanks for policy ideas; this marks a sharp difference from Jimmy Carter's reliance on technocrats or Lyndon Johnson's task
forces of academics. Unlike Eisenhower or Nixon, George W. Bush is little
interested in hearing different views on policy questions and has not created
procedures to ensure open policy discussion (Bowman 2000; Campbell
2003; Heclo 2000; Medvic and Dulio 2001; Milkis 1993). Several veterans
of the Bush administration, from John Diiulio to Paul O'Neill, have noted
the Bush White House's avoidance of domestic policy and the president's
dislike for substantive debate. Even Bush loyalist David Frum (2003) has
admitted that the "faith-based" initiative was pursued primarily to woo religious voters rather than to remedy social problems (C. Campbell 2003;
Suskind 2004). The disdain for "neutral competence" has extended to judicial nominations, with the administration ending the practice of submitting
nominees to the American Bar Administration for evaluation (0' Brien
2004).

Partisan Media
Many scholars of the presidency see as the model for presidential-press
relations the amiable back-and-forth between reporters and Franklin D. Roosevelt or John F. Kennedy; they may also envision the reliance of Lyndon
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan on televised addresses, presumably aimed at the nation as a whole. Neither paradigm fits the reality of
media relations in this partisan era. Since Nixon, administrations have tried
to actively manage the news through the White House Office of Communications (Kernell 1997; Maltese 1994). With the rise of the Internet and cable
television, the audiences for presidential addresses, except in crisis situations, have been declining; there is some evidence, at least for George W.
Bush, that those audiences have also become partisan. 2 Bush's efforts at
"going public," whether on television or on the stump, have usually been
aimed more at "rallying the base" than "reaching out" (Edwards 2004;
Wayne 2004).
Both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations have had notably
testy relationships with the White House press corps. Both have sought to
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bypass the conventional media: Clinton by using the "alternative media"
(such as the Internet and cable television), and Bush by using conservative
media outlets such as Fox News and conservative talk radio (Maltese 1994;
Kurtz 1998; West 200 I).
While most media outlets have audiences that reflect the partisan diversity of the general public, a few have striking tilts in viewership. A 2004
survey by the Pew Research Center found that 35 percent of Republicans
"regularly watch" Fox News, while only 21 percent of Democrats do. Twice
as many viewers of Fox watched the Republican convention as watched the
Democratic gathering (overall ratings for the two events were about equal;
Project for Excellence in Journalism 2005). One in seven Republicans regularly listens to Rush Limbaugh's radio talk show, whereas only one in fifty
Democrats do (Pew Research Center 2004). The Project for Excellence in
Journalism (2005) notes the growth of a "journalism of affirmation" (e.g,
Republicans watching Fox News) and a "journalism of assertion" (e.g.,
bloggers or talk show hosts making unsubstantiated charges). This contrasts
sharply with the Progressive-era ideal of objective, scientific journalism conducted by experts (Lippmann 1922).

Implications of the Partisan Presidency
The partisan presidency may have some positive effects on national politics. Turnout has increased in the past two presidential elections, both of
which featured strikingly polarized views of the candidates among voters.
Voters report clearer images of the two parties, images with greater ideological coherence than in the past. The decline of the Progressive-era ideals of
objectivity in journalism and neutral competence in administration may have
undermined the credibility of the mass media and the authority of the federal
government. An objective media, however, can also demobilize voters, turning citizens into spectators, while turning over government to unelected experts can undermine democratic control.
But citizens also report greater ideological distance between themselves
and presidents, which may be associated with increased distrust (Hetherington and Globetti 2003). Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush generated
unusually intense support and opposition at the same time, often distorting
the national debate. The relentlessness of the "permanent campaign" makes
it difficult for politicians of opposite parties to work together. United government in this partisan era may lead to greater productivity, but also to the
adoption of policies out of sync with public sentiment. Politicians may then
respond more to ideological currents within their party than to public desires
or to objective expertise. Divided government may lead to the gridlock of
the first Bush administration or to the political warfare of the Clinton era.
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Combining contemporary partisanship with a shouting-head media culture
can make it impossible to develop solutions across ideological lines.
Even in this polarized era, the broader political system continues to restrain presidential partisanship. The separation of powers often produces
conflict that does not follow party lines; it also allows for divided government that can force cross-partisan coalitions, although they have become
more difficult to form in recent years. The numerous counter-majoritarian
features of the federal system-ranging from the Supreme Court to the Senate filibuster-continue to limit the possibility of party government. Individual politicians concerned with their own political futures may choose to
break with an unpopular president. Even the quintessential "partisan president," George W. Bush, has found congressional Republicans to be cool to
his plan for Social Security private accounts.
Some potential 2008 presidential candidates, such as Arizona senator
John McCain and Virginia governor Mark Warner, might govern in a less
partisan fashion-although one should remember that George W. Bush campaigned in 2000 as a "uniter, not a divider." Party factionalism, dormant in
recent years, could revive: perhaps the Iraq War will heighten divisions
among Democratic hawks and doves, perhaps the long-awaited rupture between social and fiscal conservatives will finally split the GOP (Reiter 2005).
But most of the factors contributing to the partisan presidency appear to be
long-term, not short-term. Simply put, we are not likely to see a return to the
above-the-fray style of the Eisenhower administration any time soon.
Notes
I. In lhe 1970s and 1980s, scholars discussed a "postmodern presidency," which could
also be called a "postparlisan presidency." This concept most clearly applied to Gerald Ford
and Jimmy Carter and, to a lesser extent, lo Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson, particularly
al their poli1ical nadirs. Presidents could no longer count on their party to provide them with
a base in the electorate or in Congress. The weakening of parties and the decentralization of
power on Capitol Hill left prcsidcnls with few allies able 10 deliver support. Due to the reform
of the nominal ion process. an "outsider" like Carter was able to reach the presidency without
gaining the support of tradilional party leaders; presidents increasingly "went public" to appeal to voters directly. The executive branch was increasingly dominated by bureaucrats and
issue activists detached from party politics. Sec Greenstein 1978; Kernell 1997; King 1978;
Nathan 1983; Polsby 1983; Ranney 1975; Rose 1991.
2. For example, a Gallup poll found that the audience for Bush's address on June 27,
2005, in which he defended his Iraq policy, was 50 percent Republican, 27 percent independent, and 23 percent Democratic- a much more Republican group than the nation as a whole.
Not surprisingly, three-quarters of viewers approved of the speech. A similar partisan pattern
has prevailed for many Bush addresses (sec E. J. Dionne, "Who's Listening to the President,"
Waslri11gt011 Post, July I. 2005, and Kenneth Bazinet, "Bush Jumps in Polls After War
Speech," Nell' fork Dt1il.)' News, June 30, 2005). Al the time, lhc most recent Gallup poll
showed only 45 percent of Americans approved of Bush•s performance as president. with just
42 percent approving of his handling of Iraq.
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Party Leadership in the House of Representatives
R. Lmvre11ce 8111/er
Party leadership exists in the House of Representatives to resolve a classic collective action problem. Congressional scholars have long held that individual members of Congress have three goals: reelection, policy making,
and gaining power within the institution. However, all members need a successful party in order to advance these goals. Reelection becomes more
problematic when one's party is unpopular. Creating new policy requires the
development of a winning coalition of al least 217 other representatives. And
House members' power is enhanced exponentially when their party is in the
majority. Acting purely as individuals, members could not build the coalitions necessary to achieve their goals. Party leaders are chosen, therefore, to
force the compromises necessary to enable individual members to work together for the good of the whole.
The traditional model of successful party leadership is the responsible
party government model espoused by Wilson ( 1885), Schattschneider
(1942), Ranney (1954), Chambers and Burnham (1975), and many others.
Patterned after the party system in parliamentary democracies, responsible
party government suggests that party members vote as a unit to advance a
predetermined party platform. Since American political parties are not as
tightly structured as their European brethren, this model requires party leaders to gain the maximum possible unity among members on roll-call votes.
A more recent model of party activity developed by Cox and McCubbins
(2005) has party leaders using their agenda-setting powers to achieve party
unity. Instead of using intensive pressure to whip party members into line,
leaders allow votes on issues for which the party is unified and avoid those
that split the party. No matter the approach, the result is that party members
vote as a group to enact the party's policy agenda.
Rohde ( 1991) has argued that parties will be much more successful at
solving the collective action problem when they are ideologically cohesive.
When party members basically agree on policy issues, they will be more
willing to empower party leadership to advance that agenda. However, they
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will insist on the creation of monitoring mechanisms to ensure that party
leaders are acting as faithful agents. Consequently, the increased party polarization in the House of Representatives over the past forty years has led to
heightened party activity.
Figure 21.1 presents a measure of polarization in the House of Representatives for each Congress since 1965. 1 The graph shows that ideological polarization in the House has indeed continued to rise over the past forty years.
Because of this, we would anticipate party governance to have grown dramatically during the period.2
Much has been written on the structure of the Democratic Party leadership in the House during the post-reform era that began in 1975. However,
less has been written on the structure of the Republican leadership in the
House after their 1995 takeover. Now that that team has been in charge for
a decade, it is time to examine its structure. The Republicans made numerous
internal changes in the House upon assuming power, many of which related
to the relationship between party leaders, committee chairs, subcommittee
chairs, and rank-and-file members. This chapter contains a careful analysis
of the relative balance of power between these levels of leadership in the
Democratic and Republican post-reform House to examine the extent to
which congressional party leadership structure really matters.

The Democratic Revolt
After decades in which committee chairs dominated the activities of
Congress, liberal Democrats in 1975 instigated a series of reforms that overhauled the party structure in the House. Their frustration had boiled over
because conservative Southern Democrats had been using the seniority system to keep a stranglehold on the most important committee chairmanships.
They had used this power to block liberal legislation favored by a majority
of the Democratic caucus. Finally, after the Watergate landslide election of
1974, young liberals gained enough of a majority that they were able to force
through a series of changes that established a system later dubbed by Rohde
(1991) "conditional party government."
The underlying principle of the reforms was to shift power away from
the committee chairs. Instead, power would be vested in the party leadership
and also distributed more broadly among caucus members. Rank-and-file
members were willing to centralize authority in the party leadership because
of the growing ideological homogeneity in the party and the increased polarization of the House. Since most caucus members wanted to move in the
same policy direction, they were willing to give party leaders the tools
needed to enact the party agenda. However, they also created mechanisms to
ensure a larger role for all members in the development and implementation
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of that policy. Thus, party leaders would have added power but they would
be required to consult with the broad membership to ensure that they exercised it in accord with the party's wishes. In short, they allowed party leaders to act as the agent of the caucus with a consultation mechanism created
to keep the leadership in line.
To analyze the structure of party leadership, it is helpful to look at it as
if it were a four-level wedding cake. On top is the elected party leadership.
Underneath that are the committee chairs and the subcommittee chairs. On
the bottom are the backbenchers. Let us examine how power was shifted
among the layers at the creation of conditional party government.

Party leaders
A key ingredient of the reforms of 1975 was the creation of the Steering
and Policy Committee. Half of its twenty-four members either were members of the elected party leadership or were handpicked by them. The remaining twelve members were each chosen to represent the interests of the
members from a particular geographic region. The Steering and Policy Committee took over the task of making committee assignments and selecting
committee chairs. Previously, the members of the Ways and Means Committee had made all committee selections, and seniority governed the choice of
chairs. Additionally, the Steering and Policy Committee began making policy recommendations for consideration by the caucus.
Moreover, the Speaker was given additional tools to move legislation
through the chamber in a manner designed to achieve the policy outcomes
desired by the party. The Speaker was given the power to select members of
the Rules Committee, the entity that had been so important to the conservative Democrats' success in bottling up legislation. The Speaker was also
given more discretion in referring bills to committee. He was empowered to
grant multiple referral to ensure that a single dissenting committee chair
could not block the will of the caucus.

Committee Chairs
The major goal of the 1975 reforms was to take power away from the
committee chairs. Speakers in previous years had to negotiate with the allpowerful chairs in order to advance the party's agenda. Now, committee
chairs assumed those positions only with the consent of the caucus, potentially by secret ballot. Thus, a chair that was out of step with the party could
be removed-and several were. Also, steps were taken to lessen the power
of committee chairs over rank-and-file members during floor consideration
of bills. In 1971, the Democrats changed the rules to allow for recorded votes
in the Committee of the Whole, giving members added capacity to pass
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amendments. Similarly, the Rules Committee was required to make allowance for floor consideration of any amendment that was supported by at least
fifty caucus members. Instead of being able to strong-arm caucus members,
committee chairs would have to serve them.

Subcommittee Chairs
The 1975 reforms also weakened the committee chairs by granting
greater power to the subcommittee chairs via the Subcommittee Bill of
Rights. Subcommittee chairs obtained greater independence because they
would be chosen by seniority, not by the head of the full committee. Also,
they were guaranteed the right to hire their own staff. Finally, their jurisdictions were clarified to give them unquestioned authority over their specified
policy area.

The Rank and File
Despite the ideological polarization of the House, caucus members were
not willing simply to surrender power to the party leadership. While leaders
were given greater authority, the new party structure created mechanisms
that mandated consultation with the rank and file. This ensured that party
leaders would be unable to use their powers in ways unacceptable to the liberal base of the caucus.
One of the mechanisms for drawing members closer to the leadership
was to increase the number of positions of power. The 1975 reforms increased dramatically the number of subcommittees and mandated that no
member could chair more than one. This created subcommittee chairmanships for many more members, thus spreading power to more members and
making them a part of the leadership team. In a similar vein, the Democrats
expanded the whip system. This created more leadership jobs, but it also
gave party leaders the resources to consult more broadly and fully with
members.
Finally, the 1975 reforms provided for the election of certain leaders
who had previously been appointed. The whip and the chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee became elected positions no
longer chosen by the Speaker. Similarly, committee chairs were to be nominated by the Steering and Policy Committee but voted on by the caucus.
While Steering and Policy always nominated the most senior person to be
the chair, the caucus rejected those it deemed to be ideologically out of step
with the majority of members, selecting instead more junior members who
would support the policy preferences of the caucus.
The 1975 reforms shifted power within the party in two important ways.
Party leaders were empowered to set the policy agenda without having com-
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mittee chairs block the will of the caucus. On the other hand, party members
were brought more closely into the leadership structure by increasing the
size of the leadership and allowing them a greater say in the choice of leaders. Conditional party government, therefore, centralized authority but made
it so that the exercise of that power would be constrained by the will of the
membership.

The Republican Revolution
In January 1995, Republicans organized the House of Representatives
for the first time in forty years. On the first day of the session, they passed a
new set of rules for the chamber that significantly altered, and in some cases
repealed, many of the 1975 reforms that had established conditional party
government. Scholars analyzing those first two years of the Republican regime described those reforms as having centralized power in the speakership
(see, for example, Peters 1997 and Aldrich and Rohde 1997).
There can be no doubt that Republicans gave the Speaker a great deal of
power. The caucus accepted the reform package that he and his lieutenants
prepared almost without change. During his speakership, Newt Gingrich had
virtual carte blanche authority to lead the caucus as he saw fit. However, the
fact that a leader exercises unbridled power does not mean that the underlying system, designed to keep a rein on party leaders, has been abandoned.
The first years of Republican rule were unusual in that the party had been
out of power for so many decades. Republicans viewed Gingrich as the
Moses who had brought them to the Promised Land. However, unlike in the
biblical story, Gingrich continued as the party's leader after it took control.
It is no surprise, then, that Republicans would grant him so much power.
As the visionary who had brought them to power, they naturally trusted his
leadership.
Ten years have passed now and Gingrich is no longer Speaker. We are
now in a position to examine the leadership structure established by the Republican majority without Gingrich's shadow impairing our vision. Let us
examine the changes in leadership structure as they have evolved over the
ten years of Republican rule. Do they mark a return to the boss era of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or are they simply a variation
on the Democratic theme of conditional party government?
Party Leaders

The Republican majority made very few changes in the powers of the
party leaders. Democrats had strengthened these positions dramatically during their era of conditional party government, and Republicans essentially
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mimicked their rivals. In 1995, Republicans placed an eight-year term limit
on the office of Speaker; they abandoned this reform in 2003, however. The
only other structural change in the power of party leaders was the repeal of
multiple referral of legislation. This had been instituted by the Democrats to
keep a single hostile committee chair from blocking legislation desired by
the caucus. The downside, however, was the "too many cooks" syndrome.
One of the reasons why House Democrats were unable to bring the Clinton
health care reform bill to the floor in 1993 was that it had been referred to
three separate committees, each with its own idea of what a reformed system
should look like. Merging those bills proved impossible. So while Republicans repealed the practice of multiple referral that Democrats had intended
as a method of strengthening party leadership, they did so because it was
unworkable, not as an effort to weaken the Speaker.
The most important difference between the two party leaderships was
not the amount of power vested but the extent to which they were willing
to exercise that authority. The Republican Committee on Committees, the
counterpart to the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee, often went
beyond seniority in recommending committee chairs to the caucus. While
the caucus ultimately selected the committee chairs, Democratic Party leaders had automatically submitted the name of the most senior member for
approval. Republican Party leaders often reached down into the committee
ranks to pick their nominee. This gave the party leadership greater leverage
over the committee chairs, who knew that they were beholden to the leaders
for their position of power.

Committee and Subcommittee Chairs
The Republican majority in 1995 reserved its biggest changes for the
powers and selection processes of committee and subcommittee chairs.
Gingrich eliminated three committees that primarily served Democratic con•
stituencies: Post Office and Civil Service, Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
and the District of Columbia. He also capped the number of subcommittees
per committee at six, with exceptions made for Appropriations and Government Reform. The overall effect of this streamlining was to eliminate
twenty-five subcommittees along with one-third of the overall committee
staff. Thus, fewer Republicans were made participants in leadership by being
given a subcommittee to chair.
The Republicans also changed the balance of power between the full
committee chair and the subcommittee chairs. They abolished the portions
of the subcommittee bill of rights that had allowed subcommittee chairs to
select their own staffs, and they also eliminated the seniority system for
granting subcommittee chairmanships, granting the full committee chair
more flexibility in the selection. The net effect of these reforms was to give
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the full committee chair greater authority and flexibility to shape the legislative ugenda of the committee and to push bills to the floor.
However, additional changes were made to ensure that committee chairs
used their expanded powers to advance the will of the caucus. Six-year term
limits were established to keep chairs from building a fiefdom to advance
their own agendas within the policy jurisdiction of their committee. This also
encouraged chairs to push legislation aggressively, because they would have
power for only a short period of time; at the end of six years, a new member
of the committee would take over the reins.
At the same time, Republicans went well beyond the Democratic reforms
of the seniority system. Violations of seniority in the selection of committee
chairs becume routine. Although the most senior member is more likely to
be named chair than any other, there is usually an open competition for the
slot. The Republican Committee on Committees sorts through the applicants
and makes its recommendation to the caucus, which makes the final selection. Thus, any member who wants to chair a full committee will need to
show his or her dedication to the party leaders and to advancing the party's
agenda.

The Rank and File
The members of the Republican caucus have the final word in the selection of party leaders and committee chairs. As the data on party polarization
show, there is far less ideological diversity in the caucus than in years past.
Thus, the rank and file are in a position to demand that party leaders and
committee chairs reflect their policy views. Because of term limits, chairmanship elections are a frequent occurrence. These elections, therefore, provide the opportunity for members to deliberate over the policies they wish
each committee to pursue and to examine which candidate would be best at
achieving that goal.
Candidates for committee chairs, as a result, have to make their appeals
both to the party leaders and to the caucus members. Since party leaders
have flexibility in deciding which member to recommend for the chairmanship, the caucus has the ability to influence that initial step in the process.
Party leaders cannot hide behind seniority if they suggest a candidate who
is not favored by the caucus. Brewer and Deering (2005) note that those
seeking committee chairmanships curry favor by raising large amounts of
money through their leadership political action committees and distributing
it to members. Not only are they buying support but they are also showing
their willingness to help the party retain its majority-and without majority
status, every Republican would lose substantial power. Thus, the constant
turnover of committee chairs has the added benefit of helping Republicans
retain power, the highest goal of everyone in the party.
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Chairmanships, however, are not merely fundraising contests. At the end
of the process, chairmanship candidates have to make a presentation to the
Committee on Committees explaining why they should lead the committee
and how they would advance the party agenda. As Cohen (2005, 1681) reports, this presentation is merely the end of a two-year process of building
support. He quotes a chairmanship candidate as saying that the four keys to
victory are "demonstrated legislative leadership, political teamwork, a vision
for the committee, and seniority." The choice is not purely ideological-it is
based on who the party believes will best lead the committee to their desired
outcome. Determining the nature of that outcome is ultimately a joint effort
of the party leadership and the rank and file.
To summarize the reforms of 1995, it is clear that the relative balance of
power among the four layers of the party has changed. Subcommittee chairs
have been made subservient to committee chairs. Party leaders have gained
greater influence over committee chairs through the selection process. Committee chairs have been given stronger tools to run their committees, but they
must use those tools to advance the party's agenda rapidly. The rank and file
are actively engaged in determining the direction of the party because of the
constant elections for committee chairs.
Although they have rearranged power within the party, the overriding
philosophy is that of conditional party government. An ideologically unified
party empowers its leadership to achieve the members' policy goals. However, they also create mechanisms to ensure that that power is being exercised in a manner that serves the will of the members. Democrats achieved
this by creating a participatory structure in which most members had a voice
as subcommittee chairs. Republicans, by contrast, use competitive elections
as a means of keeping party leaders and committee chairs in line. Both methods achieve the same goal; they just do it in different ways.

Effectiveness of Post-Reform Party Leaders
Measuring the relative success of party leadership is not as easy at it
might seem. Scholars of party leadership in the House of Representatives
have used a variety of indicators to measure the extent to which party leaders
are serving effectively. Most indicators involve some combination of measures of party unity and partisanship. The logic behind them is to measure
how well the majority party sticks together on votes where the two parties
disagree.
Unfortunately, party unity and partisanship are not the same thing as
party effectiveness and party strength. There are times when a party need
not be unified to get its way. Furthermore, sometimes a very unified majority
party can be defeated by an even more unified minority. We thus will assess
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the relative effectiveness of the two post-reform party leadership structures
by using the Majority Party Strength index (Butler 2003). Inspired by the
responsible party government literature, this indicator measures how frequently the majority party is able to guarantee itself victory by being so unified that minority party votes become irrelevant. In such instances, the majority party is acting like a responsible party in a parliamentary system.
Figure 21.1 shows the level of the Majority Party Strength index for
Congresses from 1965 to 2004, along with two independent variables that
significantly affect its value: ideological polarization and majority caucus
size. Consistent with the conditional party government theory, party strength
rises as polarization increases. Moreover, party strength rises as the caucus
size grows. With a larger caucus, the majority party can guarantee victory
even with a large number of defectors. An additional factor that increases
party strength is the existence of unified government.
These relationships would suggest that party leadership structure has little impact on the majority's ability to act consistent with responsible party
government. After all, party strength appears to be a function of a number
of factors that are exogenous to the party leadership. However, Butler (200 I)
shows that the two structural efforts to strengthen majority party leadership-the Reed Rules of 1890 and the advent of conditional party government-also increased party strength in the House. Thus we can conclude
that empowering party leaders has improved the majority's ability to act as
a responsible party, but a small caucus, divided government, or a relatively
heterogeneous caucus can hinder their capacity.
To illustrate this argument, we need only compare the Majority Party
Strength index for the post-reform Democratic and Republican congresses.
Throughout the period, Democrats appear to have had much greater success
at acting like a responsible party. With the exception of the first Gingrich
congress in 1995- 1996, the index is consistently lower under Republican
majorities than it is under Democratic ones. However, this comparison is
somewhat misleading. Republicans have had to work with a much smaller
majority than the Democrats did. The largest Republican majority was 54
percent, whereas the smallest Democratic majority in the post-reform era
was 56 percent. Thus, even though Republicans have been remarkably unified in their voting, it has often not been enough to guarantee themselves
victories on roll-call votes.
The study of leadership often resembles "chicken and egg" analysis.
When party leadership is functioning perfectly, the caucus is in perfect accord with its leaders. In such cooperative circumstances, we cannot observe
whether the caucus is following its leadership blindly or whether the leaders
are perfectly mirroring the will of the caucus. Perhaps the truth is some com-
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bi nation of the two. It is only when conflict arises and the two are pulling in
opposite directions that we can determine who is really calling the shots.
For that reason, it is hard to say definitively whether or not power in
the Republican Congress has been centralized in its leadership or whether
conditional party government still exists. To date, there has seldom been
much difference between the wishes of the party leaders and the conservative base of the party. Nonetheless, two incidents stand out as examples in
which the rank and file appear to have forced party leaders to respond.
During Gingrich's second term as Speaker, he was nearly removed from
office by his lieutenants. Key members of the Republican leadership had become disenchanted by his leadership and plotted to remove him from the
position. Gingrich discovered the plot, squashed it, and remained in power.
At the end of that Congress, however, Gingrich found himself in even deeper
trouble. Many conservative members of the caucus had grown weary of
"caving in" to the Clinton administration on policy issues. Gingrich had told
them that these compromises were necessary in order to maintain their congressional majority. Nonetheless, the Republicans lost seats in the House for
the second consecutive cycle. When it became public in the wake of the
Clinton impeachment that Gingrich had also been cheating with an intern,
his support among the rank and file collapsed and he stepped down as
Speaker. Where party leaders had failed, the caucus had succeeded.
More recently, conservative House members have grown dismayed over
the lack of spending restraint by the Congress. House conservatives have
formed the Republican Study Committee, an organization that now boasts
nearly half the caucus as members. Early in 2005, conservatives forced
Speaker Dennis Hastert to include mechanisms in the budget to reduce
spending. In September of that year, conservatives brushed aside Hastert's
selection to temporarily replace Tom Delay as majority leader after the latter
had stepped down to battle indictments related to campaign fundraising.
Hastert recommended David Dreier of California for the position, but conservatives insisted that the whip, Roy Blunt of Missouri, who had worked
cooperatively with the group in spending cuts, take over most of the majority
leader's duties.3 Hastert was forced to back down on his selection in the face
of this rebellion.
After watching the Republican Study Committee dig in its heels, moderate Republicans began to do likewise. At the end of the year, they forced the
leadership to reinstate some domestic spending before they would accept the
annual appropriations bills. They also succeeded in stripping a provision to
allow drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge from a package of reductions in entitlement programs. With Democrats united in opposition, the
two wings of the party began to flex their muscles to push their own policy
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preferences at the expense of party unity. It is at such times that party leadership is put to the test.

Notes
I. As a measure or ideology, we use Poole and Roscnlhal's OW-NOMINATE scores
(for a complclc description or OW-NOMINATE scores, sec McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
1997). We then apply the formula
I - (St.Oev.(Majorily))/[St.Dcv.(All)],
where St.Oev.(Majorily) is the standard deviation of the OW-NOMINATE scores for
majority party members and St.Dev.(AII) is the standard deviation for all House members.
This measure of polarization was proposed by Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002). As specified in this paper, the measure would lake a value of Oir both party caucuses were distributed
idcnlically across 1he ideological spectrum and would take a value of I if all majority-party
members voted together on every roll call.
2. Aldrich. Berger, and Rohde (2002, 25) find a similar rise in party polarization in the
Senate during the period. However, this would have a smaller impact on the strength of parly
leadership in that chamber because of the proleclions granted lo 1hc minority in Senate rules.
3. Ironically, Blunt lost the February 2006 contest lo pennanently replace DcLay as majority leader lo Rep. John Bochner of Ohio. Bochner, the chair of the Commiuee on Education
and the Workforce, had been part of Gringrich's original leadership team from 1995 through
1998.
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Ten Years after the Revolution
1994 and Partisan Control of Government
Sha1111011 Jenkins, Douglas D. Roscoe,
John P. Frendreis, and Alan R. Gitelso11

The elections in 1994 produced a truly remarkable set of outcomes.
Rarely in American history has one party so clearly dominated electoral contests across the country. Republicans gained fifty-four seats in the U.S.
House of Representatives and eight seats in the U.S. Senate. Not one single
Republican incumbent in the House was defeated, while thirty. four Democratic incumbents lost. The magnitude of this change is well illustrated by
the remarkable transformation in the Washington State delegation, which
went from eight Democrats and one Republican to seven Republicans and
two Democrats. The Republicans picked up seats in thirty-three of fortyone state senates and forty-three of forty•six state lower chambers holding
elections in 1994. Finally, Republican candidates defeated five incumbent
Democratic governors and won fifteen open seat elections, while all Republican incumbent governors won their reelection bids. These sweeping events
caught many of those who studied American politics by surprise. In fact,
1994 had seen the publication of Congress' Pemranent Minority? Rep11blica11s in the U.S. House (Connelly and Pitney 1994). Clearly, there were few
who predicted these sweeping gains and the return of the Republican Party
to majority status after a long hiatus.
As a result, after the 1994 elections, there was a Hurry of questions and
research about what exactly had happened. Did "the elections reHect only a
short-term rebellion against the Democratic Party in general and Bill Clinton
in particular? Were the results due to enduring structural shifts in the parties'
electoral coalitions? Was 1994 a 'critical election' indicating that a realignmem has occurred?" inquired Tuchfarber and Rademacher ( 1995, 689).
Abramowitz asked, "Can we explain the Republican victory? ... Was it a
temporary aberration caused by short-term forces or does it signal a longterm realignment of party strength in the United States?" (1995, 874).
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Many of these studies developed (often conflicting) theories to explain
the Republican gains of 1994, but almost all agreed that looking at this election with a short-term focus meant that many questions about 1994 had to
remain unanswered. As Little ( 1998, I 88) suggested, more time was needed
to determine the degree to which the fruits of the Republicans' successful
strategy in this election cycle were merely temporary or more durable.
But despite the near-universal agreement on the need for perspective,
little research has been done that looks at the implications of the 1994 elections historically. Most research on the 1994 elections was published in 1998
or earlier, and 1994 is the last election included in those studies examining
that election as part of electoral trends. This chapter returns to the questions
surrounding the 1994 elections with the goal of developing more definitive
answers now that we have the vantage point of time. Was 1994 a watershed
election or simply the culmination of gradual processes of change? To what
extent have the Republican gains of I 994 persisted through 2004? Are there
regional variations to the national trends? Have these changes played out
against a backdrop of change with respect to the nationalization of American
electoral politics?
To begin answering these questions, we utilize data on the partisan balance in the U.S. Congress and state legislatures and control of the fifty governors' mansions from I 984 through 2004. Generally speaking, the results reveal that 1994 was indeed a revolutionary election; there was little evidence
of Republican gains prior to and immediately after the 1994 elections. Furthermore, while the Republican gains of I 994 have for the most part persisted, there have not been additional gains. However, there are clear regional
variations to these trends, particularly at the state level. Southern state legislatures, rather than being part of the revolution, were undergoing evolutionary change that predated 1994 and continued after. These changes, both
nationally and in the South, suggest American politics became more nationalized, although in the period since 1994, Southern congressional delegations have become as distinctively Republican as they were Democratic for
most of the twentieth century.

Early Explanations for the Republican Surge
On November 8, 1994, many politicians and political scientists alike
were stunned by the results of the congressional and state elections. Even
Republican congressional leaders were surprised- and unprepared for their
new role as a majority. As one newly elected Republican U.S. representative
noted, "I never dreamed I would serve in the majority. I expected a 20-seat
gain. . . . I don't care what those leaders say, they didn't know we were
going to win either. If they had, they would have known what to teach us in
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orientation" (Gimpel 1995, 16). Political scientists were caught off guard,
loo. Abramowitz described the election as a Republican "tidal wave" ( 1995,
873), while Gimpel used words such as "landmark," "spectacular," and
"stunning" (1995, I) to describe the tum of events. Almost immediately,
researchers tumed to the task of explaining what happened in these elections
and why almost everyone failed to predict these results.
Some have argued that these Republican victories were a function of
unique conditions in 1994. Tuchfarber and Rademacher conclude that the
I 994 elections were both a rejection of Bill Clinton, the Democratic Party,
and liberalism and an embrace of conservatism (1995, 694). Little (1998)
argues state-level victories for the Republican Party were a function of unprecedented, coordinated national party activity that induced state-level parties to adopt state-specific Contracts with America. 1 The Republicans also
efficiently targeted resources to those races where they would make the most
difference, which had a noted impact in these races (Abramowitz 1995). According to these arguments, then, in the absence of these specific conditions
in future elections, one would predict that Republican gains would not persist
or, at the very least, that such gains would not continue.
But others argued that these victories were simply a part of larger trends
or explanations of midterm elections generally. For example, Coleman
( 1997) argues that these victories were not altogether surprising due to a
long-standing Republican advantage in midterm elections. The congressional parties have different fortunes in midterm elections where-even
when controlling for factors such as presidential approval, economic growth,
surge and decline, and safe seats-Republicans lose fewer seats than do
Democrats. The Democrats lost so badly in 1994 because they were Democrats. serving under a Democratic president, the reasoning goes. Thus, if
presidential party is incorporated into existing models of midterm elections,
the results are almost entirely explicable.
Campbell ( I 997) argues that the results of the 1994 elections are consistent with a revised theory of surge and decline. The results of the election
are due to a staggered realignment in the South, where the South had become
solidly Republican in presidential elections in the 1980s but only became
solidly Republican in congressional elections in the 1990s. The 1994 elections, he claims, mark the unification of the South into the Republican
camp. Thus, Republican gains were so large because of two forces, the realignment of the South and midterm decline, both of which worked against
the Democrats.
Some have argued that changes in the electorate led to the sweeping Republican gains (Abramowitz 1995). The electorate had grown less Democratic and more conservative since the 1980s. At the same time, ideology
and party became far more important predictors of vote choice in 1994, particularly for Republicans and conservatives. From these findings, then, one
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could argue that the Republican gains should continue past the 1994 time
period. While the changes in the 1994 election may have been large, they are
explainable by minor revisions to existing models and are not a historical
anomaly.
Additionally, there is disagreement over the extent to which these victories were driven by changes in the South. While Campbell ( 1997) attributes
much of the observed change in congressional elections to changes in the
South, Little ( 1998) finds state-level gains by the Republican Party are not
related to region. Thus, it is not clear to what extent regional changes in the
South were generally important or whether such changes were critical only
at the congressional level.
Despite their disagreement over the causes of the 1994 Republican victories, all these findings seem to suggest congressional elections are increasingly responding to national-level forces. While previous research has shown
congressional elections have not become nationalized and are more responsive to state and local forces (Vertz, Frendreis, and Gibson l 987; Claggett,
Flanigan, and Zingale 1984), the widespread nature of the Republican gains
in this election cycle suggests that voters have been responding to national
forces when making choices in congressional elections. Was this nationalization of midterm elections a one-time event or have the midterm elections
become more nationalized since the 1980s?
Finally, despite the contradictory claims about the nature of these victories, what all authors seems to agree upon is the fact that it is difficult to find
definitive answers about the long-term significance of the 1994 elections
from a short-term vantage point. For example, Tuchfarber and Rademacher
( 1995, 694) note that only future elections will allow us to tell if 1994 marks
the beginning of a period of Republican dominance or a continuation of a
period of electoral dealignment. Abramowitz (1995, 885) wonders whether
the changes he identifies represent long-term changes in the electorate or
short-term reactions to the perceived failures of the Clinton administration
and the Democratic Congress. Without examining elections beyond these
events, it is difficult to answer these questions or determine to what extent
the Republicans continued to make gains in Congress and in the states beyond the 1994 election or even the extent to which the gains made in the
1994 elections persisted.

Reexamining the Revolution Ten Years After
In order to develop answers to questions surrounding the 1994 election
results, we utilize data on the partisan balance in the U.S. Congress and state
legislatures and control of the fifty governors' mansions from 1984 through
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2004. This time frame was chosen to allow analysis of the data ten years
before and ten years after the 1994 election.
At the national level, we collected data on the partisan balance of each
state's delegation to the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate after each election
cycle.2 Data were coded so that any gains or losses from a given election
were associated with the year of the election, not the year in which the winners actually served. So, for example, changes in a state delegation to Congress in the 1994 election year are reflected in the data for 1994, not 1995.
Because the overall data set is yearly, the data for the odd years, when no
elections were held, simply reflect the data for the previous year.
Data on state-level election returns came from Klamer (2003). For each
state, the percentage of Republicans in the upper and lower chambers, as
well as a variable indicating whether Republicans controlled each chamber,
is included for each year.3 Where there was a tie in a chamber, these cases
were coded as non-Republican controlled. Finally, this data set contains a
variable indicating the party of the governor. There are twenty-six cases
where the party of the governor switched midyear or there was a minor-party
governor. Once again, these cases were coded as non-Republican control of
the gubernatorial post. Finally, in the state data, because different states hold
elections in different years, the statistics reflect who actually served in that
year, rather than gains/losses from elections that year. So, for example, gains
in the 1994 election are reflected in the 1995 totals.
Because much of the speculation surrounding the changes in 1994 involves regional variation, the data have also been split into non-South and
South, with the latter composed of the eleven ex-Confederate states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia).
The primary means of analysis is an examination of trends in the variables during the twenty-one-year period centered on 1994. In each figure, a
vertical line indicates the first year reflecting the effects of the 1994 elections: for the congressional data, this is 1994; for the states, this is 1995,
because these data record the numbers serving each year, rather than election
returns. The analysis also includes an assessment of the trends before and
after 1994. To measure these trends, the variable of interest was regressed on
the time variable (year) separately for the early period (before the Republican revolution) and then again for the later period.~ The slope from these
regressions serves as a good measure of trend, capturing the average annual
change in each period.
Two additional statistics are helpful in understanding the dynamics in
the time series. First, the difference between the mean level of each variable
in the early and later periods is calculated. This change, which we have
termed the "bump," indicates the durable gains made by the GOP. A second
statistic, termed the "jump," measures the specific increase in the variable
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as a result of the 1994 elections. For the congressional data, the jump is the
gain from I 993 to 1994; for the state data, it is the difference between 1994
and 1995. If the 1994 election was truly a revolution, we would expect to see
a large jump that is equal to or larger than the bump; in such situations, all
of the change between the two periods would be explained by the jump in
1994. However, if 1994 were part of an evolutionary process, then we would
expect to see a bump that is larger than the jump. This would suggest that
while the Republicans made some gains in 1994, there were also gains that
occurred outside this election.

The Nature of the Republican Revolution in Perspective
The I 994 election is often referred to as the "Republican revolution,"
but to what extent were the changes truly revolutionary? Did any of the outcomes reflect evolutionary processes that had been unfolding in the years
prior? The story told by the data initially appears fairly clear: 1994 truly was
a revolution. Consider first the Republican share of seats in the U.S. Congress. Figure 22.1 graphs the series for the House and Senate separately. The
trend in the House prior to 1994 is essentially flat- the slope during this
period is - 0.03. At this rate, it would have taken the Republicans more than
thirty-three years to lose one percentage of their seats. The trend in the
House prior to 1994, is essentially flat, going down a bit at first then trending
up, the net result of which is a slope of - .03. As a result, almost all of the
change in representation of Republicans in the House comes as a result of
1994. The bump in the Republican percentage- the increase from the mean
level in the early period to the mean level in the later period- is 11.3 points,
as Republicans went from controlling about 40 percent of the seats to having
a bit over half. But most of this comes from the jump from 1992 to 199410.5 points. Indeed, no one could have seen this revolution coming. And,
moreover, once the revolution was over, equilibrium returned.
The story is similar in the Senate, although the first two years reflect the
Republican majority during the Reagan era (see figure 22.1 ). As a result, the
slope in the early period is negative and sizable ( - 1.31 ). This also means
the bump in the average percentage Republican, 7.0, is smaller than the jump
in 1994, 11.0. In other words, although the Republicans picked up eleven
Senate seats in 1994, their average in the post-1994 period was only seven
seats greater than in the ten years prior to 1994. Despite this characteristic
of the changes, there is certainly no evidence of secular gains prior to 1994
and equally little evidence of continuing progress after the revolution- in
fact, the slope in the later period is slightly negative ( - 0.28).
The national-level changes clearly fit the revolution mold, but what
about the dynamics in the states? Figure 22.2 graphs the number of Republi-
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can governors, along with the number of state upper and lower houses controlled by Republicans. Here, too, the changes are much more revolutionary
than evolutionary. The Republicans were gaining a governor at the rate of
about one every five years in the period before 1994 (slope = 0.20). This
was progress for the GOP, but it pales in comparison to the jump in 1994 of
eleven gubernatorial positions. This completely accounts for the bump of
10.3 positions from the early to later period. Interestingly, the Republican
Party has been handing back keys to a number of governors' mansions since
1994, losing one position every two years on average (slope = -0.56).~
The patterns in Republican control of state legislatures follow the same
revolutionary mold (see figure 22.2). The trends in both upper and lower
house control in the early period and later period are essentially flat, although the GOP is gaining one upper house every five years or so in the
post-1994 period (slope = 0.22). The changes occur almost completely in
the jump from 1994 to 1995-eight upper houses and ten lower houses move
into the Republican column. Both of these jumps account for almost the entire bump in average number of chambers owned by the GOP-8.9 upper
houses and 10.7 lower houses.
So far the conclusion about the nature of change is clear: 1994 was a
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Figure 22.2 Number or Governorships and Stute Legislatures Controlled by
Republicans
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truly remarkable election, in which the Republicans made major gains that
were not part of any gradual process of increasing electoral success. Similarly, little has happened since that revolution to alter the basic partisan balance in Congress and in the states. The gains have persisted. On the one
hand, given the popular characterizations of the Republican revolution, this
conclusion is not surprising. On the other hand, there are good reasons to
expect some buildup to the "big bang" in 1994. For one, it has been known
from survey data that the population has been trending Republican since the
mid- to late 1970s. Second, a secular realignment in the South has been
under way for some time and started to reach its maturity in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Republican identification in both the non-South and South
increased dramatically from the late 1970s into the mid- 1980s and then sta•
bilized. The changes in the South were especially pronounced, as the per•
centage of Republicans roughly doubled in about a decade (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). And all of the increases occurred well before the
1994 election.
Certainly, it is reasonable to speculate, these changes in mass partisanship must have had some effects on partisan control of government before
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1994. Or did the disparity between macro partisanship and party control simply create increasing tension that was abruptly released in 1994? The answer
is that there were, in fact, signs of increasing Republican ascendancy before
1994, but only in the South and particularly in state legislatures.
This fact becomes apparent when the trends examined above are broken
down by region. Figure 22.3 displays the Republican percentage of the members in the U.S. House and Senate from non-Southern and Southern regions/•
The two House series are basically flat in the pre- and post-1994 periods-all
of the slopes are much less than I in magnitude. So, on average, gains in
each period were offset by losses. But the Southern House series rises consistently between 1990 and 1996. This suggests the Republican revolution in
the Southern congressional delegations played itself out over four election
cycles. A good indicator of this fact is that only 12.8 of the 21.8 percentage
points in the bump in average Republican House percentage in the South was
due to the jump from 1993 to 1994. In other words, just under half of the
durable Republican gains in the House over the last twenty years occurred in
elections besides 1994. In contrast, the I 993-1994 jump in non-Southern
states was 9.7 percentage points but resulted in a bump of only 7.5 points.
The much smaller, durable change outside the South was therefore clearly
limited to 1994.

Figure 22.3

Republican Percentage In the U.S. House and Senate, by Region
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A similar story emerges for the Senate. The increases in the percentage
of Southern Republican senators start in 1992 and continue through 1996.
This is a shorter span than in the House, but it is still evidence of evolution.
In contrast, the non-Southern series looks remarkably stable in both periods
and exhibits only a minor jump in 1994 that really only served to make up
ground lost in 1992.
Are signs of evolution equally apparent in Southern statehouses? Figure
22.4 shows the percentage of upper and lower chambers in each region under
GOP control. The non-Southern series both show the expected jump, though
there were some gains in the years prior. But in the South, there were 110
Republican-controlled chambers prior to 1995. After the 1994 elections,
however, there is a notable trend upward in both upper and lower houses
with GOP majorities. Unlike the congressional trends in the South, which
seemed to suggest a series of years surrounding I 994 that were responsible
for a Republican "evolution," the state legislative data portray I 994 as the
push that started the ball rolling. Starting in 1995, the Republicans picked
up 4.5 percent of Southern upper houses and 1.8 percent of Southern lower
houses per year on average. The immediate post-1994 jump is clear in the
lower chambers, but for the upper chambers it is not unusually large com-

Figure 22.4
by Region
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pared to change later in the period. It looks like something happened in
Southern statehouses in 1994, but it was not the radical, instantaneous
change evident in the rest of the country and in Washington.
In fact, what happened in 1994 was simply that long-standing increases
in Republican membership in Southern state legislatures had finally led to
majority status for the GOP. This is clear in figure 22.5, which displays the
mean Republican percentage in upper and lower houses in the non-South
and South. What is remarkable in these figures is the relatively smooth, unbroken trend upward in the South. In contrast to almost all of the previous
figures, one would be hard-pressed to identify any particular point as a clear
jump indicative of revolutionary change. Republicans were making steady
progress in Southern statehouses long before 1994 and have continued to do
so at mostly the same rate.7 What happened in 1994 was simply that some
of these increases started to create GOP majorities in some Southern states.
As the GOP presence continued to increase in the South, more and more
chambers fell into Republican hands, as figure 22.4 shows.
These patterns are the clearest evidence of evolutionary change. Southern state legislatures were simply not part of the Republican revolution. Iron-

Figure 22.5
Region
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ically, though the Republican pickups in the South in 1994 are often presented as part of the evidence for a sweeping, critical realignment in 1994,
the timing of the gains is purely accidental. They coincide with the other
clear jumps in partisan control in 1994 not because they all share some common source but simply because that happened to be the year the secular realignment in the South yielded some GOP majorities.
One thing is relatively clear: both the sharp and gradual gains together
have nationalized American politics. At the beginning of the time frame considered here, the South was clearly less Republican than the rest of the country. By the end of the period, the South was much less distinctive and in
many instances had become even more Republican than the non-South. In
the states, both Republican control and mean percentage in the Southern
state legislatures had approached convergence with the non-South (figures
22.4 and 22.5). While the South has become as distinctly Republican as it
was Democratic in the earlier era, this actually indicates the South and the
non-South are both responding to similar forces. The South is becoming
more Republican because the South is, generally speaking, more conservative than most of the rest of the country. Nationalization has led not to partisan homogeneity across regions but to similarity in how party control re~
Heels the underlying ideological and demographic profile of each region's
population. In the South, that means the Republicans have a natural edge.

Conclusion
On one hand, some previous analyses of the 1994 elections suggested
the Republican gains were a function of specific conditions that were present
in that election. The Republican revolution, according to this model, was a
spectacular event that would probably not be replicated. On the other hand,
some argued the 1994 gains were part of a larger process of political change
in the United States and thus were more evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, in nature. Of course, it was difficult to determine which of these viewpoints was correct without the benefit of perspective.
When looking at the Republican surge ten years later, it becomes clear
that these changes were in many ways truly revolutionary. In the U.S. House
and Senate, almost all of the gains made by Republicans came in the 1994
elections, despite the fact that mass partisanship was gradually becoming
more Republican in the period preceding those elections. The same is true at
the state level. Changes in Republican control of the executive branch and
state legislatures almost all occur in the 1994 election. There is little evidence of evolutionary change at the aggregate level. Clearly, something happened in the electorate in 1994. In the search for understanding what is going
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on in contemporary electoral politics, discovering exactly what happened in
that election cycle is critical.
However, it is also true that the South had gradually tilted more Republican during this time period, and there is evidence to suggest that the changes
in the South were happening much more gradually than in the rest of the
country. Republican gains in non-Southern states-in congressional delegations, in governorships, and in state legislatures-were almost entirely confined to the 1994 election. Southern congressional delegations, in contrast,
were becoming more Republican throughout the 1990s. This evolutionary
process is even more clearly evident in Southern state legislatures, particularly when looking at the percentage of Republicans in these chambers. In
these legislatures, Republican representation increased smoothly across the
twenty-one years with little evidence of a surge at all.
So it seems clear that the 1994 Republican revolution was a remarkable
confluence of events. A gradual process of evolutionary change in the South
was reaching its culmination at the same time a number of conditions favoring the Republicans occurred. The Republicans were in an excellent position
to capitalize on these two factors-and capitalize they did, making tremendous gains. However, while these gains have not evaporated, they also have
not continued. There is a new equilibrium in congressional politics, much to
the Democrats' disadvantage.
As a result of the 1994 elections, it appears that politics became more
nationalized. In state legislatures, Southern Republican gains have brought
that region to levels similar to those in the rest of the country, and their
growth continues. If trends remain the same, in just a few years the typical
Southern statehouse will be virtually indistinguishable from its Northern
counterpart. A few years later, these legislatures are likely to be even more
Republican than the non-South. At the national level, GOP gains in Southern
congressional delegations have already made them look even more Republican than the rest of the country.
The shift of the South from solidly Democratic to staunchly Republican
must surely be seen as a realignment of some sort, though it appears to have
happened- and is still happening-in waves. The shift occurred in presidential elections earliest. The Republican "L" has been a staple of the electoral
map for decades. Then, state legislatures started moving in a Republican direction. This change is still under way, but signs point toward Republican
dominance in Southern statehouses soon. The element of these partisan
shifts that most resembles the classic critical realignment was the change in
Congress, which occurred primarily in 1994 but also extended over surrounding elections in the South. The Republican gains in the 1994 surge
have persisted, giving the GOP a durable majority in Congress.
Many people, of course, have described the Republican surge in 1994 as
a realignment. With a ten-year perspective on these events, it is now possible
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to belier understand the complexity of this realignment process. In thinking
about realignments, we nonnally look for nationwide change driven by intense, polarizing issues that is the result of interplay among party elites and
party factions, leading to mass voter changes and enduring changes in election results. Some of this describes the elections of 1994. However, the
changes unfolded with a unique regional dimension unlike any major realignment in the past. In addition, rather than mass partisanship realigning
with newly defined parties, the changes in party identification seem to have
preceded the shifts in partisan control. Furthermore, while the New Deal coalition may have faded, New Deal issues are still important and continue to
define the major divisions between the parties. Of course, these issues have
been joined by other issues of a more contemporary nature, but these issues
are rarely cross-cutting.
If 1994 represented a realignment, it is not clear what the realigning
issue was. This complexity only confirms what many students of realignment
theory have believed for years: there is no typical realignment. Perhaps we
should drop the term altogether and simply discuss partisan change. Either
way, the 1994 election was part of a major transformation in American politics with lasting consequences for the two major political parties.

Notes
I. Of course, one must question the extenl to which the Conlract drove voting behavior
in lhe states, given lhat exit polls showed rcw voters knew aboul the Contract al the national
level, let alone 1he state level. However, Lillie ( 1998) argues the importance of these state
contracts is that they gave Republicans is~ucs to hung their hat~ on-issues that resonated
with the voters.
:?. lnfonnution on state delegations lo Congress came from the official Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress (http://bioguidc.congress,gov) and was conlinned by the Clerk
of the House (http://clerk.house.gov) and official Senate (http://www.scnate.gov) websites.
3. Nebraska was excluded from our analysis as its stale legislature is unicameral and
nonpartisan.
4. for the congressional data, lhe early period is 1984- 1993 and lhc later period is
1994- 2004. For the state data, the early period is 1984- 1994 and the later period is 19952004.
5. It is important to note the slope renects the regression line thal "fits" the data and
provides a measure of the rise•over-run of this estimated line. Therefore, it may not renect
exactly lhe difference between the first and last time points, particularly when the actual trend
itself is not very straight.
6. More specifically, it is the number of Republicans from each region divided by the
total number of House seals in lhat region (not the average of each state's delegation).
7. The slopes arc largely unchanged: for upper houses, 1.7 in the early period and 0.7
in the later period; for lower houses, 1.0 before 1995 and 1.2 after. These numbers do suggest
the upward trend nanens a bit for upper houses.
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The Courts and Party Systems in 2004
Representation without Competition?
David K. Ryden
Hardly any issue concerning the institutions of governance or the conduct
of elections is outside the rc.ich of contemporary con~titutional law.
,-Richard H. Pildcs

The constitutionalizing of the American political process continues unabated. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in on the most
significant dimensions of elections- race-based redistricting, campaign finance reform, partisan gerrymandering, even regulating state judicial cam,
paigns. The Court, unchastened by the controversy surrounding Busl, v.
Gore, is poised to extend its central role in shaping the rules of politics, democracy, and representation.
Yet the Court is no closer to a sound doctrine that might guide its election law jurisprudence. It has neither an "organizing principle" nor a generally defined political structure around which the expanding constitutional
"law of politics" might cohere (Pildes 2004, 39). This is equally true of the
Court's treatment of party organizations. It exhibits neither a normative understanding of parties nor an appreciation of their representative role and
functions (Ryden I 999, 52).
The upshot is an ironic and prickly puzzle. The well-being of the political system rests in significant part on (I) an antimajoritarian, undemocratic
institution (the Court) (2) assuming major responsibility for mediating the
behavior of the institutions at the center of the representative system (the
parties) but (3) lacking the doctrinal tools to do so effectively. It is pointless
to argue that the Court ought not to be the guardian of representative principles as embodied in parties. It is, and it will continue to be. Hence it behooves political scientists to scrutinize those decisions that touch on parties,
in hopes of informing the resolution of future election law issues.
This chapter parses two recent Supreme Court decisions, not to see if
they adhere to some high-minded theoretical justification for parties but to
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discern their impact on party systems- in particular, on parties' functional
capacity to meet the demands of representative democracy. McC01111el/ 11•
FEC (2003) and Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) involved two central facets of the
contemporary campaign and election landscape: campaign finance practices
and partisan redistricting. In each case, the Court struck a largely deferential
pose. In McC01111ell, it upheld most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA), enacted by Congress in 2002. In Vieth, it let stand the party-based
redistricting scheme imposed by the Pennsylvania State General Assembly.
These decisions intersect at the point of the Court's complicity in a congressional electoral system devoid of meaningful competition. The Court,
particularly in its refusal to rein in blatant party gerrymandering, bears significant responsibility for a legal regime within which congressional parties
are so entrenched and ossified that they do not approximate general shifts in
public preferences. As such, they fail to satisfy basic representative criteria.
Until the Court raises its consciousness of the functional attributes of parties- including circumstances where party systems break down-and
gauges its decisions accordingly, it will continue to aid and abet in the erosion of basic representative government.

Party Functions and the Maintenance of Constitutional Values
The more that scholars and courts recognize the unique constitutional position of political parties and the need to construct rules that account for
their uniqueness, the richer the debate will become on which party functions, if any, judges ought to protccl.
- Nathaniel Pcrsily

Vieth and McConnell reflect neither an embrace of any particular theoretical approach nor a recognition of parties as representative entities.' Both
cases rest on judicial deference to the parties' policy-making role within
government. As a result, they raise serious questions about the Court's role
in the law of politics. A judicial predisposition favoring party autonomy
makes sense in the context of party organizations engaged in campaign and
election activities. But parties within government may not deserve the same
deference. 1 They often fail to legally promote representative functions by
partisan campaign organizations. On the contrary, parties (and party leaders)
in Congress are motivated, and in tum motivate state party officials, to take
action that undermines those functions parties ideally should carry out. Partisan self-interest that leads to entrenchment within government is deleterious to basic standards of representation and undercuts a standing policy of
judicial deference.
This problem is most prominent when the Court is asked to review ef-
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forts to reform the political process. It has occasionally facilitated reforms,
condoning broader rules regarding primary participation and rejecting further restrictions on the initiative process. More frequently, it has proven a
significant obstacle to political reform. Until McConnel/, its equating of
money with political speech hindered reform of campaign finance rules. Its
nullification of term limits for House and Senate in U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton ( 1995) effectively preempted a popular grassroots movement. In
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party ( 1997), it thwarted efforts by minor
and new parties to crack the major parties' lock on electoral politics. In California Democratic Party v. Jones (2002), it sided with the major parties to
stymie broadened participation through a blanket primary system.
It is the Court's role neither to provoke reform nor to stanch it-doing
so would require that the Court buy into a particular, and likely contestable,
political theory. A proper sense of judicial modesty should prevent the Court
from substituting its notions of good government for those of legislatures.
But at times, judicial intercession is the only means of preserving constitutional values. Hence, judicial deference in the redistricting context ensconces
the parties in power, rigidifying partisan structures at the expense of maintaining constitutional fundamentals. A more assertive judicial role is not to
impose reform by fiat, but to free up the system to allow for the possibility
of reform.
This demands a constitutional law of democracy that is cognizant of parties and mindful of the consequences judicial decisions hold for them-a
functionally derived, party-conscious standard of analysis. As Bruce Cain
notes, "Political parties are part of the informal constitution-institutions
that fill in the implied functions that arise out of the formal electoral structure" (2001, 806-7). The constitutional order should acknowledge that parties, even in imperfect form, are instrumental to the realization of crucial
democratic values of competition, consent, responsiveness, equality, public
choice, and accountability (Ryden 1999, 52; Maveety 1991, 66). 3
This does not require a constitutional doctrine that squares neatly with
party theories. It is beyond the judiciary's competency to resolve "deeply
contested claims resting largely on normative theory" (]ssacharoff 200 I,
311 ). Nor would it necessarily be advantageous. Parties perform their representational tasks informally, without explicit legal intervention. They paper
over contradictions in democratic theory and practice, in ways that vary with
circumstances and defy categorization (Fitts 2002, 98). The adaptability of
parties that makes them difficult to integrate into legal doctrine is what
allows them to perform an array of functions effectively; doctrinally forcing
them into a preferred theoretical box would only dampen that elasticity. In
short, "[The parties} functional virtue is their doctrinal vice" (Fitts 2002,
98). A settled constitutional elucidation of rights is an ill fit for a constantly
evolving system of parties and politics.
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Instead, the parties' legal status, and the constitutional protections to
which they are entitled, should mirror the degree to which they perform representative functions (Persily 200 I, 815-24; Issacharoff 200 I, 276). McC01111ell and Vieth illustrate how a nuanced functional approach to parties might
guide courts through the conceptual maze of election law. A functional analysis leads to opposite conclusions as to the appropriateness of the deference
exercised in each case. In McC01111e/l, the uncertainties surrounding BCRA's
likely ramifications necessitated giving Congress wide latitude to experiment. In contrast, viewing Vieth through a functional lens demanded a
stronger judicial presence to safeguard against manipulation of the electoral
rules for partisan advantage. The deeply ingrained self-interest of state legislators obligated the Court to police the composition of new districts to preserve the interests of fair and effective representation.

Considering the Impact of BCRA and McC01111el/ on Party Systems
Congress passed BCRA in 2002 after years of repeated failure and hotly
contested debate. The statute's thrust was threefold. First, it banned soft
money contributions that had become so prominent in recent campaigns.
Second, it constrained the practice of issue advocacy by corporations,
unions, and interest groups. Finally, it increased the hard money caps on
individual contributions to candidates, parties, and campaigns. These measures reshaped party financing to a greater extent than perhaps any reform
in the last century (Corrado 2006, I).
Invoking "responsible parties" rhetoric, BCRA opponents contended
that the elimination of soft money would weaken the aims of responsible
parties: accountability, competitive elections, and effective governance.
They speculated that parties would be unable to fund serious challengers or
make House and Senate races competitive. Some saw parties as becoming
subordinated to unregulated private nonparty groups. Others argued that the
reform would undermine party integration by discouraging cooperation between state and national committees and by making coordination between
parties and their candidates more difficult. These fears foresaw enfeebled
parties unable to run coherent, focused campaigns, leading to less effective
and accountable governance.
These arguments failed to move the Court. It upheld virtually all of
BCRA 's main provisions, deferring to Congress's expertise in weighing
constitutional interests surrounding campaign finance. The Court declined to
second-guess Congress's finding of corruption resulting from large contributions to the national party organizations. The close relationship between candidates and parties, and the parties' willingness to trade on that relationship,
rendered all soft money contributions to national parties suspect.4
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Eying BCRA, as modified by McC01111el/, through a functional lens
yields a fuzzy picture at best, and one that is decidedly incomplete. The litany of woes that campaign finance reform was to have visited upon political
parties has not materialized, at least not after a single presidential election
cycle. Indeed, the report card for party performance in 2004 shows high
marks:
• Contrary to the predictions of BCRA opponents, the financing role of
the national political party organizations did not flag. Parties proved
adept in adapting to the statute, ultimately raising records sums of
money (Corrado 2006, 13) and exceeding levels that even BCRA supporters had thought possible.
• The parties compensated for the loss of soft money through dramatic
increases in hard money. They managed an unprecedented increase in
party givers, particularly small donors of less than $200. Money from
unitemized small donors rose from $59 million to $166 million for the
Democratic National Committee and from $91 million to $157 million
for the Republican National Committee between 2000 and 2004 (Malbin 2006), a "historic [increase] by any standard" (Corrado 2006, 8).
• At the same time, 527s surfaced as major finance players and potential
competitors to parties vying for money and influence with candidates
and voters.
At first glance, parties in the post-BCRA/McConne/1 era look as strong
as they did prior to the reforms. Financing reforms have not seriously eroded
party functions-and may actually have strengthened them in some regards.
The 2004 campaigns confirmed the resilience and adaptability of partisan
organizations in adjusting to, even thriving in, altered legal environs.
Consider the democratizing function that parties play in mobilizing political participation. The parties' success in raising hard money enabled them
to sustain party-building activities that had previously been funded through
soft money. Both parties waged intensive, highly sophisticated voter outreach and mobilization efforts (Corrado 2006, 13). Consequently, the BushKerry match engendered as much popular interest and involvement as any
recent presidential election. The 60 percent voter turnout testified to the parties' success as democratizing institutions responsible for engaging and activating the electorate.
Likewise, the increased numbers of small hard money donors arguably
made parties more representative of the rank and file. The gains in grassroots organizational development could translate into parties being less wedded to wealthy voices and more attuned and responsive to their members in
the electorate (Corrado 2006, 14).
Nor did the reforms come at the expense of the parties' expressive fimc-
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tion. The 2004 presidential race was a relatively substantive and issueoriented campaign, characterized by robust, widespread speech and debate.
The rise of 527s meant that parties yielded some degree of control over the
content of campaign speech, but this was minimized by party success in
overlaying their identity on the 527s, with many in 527s' leadership positions having prior histories within the parties.
The impact on other party functions is more ambiguous and suggests a
more guarded assessment. For example, the parties' aggregation and governance functions depend upon their standing relative to other political actors.
Parties are thought to simultaneously give voice to groups and collective interests while modulating, controlling, and channeling them. As parties build
coalitions and construct platforms in pursuit of electoral success, they soften
and prioritize the interests within their coalition, thus aggregating group interests into the American political system (Persily 2001, 750). Likewise parties within government are distinct in coordinating action across levels and
branches of government. They alone can work compromise, within and between partisan entities, to make formal action possible in a system of constitutionally fragmented and dispersed power.
Any appraisal of these functions must take into account the parallel universe of 527 fundraising and spending that sprang up in 2004. The extent to
which parties aggregate and govern rests in part on their ability to control
and diffuse group influence, so as to impose consensus and compromise on
self-interested groups. Groups operating outside the party framework diminish these capabilities (Ryden 1996, 115-22). In this respect, the parties'
functional capacity to mute and constrain outside voices was undoubtedly
affected by BCRA. The magnitude of the harm could have been much
greater, but for the high level of involvement of former party officials with
527s. The substantial overlap and shadowing of party identification produced more cooperation and coordination than otherwise might have been
expected.
Moreover, the parties' governing capabilities are related to the leverage
they can wield over officeholders to enforce party discipline. That leverage
is a by-product of party support and benefits for candidates seeking election.
As parties wane in their electoral usefulness to candidates, they will have
less leverage and control over those candidates once they are in office.
Consequently, the impact of 527s is a largely unknown but potentially
significant factor in the future of the parties' aggregation and governance
functions. While parties proved versatile in adapting to BCRA, so too did
nonprofits. They quickly stepped in as "willing conduits for ... the flow of
'soft money' ... that had previously gone to the national and state parties"
(Holman and Claybrook 2004, 238). One observer describes 527s as the "genie[s] of huge contributions" that, having escaped the bottle in 2004, are
unlikely to return (Weissman and Hassan 2006).
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Whether 527s grow to more directly threaten the parties remains to be
seen. It is not implausible that 527s might diminish in their financial commitment to elections. Wealthy individuals who spent millions in 2004 with
little tangible payoff might be inclined to pull back or even out of campaign
funding. The more ideologically driven motives of 527 donors could mean
weaker long-term commitments compared to those that characterize parties.
Indeed, some of the most aggressive Democratic-leaning 527s have faltered
since November 2004, raising questions about their ongoing viability. 5
On the other hand, if these groups follow through on their stated intentions of sustaining their efforts in future elections, it could further undennine
the parties as countervailing dampers on rampant interest group politics
(Maveety 1991, 172-73; Ryden 1999, 61). As independent sources of financial support, more influential 527s could substantially erode. if not replace outright, the parties' instrumental functions. More likely they would
force parties to compete for dollars, thus moving parties in the direction of
527s to give donors the incentives to "invest in party politics. rather than the
initiatives of more specialized organized groups" (Corrado 2006, 15). This
could impact parties' representative nature. The 527s and those who fund
them differ from the parties and donors who previously kept parties' soft
money accounts filled. They are more idealist than pragmatic. They are
driven by ideology more than partisan commitment. Unlike parties, they are
not accountable to voters for their conduct. Parties seeking their contributions will need to reflect their donors' ideologically driven perspective. This
could render parties more polarized and responsive to wealthy elites, favoring "millionaires over workers, and ideologues over pragmatists" (Bai
2005). 6
Finally, the respective positions of parties and other groups will hinge
on the likelihood and nature of additional refonns. McConnell paves the way
for broader regulation of parties as perceived agents of corruption and special access, by essentially equating access to officeholders with corruption
per se. But there is no move at present in Congress to follow that path. Indeed, the reforms currently under consideration would work to the competitive advantage of parties over 527s and other private groups. Still, none has
ignited a groundswell of support, and ongoing refonn efforts are becoming
increasingly fragmented and contradictory. At this stage, imminent passage
of additional reforms is unlikely.
In the end, it simply is too early to make definitive predictions regarding
the long-term health of parties relative to other group competitors. A single
election cycle is not a solid foundation upon which to base meaningful conclusions as to the effects of BCRA and McConnell. The 2004 elections took
place in an environment framed by war and other important debates over the
future of American domestic and foreign priorities. The energy and polarization of 2004 led to "'a perfect stonn' for party fundraising," with historic
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levels of party contributions, individual participation, and amounts raised
(Corrado 2006, 6). Hence, one should be wary of extrapolating BCRA's effects from 2004. Too many fundamental questions remain over the future
direction of campaign financing, what it might mean for party systems, and
how parties will respond.
The mixed and open-ended legacy of BCRA after a single election cycle
validates the Court's deference to Congress in McC01111ell. The divergent assessments of the impact of campaign finance reform rightly gave the Court
pause. The 2004 elections gave us a marginally clearer view, but the complexities of the financing system render any analysis highly speculative. For
the Court to have struck down the law based on hypothetical or empirically
untested fears would have constituted judicial activism (see Fitts 2002, 111;
Lowenstein 1995, 30 I). The Court rightly concluded that the effects of campaign finance laws are simply too complex to justify judicial superseding of
congressional judgments (Pildes 2004, 146).

Vieth, Parties, and the Disappearance of Competition
Functional principles of competition and representation form the core of
... [what] distinguishes political parties from other organizations....
Constitutional analysis of parties' associational claims ... must ground
itself in the parties' role in interest group representation and electoral
competition
- Nathaniel Persily

Vieth involved a challenge to the Pennsylvania General Assembly's congressional redistricting plan subsequent to the 2000 census. That census cost
Pennsylvania two congressional seats. Republicans, who controlled both
houses of the state legislature and occupied the governor's mansion, took
full advantage to redraw the districts to maximize the number of safe districts
in their favor. The plan was challenged by Democratic voters as violating the
equal protection clause.
The Court's fractured split decision failed to constitutionally resolve
one of the most deep-seated American political pathologies: the practice of
partisan-based gerrymandering (Pildes 2004, 56). Nearly two decades had
elapsed since Davis v. Bandemer (1986); in that case, the Court determined
that partisan gerrymandering could be found unconstitutional but required
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they had effectively been shut out of the political process. Bandemer set the bar so high that a finding of unconstitutionality
proved practically impossible. Meanwhile, enhanced computer sophistication and increasingly brazen line drawers left fewer and fewer congressional
seats in the competitive column.
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On the badly divided Court, a plurality of four justices argued that partisan gerrymandering was nonjusticiable, due to a lack of manageable standards or a workable approach. Opposing them were four dissenters who
found the gerrymander in question to be unconstitutional but could not agree
on a standard to apply. With four distinct dissents proffering four alternative
standards, they actually lent credence to the plurality's claims of the unmanageablility of the entire enterprise.
Standing astride the two opposing blocs was Justice Anthony Kennedy's
controlling but singularly unhelpful opinion. To Kennedy, partisan gerrymandering presented the potential for serious harm to "representational
rights" by "burdening or penalizing citizens because of their ... association
with a political party" (Davis v. Bandemer at 1797). Kennedy acknowledged
that similar burdens on voters and parties in other First Amendment contexts
"are unconstitutional absent a compelling government interest" (at 1797),
yet he made no attempt to articulate a compelling governmental interest that
might justify the gerrymandering. Though there was little dispute over the
burdensomeness of the redistricting plan to Pennsylvania Democrats, Kennedy refused to strike down the gerrymander. The constitutional challenge
could not succeed without "clear. manageable, and politically neutral standards" by which to measure the effect of apportionment or the burdens imposed on the voters of a party (at 1793, 1797). Meanwhile, Kennedy held out
a reed of hope that future partisan gerrymanders might be unconstitutional
if a workable standard were to emerge (at 1795-96). The upshot of Vieth is
that the constitutional constraints on partisan gerrymandering exist in theory, but are, for all practical purposes, absent in fact.
Unlike McConnell, the functional impact of the Court's deference to
parties within government in Vieth is plain; the unconstrained redrawing of
lines to maximize safe electoral seats has helped obliterate competition in
the U.S. House of Representatives.
The dearth of competition, thanks in large part to partisan gerrymandering, is striking. Safe House seats rose from 281 in 1992 to 356 in 2002. By
the close of the 2002 elections, only forty-five House seats were rated as
competitive. Jacobson demonstrates how redistricting reduced competitive
House seats by strengthening marginal incumbents. He concludes that
"three-quarters of the marginal districts in the country were made safer
through redistricting" (2006, 2). Consequently, only 4 of 382 incumbents
seeking reelection in 2002 lost. The paucity of competition was even worse
in 2004, dropping to its lowest levels ever (Jacobson 2006, 3). Congressional
Quarterly ratings in the October before the vote listed thirty-seven House
races, 9 percent, as competitive. Only 10 of 435 districts were decided by
less than 5 percent. On the state level, not one of California's 173 House and
state legislative races changed hands in 2004. In Florida, incumbents have
won all but one of the last 140 races.
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In short, the near-complete absence of competition is the defining trait
of congressional elections, thanks largely to redistricting done without fear
of judicial intervention. Highly sophisticated software in the hands of audaciously unrestrained and politically motivated line drawers has led to the
virtual extinction of legitimate competition in the House of Representatives.
In this context, the parties have abandoned the function of cultivating
competition.
Competition is a core value of the constitutional structure and a prerequisite for representative government. Without legitimate choice, voting
means little. This is why proponents of a party-friendly constitutional doctrine pin their arguments on parties' capacity for promoting competition (see
Persily 200 I, 752). But parties are as capable of frustrating competition as
they are of engendering it.
The lack of competition caused by redistricting has a trickle-down effect, leading to the erosion of other functional attributes of parties. The parties' propensities for the mobilizing, democratizing, and expressive functions are maximized in the context of highly competitive elections because
energized parties eager to win are motivated to pursue these functions vigorously. Conversely, party organizations provide little support for a challenger
with little or no hope of winning. Uncompetitive races dampen enthusiasm.
Without party volunteers for get-out-the-vote drives or money for an ad campaign, mobilization flags. The expressive element is muted. Turnout sinks.
Partisan gerrymandering impacts the parties' governing capabilities
more subtly. It is credited with the widening ideological gulf between the
parties in Congress. In this respect, Vieth and the redistricting dilemma reveal the shortcomings of a theoretically driven jurisprudential approach.
Those who advocate a theoretical guide to election law doctrine usually invoke the "responsible party" model of government, which in this context is
a justification for the indefensible.
At first glance, partisan gerrymandering does not necessarily offendand may even advance- responsible party government. By maximizing safe
seats, it leads to more conservative and liberal incumbents and respective
party caucuses. The upshot is parties that are distinct and differentiated,
more unified and disciplined (i.e., responsible), and that provide clear
choices and competing programs. To responsible party adherents, this is a
recipe for meaningful elections and decisive, accountable government.
But this is where neatly constructed theories of party government run
headlong into the constitutional reality of fragmented, dispersed, and diffused power structures. A disciplined House majority party is inevitably stymied at countless other points, starting with the Senate's ample checks on
majority rule. An ideologically polarized House is less effective in its purity
than if it were forced to be more pragmatic, compromising, and centrist at
the outset.
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More importantly, blind pursuit of an abstract ideal of responsible parties loses sight of the most basic measure of party legitimacy: their promotion of representative democracy. Responsible parties should institutionalize
public opinion rather than distorting it. They should discern and reflect majority sentiment, not obscure it. Responsible parties are desirable only as
channels through which representative government is assured by public consent and accountability through competitive elections (Ryden 2003, 80-81 ).
Party-based redistricting eviscerates this overarching objective, producing a
false polarity grounded in the lack of meaningful electoral choices. Over
time, congressional parties fail to reflect the broad electorate, resulting in
less representative government.
This is especially true when party gerrymandering undermines majority
rule. Parties legitimize government by converting majority sentiment into
majority governance. When they frustrate that function instead, it compromises the integrity of the entire electoral system.

Realignment in a Noncompetitive Age?
The failure of congressional parties to engender more than token competition is the point at which campaign finance and redistricting practices converge. Together they produce a congressional party system that fails the
threshold test of representativeness. Self-entrenchment has left the makeup
and control of the House so resistant to changes in public preferences that
party systems barely qualify as representative.
Consider again the 2004 elections, which yielded a positive picture only
of the spirited and highly competitive presidential race. Any hope that
BCRA would lead to more competitive elections in Congress was overwhelmed by more fundamental considerations favoring congressional
incumbents. Campaign financing is still dictated by free market and costbenefit considerations. Donors have little incentive to give to contests where
the odds are long. The uncompetitiveness of congressional elections-due to
redistricting and other incumbent advantages-is amplified by the habits of
financial campaign supporters (see, for example, chapter 7 in this volume).
No campaign finance rule could reverse these realities.
The functional shortcomings in terms of representation are apparent
when looking for evidence of partisan realignment. Realignment is more
than a parlor game to keep political scientists entertained; it is an important
baseline for gauging deeper movements in the electorate's partisan attachments and how those movements translate into changes in government. Realignment presupposes party systems that are responsive to shifts in the public's partisan preferences. It assumes that legislatures are indeed
"collectively responsive to the popular will" (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 at 565).
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But the dearth of competition in the House defeats this presupposition
by allowing a minority to entrench itself in power. It is ironic that so few
competitive congressional seats exist in a political environment of relative
parity between the major parties. The practical result is that such shifts in
public sentiment, unless they rise to the level of the "tsunami" of 1994, fail
to significantly impact the makeup of Congress. Despite near-parity in voters' party affiliation, the odds remain exceedingly slim that majority status
will change hands in any given election. Incumbent entrenchment through
redistricting makes it far more difficult for voters' displeasure with leadership to produce change in that leadership. In sum, it is difficult to have realignment in an era of noncompetitive House elections. 7
Redistricting is so inimical to party structures as representative linkages
that it compels policing. That policing must come from the courts, as the
only institutions capable of "addressing the central structural problem of
self-entrenchment" (Pildes 2004, 83). The Court simply cannot avoid responsibility for securing the necessary preconditions for genuine partisan
competition. If it will not address the structural problems of self-entrenching
laws, no one will (Pildes 2004, 54).
A functionally based constitutional treatment of political parties is
rooted in "constitutional values of preventing incumbent entrenchment
through manipulation of the rules of the game" (Persily 2001, 794). The gerrymandering of favorable electoral districts is such a manipulation. Democracy does not allow for those in power to wield that power in ways that freeze
the status quo (Persily 2001, 795). Yet partisan line-drawing does exactly
that, to the detriment of representative principles of accountability, responsiveness, and majority rule.

Conclusion
The major role thal constitutional law can justifiably assume in this area
is thal of ensuring that laws do not inappropriately undermine robust
competition between political parties
- Richard H. Pildes

The Supreme Court will continue to wield a central fonnative influence
on key aspects of democratic structures and processes, including political
parties. Despite the thorny nature of questions such as campaign finance and
regulating partisan redistricting, the Court is unlikely to recede from the
realm of election law. Rather, contemporary legal and political circumstances are certain to "spawn recurring challenges to existing democratic
structures" (Pildes 2004, 39).
First among these are the potentially far-reaching implications of Bush
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Gore and its unbounded application of the equal protection clause (on this
case, see Banks, Cohen, and Green 2005). The majority's reliance upon
equal protection to bring the Florida recounts to an end stands as an open
invitation to future litigation over campaign and election practices. A second
factor is Congress's enactment of the Help America Vote Act (HAYA) in the
wake of the Florida imbroglio in 2000. That legislation has further enriched
the election soil out of which litigation is likely to sprout. Finally, the system
is dominated by two polarized parties who are intensely motivated to pursue
every avenue that might lead to majority status, including the way of litigation. This was evident in the flurry of preemptive litigation prior to the 2004
elections and the legal battalions each party recruited to dispatch to whatever
hot spot might erupt on Election Day. Legal challenges to electoral practices
are likely to increase, further ensnaring the Court and implicating the
Constitution.
Given the complexity of forms, paths, and practices bound up in political
representation, it is delusional to expect from the Court anything approximating an integrated jurisprudential theory of democratic governance. At
most, one might hope for the Court to identify basic facets of representation
implicated by various constitutional questions and to craft appropriate mediating principles. A doctrine that better captures the intricacies of political
representation must begin with an acknowledgment that parties are essential
to accommodating and arbitrating conflicting group .interests in a pluralist
system. It would functionally evaluate parties' legal status and in the process
decide cases that implicate that status. A functional view of parties as channels of representation has them bringing a broader array of interests into the
political arena, then providing a means of mediating and resolving those
conflicts and differences to make governance possible. This implies judgments sympathetic to parties when they are serving to create a more inclusive political arena. Parties should receive more generous constitutional
treatment when they are widening the interests involved in politics and subsequently working to effectively reconcile those interests.
With respect to campaign finance, this means that parties are distinguishable from, and in fact preferable to, interest groups in the realm of campaigns and elections. They are assembling majority coalitions consisting of
a variety of interests and views. In the process, no single view or interest
wields undue power or influence, but each is subordinated to the overarching
party messages and goals. As decisions are made through intraparty primary
contests, interparty competition, and majority-versus-minority party relations within government, the values of compromise, accommodation, and
moderation are served.R Through party politics, interests are activated, then
constrained. Outside of parties, the politics is win-or-lose, the interests polarized and unrestrained, and representation but a crude imitation of what it
should be.
11•
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Notes

I. lf 1here is a unifying theme in lhe Court's parly jurisprudence, it is the Court's respect
for organizational autonomy rather than a discernible theory of party-bused rcprescn1a1ion
(Mavccty 2002, 31; sec Calif"mi11 Democrmic P(lrry 1•. J"11es [20021). For a contrary view,
sec Richard Hascn's claim that "the Supreme Court has proven itself quite enamored of the
responsible party government position" and has even "adopted [the responsible party government scholars] viewpoint" (2001, 819, 820).
2. Hasen has argued against First Amendment protection for parties in the electoral
process, asserting that, if anything. the parties' "pervasive control over the political process
should militate toward lesser, ratherthan greater, judicial protection" (200 I, 835). Likewise,
Dan Lowenstein has remarked thal the "parties arc 'grown-ups' who should be expected to
take care of themselves" (Hasen 2001, 835).
3. Parties arc integral to building consensus across branches and levels of government,
without which effective governance would be inconceivable. Party subsystems arc crucial
representational linkages, melding individuals, groups, and states into a representative pluralist democracy. They channel group influence while diffusing factions, balance majority rule
and minority rights, and simultaneously pursue multiple democr.itic aims of aggregation, consensus, compromise, and civic education. By consolidating and accommodating lhe various
strands of rcprescnlation, party structures engender a richer. more effective system of reprc•
sentation (Ryden 1996, 115- 22).
4. The Court did strike down a provision lhat required parties to choose, at the time a
candidate is nominated, between coordinated or independent expenditures. This was found to
breach the parties' constitutional right 10 engage in unlimited independent expenditures.
5. Chris Suellentrop, "Follow the Money," Boston Globe, June 26, 2005, available al
http://www.boston.com/ncws/globc/idcas/arlicles/2005/06/26/follow_ the_money'?modc
~ PF.
6. Indeed, some have already suggested that we arc in a "post-party world," with power
moving out of party headquarters and into a "decentralized network of grass-roots groups,
donors and Internet impresarios" (Bai 2005).
7. Another explanation for the decline of competition at the district level is that a re•
alignment occurred in 1994 (sec chapter 19). This pattern can be due to both redistricting (in
which voters wilh similar demographic characterizes and voting patterns arc packed into districts) and realignment (districts, especially in the South, arc no longer cross-pressured to vote
for candidates of different parties). Burnham ( 1981) argues that one of the hallmarks of the
"System of 1896" was the decline in competition across congressional districts, especially in
the North. This was due to both a realignment of citizen preferences favoring the GOP and
institutional changes that increased the difficulty of voting for many citizens, reducing voter
turnout and district competition.
8. This is not to say that the Court necessarily got it wrong in McCmmefl by not offering
up more constitutional protection to the parties. But it docs suggest that the Court's musing
would be more reassuring if it grasped the functional differences between parties and other
group actors, and the unique attributes of the fonner.
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Youngstown State University. He has been active on Ohio politics for more
than thirty years.
Melanie J. Blumberg is associate professor of political science at California
University of Pennsylvania. She and her coauthors publish their work on the
Coordinated Campaign in The State of the Parties series and their studies
of Ohio and Pennsylvania congressional elections in The Road to Congress
series.
R. Lawrence Butler is assistant professor of political science at Rowan University. He is the author of Claiming the Mantle: How Presidential Nominations Are Won and Lost Before the Votes Are Cast (2005).
Daniel J. Coffey is assistant professor of political science at the University
of Akron and a fellow in the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics. He
studies political parties, public opinion, state and local politics, campaigns
and elections, and research methods and has been published in State Politics
and Policy Quarterly.
Christian Collet is associate professor of American politics at Doshisha
University in Kyoto. His work on minor parties has appeared in Public Opbrion Quarterly and several edited volumes.
David A. Dulio is assistant professor of political science at Oakland University. He is the author of For Better or Worse? How Political Consultants are
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Changing Elections in the United States (2004) and Vital Signs: Perspectives
the Health of American Campaigning (2005, with Candice J. Nelson) and
several articles and book chapters on political parties, professional political
consultants, and campaigns and elections generally. He was also an American Political Science Association congressional fellow in 2001- 2002 in the
office of Rep. J. C. Watts Jr. (R-Okla.).

011

Diana Dwyre is professor and chair of the Political Science Department at
California State University, Chico. She has published extensively on political parties and campaign finance, particularly in the context of congressional
elections. She is coauthor, along with Victoria Farrar-Myers, of Legislative
Labyrilllh: Congress and Campaign Finance Reform (2001 ).
John P. Frendreis is professor of political science and the interim provost
at Loyola University, Chicago. His publications include articles in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Social Science Quarterly, and
Journal of Urban Affairs, and he is coauthor of The Modern Presidency and
Economic Policy ( 1994) and Professional Associations and Municipal lmwvation ( 1981 ).
Cary Funk is senior project director at the Pew Research Center in Washington, D.C., on leave from Virginia Commonwealth University, where she
is associate professor. Her specialty in public opinion includes analysis of
candidate evaluations, voting behavior, and the underpinnings of policy attitudes.
R. Sam Garrett is an analyst in American national government at the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. His dissertation at American University focused on crisis management in congressional campaigns.
He also serves as a research fellow at American University's Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies and an adjunct faculty member in the
Department of Government.
Alan R. Gitelson is professor of political science, assistant provost, and former chair of the Department of Political Science at Loyola University in Chicago. His books include American Political Parties: Stability and Change,
American Government (7th ed., 2004), Public Policy and Economic lnstitutio11s ( 1991 ), and American Elections: The Rules Matter (2002). Gitelson has
served as a member of the Executive Council of the American Political Science Association's Division on Political Organizations and Parties and the
APSA Committee on Education and Professional Development.
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John C. Green is distinguished professor of political science and director
of the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron.
His most recent publication is the edited volume The Elections of2000: Politics, Culture and Economics in North America (2005).
Cassie A. Gross is a doctoral student in political science at the University
of Missouri-St. Louis. Her research focuses on public policy and political
participation.
Jerrold Hansen is regional coordinator of research and consulting, AsiaPacific, with the Gallup Organization in Singapore.

Eric Heberlig is associate professor of political science at the University of
North Carolina-Charlotte. He is coauthor of American Labor Unions in the
Electoral Arena (200 I), Classics in Congressional Politics (1999), and journal articles on congressional and interest group politics.

John S. Jackson III is a visiting professor at the Public Policy Institute at
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, where he was formerly interim
chancellor and vice chancellor for academic affairs. His most recent book is
The Politics of Preside11tial Elections (2000, with William Crotty).
Shannon Jenkins is assistant professor of political science at the University
of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, specializing in state politics, urban politics,
and public policy. Her research focuses on decision making in state legislatures, with a specific focus on the role of political organizations in these institutions. Her research has appeared in journals such as legislative Studies
Quarterly, Urban Affairs Review, and Social Science Quarterly.
Scott Keeter is director of survey research for the Pew Research Center in
Washington, D.C. His published work focuses on public opinion, political
participation, religion and politics, and survey research methods. He has
held faculty positions at George Mason University, Virginia Commonwealth
University, Rutgers University, and Union College.
Courtney Kennedy is a project director at the Pew Research Center in
Washington, D.C., and a doctoral student in survey methodology at the University of Michigan. Her research interests include survey research methods
and U.S. political behavior.
David C. Kimball is associate professor of political science at the University of Missouri- St. Louis. He is the coauthor of Why Americans Split Their
Tickets (2002, with Barry Burden), and he has published articles in several
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academic journals. His research and teaching interests include voting behavior, interest groups, and election reform.

Robin Kolodny is associate professor of political science at Temple University. Her research focus is on political parties, campaign finance, and political consultants. She is the author of Pursuing Majorities: Co11gressio11al
Campaign Committees in American Politics ( 1998).
Raymond J. La Raja is assistant professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, as well as an editor of The Forum, an
electronic journal of applied research in contemporary politics. His research
on American political parties, interest groups, and consequences of electoral
reforms has appeared in numerous journals and edited volumes. He serves
on the Academic Advisory Board of the Campaign Finance Institute in
Washington, D.C.
Bruce Larson is assistant professor of political science at Gettysburg College. His current research interests are congressional parties and congressional campaign finance.
David B. Magleby is the dean of the College of Family, Home, and Social
Sciences; a Distinguished Professor of Political Science; and a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at
Brigham Young University. His recent work includes Financing the 2004
Election (2006) and The last Hurrah? Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in
the 2002 Congressional Elections (2004).

J. Quin Monson is assistant professor of political science and assistant director of the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at Brigham
Young University. His interests include public opinion, voting behavior, religion, and politics, and his work has recently appeared in Political Research
Quarterly, Political Analysis, and Presidential Studies Quarterly.

Susan E. Orr is a doctoral student in political science at the University of
Florida. Her dissertation research explores the intersection of union organizing drives and political activity.
Kelly D. Patterson is associate professor of political science and the director of the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at Brigham
Young University. His research interests include campaigns and elections
and public opinion. His recent work includes The Dawning of a New Day?
Congressional Elections in the Wake of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act.
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John R. Petrocik is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Missouri-Columbia. His teaching and research centers on mass attitudes and behavior, political parties, elections and campaigns, and survey research and analysis, and he has authored and
coauthored books and research articles on these topics. His current projects
are on issue ownership and conventional wisdoms about American public
opinion and voting.
Ronald B. Rapoport is the John Marshall Professor of Government at the
College of William and Mary. He is a coeditor of The Life of the Parties: A
Study of Preside111ial Activists ( 1993) and coauthor of Three's a Crowd: The
Dynamic of Tltird Parties, Ross Perot, and Republican Resurgence (2005,
with Walter J. Stone).
A. .James Reichley has written many books and articles on politics, including The Life of the Parties (2000), The Values Connection (2001). and Faith
in Politics (2002). He has been political editor of Fortllne, domestic policy
assistant to President Gerald Ford, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution,
and senior fellow in the Graduate Public Policy Institute at Georgetown University.
Howard L. Reiter is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Connecticut. He is the author of Selecting the President (1985) and Parties and Elections in Corporate America (1987, 1993),
and his writings on political parties have appeared in numerous journals. In
2001-2002, he was Fulbright Distinguished Professor at Uppsala University
in Sweden.
Douglas D. Roscoe is assistant professor of political science at the Univer~
sity of Massachusetts, Dartmouth. His interests include Congress, the president, interest groups, and political parties. His research has been published
in the Journal of Politics, Social Science Quarterly, Legislative Studies
Quarterly, and Congress and the Presidency.
David K. Ryden is a professor of political science at Hope College and an
attorney. One of his primary areas of scholarly work is the intersection between constitutional law and electoral politics. He has published and edited
a number of books, including Representation in Crisis: The Constitlllion,
/merest Groups, and Political Parties ( 1996) and The U.S. Supreme Court
and the Electoral Process (2002).
Kyle L. Saunders is assistant professor of political science at Colorado
State University. His research interests include political parties, public opin-
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ion, and political behavior. He is the author or coauthor of articles appearing
in the Journal of Politics, Comparatfre Political Studies, Political Research
Quarterly, American Politics Research, and other journals as well as contributions to several edited volumes.

Daniel M. Shea is associate professor of political science and director of the
Center for Political Participation at Allegheny College. He has written
widely on campaign strategy, political parties, Congress, and political participation.
Richard M. Skinner is visiting assistant professor of government at Bowdoin College. He previously served as a research analyst at the Campaign
Finance Institute. He has authored or coauthored several scholarly articles
and book chapters on political parties, interest groups, and campaign finance
reform.
Daniel A. Smith is associate professor of political science at the University
of Florida. He is the author of Tax Crusaders and the Politics of Direct Democracy ( 1998) and coauthor of Educated by Initiative: The Effects of Direct
Democracy 011 Citizens and Political Organizations in the American States
(2004). He serves on the Board of Directors of the Ballot Initiative Strategy
Center Foundation.
Walter J. Stone is professor and chair of political science at the University
of California, Davis. He is a coauthor of Three's a Crowd: The Dynamic of
Third Parties, Ross Perot, and Republican Resurgence (2005, with Ronald
B. Rapoport).
Jeffrey M. Stonecash is professor and chair of political science at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. His research focuses on political parties,
their electoral bases, and how these bases shape public policy debates. His
most recent books are Class and Party in American Politics (2000), Diverging Parties (2003), and Political Parties Matters: Realig11111e11t and the Return of Partisan Voting (2006).
Peter Ubertaccio is assistant professor of political science at Stonehill College. He is the author of learned in the Law and Politics: The Office of the
Solicitor General and Executive Power (2005).

